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“The tension between properly supporting what exists 
while also responding to the demands of expansion 
is endemic. It can only be addressed as a policy 
question.” 
 
                    Darling et al, 1989 (p. 582) 
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FUNDING HIGHER EDUCATION IN URUGUAY:  A POLICY QUESTION 
By Panambi Abadie  
 
For years the dominant theme of higher education in Uruguay has been financial distress. 
However the literature relating to higher education has not addressed the question of how 
higher education institutions receive their funding. The aim of this study was to provide an 
analytical view of the current model of financing higher education in this country and 
predictions about its possible evolution or change according to the views of different 
stakeholders. 
This study used a qualitative approach and multi-modal tools -documents, literature, semi 
structured interviews, a Focus Group and speeches at Parliamentary sessions- were chosen 
to address several questions from different perspectives. 
Findings in this research suggest that the traditional historical funding model used until the 
1990s has evolved into a historical/ incremental model. In this case, increases, or new funds 
that are allocated to the system, are tied   to certain specific purposes determined in the 
Budget laws.   In this way, funding   relies on:  (a) historical allocations, actually the biggest 
part of the allocations, which are always the same and are expected to be the same; and (b) 
new allocations (increases) focused on certain projects which are specified in the Budget 
Laws by the Parliament.  In this way, Uruguay mirrors the regional pattern in which very 
little strategic planning occurs in the financing process. 
This study suggests, too, a particular approach   to accountability in Uruguayan higher 
education.  Resources are allocated   to the system by the Parliament on a decentralised 
basis and institutions keep broad decision-making powers. The Ministry of Education and 
Culture is not involved in the process of allocating resources to higher education. The 
Government applies no control on institutional performance or efficiency.  University 
autonomy   is considered the raison d´etre of this approach; information gathered for this 
study suggests that Governmental agencies hold very little concern about the use of public 
funds. Internal use of public appropriations has bureaucratic controls and is only monitored 
through the conventional accounting audits prescribed by law.  
This research shows that  a new left wing  state-wide administration headed  by  the Frente 
Amplio Party will   devote more funds to the  finance of public higher education,  primarily  
concerned with   the insufficient  amount of funds  devoted historically  to the sector.  A 
considerable increase is expected as political leaders and Government officers have 
announced that the educational sector will receive added funding in the future Budget Law. 
However, there is also a view that, although   the system will receive further funding, the 
funding model will remain the same. Moreover, whilst there is concern about  the 
insufficient  amount of funds  devoted to the sector,  the majority of  stakeholders   are not   
paying attention  to  the  merits or problems of the current  model of  funding the sector.    




This study  also suggests that : a)  in the future the funding authorities  may  expand  the 
mechanism of  allocating funds oriented to special programmes and, in this way,  introduce 
some kind of strategic orientations; b) further funding for public institutions may be 
originated in the collection of the graduate tax and that its  utility  could be improved  in 
ways to introduce more funding to the system;  c)  it  is unlikely that  a future model  will 
consider  the use of formulae or quality considerations;  and d) the introduction of a tuition-
fee scheme is very improbable  in  the short term because the availability of further funding  
will reduce the  pressures to introduce alternative funds to complement  public revenues.  
Further, the ideological and political predominance of the Frente Amplio party in the 
Parliament (historically placed against tuition-fees) will certainly abort discussions about 
cost-recovery in the public University. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND THE RESEARCH 
PROBLEM 
  




1.0.  Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the reasons for undertaking this study and its 
overall importance to the field of education.  The main aims of the research study 
will be explained and the research questions developed in order to investigate 
them will be identified. 
 
1.1.  The research problem.  Background. 
 
For many years, the dominant theme of higher education in Uruguay has been 
financial distress. Public higher education -mainly represented by the University of 
the Republic - has absorbed the rapid growth of student demand since the 
restoration of democracy in 1985 through a policy of open admissions and cost-
free education. A tremendous increase in the number of students has occurred; at 
the same time public funding has not been able to maintain the expenditure per 
student in the country´s only public University. The results are severely 
overcrowded classes, inadequate library and laboratory conditions, and poor 
student services. 
 
However, in spite of the catastrophic outcome caused, prime facie, by scarcity of 
funds, there is little research literature about higher education funding in the 
country. This is not unexpected, because the development of analytical studies 
requires information about the sector. Such information is not available, is missing 
or is invisible. 
 
In addition, Uruguay is placed in a unique position in the continent. In general, the 
funding models used in the higher education systems of all Latin American  




countries have already been described and analysed by researchers or by analysts 
working for funding agencies such as International Development Bank or the World 
Bank. This is the case of José Joaquin Brunner (1990; 1994; 1997) in Chile; Carlos 
Marquis (2002; 2002) in Argentina, and Simon Schwartzman (1991; 1992; 1993ª; 
1993b; 1993c;  1994; 1996; 1999; 2001) in Brazil, each of whom has developed 
complete reports  as consultants for those agencies. All of them are scholars from 
countries with big higher education systems, a fact that has favoured a circulation 
of ideas about - and within- the field. 
 
Based on the knowledge provided by these and other authors, it is usual to say 
that there is a "Brazilian" model or an "Argentinean" model of funding higher 
education. For instance, Brazil, the biggest country in the continent, is of interest 
due to the changes and experiments in its models of funding during the 1990s, 
evolving from a historical, block funding model towards a more rational model 
using some formulae and contracts. Argentina has also experimented and has 
created an interesting, "smooth" evolution from a historical model to a system 
which combines historical allocations and some portions based on formulae or 
strategic programmes. However, it is clear that Chile shows the most significant 
experience in the continent and has deserved most attention since the 1980s, due 
to the country´s particular approach to deregulation in the sector and a significant 
stimulus to private provision (World Bank, 1994; Johnstone, 2000). 
 
This background to this research is not the same in the case of Uruguay. Technical 
analysis about higher education in this country is scarce. Existing literature in the 
field comes from institutions, especially from the public University, and is intended 
to inform the general public rather than to provide scientific knowledge.  
  



























All these moves, after years and years of "quietness", have probably determined 
the emergence of some critical mass and of incipient technical analysis in relation 
to the field. Recent studies authored by Martínez Sandres (1999), Bentancur 
(2002), Martínez Larrechea (2003) and Oddone and Perera (2004) introduced a 
 
A distinguishing feature of the Uruguayan case helps to explain this 
situation: the higher education system has always been small and, in 
particular, the public University was monopolistic until the 1980s. 
However, during the 1990s and 2000s, higher education has faced a 
significantly different political context. For example: 
 
  A series of private Universities was created and some public 
institutions launched degree programmes, demanding their own 
positions in the arena of higher education and changing the 
landscape of education in the country. 
 
  The public University was authorised by law to charge tuition, but 
the institution decided to remain with policies of no tuition. 
 
  A graduate tax was introduced with the specific purpose of 
providing new funds for the public University. The introduction of 
this tax implies that, for the first time, a user charge - by a form of 
deferred payment- was introduced for the service of public 
education in Uruguay.   
  




scientific approach to the analysis of higher education in Uruguay for the first time.   
 
These studies provide an initial scope of the system and supply basic institutional 
information in relation to its history, affiliations, enrolments, governance and staff. 
Some of them do mention aspects related to institutional budgets, but none - 
excepting Oddone and Perera´s - concentrates on financial concepts. Oddone and 
Perera concentrate their analysis on three related aspects: (a) the funding sources 
in the University system; (b) the newest source at the public University funding: the 
graduate tax; and (c) the calculation of economic gains in individual wages 
associated with increasing levels of higher education attainment. However, their 
study does not provide an overall analysis of the funding model for higher 
education. A significant gap, therefore, remains in the research literature that this 
study aims to fill. 
 
Furthermore, the information that is available makes it impossible to develop a 
conceptualisation of the funding model in use in the country. Most data is related to 
the public University which covers a high percentage of total enrolments in the 
sector. However, the system as a whole cannot be described ignoring the rest of 
the institutions that have emerged in recent years and that are clearly growing very 
fast. To consider the whole system as a monolith would be a considerable over-
simplification. 
 
Even consideration of the public University shows that the available data from the 
institution is insufficient or presents problems. Almost all its management 
information comes from analysis and elaboration made on an ad hoc basis and the 
methodology and criteria used for its collection are not certain (UdelaR, 2001 
p.101; Abadie and Pereira, 2001, p. 9).  





Funding arrangements in use in the rest of the system are completely ignored. 
Only some general aspects are known.  For instance, it is recognised that private 
Universities are supported by tuition (Martínez Larrechea, 2003, p. 98 and Oddone 
and Perera, 2004, pp: 26-27) and that other public institutions of higher education 
receive appropriations from their ―mother‖ institutions (Brunner and Becerra, 1999, 
p.13). However, nothing has been written about the precise funding models of 
these institutions. 
 
It is clear that information is scarce and that Uruguay is in need of formal studies 
about the funding of higher education. This is not just an academic concern. A 
systematic investigation on the field may help, as well, in the design of relevant and 
needed policies and thereby make an important contribution to the future 
development of higher education in the country. 
 
1.2. Statement of the problem 
 
The aims of this study, therefore, are to provide an analytical view of the current 
model of financing higher education in Uruguay; to understand more about how the 
financing of higher education is perceived by different stakeholders; and to provide 
predictions about its possible evolution or change according to the views of 
different stakeholders. 
 
This study tries to find out the necessary information that will enable us to establish 
a full picture of the current model of funding in the sector and to construct some 
theory of how this model will evolve or change. 
  




In addition, this research may lead to some policy building about funding of higher 
education. Change will only occur if the appropriate individuals feel the need for 
change. Policy-makers and other stakeholders might be motivated for change if 
there is information and analysis that provide persuasive evidence that shows that 
there is a need of that change. At least, they will probably be more motivated to 























The study is intended to answer the following questions: 
 
RQ. 1.  What is the current model of funding higher education in Uruguay 
in reference to the following elements: 
 
ORQ 1.1 How are funds provided? 
ORQ 1.2 What criteria are used to determine allocations? 
ORQ 1.3. What are the degrees of decentralisation? 
ORQ 1.4. With what requirements for accountability? 
ORQ 1.5. Which are the historical and political factors that influence 
resource allocation? 
ORQ 1.6. To what extent is the Uruguayan Government utilising the 
current model of resource allocation as a means to influence the 
behaviour of the publicly funded University? 
 
RQ: 2.  Is the current model likely to change according to the views of 
decision makers in the sector? 
 
ORQ 2.1. Are the historical/policy factors that shape the current model 
likely to change in the future? 
ORQ 2.2. Are public subsidies likely to grow in the near future? Are there 
other sources of funding, like tuition fees, likely to be considered as 
alternative sources of revenue in public higher education? 
  








The thesis will analyse and characterise funding arrangements according to 
international classifications in reference to the following elements: 
  
ORQ 1.1 How are funds provided? 
 
The first element is related to the funding methodologies in use,  considering 
whether the appropriations are received as a block grant, whether there is a 
separation between research and teaching funds, and  whether  there is in use 
some formula to "follow" students or teachers (or both), as described by Albrecht 
and Ziderman (1992, pp: 45-47). 
 
Koelman (1998, p .129) describes block grant funding as a mechanism in which 
"the subsidy is an amount paid in advance for a set period of time. The institution is free to decide in 
what way this amount will be spent”.  In typical block-budgeting, "what happens is essentially 
this:  a central funding authority engages in negotiations with each operating unit about its operation, 
and funding and a mutually agreed plan is agreed upon and a block allocation is made‖ (Massy 
and Hulfactor, 1993, p.30).   
 
In general, public Universities consider the Government block grants as “the base of 
revenue pyramid” (Slaughter  and Leslie, 1997 p.71). In addition, the block allocation 
is critical due to their (relatively) unconditional nature, which contributes to 
institutional independence. 
  




However, on the other side, block allocation systems have negative effects, 
because they lack good processes for evaluating plans and performance and re-
inforce the idea that operating units ―own‖ their funding, taking Government block 
grants as a given. 
In an analysis of the funding mechanisms in place across OECD states, Jongbloed 
(2001) reported that Governments in a number of countries have attempted to 
separate their support for teaching and research by providing block (i.e. lump sum) 
funding for each activity, covering the day-to-day running costs.   
 
For instance, in the UK, public funds are provided for teaching and research under 
a dual support system, both with a block grant from the Funding Councils. 
Institutions are free to allocate their block grants according to their own priorities 
within broad guidelines (Jongbloed, 2001, p.11).  
 
ORQ 1.2 What criteria are used to determine allocations? 
 
This element relates to the funding criteria used by the authorities when providing 
the allocations. In this case, the focus is placed on the elements that are 
considered by the authorities in order to "base" the funding. In particular, it will 
consider whether:  
 
(a) the basis is the former budget, for instance: historical allocations;  
(b) the basis is the result of a negotiation between the funding authority and the 
institution; 
(c)  the allocations are a consequence of the application of formulae;  
(d) there are orientations or guidelines, and allocations are linked to these specific 
orientations or to specific policies or commitments;  




(e) the outcome is the subject of a formal contract between Government and 
institutions. 
 
ORQ 1.3. What are the degrees of decentralisation? 
 
This element relates to the degree of decentralisation that exists between the 
institution and the funding authority. This element will also consider the frame of 
control that is in use. Knowledge about the degree of decentralisation will enable 
us to analyse, for instance, if there is some control over the use of funds, or over 
the achievement of indicated goals, and whether control is loose or tight. 
 
The concept of centralisation refers to the relationship between a centre and 
divisional units within an organisation, with particular emphasis on variable 
characteristics like control (by the centre) and autonomy to take decisions and  to 
be responsible (by the divisional unit). The variation between the control and 
decisional/ responsibility elements determines the degrees of centralisation that 
exist within an organisation or a system. Within this frame, decentralisation is 
defined as "a transfer of tasks from a centre to lower levels" (Otten 1996, p. 75).  
 
―Centralisation‖ and ―decentralisation‖ are concepts commonly used in dealing with 
the relationship between the corporate centre and the organisational division. The 
guiding philosophy of decentralisation is that the divisional unit is able to take 
better decisions because it is placed closer to the point of action or delivery. In the 
case of a University, this means closer to the point of contact with students or with 
other stakeholders 
  




The degree of centralisation may vary according to environmental conditions. As 
shown by Sizer (1982, p. 20), under conditions of contraction or decline, institutions 
of higher education may need to apply more centralised methods of planning and 
resource allocation. In the same way, Sizer finds that periods of expansion allow 
the use of decentralised models. Jarzabkowski (2002, p. 6, citing Khandwalla), 
shows that competitive environments may increase centralisation in order to 
improve co-ordination, reduce costs or monitor quality. 
 
ORQ 1.4. With what requirements for accountability? 
 
This element refers to the requirements of accountability to the funding body, or 
other bodies, and to the procedures or methods that are used to report how funds 
have been used (for instance: the use of performance indicators or types of 
auditing procedures). 
 
Trow (1996, p.2) describes accountability as the obligation to report to others, to 
explain, to justify, and to answer questions about how resources have been used 
and to what effect. Accountability, he explains, is closely linked to trust because  
 “it implies that society provides support  without the requirements that the institutions 
either provide specific goods and services in return for that support  or account 
specifically and in detail for the use of those funds. Trust, indeed, is the basis of  the 
very large measure of autonomy of colleges and Universities at everywhere” (Trow, 
1996, p.2).  
 
Trow makes a distinction between ―academic accountability‖ and  ―legal/ financial 
accountability‖. The first is “the obligation to tell others what has been done within 
the institutions to further learning, teaching and public service and to what effect”.  




Legal and financial accountability is described as ―the obligation to report  how resources 
are used : is the institution doing what it is supposed to  be doing by law and  are its resources being 
used for the purposes for which they are given?” (Trow, 1996, p 7). Trow defines academic 
accountability as ―the obligation to tell others, both inside and outside the institution, what has 
been done with those resources to further teaching, learning and public service and to what effect 
“(p.8). 
 
The forms of accountability vary with circumstances. In many European countries, 
funded largely by the State which maintains control over expenditures, 
accountability is discharged chiefly through financial and (increasingly) academic 
audits, rather than through direct assessments of the work of the institutions linked 
to funding (Trow, 1996, pp: 6-7).  
 
Hendel et al (2004, pp: 5-6) examine how interconnected is the concept of 
accountability to the concept of autonomy in higher education. The authors explain 
that, in the past, Universities in the United States have had a relatively 
autonomous existence from State and Federal Governments because these 
bodies were confident that academia held high standards of quality and 
excellence. As a pattern, they explain, the federal Government also had minimal 
involvement in higher education. Today, a very different situation exists. 
Institutions of higher education are facing external demands from State and 
Federal Governments, as well as from the general public and State level agencies, 
and these demands are often manifested in an increase of governmental 
involvement in academic matters (Zumeta, 2000, pp: 59-61). Public institutions, in 
particular, are now expected to be accountable and to report on their operations 
and performance (Layzell, 1998). 
  




Furthermore, in the United States a relatively recent series of accountability 
initiatives, published in the three national reports- "Measuring Up 2000: The State-by-
State Report Card," "Measuring Up 2002: The State-by-State Report Card", and "Measuring Up 
2004: The State-by-State Report Card"- has revisited the notion of accountability (Hendel 
et al, 2004 p. 16). These reports, authored by an independent policy research 
organisation –The National Centre for Public Policy and Higher Education- rely on 
the concept that the most important evidence of quality in higher education is 
performance, especially the achievement of student learning outcomes. These 
have led to a series of biennial, State-by-State report cards that identify a broad 
range of performance indicators or measures, including access, productivity and 
efficiency, student learning, degree completion, and economic returns from 
postsecondary education. They are designed to give State leaders and policy-
makers a tool for evaluating and comparing State performance in higher education 
on a variety of key results-oriented measures in five categories: preparation, 
participation, affordability, completion, and benefits. The States are graded by 
comparing their performance against the top-performing States in each category 
(Idaho Board of Education, 2005).  
 
The way in which Universities react to pressures towards accountability also 
differs.  Many institutions of higher education have mandates and performance 
indicators that are forced on them by State legislatures and co-ordinating boards 
(Hendel et al, 2004, p.11). Conversely, some institutions have taken a more 
proactive role in developing their own reports in an effort to dissuade policy makers 
from imposing their own designs (Moloney and Grotevant, 1997). 
 
ORQ 1.5. Which are the historical and political factors that influence resource 
allocation?  





The purpose of this sub-question is to identify the political and historical factors that 
have inter-acted to shape the model of funding which is currently in use. Although 
there may be many factors influencing policies, I will try to highlight those factors 
that emerge as most significant according to the collected data, and as illustrated 
by Parliamentary debates. 
 
ORQ 1.6. To what extent is the Uruguayan Government utilising the current model 
of resource allocation as a means to influence the behaviour of the publicly funded 
University? 
Resource Dependency Theory, a theory developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), 
has been used to explain how organisations function in a context of scarcity of 
funds.   
According to Pfeffer and Salancik ―…organisations are inescapably bounded up with the 
conditions of their environment‖ (1978, p.1). Therefore, to understand the behaviour of 
an organisation, one must understand the context of that behaviour.   
The central themes of Resource Dependency Theory are: a) the importance of the 
environmental or social context of organisations for understanding what decisions 
are to be made; b) that organisations are embedded in networks of 
interdependencies and social relationships which constrain their situations and 
environments; and c) that there are opportunities to do things, such as co-opting 
sources of constraint, to obtain, at least temporarily, more autonomy and the ability 
to pursue organisational interests (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. xii).  




According to this theory, if an organisation is dependent on the environment for its 
survival (for instance through the provision of funding), it may become dependent 
on the continued success of the other organisation and build "behavioural 
dependencies" with it.  
Slaughter and Leslie (1997) consider that, in the case of Universities, those who 
provide resources to the institutions have the capability of exercising power over 
those organisations (p. 68). Furthermore, following Pfeffer and Salancik concepts 
(the relative magnitude of the exchange), they pre-suppose that organisations that 
receive funding from only one source will be heavily dependent on that supplier 
which may exercise great power over that organisation should it desire to do so. 
Slaughter and Leslie describe the situation as follows: 
“Historically, public Universities in most Western democracies, have been heavily 
dependent financially upon their Governments, which usually have allowed Universities 
cosiderable operating autonomy. The principal mechanism that has enabled this 
autonomy has been the unstipulated or block grant mode of funding general institutional 
aid “ (p.68). 
 
 Within the framework of resource dependency theory, I will analyse whether the 
Uruguayan Government is utilising resource allocation strategically and making an 
active choice to manage the resource dependencies that may exist with the public 
University arising from the fact that its funding relies heavily on Government 
allocated public subsidies. 
 
RQ 2   Is the current model likely to change, according to the views of decision 
makers in the sector? 
  




Description and analysis undertaken in the initial stage of the study will move to 
investigation within a contextual analysis of how the system may evolve based on 
the views of those who take decisions about higher education funding. In other 
words, how do they observe the impact of the application of the current model and 
what are their perspectives for change? 
 
The people who take decisions about higher education are not only the 
representatives from Universities themselves (either academics or administrators), 
but  also members of the Parliament, various officials of the Ministry of Education 
and the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and educational or financial advisors at 
the legislature. Therefore, the research will refer to people that come from both the 
internal context and the external context of higher education.  
 
Each of them will offer views that are only a part of reality. Certainly they represent 
different goals and visions about the sector. However, all are members of a policy 
network that, as described by Van Vught (1997, p.395), is in the position of 
developing patterns of communication and inter-action in order to build policies 
about the sector. 
 
ORQ 2.1.  Are the historical/policy factors that shape the current model likely to 
change in the future? 
 
In October 31st, 2004 a left-wing party candidate won the Uruguayan presidency 
for the first time in the nation´s history. When Mr Tabare Vazquez took office in 
March 2005, his coalition party – The Frente Amplio- joined the ranks of leftist 
Governments currently in place in several Latin American countries, including the 
neighbours Brazil and Argentina and the politically powerful Chile and Venezuela.  





The victory of Tabaré Vázquez brought to an end an era of 170 years of political 
power shared by the rural elite in the Blanco Party and the urban elite in the 
Colorado Party. Vazquez‘s win was widely seen as recognition of the newly 
established credibility that the left would solve the growing problems of poverty, 
inequality, and corruption. 
 
However, as the Uruguayan left arrives to power, we may wonder how this party 
will face the central dilemma of dealing with multiple, antagonistic political, social 
and economic pressures that are represented, on the one side, by its own historical 
leftist programme, and, on the other side, by the economic elites and the 
international credit agencies. It is important to recall that, less than one year after 
becoming President of Brazil, Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva declared, in December 
2003, that the experience of governing the country had made him abandon some 
of the early dreams of his militant past.  
 
Despite it all, when we compare the current situation with the one that 
predominated before 2004, the changes are evident. Everything indicates that a 
new phase has been initiated. Governing has changed with a national Government 
that declares that it will try to respond to the demands, aspirations and 
expectations of the most vulnerable social sectors (Frente Amplio, 2004). 
 
Therefore, through this question, I will analyse how the current administration, 
represented in the Executive Branch and especially in the Ministry of Education 
and Culture, and by the majority of the Congress MPs, will attempt to change the 
current model of financing public higher education. 
  




ORQ 2.2. Are public subsidies likely to grow in the near future? Are there other 
sources of funding, like tuition fees, likely to be considered as alternative sources 
of revenue in public higher education? 
 
In the past quarter century, most developed and developing countries around the 
world have moved towards a system of financing higher education that is based at 
least in part on the principle of cost-recovery.  
 
While there is extensive evidence of a major shift in the burden of higher education 
costs from being borne by Governments to being shared by students (Johnstone, 
1986, 1993, 1997), in some developing countries (including most Latin American 
countries), there is strong opposition to any expansion of tuition or fees as a source 
of additional funding, based largely on political and equity grounds (Lewis and 
Dundar, 2002; Garcia Guadilla, 2005). Public institutions, unions and politicians 
commonly argue that non tuition-fees systems provide greater equality of 
educational opportunity and greater access to disadvantaged groups.   
 
However, as enrolments in most of the public Universities have risen while financial 
resources per student have fallen dramatically, some voices claim that the political 
authorities cannot provide sufficient public revenue to higher education and that the 
institutions must seek funding from other sources, including tuition and other 
means (Moura Castro and Levy, 2000).  
In Uruguay, in 1990, under the influence of the conservative Blanco Party 
Government, the Parliament passed a law which authorised the public University 
(UdelaR) to charge tuition-fees to students who could afford them. However, 
UdelaR has refused to implement this authorisation. This study will analyse if a 
tuition-fee scheme is likely to be introduced in UdelaR in the future or whether  




other funds could be available in order to increase the current scheme based, 
almost only, on public subsidies. 
 
1.3.   Reasons to develop the study 
 
The reasons that have moved me to choose this research topic  were the following: 
 
  It was original. As mentioned above, there was no technical literature  in 
the country with a focus in  this topic. This means that the research would fill a 
gap in the field. In the meantime, it was clear that this topic covered  a broader 
field, including policies of education, and other aspects related to  finances in 
general, public financing and educational finances. All these issues were 
considered in the study.  
 
  It would develop new information and knowledge. This work was 
relevant from two perspectives: (a) the academic one, which was in the need of 
a scientific approach to the matter, providing a characterisation of the funding 
model for Uruguay like those developed for almost all countries in the world, 
and (b) the policy-building one, where information about the sector and about 
the current model was needed in order to build policies about the sector. 
Martinez Larrechea (2003), Martinez Sandres (1999, p.75) or Bentancur (2002, 
p.40) reported  that, until now, Uruguay has failed to identify and establish 
public policies about higher education in general, and about its funding in 
particular. 
 
  It was a realistic project for me. I was placed in a position in which the 
study could be developed without ethical concerns as I was not working in  




financial matters while the study was developed. Also, I had an appropriate 
background to understand the topic very well because I had worked on 
budgeting issues for many years. Last, but not the least, I could cover the costs 
of conducting the research within my own funds. 
 
  It covers an attractive topic. It means that, although the topic has not been 
addressed until now, it would catch the attention of many people, principally 
from higher education stakeholders. 
 
1.4.   Significance of the study 
 
The research reported in this thesis is important for the following reasons: 
 
First, the study is important for decision-makers concerned with higher education in 
Uruguay who are in need of information about the sector and about the current 
model in order to build future policies about the sector. 
 
Second, the study adds to the literature by providing a characterisation of the 
country model like those developed for almost all countries in the world. 
 
1.5.  Organisation of the study 
 
This study has seven chapters in which the rationale for undertaking the research, 
its context, the methodology used and the findings are presented, analysed and 
discussed.  
 
Chapter 2 explains the existing models of funding higher education and the  




rationale involved in the use of each of them. 
 
Chapter 3 provides information about the context of Latin America and Uruguay 
with reference to higher education systems and shows some of the key aspects of 
the Uruguayan case. 
 
Chapter 4 reviews the literature and examines many of the current policy 
documents and theoretical analyses for details of the processes that may be at 
work and considered in this analysis. Gaps in the literature are identified and the 
contribution to be made by this study is outlined.  
 
Chapter 5 describes details of the approach taken, the implementation strategy for 
the study and the evolution of the theoretical framework as it proceeded.  
 
Chapter 6 presents the data gathered from the sources selected: documentation, 
interviews, focus groups and parliamentary discourses and sets out how the data 
were used to answer the research questions in the context of the literature. 
 




This chapter described the reasons for undertaking the research, and its overall 
importance to the field of education. The main aims of the study were explained 
and the research questions to investigate them were identified. 
 
  





















    












CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
What is there to study about resource 
allocation? Can´t informed people  who know 
the academic disciplines and their 
institutional strenghts and weaknesses, 
simply decide what programmes need  
funding the most and give them the money?  
Massy, 2004,  p.3  




Aim of the chapter 
The aim of this chapter is to explain the changes that have occurred in the funding 
of higher education systems during recent decades and the meaning and rationale 
which underpin each of the most notable funding models in use.   
 
Finally, I will identify some of the principles that might underpin an effective funding 
model, according to some experts in the field. 
 
2.0.  Introduction 
 
Higher education is an expensive enterprise that is predominantly funded by 
Governments (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1992; Hauptmann, 1998).  However, as 
noted by Psacharoupoulus (1990) and Blaug (1982), today no country can provide 
through the State as much funding and support as is wanted by its society. In 
addition, the landscape of higher education finance has been  complicated by 
several issues in recent years, including competition for resources with other 
sectors (Booth, 1982), concerns about efficiency and effectiveness in the use of 
funds (Thomas, 2001), and the convergence of several economic and 
demographic forces (Coombs and Hallak, 1972;  Blaug, 1982; Montserrat, 1997; 
Eicher, 2000).  
 
These factors have placed constraints on Government funding to higher education 
throughout the world and have strengthened resistance to increasing tax burdens 
(Johnstone, 1993).  At the same time, they have given impetus to a series of 
innovative dimensions of financing and budgeting in the sector and various 
alternative models have been developed to allocate resources in response to 
different views and approaches (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1992).  Indeed, it is  




important to emphasise this last aspect because the emergence of new concepts 
that refer to different types of allocations - such as: "resource allocation 
methodologies", "strategic orientations‖ and "contract driven allocations‖ - are not 
merely simple changes in methodology; their emergence responds to an important 
long-term ideological re-orientation (Neave, 1998).  
 
2.1. The rationale of allocating funds to higher education 
 
Hauptman (1991) explains that the way in which Governments allocate taxpayer 
funds to institutions is the principal public policy vehicle for higher education 
around the world.  This concept relies on the assumption that an organisation may 
use a model of funding as an instrument to implement strategies and to translate 
policies into activities.  In the application of  this concept to University funding, and 
considering that in most countries Governments are the dominant source of higher 
education finance, Albrecht and Ziderman (1992) show how each model of 
allocating funds to the sector has effects in how these funds are used. 
 
Probably most of the behavioural consequences that are studied in the literature 
can be analysed under the scope of the Resource Dependence Theory. This is a 
well known theory in social sciences to explain organisation-environment relations 
and relies on a particular view of inter- and intra-organisational interactions. In 
general, it focuses on the dependency relations between organisations and the 
environment, power positions of different organisations, and strategic alternatives 
for those in organisational leadership. 
 
This theory, developed by Pfeffer and Salanick (1978), suggests that control over 
resource allocation is an important power source in organisations. The core of this  




theory is that organisations will respond to demands made by external 
organisations upon whose resources they are heavily dependent. Anytime there is 
dependence asymmetry between organisations (or individuals), there is a power 
difference (pp: 39-64).  
 
Pfeffer and Salanick identified three factors that are critical in determining the 
dependence of one organisation on another: 
 
(1)  the importance of the resource and the extent to which the organisation 
requires it for continued operation and survival; 
(2)  the  extent  of  discretion  over  the  allocation  and  use  of  a  resource 
possessed by the other organisation; and  
(3)   the extent to which there are few alternatives or concentration of resource 
control (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, p.45).  
 
Within this frame, the power of an organisation is understood as a measure of the 
extent to which it can control responses and reduce its dependencies on others for 
resources. Scott (1998) explains that:   
"The need to acquire resources creates dependencies between organisations and 
external units, which ultimately can cause political problems that require political 
solutions. In this perspective, organisations have choice over their own fate" ( p. 
114). 
 
Why is it relevant to recall and explain Resource Dependency theory while talking 
about resource allocation in higher education? Because, as higher education in 
most countries is either Governmentally-owned and operated, or, at least, publicly 
funded (or both), it may be expected that the Governments are in the position of  




exerting influence through the allocation of resources and therefore to be the most 
powerful agent in the sector.   
 
For instance, Slaughter  and Leslie (1997, p. 69) suggest that changes in national 
higher education policies have resulted in alterations in resource dependence that 
are driving changes within western Universities rather than self induced change led 
by the academy. According to these authors, Resource Dependency theory helps 
us to understand these changes, as it contends that those who provide resources 
to an organisation have the capability to exert power over that organisation (p. 68). 
 
Similarly, studies conducted by Otten (1996) and Thomas (2000) show that the 
way budgets are allocated depend largely on the relationship between central 
authorities and lower organisational levels. Thomas (1998) suggests that the 
evidence from the United Kingdom is that the way in which funds are allocated to 
institutions can affect the way in which institutions allocate those funds to their 
constituent parts.  He explains that an increased transparency in national funding 
methodologies has increased pressures on managers to create income and 
expenditure accounts for each academic unit and to use those accounts as a basis 
for internal allocations. He explains: 
 “This development has taken place alongside a decline in Government funding with 
consequential pressure for increased efficiency and effectiveness in the management 
of resources and a need to encourage academic departments to earn more non-
Government income. There has, therefore,  been a move in some United Kingdom 
institutions towards greater devolution of budgetary responsibility to a departmental, 
faculty or school level” (p. 3).  
  




Finally, the analysis of the Resource Dependency Theory suggests that some of its 
consequences are that  
(a)  organisational behaviour is a consequence of influences; and  
(b)  organisations who are dependent on the continued success of another 
organisation may build behavioural dependencies with them.  
Therefore, it can be understood that (a) the more dependent an organisation is on 
external resources the less powerful it is, and that (b) a reduction of dependency is 
a key element to reduce environmental pressures. This interpretation becomes 
relevant when talking about higher education funding because it implies that, for 
example, a publicly funded University, facing decreasing Government funding, may 
look to new opportunities to diversify its funding base in order to reduce 
Government dependency. However, at the same time, it may enter into new 
dependency relationships with other funding sources. 
 
2. 2. The concept of resource allocation 
 
CIPFA (1997 p. 8) defines resource allocation as a planning and management tool 
which provides a means of providing resources on a methodological basis to 
various activities in an organisation. Resource allocation methods can be utilised 
either as instruments for implementing strategies (Jarzabkowski, 2002) or as 
frameworks for accountability (Otten, 1996).  
 
Otten (1996) notes that, when talking about funding models, explanations can refer 
to one of the following:  
  the relationship between national or state Governments and Universities or a 
University system;  
  the relationship  between  central  University administration and faculties; or    




  the relationship between faculty administration and departments.   
He explains that these three levels co-exist inside the system and, in each of them, 
different methods and mechanisms of resource allocation may be found due to 
different logics or orientations (pp: 75-76). 
             
2.3.   Mechanisms of allocating funds 
 
Albrecht and Ziderman (1992) show that the mechanism through which funds are 
transferred from the centre to divisional units influences the ways how these funds 
are used. This notion is critical to convert a resource allocation mechanism into a 
strategic tool.   
 
Research by Williams (cited by Otten, 1996. p.71) showed that Governments 
influenced higher education systems by altering the terms in which financial 
resources were made available. Albrecht and Ziderman (1992) found that 
Governments have used different criteria to induce certain behaviours in systems 
of higher education. They found that, throughout Europe and North America, while 
Governments have allowed for greater autonomy, they also have provided the 
means to limit funding to the cost of activities and therefore secure accountability 
from institutions (p.40).  
 
Neuson (quoted by Zinberg, 1996) explains that  
 “ It is only recently that policy-makers have begun to understand the critical link 
between expenditure patterns, cost, efficiency in higher education and the 
mechanisms by which institutions receive funds. Increasingly, Governments now see 
financial incentives  as a more effective way of influencing the pattern of activities in 
higher education institutions than administrative intervention". (p. 285)  





Higher education policies implemented through the State are increasingly 
significant. According to Thomas (1998; 2000), in the United Kingdom, the 
adoption of formulaic approaches at institutional and sub-institutional levels was 
pressured by the methodologies used by the Funding Councils. Thomas explains 
that, in the United Kingdom ― the greater transparency at national level impacted on internal 
allocation procedures. Some Universities have adopted a formulaic approach in determining 
allocations to academic departments and incentive schemes began to be incorporated into resource 
allocation methods” (1998, pp: 99-100). This suggests that methodologies in resource 
allocation at national levels affect institutional mechanisms and is consistent with 
the World Bank (1994, p. 50) which recommends the use of procedures to “create 
incentives  for institutions to use scarce funds efficiently. The mechanisms in which transfers are 
made strongly influence the way in which public funds are used”. Similarly, Vossensteyn 
(2004, p. 43) states that the way how Governments encourage the higher 
education sector to become more efficient and productive is by integrating 
performance criteria into the basis for funding higher education institutions and 
students. 
 
2.4. Models of allocating funds 
 
Today, the most notable models of allocating funds to higher education systems or 
institutions are:    
  historical ; 
  formula-based; 
  performance-based funding; 
  a combination of the above  





2.4.1. Historical models 
 
Historical models imply the repetition of the former allocations. Most Governments 
using this approach do not transfer funds using mechanisms that use criteria of 
internal working or the achievement of certain goals or other forms of objective 
criteria. In this model, the University will receive “automatically” the same amount of 
money every year.  
 
Literature denominates this model in different ways: historical, incremental 
(Brunner et al, 1995; Albrecht and Ziderman, 1992 ; Layzell 1994); bureaucratic 
(Schwartzman, 1995); negotiated (Massy and Hulfactor, 1993; Albrecht and 
Ziderman, 1992 ) and automatic (Brunner et al, 1995). All these denominations 
describe forms of mechanisms that involve institutions receiving a flat increment on 
a historic share basis, without relation to institutional characteristics, enrolments or 
staffing patterns or cost changes (Pratt  1987).   
 
According to Brunner et al (1995, p 42), this is the predominant model in Latin 
America, a model that provides to institutions the security that they will be able to 
pay some expenses, such as salaries for instance. In some countries, the use of 
this model is a consequence of Government paralysis, a phenomenon that, 
according to this author, tends "to   avoid the adoption of decisions for  change  in the system" 
(p. 21). Brunner et al conclude that this mechanism can be called ―the automatic 
model" (1995, p. 43). 
 
Incremental budgeting is described by Layzell (1998, p. 106) as one of the 
predominant models of Government budgeting in the United States. He explains:   




 "It starts with an institution’s prior year base budget and allocates increases (or 
decreases) to that base according to a set of established decision rules or budget 
guidelines, such as inflationary increases or new programmes (p. 106).   
 
In this way the previous year´s budget (usually adjusted by inflation) is 
incremented or decreased  by sums associated with particular line items of 
expenditure and the attention is focused on additions or deductions.  Massy 
(2004) asserts: “The base budget is too hard to analyse. After a period of time, operating units 
tend to assert ownership of base funding levels and come to view most of their cost as fixed” 
(p.39). 
 
The consideration of budget increments provides a number of benefits to decision-
makers. First, they only have to consider a small number of alternative budgets. 
Second, consideration of increments prevents re-visiting past political struggles. By 
considering only incremental changes, past fights may be avoided.   
 
For an institution, incrementalism implies predictability because one of the best 
predictors of its budget in a given year is that same budget for the year before plus 
or minus a small increment representing the rate of growth or shrinkage of total 
Government revenues (Marks and Caruthers, 1999, p. 10). 
 
However, incremental funding leads institutions to several problems:  
  To the extent that past values are an important explanation for future 
outputs, there are no real incentives for change.  
  Old unfairness and errors are built in and compounded. 
  It is difficult for the system to cope with real changes in cost base 
  




Negotiated funding is described by Massy and Hulfactor (1993, p.30) as a 
procedure in which the central funding authority engages in negotiations with the 
operating units over the activities to be undertaken; mutual agreement is reached 
and a block allocation is made. "The money goes as a block to the unit and can be spent for 
whatever it deems necessary" (p.30). Albrecht and Ziderman (1992) explain that 
negotiated funding has been the predominant form of funding Universities in the 
developing world.  
 
Schwartzman (1993a, p.2) names this model as ―bureaucratic funding” because, he 
explains, allocations are determined by bureaucratic authorities. Schwartzman 
considers, that in this model, the Governments (bureaucratic authorities) decide in 
centralised ways what will be the allocations for the Universities. He explains: "The 
last decision about the global amount will be taken by a Ministry or the Parliament while the 
Universities and other stakeholders will try to exert influence on that decision" (p. 1). 
 
Interestingly, many public systems still rely on these kinds of mechanisms. A 
review of 35 countries developed in the 1990s by Albrecht and Ziderman (1992) 
reported that, in most cases, Government allocations were based on those of the 
previous year augmented by across-the-board incremental increases. In Latin 
America, for instance, historical-incremental budgeting has been common in 
University finance. Brunner et al (1995) observe that Latin American Governments 
have used this method to avoid confrontation with University constituencies (p.21), 
while Albrecht and Ziderman suggest that, according to their studies, this model 
has not served higher education well because it has been utilised as a deliberate 
way to reduce real spending in higher education by allowing inflation to erode 
University budgets (1992, p. 21). 
  




2.4.2. A mixed model: Categorical funding 
 
As one of the variations of the traditional type of budgeting, Jongbloed (2004 p.4-6) 
describes an approach, in which the funding authorities (i.e. the ministry, or funding 
council) supplement the basic budget by the addition of some extra funding for 
specific initiatives, such as increasing the participation of certain target groups, 
targeting specific skills areas, post-graduate training, or specific strategic research 
in ‗areas of excellence‘. 
 
In the United States, during the 1990s, certain States distributed funds to public 
Universities through allocations with two distinct parts – the ―foundation” (or base) 
and ―categorical” funding. In these cases, the foundation amount designed to 
cover the ―maintenance costs”, while categorical funding programmes financed 
specific tasks, such as improvement of academic programmes, faculty 
development or student services (Serban, 1998, p.19-20). One of the States which 
experimented with categorical funding was Ohio, through an initiative called the 
“Ohio´s academic challenge grant” which provided funds to high quality programmes.  
 
The use of categorical funding implies that institutions receive funds to carry out 
certain activities. The model has been considered as ―acceptable‖ by institutions 
(Serban, 1998, p 21), especially when they provide funds for activities or 
programmes that are institutional priorities.  However, as the allocation is activity-
oriented and not awarded to achieve particular outcomes, categorical funding fails 
to provide for accountability. 
 
2.4.3. Formulaic models  





There is a clear move to other models in recent years.  Darling et al (1989) and 
Layzell (1994), report that, since the early 1950s, Canadian and American 
jurisdictions have used formulae to allocate public funds among Universities and 
Colleges. Formulae were originally envisaged as a means of distributing public 
funds for higher education in a rational and equitable manner, but have evolved 
over time into mechanisms with multiple purposes and outcomes (Layzell, 1994, 
p.107). 
 
According to Darling et al (1989), the introduction of formula funding arises for 
various reasons: (1) they are a sign of the times: as public funding for Post-
Secondary education becomes more scarce, there are greater demands for visibly 
equitable means of allocating those scarce funds; (2) there is a need for 
predictable bases for planning and budgeting; (3) there is an interest in funding 
formulae as devices for holding institutions accountable (pp: 559- 560). 
Interestingly, these are all characteristics of New Public Management, a set of key 
managerial ideas and beliefs which spread through the world in the 1980s and 
1990s and entailed a substantial shift in the governance and management of the 
state sector in the UK, New Zealand, Australia, Scandinavia and North America 
(Barzelay, 2001, pp: 2-3).  
 
Formula funding also attempts to reduce the political elements in decisions about 
appropriations by front-loading the inevitable political discussion and reducing the 
lobbying by institutions (Darling et al, 1989, p.560). 
 
Formulaic approaches are mathematical models that consider institutional 
characteristics, such as workloads, unit costs, ratios or head-counts, to calculate  




the amount of resource to allocate.  Darling et al (1989) define a funding formula as 
"...a formally defined procedure, based on data that can vary and be manipulated 
according to definite and predetermined factors, which can be used to determine 
funding requirements for a system of Universities or to allocate funding to individual 
institutions within a system, or both..." (p.559). 
 
Formulae may be based either on input or output elements. Input methods have 
been called ―the cost of higher education” (Albrecht and Ziderman 1992, p 9). This 
method employs formulae usually based on multiplying enrolment by parameters of 
unit cost (p. 9). 
 
According to Jongbloed (2001, p.15), the use of an input method implies that since 
“an individual University’s grant depends on the number of students that have chosen to enrol for its 
courses, it is actually the students voting with their feet that determine the University’s resources. In 
other words: money follows the student”.  
 
Output-driven funding systems are ―systems in which payments made to service-delivery 
agencies by Governments are an explicit function of quantities of outputs delivered by those 
agencies” (Robinson, 2002, p.1). The defining characteristic of a pure output-driven 
funding system is that in such a system the aim is to base the output “price” upon 
what might be called the “ efficient cost of  production” (Robinson, 2002, p.4). In output 
methods, funding is allocated on the basis of the estimates of costs for educational 
outputs. It rewards institutions according to their performance in producing 
graduates, post-graduates and research. 
  
The most common approach in formulae is to multiply enrolments by a parameter 
of unit cost, usually called "unit of resource" (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1992, p.9).  




However, in the formulaic approach called "incentive or performance formulae", 
there is also a consideration of incentive elements. Darling et al (1989) explain that 
these formulae are usually combined with other types of formulae which are used 
to allocate most of the funds; a portion is withheld and allocated on the basis of 
performance. In these cases, performance is measured in a number of ways, such 
as programmes accredited, performance of graduates on standardised tests, the 
evaluation of programmes and services, peer evaluation, and success in attracting 
competitive research grants and contracts. Incentive funding or performance 
funding formulae are the most policy oriented of funding formulae (pp: 559-561). 
 
Many countries have been using formulaic models since the 1990s. For instance, 
in some Latin American countries like Argentina (Republica Argentina, 2001; 
García de Fanelli, 2000), Brazil (The World Bank, 2000; Brunner et al, 1995; 
Schwartzman, 2002), and Chile (Bernasconi and Rojas, 2004), the Governments 
have introduced formulaic funding mechanisms in order to bring about some 
efficiency and transparent elements in public higher education funding. 
 
More recent studies by the EURYDICE European Unit (2000), Jongbloed (2001) 
and Jongbloed (2004), show that, in European countries, one of the main trends of 
the 1990s and the 2000s is a move away from negotiated line item funding towards 
formula-based mechanisms. In a report by Kaiser et al (2001), there is a 
description of their use in various European countries, including the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. In the Netherlands, for instance, the funding 
mechanism has made use of performance indicators in the funding formulae for 
teaching and research since the early 1990s. Sweden utilises a formulaic 
approach, too, including input and output indicators for calculating the Universities‘ 
allocations for teaching (pp: 119-124). Finally, the last example is the United  




Kingdom. In this case the teaching grant is determined by projected numbers of 
full-time students. The student numbers are adjusted for subject-related factors 
(there are four broad groups of subjects), student-related factors (i.e. different 
forms of enrolment), and institution-related factors (i.e. institutional scale, location, 
age of buildings). Total weighted (FTE) student numbers are multiplied by a base 
price, which leads to the University‘s standard resource. If the difference between 
the standard resource and the institution‘s actual resource (i.e. the previous year‘s 
resource adjusted for various factors such as inflation) is no more than 5 %, then 
the Funding Council will carry forward the grant from one year to the next (Kaiser 
et al, 2001, pp: 151-162). 
 
The major advantage of funding formulae is that, because they use objective 
criteria, they provide a clear insight in the distribution of funds among higher 
education institutions and they facilitate comparisons between institutions 
(Jongbloed, 2001). 
 
It may be argued that formula based funding mechanisms reflect several other 
positive aspects. First, they allow a more rational (and non-political) distribution of 
funds among higher education institutions and between disciplines. Second: they 
enable correction of major inefficiencies in the system and help in improving 
innovation and reducing costs. (Johnstone et al, 1998, p. 4) 
 
However, the use of formulae has critics too. For instance, Layzell (1994) and Lang 
(1998) identify a trend for formulae to become increasingly complex. In similar 
ways, Darling et al (1989, p.581) point out other problems when they describe that 
formulae in place in Canadian provinces are based on averages which means that 
all programmes within a given category are assumed to have the same costs.  





Lang (1988, p. 4) reports other disadvantages: (a) as a funding formula becomes 
more predictable -an advantage - it may become more complex, which might be 
seen as a disadvantage; (b) funding formulae create entitlements. For example, if a 
funding formula arithmetically ―promises" a certain amount per student in a certain 
discipline and the enrolment in this discipline unexpectedly increases, the public 
treasury must provide the resulting amount, whether or not it had been budgeted 
for. Other negative factors identified by Michael (2004) include: formula rigidity, 
over-reliance on quantifiable factors and maintenance of historical inequity. 
 
Furthermore, Massy considers that formulae tend to lock budgeting to unit costs 
making productivity improvement exceedingly difficult and drawing attention away 
from institutional goals (Massy, 2004, p. 44).  
 
Lastly, some may also contend that a formulae approach, especially if applied in an 
excessively mechanical way, represents an ―opting out‖ of the responsibility of 
leaders and managers to reach considered judgements.  
 
2.4.4. Performance based models 
 
The use of funding formulae is considered the first step in developing a system of 
performance-based funding (Jongbloed , 2001, p.4). 
 
In the 1990s, many States in the USA began to link part of higher education budget 
allocations to performance with related accountability measures. This practice was 
called "incentive or performance funding"  (Zumeta, 2000, p. 61). Public institutions were 
expected to be accountable for and to report on their operations and performance;  




since simple reports of numbers or inputs did not satisfy numerous stakeholders in 
higher education, institutions were expected to measure both their efficiency and 
productivity (Layzell, 1998; Zumeta, 2000). 
 
According to Layzell (1998), the evolution from incremental and formula budgeting 
to  performance-funding categories was intended to monitor the performance of 
public funded institutions through the use of accountability mechanisms; for 
instance, allocating resources to institutions according to their achievement of 
previously established goals, objectives or outcomes (p. 101). 
 
The phenomenon is described by Zumeta for institutions of higher education in the 
United States as follows: 
"The States traditionally depended on the good judgement of citizen trustees and  
higher education boards to monitor institutional actions in the public interest. 
Accountability often took the form of “report cards” that provided information about 
institutional operations and results. But policymakers became convinced that reporting 
alone did not often enough improve performance on the reported indicators. 
Accountability now means a focus on both “objective” information and explicit financial 
incentives to complement the judgement of citizen oversight bodies" (2001, p. 61). 
 
Burke (2001b) considers that this development entails a shift in the notion of 
accountability. According to his view, the “old accountability” asked the accounting 
question of how public campuses expended state resources. The “new accountability” 
asks the management question of what are their results (p. 419). 
 
Performance-based funding is a model in which a formula is used to link the 
provision of funds with institutions that are successful in certain elements of their  




performance. It may be, for instance, students passing exams or a weighted 
number of passed courses (Jongbloed,  2001, p.3). Resources flow to the 
institutions after the recipient of funds can demonstrate that the specified outcome 
has been produced. Funding is tied to the ‗products‘ of teaching and research 
activities of higher education institutions, e.g. the number of credits accumulated by 
students, the number of degrees awarded, the number of research publications, or 
the patents and licenses issued (Jongbloed, 2001,  p.3). Therefore, the allocation 
of resources is linked to achievement rather than to promised results. Unlike 
historical or formulae models, the performance-based model is a merit-based 
system rather than a needs-based system and is often heavily based on the 
evaluation and self-evaluation of institutional academic programmes.  
 
Burke and Minnasians (2002) and Shin and Milton (2004) explain that 
performance-based funding models have been used in the United States in two 
models: performance budgeting and performance funding. Both are based on 
the underlying concept that higher education institutions are motivated to improve 
their performance when performance is linked to budget allocation.  
 
Although these modes are different in focus, both create a link between budget 
allocation and institutional performance.  Burke and Minnassians (2002) describe 
both categories as follows: 
" Performance funding ties specified state funding directly and tightly to the 
performance of public campuses on individual indicators. Performance funding 
focuses on the distribution phase of the budget process.  Performance budgeting 
allows governors, legislators, and co-ordinating or system boards to consider campus 
achievement on performance indicators as one factor in determining allocations for 
public campuses. Performance budgeting concentrates on budget preparation and  




presentation, and often neglects, or even ignores, the distribution phase of budgeting. 
In performance funding, the relationship between funding and performance is tight, 
automatic, and formulaic." (p. 3) 
 
A third category called ―Performance Reporting” does not entail the allocation of 
resources but the provision of periodic reports regarding University performance on 
key performance indicators. The reports are usually sent to legislators, the 
governor, campuses and, in some cases, the media. The idea behind performance 
reporting is that institutions will focus on those indicators the legislature finds 
important because they will be measured and individual institution's performance 
published (Burke, 2001b, p. 419).  
 
Burke explains that Performance reporting sets the stage for the move to 
performance budgeting as ―progressing from reporting to funding seemed a short step to State 
officials” (Burke, 2001b, p. 419). 
 
The State of Tennessee (United States) has been using the performance-based 
model since the 1970s and is widely recognised as the pioneer in developing an 
incentive-based funding scheme oriented to reward public higher education 
institutions for exemplary institutional performance. Tennessee uses four 
performance standards, comprising in total ten performance indicators. Students 
and faculty are the most important elements under consideration because 
improvement of student outcomes resulting from the highest quality is at the heart 
of the system. Interestingly, this scheme was developed in consultation with 
academic constituencies. 
  




After Tennessee, many other States in the USA have adopted this approach or are 
considering some kind of performance category (Layzell, 1998). A series of 
surveys by Burke and his associates at the Rockefeller Institute of Government 
since the mid-1990s, showed that performance funding grew rapidly from 1979 to 
2001, at which time it was in place in some form in 19 states. The Fiscal Survey of the 
States in the late 1990s called performance budgeting ―the most significant trend in State 
budgeting” and     "the budgeting phenomenon of the decade” (Burke, 2001b, p. 417). 
However, between 2001 and 2003, various States discontinued this practice due to 
several reasons: campus opposition and changes in legislative leadership 
(Colorado), changing governors and campus resistance (Kentucky) or lack of 
understanding between legislators and University system officials (South Carolina) 
(Burke, 2001b, pp: 427-428). 
 
Kaiser et al (2001) have reported the use of this model in other countries. In 
Europe, the funding of teaching is performance-based in three countries, for 
example: Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden. The Swedish model is 
interesting because its performance-based model of funding has adopted the form 
of an agreed contract between the institutions and the funding body. In this 
category, the institution agrees to undertake a range of activities and, in return, it 
receives a specified level of resource. The Swedish Ministry of Education and each 
individual institution agree a contract that covers education and research. 
Institutions of higher education receive an educational assignment for each new three-
year period. The allocation of resources depends on results measured in terms of 
students (FTE) and study achievements (Kaiser et al, 2001, pp: 119-124). 
 
Other interesting case reported by Kaiser et al (2001, pp: 35-43) is Australia. In this 
country, a uniform national system of performance indicators was replaced by a  




system that allows each institution to select and declare its own performance 
indicators in periodic performance agreement negotiations with the Government. 
 
In the USA, as many States adopted the model and later decided to abandon it, 
performance based funding is associated with “volatility” (Burke, 2001b, p.9), partly 
related to its novelty. Certainly, its newness seems to increase both attractiveness 
and volatility.  
 
2.5. Principles underpinning effective funding models 
 
Looking beyond the characteristics of the existing models that are utilised  to fund 
higher education, Serban ( 1998, p.16), Burke (1998, p.12) and  Marks and 
Caruthers ( 1999, pp: 4-6) have identified a series of principles that, as they see it, 
should underpin an effective funding method. They identify some of those 
principles as follows: 
 
  Should be strategy-based  
A funding model should incorporate and reinforce the goals expressed through 
approved national or sectoral plans (Burke, 1998, p.12 and Marks and Caruthers, 
1999, pp: 4-6). 
 
  Should provide adequate funding  
A funding model should focus on determining how much funding each institution 
needs to fulfil its approved mission (Serban, 1998 p.16 and Marks and Caruthers 
1999, pp: 4-6).  
  




  Should provide incentives for or reward performance 
A funding model should provide incentives for institutional effectiveness and 
efficiency (Burke, 1998, p. 12 and Marks and Caruthers, 1999, pp: 4-6). 
 
  Should be equitable  
The model should recognise institutional differences and missions.  Examples of 
such differences may include, i.e., institutions with medical schools, agricultural 
colleges, research centres and University hospitals. In addition, different 
institutional missions might require different per-student funding or different rates of 
funding attributed to differences in degree levels, programme offerings and 
geographic location (Burke, 1998, p. 12; Serban 1998, p.16; and Marks and 
Caruthers, 1999, pp: 4-6). 
 
  Should be simple and transparent  
A funding model should be simple and easy to understand from a Government, 
institution and student perspective. Besides it should be easy to administer from a 
Government and institutional perspective (Burke, 1998, p.12 and Marks and 
Caruthers, 1999, pp: 4-6). 
 
  Should be flexible 
The model should enable institutions to be responsive to changes in technology 
and changes in demand from students and industry, in external conditions or in the 
costs encountered by institutions (Burke, 1998, p. 12 and Marks and Caruthers 
(1999, pp: 4-6). 
  




  Should be predictable and sustainable 
The model must provide reasonably stable funding and a reasonable level of 
predictability in order to enable the development of plans at institutional levels 




This chapter has explained the changes that occurred in the funding of higher 
education systems during the last decades, outlining the most notable models in 
use and what is the rationale underpinning each of them. It has also provided a 
description of the use of the models in different countries and indicated a series of 
characteristics that, according to the literature, should underpin the ―ideal‖ model. 
This project will aim to examine to what extent the model in existence in Uruguay 
meets these characteristics.  
 
 
    








    














CHAPTER 3: CONTEXT 
 
  




Aim of the chapter 
 
This chapter is intended to provide an outline of the context of Latin America and 
Uruguay; in particular, higher education systems will be examined and some key 
aspects of the Uruguayan case will be highlighted. 
 
This chapter comprises seven sections. The first presents a brief historical 
background of the development of Universities in Latin America, with a brief 
analysis of the key features of the higher education system. The second section 
provides information about Uruguay and an overview of the most distinctive 
aspects of its economic, social and political situation. The following sections are 
intended to provide information about the system of higher education in Uruguay 
(section 4), including analysis about UdelaR (section 4), the other public 
institutions (section 5), the private institutions (section 6) and the Ministry of 
Education and Culture (section 7). 
    





SECTION 1: LATIN AMERICAN CONTEXT 
 
3.1. 1.  Historical background. 
 
3.1.1. 1. The installation of the colonial Universities 
 
The first Universities in Latin America were established by the Spanish Crown in 
alliance with the Catholic Church after the conquest, to provide education and 
certification to the colonial administrators (Steger, 1974;  Reyes Abadie and Perez 
Santarcieri, 1992).  
 
In the 16
th century Spain was a federation of kingdoms. Each of the kingdoms had 
a University very closely linked with the crown. Following this model, Spain created 
several Universities in the New World soon after the conquest. Only 100 years 
after the arrival of Christopher Columbus in to new territories, three Universities 
were founded in the Americas: in Peru, Santo Domingo and Mexico (Reyes Abadie 
and Perez Santarcieri, 1992). Osborn (1976) shows that, in the 16th century, when 
Harvard, Yale, Princeton and Columbia were installed in North America, in Latin 
America there were already five Universities (pp: 6-11). 
 
Spanish authorities considered the Universities as ―tools‖ of the crown, needed to 
train military officers, priests and lawyers who could manage the colonies of the 
New World (Steger, 1974). Interestingly, other colonial powers, like Portugal, 
preferred to keep their higher education institutions for themselves, and did not 
allow many opportunities for local populations to educate themselves (Steger, 
1974; Niesker, 1992). The differences reflected contrasting approaches to the  




overall pattern of the colonial enterprise. The Portuguese empire considered that 
the colonies were mostly places for economic exploitation, to be ruled from the 
metropolis. As a result, the young Brazilians wishing to embark on higher studies 
had to travel to the Universidade de Coimbra in Portugal (Niesker, 1992; Schwartzman, 
1992). Only in the 19th century were the first higher education institutions 
established in Brazil and its first University, the Universidade do Rio de Janeiro, was 
inaugurated in 1920 (Schwartzman, 1992, p. 4).  
 
The Spanish conquerors were very effective in the destruction of the political and 
economic structure of the pre-Columbus aboriginal empires and in the 
establishment of a caste-like system where the lower class would be Indian and 
the upper class would be the Spanish and the ―Criollos”, the Spanish born in 
America (Osborn, 1976, p. 5). In the meantime, the colonisers created a complex 
system of tax-collection and the bureaucracy, which was established for this 
purpose, was progressively enlarged to give jobs to European newcomers. Within 
this context, the creation of Universities responded to the need to train cadres to 
serve both the colonial administration and the Church. As a consequence, the new 
University institutions were run by the Catholic Church as part of the Spanish 
colonising process (Steger, 1973).  
 
3.1.1.2. The Universities in the independence days 
 
In the 19th century, the colonial model crumbled with the emergence of the 
movements of independence. The young nations admired and copied the French 
opposition to all forms of corporatist arrangements and privileges, including those 
of the Church and of the traditional Universities (Scwhartzmann, 1991; 1992). 
Once free from the colonial rule, the new model introduced to the young Republics  




was the Napoleonic model, with a centralised State and bureaucratically controlled 
institutions. This model also brought with it conflict between the State and the 
Church, as the latter was taken away from most of its roles in élite education 
(Schwartzman, 1992). Throughout Latin America, from the early 19th century until 
well into the 20th century, French science and French higher education symbolised 
the victory of modern science and rationality against the traditional, religious and 
aristocratic colonisers and their local allies. 
 
As Schwartzman (2002, p. 30) describes:  
"...the adoption of  the "Napoleonic Model", means, in essence, that higher education 
institutions are considered public entities entitled to provide their students with legal 
rights to practice their professions, and to enjoy all the rights and benefits derived from 
their higher education degree. The basic unit of this system is the "Faculty", an 
organised teaching unit  responsible for providing a specific degree. The system did 
not require Universities, and the first Universities were organised as an aggregation of 
formerly existing Faculties."  
 
Latin American higher education, as it exists today, was organised in the period of 
independence. However, Schwartzman (1992, p. 3) explains that  
 "political independence did not mean much in terms of social and economic 
transformations. Latin American enlightened élites spoke French, travelled to Europe 
and handled French concepts, including their democratic and rationalist ideals; still, 
their societies remained restricted to the limits of their economies, based on a few 
export products, large pockets of traditional or decadent settlements" 
 
The Universities contributed to the replacement of the colonial authorities by the 
republican oligarchies and, as a consequence, they dispensed education to  




economic, political and religious élites. They were a synonym of "education for the 
professions" (Schwartzman, 1993b, p. 9; Albornoz, 1993, p.71).  
 
In contrast to what happened in Germany, for instance, Latin American Universities 
were extremely slow in creating space for empirical research. A dominant feature 
of the South American model is the weight of the professional schools in law, 
medicine and engineering (Schwartzman, 1993b, pp:9-10), a feature that remains 
today.  
 
3.1.1.3. The transformation of the Universities in the 20th century   
 
In the 20th century, Latin American countries followed the continental tradition of 
all-powerful States, enabling the transformation of the Universities placed in the 
capitals of the former colonial vice-royalties (Mexico, Lima and Buenos Aires) into 
National Universities (Didriksson, 2002). Those cities were the scene of massive 
European immigration at the turn of the century, only comparable with the United 
States.   
 
European migration meant the beginnings of a modern middle class in Latin 
American cities, with all its social and economic attachments: a growing service 
sector, small industries and demands of professionalisation and education 
(Schwartzman, 1993b, p.10). 
 
 The “Reforma” 
 
The early 20th century was also a period of University autonomy. The turning point 
was a student rebellion at the University of Cordoba (in Northern Argentina) in  




1918 that launched a movement that would have vast consequences for the entire 
continent. The student movement, called the “Reforma de Cordoba”, advocated the 
secularisation and democratisation of the elitist, traditional Universities that were 
considered as ―schools of castes‖. The Reforma  proposed to organise a self-
governing, autonomous University, led by the establishment of a joint academic 
governance by faculty, students and alumni, named "co-Government" . 
 
According to Schugurenski (2002) the most important features of the Cordoba 
Reform can be summarised as follows:  
”a) institutionalisation of student participation in University councils,  joining professors 
and alumni in a three-party system known as co-governance.  
b) a linkage between student politics and national politics in order to mobilize the 
University toward the solution of economic, social and political problems.  
c) an emphasis on University extension, particularly courses for workers that would lead 
to the development of fraternal bonds with the proletariat.  
d) tuition-free education and open admission to all academically qualified applicants, in 
order to replace the elitist and archaic 19th century University with a democratic, modern 
and mass University.” (p.2) 
 
The Cordoba movement soon spread its word throughout the continent and 
inspired similar movements, most notably in Peru, Uruguay, Chile, Cuba, Colombia 
and Guatemala. One of the consequences of the Cordoba Reform was the 
politicising of the student body for elections within the Universities. In this activity, 
students were normally connected with, and supported by, national political parties. 
This is certainly a key feature to be recalled when considering the proposals 
coming or supported by the student unions in the continent: political activism on the 
part of student unions is considered a normal aspect of the University experience  




and is accepted as a customary means of political socialisation, especially rooted 
and supported in the ideas and the structures of the political left.  
 
On analysing the history of the Uruguayan students union -called “FEUU” - Van 
Aken (1990) comments:  
“Most (...) are persuaded that the current structure and procedures inside FEUU 
provide a place to the (ideas of the) left (…)...the University is even more politicised 
than ever... these is not due to the political parties, but it is due to the student (union). 
Those students who claimed for the academic freedom as a right to face political 
influences have introduced the leftist activities and ideologies (to the University). Most 
students have no idea about the high degree of influence of the leftist politicla parties 
in academic affaires ” (pp: 253-254)  
 
Other consequences of the Reforma 
 
 It is important to emphasise two other aspects of the Cordoba Reform which relate 
to  the  creation  of  concepts  that  remain  deeply  rooted  in  most  of  the  public 
Universities  in  Latin  America:  the  co-Government  system  and  the  tuition-free 
model. 
 
The first concept, the co-Government system, means that the University council 
and  the  Faculty  bodies  are  tripartite  bodies  integrated  by  representatives  of 
professors,  students  and  alumni.  Most  public  Universities  include  in  the  co-
Government frame this representation, not only at the central level or in Faculty 
councils, but in committees and ad-hoc commissions as well. This system means 
that  University  authorities  (often  made  up  of  co-Government  members)  adopt 
decisions  based  upon  the  co-Government  advice,  rather  than  on  independent,  




technical or professional advice. According to tradition this modus operandi assures 
full representation of the co-Government members in all University affairs.  
       
The co-Government system has some critics. For instance, Van Aken considers 
that ―The co-Government system has opened the door to the political left by the back door of the 
University...”(p 253). 
 
In similar ways, while talking about the University of Buenos Aires (called the UBA), 
Garcia de Fanelli says: “In the tradition of the 1918 Cordoba Reform…according to the UBA 
statute, the president is elected by the University assembly, which is composed of the deans and 
academic  bodies  of  the  13  faculties  and  the  University  council.  One  characteristic  of  these 
representatives, as well as those from student unions, has been their ties with major political parties. 
Consequently,  there  has  been  an  element  of  partisanship  concerning  the  way  votes  from  the 
constituencies have been cast.”(2005, p.3) 
 
As  a  result,  some  critics  consider  that  co-Government  does  not  assure  full 
participation because “... the majority of the student population and the faculty are not motivated 
to become involved in University elections and academic politics” (Garcia de Fanelli, 2005, p.3) 
 
The other aspect is tuition-free education. The Reforma model implies that public 
higher education institutions in Latin America are to be predominantly tax-financed 
and tuition-free based. In most cases, this aspect has been enshrined within the 
countries´ National Constitutions or by National education Laws.   
 
This is, clearly, a key aspect of Latin American public higher education, because it 
has shaped a system in which the public institutions are reluctant to charge tuition-
fees.  Only  in  Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica  and  Guatemala,  do  the  public  




Universities  charge  tuition-fees,  and  in  Peru,  Bolivia  and  Mexico  they  charge 
symbolic fees (Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p. 7)   
 
The main economic and equity arguments of the Cordoba Reform about tuition-free 
education  were  based  on  the following  concept: any  tuition-fee would  place an 
intolerable burden on students of modest means and therefore reduce access.   
 
Today, the main student unions remain as strong critics of tuition, even of a modest 
tuition, and add other elements to their arguments: ―... the introduction of tuition  is  an 
extension of a World Bank neo-liberal agenda and a promotion of the power of the market over 
academic considerations and state responsibility (Levy and Arenas, 1999).  
 
As  a  consequence,  reforms  to  introduce  or  increase  tuition-fees  are  often  not 
politically viable and, in many cases, meet with major resistance. Garcia Guadilla 
considers that “...the payment of tuition-fees is a dilemma, because it has immense political and 
socio-cultural consequences. That is why, few (Latin American) countries have been successful in its 
introduction” (2005, p.24). 
 
For instance, in 1999, a move to raise tuition levels at Mexico‘s largest University, 
Universidad  Nacional  Autónoma  de  México  (UNAM)  had  to  be  abandoned  following  a 
student strike that closed down the University for nearly an entire year.  
 
Interestingly,  the  UNAM  strike  shows  that,  despite  the  lack  of  motivation 
commented  above,  students  retain  the  power  to  disrupt  and  to  block  certain 
reforms. 
 
However, the Reforma movement, which was incendiary in its rhetoric against the  




University establishment, was also conservative in its accomplishments. Whilst the 
Universities became less subject to daily interferences from central Governments, 
they did not incorporate new social groups or improve the quality of teaching 
(Schwartzman, 1991). The Latin American reformed Universities became the 
places where the children of the traditional élites expressed their frustrations against 
the decadence of their elders (Schwartzman, 1991). Albornoz (1993) comments 
that Latin American Universities became  
“...academic entities in non intellectual societies which train people in societies where 
such a life is quite remote from the daily life of the society. As such, the Universities 
have not become instruments to nourish the process of modernisation; rather they are 
still institutions that reproduce and perpetuate a given social order” (1993, pp: 855- 
857). 
 
3.1.1.4. Universities as non research institutions 
 
The idea of the University as a research centre arrived late to the Latin American 
continent and, only in the 1920s, did science evolve into an integral part of the 
education provided in the Universities of Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, 
Uruguay and, shortly thereafter, Brazil (Cetto and Vessuri, 1998, p.1; 
Schwartzman, 1993b, p.9).   
 
Nevertheless, although most Latin American Universities are concentrated in 
professional fields in Faculties with scarce research activities, the Universities, 
especially the public ones, have had a significant rôle in the creation of knowledge 
in the region (Arocena and Sutz, 2000; 2001; Cetto and Vessuri, 1999) and have 
remained the main vehicles for scientific research. 85 % of scientific research is 
undertaken by Universities, in particular by public Universities (IESALC, 2005, p.  




199). In Brazil, for example, 41 % of all research groups are concentrated in five 
institutions: three Universities of Sao Paulo State and two of the more traditional 
federal Universities (CINDA, 2007, p. 177). The University of Sao Paulo (USP) is 
the recipient of around 60 % of all thematic projects launched in that State through 
a mode of financing established by the Sao Paulo State Promotion Agency in 1991 
(CINDA, 2007, p. 183). In Mexico, UNAM remains the most prominent centre for 
scientific research, with specialised research institutes within the Schools and 
Faculties (Ríos y Herrero, 2005, pp: 50-52).  
 
FIGURE 1 below shows that there is a high concentration of scientific researchers 
working in higher education institutions and, at the same time, there is a notorious 
difference in the regional numbers with those of selected countries of other world 
regions (FIGURE 2). 
 
FIGURE 1. Distribution of researchers in the employment sector in selected countries (in %) in 1999 
  Government  Higher education  private sector  other sectors 
ARGENTINA  7,9  64,7  25,7  2,1 
BRAZIL  37,3  49,3  11,3  0,7 
URUGUAY  13,4  85,7  1,0   
         
AUSTRALIA  11,0  28,2  58,3  2,6 
CANADA  6,9  51,8  31,0  0,2 
Source: Secretaría de Ciencia y Tecnología e Innovación Productiva (SECYT)   and Red iberoamericana  de  Indicadores de Ciencia y 
Tecnología (RICYT) (2001). 
 
Further, in Latin America, the number of individuals working in scientific activities is 
low if we compare it with the numbers of some industrialised countries. 
  



















Source: Secretaría de Ciencia y Tecnología e Innovación Productiva (SeCyT)   and Red Iberoamericana  de Indicadores de Ciencia y 
Tecnología (RICYT)  (2001). 
 
 3.1.1.5. University expansion 
 
After the 1950s, the process of expansion of the University system was extremely 
rapid (Schwartzman, 1993b). Expansion was due to irresistible sociological trends: 
secondary education was gradually expanding; middle-class women went to work 
and continued to study; and evening courses opened everywhere for working 
lower-middle class sectors (Schwartzman, 1999).   
 
From 1980 to 1994, enrolment in Latin American higher education increased by 
over 2.5 million at an annual rate of 4.5 % (IESALC, 2005, p. 198). Although 
average per capita income in the region increased, absolute levels of poverty rose 
and disparities in income worsened. In 1994, the number of students enrolled at 
higher educational institutions totalled nearly 8 million and the teaching staff over 
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Some countries kept open the gates of their public institutions, leading to ―mega 
Universities‖ like Buenos Aires (316.050 students) or Mexico (170.018 students) 
(Schwartzman, 1993b). Its most immediate consequence was that higher 
education became very expensive to maintain, not just because of the increased 
number of students, but mostly because of the growing number of academic and 
administrative staff.  
 
The evolution of some Universities to enormous institutions 
 
Most of the public Universities placed in the capital cities of the Latin American countries that 
descend from the Spanish colonial period or from the Independence days evolved into very 
large institutions. Today, many of the largest Universities of the region have an enrolment of 
70.000 students or more.  
 
There is probably no other region in the world with this experience of higher education 
institutions of such magnitude and political importance.  In other parts of the world, the 
appearance and organisation of ―mega Universities‖ has occurred in a radically different 
ways; for instance, under schemes of distance or open education (i.e. the Open University in 
the UK or the Spanish UNED (Universidad de Educacion a distancia); as multi-campus 
systems (for example that of the State of California or SUNY, in USA); or under a scheme of 
national Universities, like in Japan (covering about 500 thousand students in the whole 
country). However, in these cases the size of institutions never comes near that of the Latin 
American macro-Universities (Didriksson 2003). This is, certainly, unparalleled in the 
international experience.   
  




Also, elsewhere in the world, the challenges of increasing enrolments in higher education 
were undertaken by the re-constitution of higher education systems leading to further 
institutional differentiation. This has not been the case in most Latin American countries 
which in all cases lack the overall strategic planning related to student participation and 
access (Didriksson, 2003). For example, while only 1.9 % of individuals between 20 and 24 
years old studied in higher education in the region in 1950, this figure jumped to 20.7% on 
average in 1994 (Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p.6) and the region fully entered into the global 
model of massification of higher education. In the same year, the total student registration in 
higher education in Latin America was more than 7 million, of which almost 68,5% was 
located in public Universities (IESALC, 2005, p 197).   
 
Even though tertiary enrolments grew significantly in virtually all countries (Garcia Guadilla, 
2005, p.9) these was not accompanied with national policies oriented to re-craft the higher 
education systems, based on careful planning, priorities or, at least, some kind of visionary 
thinking. Enrolment expansion was, mostly, absorbed by the existing National Universities, 
based in the capital cities, that already had estates, classrooms and equipment, and, not the 
least, promoted open-access and associated tuition-free institutional policies. In addition, 
these institutions, under the inspiration of the Reforma, had the willingness to receive more 
and more students in order to assure the democratisation of knowledge.  
 
 
A Latin American crafted category: the so called “macro-Universities” 
  




Based on enrolment numbers, Rama (2002, p. 1) and Didriksson (2002, p. 4 ) group a series 
of Universities in a category that they  term  “macro-Universities", trying to expose a 
phenomenon  that, according to their view, offers great originality.  
 
In this category, they include the Uruguayan public University, UdelaR, and three Argentinean 
Universities: Buenos Aires, with close to 300.000 students enrolled, Cordoba with more than 
110.000 students enrolled and La Plata with more than 90.000 students enrolled (Didriksson, 
2005). 
 
What are the specific features and common characteristics that categorise an institution as a 
macro-University”? Didriksson (2002, pp: 10-20) describes the key features of the "macro-
Universities" as follows: 
 
  Size: These Universities have more than 60.000 students enrolled.  
 
  Complexity: Teaching activities in this institutions cover all disciplines and embrace 
the whole set of the areas of knowledge. This means that such institutions require a complex 
organization. 
 
    Research activities: These institutions represent an important gathering of researchers 
and post-graduate programmes and form, by far, the highest percentage of national and 
regional scientific research. 
 
    Funding patterns: All are public institutions and all are funded by public subsidies. In 
addition, they absorb the most significant percentage of the national budget for the higher  




education system and their main financing source comes from Government funds. 
 
   Rôle  in the protection of the cultural and historical heritage of their nations. They 
are responsible for the protection of a notable physical and ideological legacy and often a 
unique historical, cultural and natural patrimony. 
 
FIGURE 3 ―Macro-Universities‖ in selected countries Year 2004 
  Institution 
Number 
of students 
ARGENTINA  Universidad de Buenos Aires  316.050 
ARGENTINA  Universidad de Cordoba  116.627 
ARGENTINA  Universidad de La Plata  94.283 
BRAZIL  Universidad de Sao Paulo  70.354 
COLOMBIA  Universidad Nacional de Colombia  84.052 
HONDURAS  Universidad Nacional de Honduras  79.346 
MEXICO  Universidad Autonoma de Mexico  170.018 
SANTO DOMINGO  Universidad Autonoma de Sto Domingo  161.200 
URUGUAY  Universidad de la Republica  70.156 
Source:  Didriksson  (2002) 
 
3. 1.2. Current issues in Latin American higher education. 
 
Some  authors  show  concern  about  considering  a  single  pattern  for  all  Latin 
American institutions. For instance, Schwartzman (1994) comments:  
"There must be room to question this concept. What is in common between the School 
of Medicine  in San Paulo, the Universidad de San Marcos and a small technological  




institute in Valparaiso? Resources, objectives, clientele, graduates, cultures, all are so 
different that very few things can be said that could embrace them all" (p.1). 
 
However, other authors identify some distinguishing features of the Latin American 
higher  education  systems:  Garcia  Guadilla  (2005),  Brovetto  (2002),  Yarzabal 
(2001), Rama (2002) and Rodrigues Dias (1996).   
 




As already expressed by Trow (1973, p.1) ―in every advanced society the problems of higher 
education are problems associated with growth‖. In Latin America, as higher education 
became a mass phenomenon, expansion has substantially transformed the higher 
education scene in the region.  
 
By the end of the 20th century, the number of university students in the region has 
increased from 270.000 in the 1950s to more than 7 million in the mid 1990s and to 
12 million in the mid 2000s (Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p.6). Castañeda (1993) pictures 
this increase as follows: 
“Student population increased fifteen fold in Mexico and Brazil.(For instance) Peru´s 
student population also grew more that fifteenfold: from 16.000 on 1950 to 246.000 in 
1980”. (p.191) 
 
As noted above, this enrolment expansion was primarily absorbed by the public 
Universities, some of which grew to unmanageable proportions (Kent 1998, p.3)  




and now suffer a consequent over-saturation in the number of students per 
classroom. 
 
As elsewhere, mass higher education in Latin America developed since the 1960s 
in a phenomenon called ―massification‖, a consequence of a combination of forces 
that resulted in an enormous increase in demand for higher education. Trow (1973, 
p1-2) explains that the transition from elite to mass higher education poses a variety 
of problems for the educational systems that experience it and for societies that 
support them, such as: a) the rate of growth associated to the number of students; 
b) the absolute growth of both the systems and individual institutions; and c) the 
changes in the proportion of the relevant age grade enrolled in institutions of higher 
education.   
 
However, it can be argued that, in the Latin American region, this phenomenon 
resulted, not as purposeful planned projects of Governments and University 
administrators, but as a consequence of large-scale social, economic, and cultural 
changes beyond anyone‘s control (Schwartzman, 1996).   
 
The increase in higher education enrolment in Latin American during the last four 
decades is remarkable. In 2004, an average of 27% of the relevant age cohort in 
the region was enrolled in a higher education institution (Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p. 
9). This constitutes an annual growth rate of 4.4% since 1985. Argentina and Chile 
are among the regional leaders with enrolment rates well above 30% (FIGURE 4). 
However this rate remains lower than those of industrialised countries, North 
America and Europe, where equivalent figures may exceed 70%. 
 
  



















Source:  Garcia Guadilla  (2005, p.9) 
 
3.1.2.2. Diversification in institutional structures 
 
Under the heading of ―diversification‖ it is possible to identify two aspects: (a) the 
growth in the number of the non-university higher education institutions and (b) the 
significant growth of the enrolment of students in private higher education. 
 
3.1.2.3. The growth of the non University sector  
 
In the past 20 years, the number of non-university institutions has increased. In the 
mid 1990s, there were about 800 Universities as well as roughly 5400 non-
university education institutions (54% of them private) (Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p. 8). 
In the mid 2000s, the number of non-university higher education institutions has 





ARGENTINA  51 
BRAZIL  20.4 
COLOMBIA  20.8 
CHILE  48.1 
PARAGUAY  15.5 
MÉXICO  22.9 
URUGUAY  35.8 
VENEZUELA  34.4  




non-university system accounts for 28, 30 and 32% of total tertiary enrolment, 
respectively (Garcìa Guadilla, 2005, p. 10). 
 
Examples of such institutions are technical schools and teacher colleges. In 
Mexico, for instance, several new institutions, called “Technological Universities‖ 
were created, offering two year postsecondary training linked to regional job 
markets and in close coordination with local business leaders. The experiences of 
the French Instituts Universitaires de Technologie and the community colleges of the 
United States seem to have partially inspired policymakers in this case (IESALC, 
2005, pp: 198-199).  
 
3.1.2.4. Growth of the enrolment in private higher education. 
 
In the early 1960s, only Brazil, Colombia and Chile had an important private higher 
education sector. In 2002, about 47,5% of higher education enrolments in Latin 
America were in private institutions (Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p.5). In Brazil, 
Colombia, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Chile, the 
majority of students are now enrolled in private, rather than public, institutions 
(Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p.32)(FIGURE 5). 
 
There is an exception in this institutional character in Cuba, because there are not 
private institutions in this country. All Cuban higher education institutions, including 













FIGURE 5:   Percentage of private enrolment in 1995 and 2002 


























































































Source: Garcia Guadilla (2005, p. 7)  
3.1.2.5. Problems of access 
 
Access to higher education is still insufficient and reveals inequities between 
regions, within regions and between countries. As mentioned above (p.92), in the 
mid 2000s participation of 18-30 year olds in higher education, dropped to 20% in 
Brazil, to 15% in Paraguay and 20% in Colombia while in Argentina it dropped to 
51%, and to 48% in Chile (Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p. 9).   





While the middle class represents 15% of the population in the region, 45% of 
students enrolled in higher education institutions belong to this sector (Rama, 
2002). However, this position is even more worrying when certain groups are 
considered: Rama has examined some countries in which the aboriginal groups 
represent a high percentage of the total population, for instance 50% in Bolivia, 
48% in Guatemala, 38% in Peru and 25% in Ecuador. In all these cases, the 
access to higher education of these groups is extremely low (Rama, 2002). As 
Albornoz (1993, p. 141) points out:  
“access to the University is restricted according to the peculiar social division in each 
society. No “cholo” – native Peruvian- would be found in any of the elite Universities in 
Lima and no “negro” would be found in the same kind of University in Caracas”. 
 
IDB (1997) considers that this situation is largely caused by the current public 
financing patterns used in the region, which favours the middle class. Most public 
students come from a middle class, ranging from substantial privilege to modest 
backgrounds, where the very rich and the very poor are only a minority. This has 
been confirmed by studies developed by UdelaR (2000) and Torello (2004) in 
Uruguay, and by Gonzalez Rosada and Menendez (2001) in Argentina.  
 
UdelaR´s study shows that, in Uruguay, the majority of public University students 
belong to the top two quintiles of the income distribution and to relatively highly 
educated families. In similar ways, the Argentinean study suggests that the highest 
majority of the students (almost 90%) in tuition-free public Universities have higher 
than median per capita family income and that close to 50% of them previously 
attended tuition-financed private secondary schools.  
  




As a consequence Albornoz (1993) concludes: 
“Latin American Universities remain elite institutions, with the largest masses of Latin 
Americans unable to enter these institutions. Within each Latin American  society the 
University remains dominated by the axis of political power and defined by the social 
structure of underdevelopment and unequal distribution of wealth”(p. 140). 
 
3.1.2.6. Financial pressures 
 
This is a key feature identified by Schwartzman (1993b) who explains that: "In the 
public sector, the problems of financing tend to overwhelm all others" (p.12). Finance of the 
higher education system, he thinks, is the most significant policy problem for higher 
education in the continent.   
 
The dominant model of funding for public higher education  in the continent, that he 
describes as historical-bureaucratic,  is "has failed” because: (a) resources allocated 
to the sector have been insufficient; (b) it is inadequate for the  economic 
development established by the Governments and (c) the funding systems have 
allocated the resources in inefficient ways inside the higher education sectors and 
have not encouraged efficiency, effectiveness or quality (Schwartzman, 1994). 
 
Latin American public higher education, predominantly tax-financed, is also the 
main recipient of the growth in the student demand through a policy of open 
admissions and tuition-free education. Within this context, whilst State involvement 
reflects a priority attributed to education by Governments from across the region, 
the public resources devoted to sustain this expansion have not been able to 
maintain the expenditure per student. 
  




At this stage, Schwartzman (1992) wonders how higher education can continue to 
be financed in a context of scarce public resources and pressures for higher 
expenditures and increasing enrolments and costs while there will be "pressures for 
evaluation, administrative efficiency and accountability are likely to increase, together with a growing 
movement toward new sources of income, including cost recovery from the better endowed students 
" (p. 24).  
 
As a combination of all those factors, Cetto and Vessuri (1998) observe the 
following picture: 
“   It is currently calculated that approximately one-third of the teachers in the region’s  
higher education system are primarily involved in teaching under more or less 
overcrowded conditions. There is also a large contingent of teachers who work on an 
hourly basis in a variety of institutions, particularly public Universities with little prestige 
or chronic overcrowding, but also in larger public institutions such as the University of 
Buenos Aires (UBA) and the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) (p 
5). 
    




   
SECTION 2: NATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
3.2.1. About Uruguay 
 
Uruguay is South America's smallest country with an area of 176,215 square 
kilometres. It borders the Atlantic Ocean between Argentina and Brazil. The 
country has 3.314,466 inhabitants (according to the survey carried out by the 
National Statistics Institute in 2006), with 1.345,010 living in the capital city 
Montevideo, one of its 19 political departments. 
  
Uruguayans share a Spanish linguistic and cultural background, even though about 
one-quarter of the population is of Italian origin. Most are nominally Roman 
Catholic, although the majority does not actively practice a religion. Church and 




Uruguay's economy is based mainly on livestock breeding and related industries 
such as wool, leather, and meat production. The country has abundant natural 
resources, including fertile land, minerals and fisheries. Its main agricultural 
products are barley, wheat, rice and citrus fruits. Uruguay exports beef and other 
animal products, wool and textiles, chemicals, rice and fish. 
 
3.2.3. Social aspects 
 
Uruguay has demographic characteristics similar to those of industrialised  




countries: life expectancy at birth is 76 years (World Bank, 2006) and infant 
mortality rate is 12 (World Bank, 2006). Its per capita income of US$ 7.468 is high 
by regional standards, (see below FIGURE  6).  
 
The Uruguayan level of social development is high, as indicated by the United 
Nations 2005 Human Development Index (HDI). The country‘s HDI, based on three 
factors -health and longevity (life expectancy), education (literacy and years of 
schooling), and quality of life (per-capita GDP)- puts the country fifth in the Latin 
American ranking, after Argentina, Barbados, Chile and Costa Rica (UNDP,  2006).  
 





















Source: UNDP (2006) 
 
FIGURE 7:  Uruguay social basic social indicators (in 2006).  
Population:  3.32 (in millions) 
Population growth (annual %):  0.1 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years):  76 
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URUGUAY  43 
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Fertility rate, total (births per woman):  2.0 
Mortality rate under -5 (per 1,000):  12 
GNI per capita (in US$): 7.468 
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group):  99 




3.2.4. Political system 
 
Uruguay is a republic state based on parliamentary democracy with a presidential 
form of Government. The President is elected by a popular vote for a five-year 
term. He or she is both chief of the state and head of the Government and the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Executive power is exercised by the 
President and thirteen cabinet Ministers. 
 
Legislative power is vested in the legislature (usually called the Parliament) which 
is bicameral with:   
  a Chamber of Senators (called the Upper Chamber) having 31 seats with 
members elected by popular vote (proportional representation) to serve five-
year terms and the Vice-president who presides it and   
  a Chamber of Representatives (called the Lower Chamber) having 99 seats 
with its members elected by popular vote (proportional representation) to 
serve five-year terms.  
 
The judiciary is largely independent of the executive and the legislature. The 
highest court is the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court judges are elected for 10- 




year terms by the Parliament. Below it, are appellate and lower courts, and justices 
of the peace. In addition, there are electoral and administrative courts, an accounts 
court, and a military justice system. The legal system is based on the Spanish civil 
law system and the main source of the law is the Constitution of 1967. 
 
3.2.5. Major political parties 
 
Uruguay has a multi-party system, with three dominant political parties:  
  the Partido Colorado (Colorado Party) a liberal, right wing, urban based party. It 
is the most elected party in Uruguayan history;   
  the Partido Nacional (National Party), created by conservative landowners. It is a 
right wing party; and 
  the “Frente Amplio”, a left wing parties coalition of socialists, former urban 
guerrilla members (called “Tupamaros”), communists, social-democrats, 
Christian-democrats and dissident members of the Colorado and Blanco 
parties. 
 
3.2.6. Current situation 
 
In the early 2000s, Uruguay found itself in a serious economic recession which was 
partly linked to regional difficulties. The Uruguayan economy is very dependent 
upon regional links. The next door neighbours, Argentina and Brazil, alone, 
accounted for almost half of Uruguay‘s trade. With respective GDPs of nearly 50 
and 12 times that of Uruguay, the economic size and location of both of these 
countries enable them to have a strong influence over Uruguay. 
 
  




A combination of events, such as the financial collapse of the Brazilian currency in 
1999 and the external debt default in Argentina in 2001, prompted a severe financial 
crisis, with widespread illiquidity and insolvencies in the domestic banking system; 
a sharp depreciation of its currency followed by high inflation; and a doubling of the 
























The Uruguayan 2002 crisis was a major banking crisis. 
  In total, approximately 33% of the country's deposits were 
taken out of financial system and five financial institutions 
were left insolvent. A massive run on the banks by 
depositors caused the Government to freeze banking 
operations.  
  The national currency “the peso” devalued by 98%. In a period 
of a year, the peso became worth almost a half of its previous 
value.   
  All of Uruguay‘s foreign debts were in dollars, while the 
Government revenue was in “pesos”. This meant that a debt 
burden of a million pesos suddenly became two million. 
Previously feasible debts suddenly became enormous.  




The crisis pushed the Uruguayan economy into negative growth.  In the short term, 
unemployment and growing poverty created greater social exclusion and public 
insecurity, and threatened the achievements of Uruguay as a middle-income 
country. 
 
Although Uruguay‘s economy showed signs of recovery in 2003-2005, this 
improvement was not reflected to the same extent in income levels and the 
condition of the more vulnerable groups. According to UNDP (2005), poverty in 
Uruguay tends to be concentrated within the youngest segments of the population.  
 
However, the increase in child poverty cannot be blamed exclusively on the 2002 
economic crisis. Katzman and Filgueira (2001) also point out that the situation in 
which nearly half of all children and adolescents live in poverty dates back over two 
decades (pp: 61-64). In 2003, 56.5% of children under 6 were living in poor 
households and could not access sufficient food and basic goods and services 
(UNDP, 2003, p. 21). 
 
Currently, the Government of Uruguay is dedicated to addressing the problem of 
poverty in the country. Social programmes and institutions are attempting to 
address the highest levels of poverty of an increasingly structural nature that have 
developed in recent years.  
 
3.2.7. A new administration 
 
A new administration headed by Frente Amplio was elected in October 2004. In 
Uruguay, this election meant that, for the first time a left-wing party was in charge 
of a State-wide administration.   





When the Frente Amplio party defeated the ruling Colorado Party, it was seen as 
part of a regional political trend which had seen the emergence of left-wing 
Governments in Brazil, Venezuela, Chile and Argentina. In addition, a general 
distrust of controversial reforms, including privatisation measures, the outsourcing 
of some public services to the private sector and the severe economic crisis on 
2002, were said to have also contributed to Uruguay's dramatic political shift.  
 
On taking office, the newly elected President of the Republic and Frente Amplio 
leader, Mr Tabare Vazquez, announced that he would pursue a moderate political 
course, with the emphasis on alleviating poverty, including a US$100 million 
Emergency Plan to help the poor. He also promised to build better relations with 
neighbours, Brazil and Argentina; and diplomatic ties with Cuba were restored. 
    





SECTION 3: THE URUGUAYAN SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
The higher education system in Uruguay comprises one University -the University 
of the Republic, UdelaR- and another eight higher education institutions in the 
public sector, and four Universities and eight university institutes in the private 
sector.  
 
FIGURE 8:  Enrolments in Universities (in 2006) 
   Number of students 
 
UDELAR   88057 
 
UNIVERSIDAD ORT   5863 
 
UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA   5911 
 
UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO   1612 
 














Based on: Anuario estadístico de Educación 2007, MEC,  Dirección de Educación  ISSN 0797- 6038 
 
As seen in FIGURE 8 (above), the public University represents, by far, the greatest part 
of student enrolments. In this context, due to cultural and historical reasons, and to 
the weak role of the Ministry of Education and Culture, UdelaR has played a 
dominant role in the scene of higher education in the country. It is considered “the” 
University, a centre of gravity so prominent that it practically makes the system all 
by itself (Brunner and Becerra, 1999; Bentancur, 2002). Consequently, the UdelaR 
policies and problems are the problems and policies of the whole higher education 
system.  
 
From 1833 to 1985, the public University had the monopoly of University studies in 
Uruguay, evolving in isolation with no academic references, except those coming 
from abroad (Martínez Sandres, 1999). Furthermore, following the pattern of the 
colonial Universities in the continent, in its creation, this University was in charge of 
all public education in Uruguay. However, during the 19th and 20th centuries, 
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i)  In 1875, elementary education was moved to a Council of Primary 
education and in the 1930s the secondary schools were placed in a 
Council of Secondary education. In 1941, technical and vocational 
studies were also placed in another public agency. In the 1970s, these 
three agencies were placed under the framework of a single institution 
called ―educational Administration of Public education‖, in Spanish 
ANEP. This evolution reflected the policy direction given by the National  
Constitution, passed in 1918, of placing certain activities - for instance, 
transportation, banking, insurance and  education -  in autonomous 
agencies that  operate with complete independence (institutional 
autonomy) from the national Government.  
 
ii)  In 1984 a national law permitted the creation of private Universities. As a 
consequence, since 1985 the Ministry of Education and Culture has 
authorised the creation of several institutions. This was the beginning of 
a new era for Uruguayan higher education with the emergence of a 
private market and some reduced involvement of the Uruguayan 
Government in the sector.  
 
    










Notwithstanding the fact that during the 20th century UdelaR lost the role of 
provider of public education at all levels, it is still the biggest higher education 
institution in the country and the only public University. According to MEC, in 2006 
UdelaR had 88.057 students enrolled in 109 undergraduate programmes (MEC, 
2006, p. 56).  
 
The main features of the University were defined in 1958 in the University Organic 
Law and the National Constitution of 1967. These measures continue to define the 
University today, as follows: 
 
  Following the Reforma inspiration, the Organic Law established what is called 
a co-Government system, as explained previously: the effective participation in 
the governance of the University by students, faculty and alumni (pp: 79-82 above). 
 
  In addition, UdelaR is defined by the National Constitution as an 
autonomous institution which means that it is an institution which develops its 
activities with total independence from the national Government, setting its own 
rules in all respects. 
  




  Another key element is open access. Following the Reforma pattern, access 
to UdelaR has been traditionally unrestricted to those who complete their 
secondary studies.  
 
  Last, but not least, the University is a tuition-free institution, a principle that 
has been inspired by the Reforma and vigorously defended and re-inforced in the 
past by the University authorities. All attempts to introduce fees have encountered 
major resistance. 
 
3.4.1. Structure of UdelaR 
 
The UdelaR is structured in thirteen Faculties and ten Schools that are subdivided 
into Departments or Institutes. Each Faculty or School is responsible for 
educational and research programmes, and for granting diplomas within a general 
framework of autonomy in academic matters.   
 
In 2006, UdelaR´s Faculties or Schools awarded 109 University degrees (MEC, 
2006). Research is a major duty developed by the University as it is responsible for 
81 % of the Uruguayan scientific research (Bertola et al, 2005). Due to a recent 
internal re-organisation, the Faculties are considered as components of five ―areas‖ 
related to basic academic disciplines: Science and Technology, Social Sciences, 
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Source: UdelaR, Dirección Gral. de Planeamiento and SECIU (2005). 
 
3.4.2. Governing bodies 
 
The University is directed by a Central University Council which comprises the 
Rector, the members that represent the undergraduate students, the alumni and 
the teachers, and a representative of each Faculty. The University central 
administration comprises one Vice-Rector and four Pro-Rectors in Teaching, 
Research, Outreach and Management respectively.  
 
Each Faculty or School is administered by a Dean or a Director in the case of 
Schools and a Faculty Council elected each four years. This Council includes the 
Dean (or School Director) and elected representatives of the undergraduate 
students, the alumni, and the teachers.   
 
Election of University authorities is an important tradition within University  




governance in UdelaR. All political authorities are elected by bodies – called ―the 
Cloisters‖- comprising academic staff, students and alumni representatives who 
are themselves elected in national elections (called ―elecciones universitarias”).   
 
The participation of the University constituencies in the elecciones universitarias is 
mandatory: all have an obligation to vote. Those Faculty members, students or 
alumni who do not vote in the elecciones universitarias suffer economic punishments 
(in the case of the teachers and the alumni) or academic penalties (in the case of 
students).   
 
3.4.3. Student body 
 
According to the Ministry of Education and Culture, in 2006 UdelaR had 88.057 
students enrolled in 109 undergraduate programmes (MEC, 2006, p. 56).  
 
All students receiving a secondary school diploma are entitled to access UdelaR 
and there are no entrance examinations for undergraduate programmes. On the 
other hand, access to post-graduate programmes is generally driven by high 
academic standards (UdelaR, 2002). 
 
As the only public University in the country playing a leading role in the sector 
(Brunner and Becerra, 1999), UdelaR has faced almost alone since the 1990s the 
burden of massive enrolments. As shown below, and as analysed by Lemes (2002, 
p.10), from 1958 (the year of the Organic Law) to 2000, enrolments in UdelaR grew 
more than 400 %. 
 
  





FIGURE 10: UdelaR total number of students in selected years 
YEAR  TOTAL 
2006  88057 
1999  70156 
1988  61428 
1974  26220 
1968  18160 
1960  15320 
 
























FIGURE 11: Increase in the number of students enrolled in Uruguayan Universities in selected years 
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Source: MEC (2007) 
 
 
3.4.4. Academic and administrative staff 
 
The University staff consists of academic and non-academic employees. 
In 2004, the University had 7. 824 academic staff and 5.177 non-academic 
employees ( UdelaR SUI, 2005). All employees are subject to Statutes adopted by 
the Central University Council within the framework of public autonomy. 
 
The academic staff includes five classes of professors: attendant (grade 1), 
assistant (grade 2), adjunct (grade 3), associated (grade 4) and Chair (grade 5). All 
positions are held on a competitive basis within public calls and there are no 













2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
UdelaR
Total private universities 





FIGURE 12: Number of academic positions per academic unit (according to grades) in UdelaR in 2004 
  Gr 1  Gr 2  Gr 3  Gr 4  Gr 5  Total 
AGRONOMY 
 
71  95  85  28  26  305 
ARCHITECTURE 
 
208  148  213  61  38  668 
ECONOMICS 
 
294  257  139  62  70  822 
LAW 
 
161  266  231  127  82  867 
ENGINEERING 
 
172  153  173  52  52  602 
MEDICINE 
 
191  386  231  97  43  948 
DENTISTRY 
 
71  198  97  23  36  425 
CHEMISTRY 
 
115  97  59  24  18  313 
VETERINARY 
 
121  87  64  28  7  307 
HUMANITIES 
 
52  59  51  18  19  199 
NORTH CAMPUS 
 
30  23  6  1  1  61 
UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 
 
139  230  140  86  36  631 
ARTS 
 
29  27  21  4  15  96  




Source: UdelaR, Dirección Gral. de Planeamiento and SECIU (2005). 
 
Post-graduate programmes are still few in number and, in many cases, are very 
recent in establishment. As a result, only 8% of the academic staff holds master-
level degrees, 6% holds doctoral degrees; and 1% has post-doctoral education 






125  163  63  17  13  381 
NURSING 
 
29  81  48  7  18  183 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 
 
56  128  87  20  33  324 
BASIC SCIENCE 
 
118  134  82  31  21  386 
LIBRARY SCIENCE 
 
18  2  38  0  0  58 
MUSIC 
 




26  22  21  0  0  69 
FOOD SCIENCE 
 
0  0  0  0  1  1 
RECTOR´S OFFICE 
 
14  26  38  11  11  100 
TOTAL 
 
2049  2594  1940  697  544  7824  




3.4.5. Management problems  
 
Management problems are identified at all levels of the organisation (Diaz et al, 
1992). In addition, co-ordination within the different levels is scarce (UdelaR, 
1997). Brunner and Becerra (1999, p.17) suggest that management systems at 
UdelaR are "in bankruptcy‖.  
 
Lack of institutional planning, management and monitoring has been repeatedly 
reported by UdelaR (1997) and by Brunner and Becerra (1999).   
 
  University governance has suffered a system fatigue since the early 
1990s (Grompone, 1994; UdelaR 1997). Lack of consensus observed as 
an ideal for democratic decision making has contributed to  an  absence 
of decision-making. Lemes (2002) terms this situation as a "blockage” 
(2002, p. 14) which means that the institution has no capacity to adopt 
the decisions that are required to change the current situation. 
 
  The management information system is technically inefficient and lacks 
any ability to evaluate the performance of the component parts of the 
institution. The difficulties have been reported during the 1990s and the 
2000s by Rama (2002) and by UdelaR itself (1997; 2001; 2004), but 
have still not been overcome. In general, there is a lack of appropriate 
information about the sector and the information systems that are 
available are out-dated or not oriented to support the adoption of 
decisions at any level (Abadie and Pereira, 2001; Serna et al, 2004). 
Despite these problems, UdelaR has decided to embark on University- 




wide processes, like institutional evaluation and accreditation that will 
require reliable and functional managerial information systems in place. 
 
  Resources available to UdelaR have fallen sharply in real terms. 
Massive enrolments have not been accompanied by institutional 
measures or by growth of public funding. Errandonea (1990) 
summarises this process in explaining that “the educational growth has been 
bigger than the economic growth" (p.  92).   
 
To understand this aspect more clearly, it has been common to compare the 
budget of the University with the budget of the nation (GDP). In the UdelaR 
case, the budget allocation represents the following numbers which confirm that 
the allocation has been falling constantly: 
 
FIGURE 13: UdelaR´s budget as a percentage of GDP on selected years 
1994  0.61 
1995  0.62 
1996  0.64 
1997  0.61 
1998  0.62 
1999  0.65 
2000  0.57 
2001  0.67 
2002  0.57 
2003  0.57 
2004  0.52 
Source: Bentancur (2001)  and SUI UdelaR (2005).   





  One of the main challenges for UdelaR is how to deal with a large 
number of students while the current facilities are not enough. One can 
observe that, simply, the UdelaR does not have room for all the students.  
 
Bentancur (2005) described the picture inside the University as follows: 
 “ …classes (are) taught in big rooms or even in locations not specifically designed for 
teaching (cinemas, amphitheatres, etc.), that usually are not ample enough to allow 
access to all enrolled students, an extremely low teacher/student ratio, and, as a 
consequence, a methodology of teacher centered presentations with almost no 
possibilities of exchange with students” (p.5). 
 
At the same time, there are not enough teachers. In 2003, UdelaR reported 
overcrowded classes at several Faculties like Economics, Communication Science 
and Law (SUI, 2003, p.53). 
 
The fall in the budget/student ratio that was experienced by UdelaR, as a 
consequence of the relative ―freezing‖ of State allocations during 2001 to 2005 
(FIGURE 14 below)  and the increase in the number of students ( FIGURE 10  above) 
below exacerbates the stress that exists between quality of education and the 
needs of a large student population. 
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Allocated in $ 
 
 














381.088.000  18.6  
























793.658.000  28.4 
Source: SUI UdelaR  (2006) and  Banco Central del Uruguay (2001,2002,2003,2004,2005) 
 
  As mentioned above, access to the UdelaR is unrestricted to those who 
complete their secondary studies. However, while contemplating the 
current conditions in which courses are taught in the majority of the 
University‘s schools, especially in the first years of each programme, it 
becomes evident that such openness might have had an adverse impact 
on the quality of the resulting teaching (Bentancur, 2004, p. 10). For 
instance, the following description was provided during a Parliamentary 
session: 
“I am a teacher in the (public) University since 1960, I teach every two days in the 
week. I can assure that the conditions of the facilities are really very bad due to the 
lack of resources. I am talking about a field that I really know well. For instance the 
library of the Faculty of Law does not receive any international publications because 
they can´t afford them. Fortunately since I came back in 1985 -after being dismissed 
by the dictatorship- I taught to large groups with more than 300 students. I am very 
happy about that. Unfortunately those students cannot sit down because we don´t 
have chairs. During this winter we have been very lucky because we had electricity 
but, during the last years, we had problems with the electricity provision… This is not 
about bad management…it is about lack of funding”  (Senator Jose Korzeniak, 
Frente Amplio MP, July 23, 1997) 
 
  According to Bentancur, one form of adjustment has been related to the 
teaching staff: while the actual University income has decreased  




constantly in relation to GDP (FIGURE  13, above) and teacher salaries have 
decreased by 23%, both the number of teaching positions and the 
number of hours of teaching dedication have increased (Bentancur, 
2001, p. 13).  
  
As an example, FIGURE 15 below shows the amounts of academic salaries, an 
eloquent enough picture of the economic stress at all levels. 
FIGURE 15: Salaries of the academic staff in UdelaR up to January 1, 2004 (in US dollars). 
 
Nr.Hs/week  G 1  G 2  G 3  G 4  G 5 
10  39  53  67  79  91 
20  87  120  153  180  207 
30  149  204  260  306  352 
40  246  337  429  505  581 
 
Source SUI  UdelaR (2005); and Banco Central del Uruguay  (2005) 
 
  Unlimited access and consequent massification might be connected with 
other indicators of University efficiency which show the low performance 
of the institution: high drop-out rates and programme-completion times 
far longer than expected (Bentancur, 2004, p. 10). 
 
  

























UdelaR at a glance 
 
 Up to 2005, most statistics for UdelaR showed a serious situation: 
 
  82, 3 % of total national enrolments in higher education in the country attended 
the public University (MEC, 2006).  
  
  The average time taken by students to graduate was 1.7 times longer than 
theoretically expected (Serna et al, 2005, p 10).  
   
  76% of entrant students left  the institutions before completion (Chiancone 
and Martinez Larrechea, 2006, p.41) 
 
  66,3% of students  came from Montevideo, the location where the University is  
placed (UdelaR , 2006, p.40). This meant an under-representation of students 
coming from outside Montevideo which represented, in demographic terms, 55% of 
the total high school graduates (UdelaR , 2005, p.40).   
 
 78% of students came from the richest two quintiles, which represented 
middle and upper- middle class households while needy students (poorest two 
quintiles) represented only 11.6% of enrolments (UdelaR,  2006, pp 26-40).    
 
  A major contribution by students towards their income while studying came 
from earnings through employment or personal savings. 43% of students worked 
in full time jobs (Serna et al, 2005, p.153). Interestingly, while attending a 
Parliament hearing, the University Rector, Dr Rafael Guarga pictured this 
situation, commenting: “we (UdelaR) donﾴt have students...we have workers...ﾨ” 
(August 15, 2000). 
 
  Student progress through the system was probably influenced by the 
elements described above: the retention rate represented 23% (Serna et al, 2005, 









3.4. 6. Internal resource allocation 
 
Internal resource allocations are decided according to historical precedence. The 
income which is received from the Government allocation is top sliced for central 
services and the remainder is allocated to Faculties and Departments which 
operate as semi-autonomous budget centres. 
 
The basis of financial allocation within the University is largely historical. Cost 
centres receive staff, space and other resources on an incremental basis which 
implies that every year the Faculties receive "automatically" the same amount of 
money. Variables like unit costs, enrolment growth or new study programmes are 
ignored in institutional resource allocation processes. Any reduction of funds to the 
University flowing from the Ministry of Economy and Finance would be 
implemented by internal cuts to these recurrent allocations "across-the-board"; so 
no selectivity is applied. 
 
However, it is important to point out that, in 2000, this internal resource allocation 
method had variations. As resource allocation from the Central University Council 
to the Faculties relied on a historical model, the methodology drove to internal 
imbalances inside UdelaR that were never corrected through resource re-allocation 
(UdelaR, 2001). In 2000, UdelaR´s Central Council and the Rector´s office 
introduced the concept of a ―correcting historical budget" (UdelaR, 2001, p.24), a 
notion that entailed some "remediation" to consequences of enrolment growth and 
the emergence of new units or study programmes. This concept entailed the 
recognition, for the first time, that University allocations have to consider other  




elements rather than purely historical precedence (Abadie and Pereira, 2002, 
p.45). 
 
3.4.7. A crisis behind the doors 
 
Finally, it is interesting to show that in 1994, Barbato edited a series of essays 
reflecting some critical views about the performance of UdelaR during the late 
1980s and early 1990s. In particular, this book contained the ―Documento de los cuatro” 
("Document of the Four‖, Barbato, 1994) authored by four dissident Deans of the 
UdelaR. This essay is considered as a landmark in University reform since the 
1990s and is, perhaps, the only proposition about University change coming from 
within the University authorities. The document emphasised the critical, and often 
under-recognised, importance of a strategic plan in the higher education sector. In 
addition, it introduced concerns about the system's structure and about the need 
for creating new programmes inside UdelaR and other higher education 
institutions, i.e. Polytechnics. The document argued for a deep discussion of 
University issues, including open access to studies, institutional evaluations, and 
reform of institutional management and governance (pp: 179-206). 
 
The ―Documento de los cuatro” was, at that time, vigorously resisted by most of the 
University authorities, including members of the Central University Council, the 
Rector, the Vice-Rector and other important officers. Some of these officers 
considered the Document as an ―internal attack‖, written under the influence and 
the ideology of the Inter American Development Bank (Ares Pons, 1994; Ubach, 
2000).   
  




Nonetheless, this reaction offers a good example of how the attempts to introduce 
a discussion about the problems of UdelaR encounter major resistance behind its 
doors. Furthermore, like other discussions that are mentioned in this study (i.e. the 
imposition of tuition in Latin American public Universities), some of the internal 
actors show the capacity of paralysing the discussion and placing the problems in 
an agenda that is never addressed. 
 
Interestingly, Martinez Larrechea (2003), Bentancur (2002) and Chiancone and 
Martinez Larrechea (2006) consider that the propositions contained in the 
Document were the catalysts for changes that were introduced in UdelaR in the 
late 1990s, including the introduction of a University strategic plan and diverse 
Institutional Evaluation programmes. 
 
    





SECTION 5: OTHER PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 
 
Public non-university institutions are oriented to train students in specific fields as 
follows: 
 
1.  There are four institutes focused on training officers for the military, navy, air 
force (all of these dependent of the Ministry of Defence) and for the police 
(dependent on the Ministry of the Interior). These institutes operate with very little 
autonomy; their teaching staff and study programmes require approval by political 
authorities, such as the Minister of Defence or the Minister of the Interior.  
Military: Escuela Militar  e Instituto Militar de Estudios Superiores  
Navy: Escuela Naval y  Escuela Superior de Guerra  
Air Force: Escuela Militar de Aeronáutica  y Escuadrón de Vuelo Avanzado  
Police:  Escuela Nacional de Policía  
 
2. There are, also, three other institutes oriented to train teachers, that operate with 
complete autonomy from the national Government. These institutions belong to 
ANEP, the public educational body that provides primary, secondary and technical 
education.  
Instituto Magisterial Superior 
Instituto de Profesores Artigas 
Centros Regionales de Formacion de Profesores 
 
Teacher education in Uruguay follows a pattern in which teachers receive training 
in  specialised  institutions  outside  the  Universities.  These  institutions  provide  




education to teachers of basic, secondary and technical education. Their degrees 
are higher education degrees, but are not "University degrees". 
 
3. Two other institutions are focused in training for the fields of industrial design 
(“Centro de Diseño Industrial”) and drama. 
 
The Uruguayan Government funds these institutions through their ―mother" 
institutions, such as the respective Ministries or ANEP (Brunner and Becerra, 
2002).  
    










The National Constitution of Uruguay guarantees that all provision of education 
(public or private) in the country operates within a right that it denominates 
―freedom of teaching‖ (article No. 68). This ―freedom‖ is actually “a right” that implies 
that all private educational institutions in Uruguay are free (have the right) to select 
their own staff, approve their study programmes and award their own degrees 
(Martins, 1975 p. 40). 
 
In 1984, the military Government established by law (Decree-law No. 15661) that 
private Universities were authorised to function under an ex ante control by the 
Ministry of Education and Culture. At the same time, the Government authorised 
the functioning of the first private University in the country: the Catholic University 
(UCUDAL) . 
 
In 1995, ten years after the end of the military dictatorship, the Ministry of 
Education and Culture promoted the approval of a Government decree No. 308/95 
that enabled the creation of three new Universities and various University 
Institutes. In the absence of a General Law on higher education, the activities of 
private institutions are regulated by that decree and other successive amendments.  
 
The Decree No. 308/995 provided a regulatory framework to ensure that 
institutions are financially viable, can count upon the necessary physical and  




human resources, and that their academic offerings meet acceptable standards of 
quality. In order to comply with the latter requirement, private providers of higher 
education are requested to submit their academic programmes periodically. 
 
Private provision of higher education in Uruguay grew steadily from 1985 to 1998. 
In 2007, the Ministry of Education and Culture reported that approximately 14997 
learners were enrolled in private higher education institutions (FIGURE 16) below 
which entails 17.6% of total enrolments. According to national statistics developed 
by that Ministry, there is a tendency towards an increase in total student enrolment 
in the private sector (MEC, 2003; 2005; 2007)  
 
FIGURE 16:  Evolution of enrolments in private Universities (number of students in selected years)  
Source:  MEC  (2007). 
Source:  MEC  (2007). 
 
The new institutions created since 1985 offer relatively few disciplines, mainly 
those related to law, economy and computing systems.  They are small institutions 
that have followed the pattern of UdelaR in many ways. They are structured in 
Faculties and offer programmes that are very similar to those delivered by the 
   1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2003  2006 
UNIVERSIDAD  
CATOLICA 
1853  2112  2214  3355  4057  3286  5911 
UNIVERSIDAD  
ORT 
3361  3474  4808  3227  3445  3827  5863 
UNIVERSIDAD  
DE MONTEVIDEO 
    186  223  575  916  1612 
UNIVERSIDAD  
DE LA EMPRESA 
        470  n/a  872  1611 
TOTAL  5124  5686  7208  7275  8077  8901  14997  




public University, with a strong professional orientation (Martinez Sandres, 1999). 
However, unlike the public University, the private institutions do levy tuition fees. 
 
Although, tuition fees vary from University to University and between subjects, 
degrees in professional programmes, like law or administration, will charge similar 
fees. An average fee would represent an amount of US$ 200 per month in 
Universidad ORT (http:// www.ort.edu.uy, 2007) or Universidad de la Empresa 
(Martinez Larrechea, 2006). Only the Universidad of Montevideo charges fees that 
are, comparatively, 50% higher (Martinez Larrechea, 2006).    
 
It is interesting to observe that, although the enrolment rates in the private 
Universities are still not very significant, compared with national enrolments,   their 
graduation rates in certain fields are highly significant. In 2004, for example, 43,6% 
of national graduates in the field of computing systems, corresponded to one of the 
private Universities, the Universidad ORT (Martinez Larrechea, 2005).  
 
During the 1990s and the early 2000s, the private Universities were almost 
invisible in the research field. These related to the financing structures as they 
were highly dependent on student tuition (Martinez Larrechea, 2005). However, 
since the mid 2000s, some scientific groups placed in the Faculties of Engineering 
and Management of the Universidad ORT and in the Faculty of Social Science of 
Universidad Catolica have been successful in obtaining funding on a competitive 
basis from the National Science and Technology Council (Martinez Larrechea, 
2005). 
 
Also, it is interesting to observe that the private Universities have been very active 
in the creation and development of post-graduate programmes, mostly masters  




degree programmes (Martinez et al, 2004; Abadie et al, 2007) as shown in FIGURE 17 
below.  
 
FIGURE 17:  Number of post-graduate programmes in selected years 
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The biggest private University, called Universidad Catolica del Uruguay Damaso Antonio 
Larrañaga, UCUDAL, belongs to the Catholic Church and is managed by the Society 
of Jesus (the Jesuits). The University Chancellor is the Archbishop of Montevideo.  
  
Founded originally as an Institute of Philosophy in 1954, this institution was 
originally oriented to studies in Philosophy and the Humanities. The University 
awards undergraduate and post-graduate degrees in the social sciences, and the  




humanities, computing systems, dentistry and nursing (Monreal, 2004). 
 
3.6.2. ORT University  
 
This institution was founded in 1943 as the technical school Escuela Técnica ORT 
oriented to technical and vocational studies and to support immigration (Martinez 
Larrechea, 2003). It was authorised to function as a University in 1986.  
 
The University functions as Universidad ORT de Uruguay, which is owned by the 
Asociacion Uruguaya ORT, a branch of ORT International, a Jewish-affiliated 
association (Martinez Larrechea, 2003). The University awards undergraduate and 
post-graduate degrees in Engineering, Management and Social Sciences, 
Communications and Design and Architecture. 
 
3.6.3. Universidad de Montevideo   
 
Founded originally as an Institute of Business Studies (Instituto de Estudios 
Empresariales de Montevideo) in 1986, it was authorised to function as a University in 
1997.  
 
The University functions as Universidad de Montevideo under the "spiritual" patronage 
of the Catholic Group called Opus Dei (Martinez Larrechea, 2003). The University 
awards undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in Engineering, Management, 








3.6.4. Universidad de la Empresa 
 
Founded originally as a School of Business in 1992 (Escuela de Negocios del Uruguay), 
it was authorised to function as a University in 1998.  
 
The University functions as Universidad de la Empresa and operates under the 
patronage of Association of Marketing Directors (Martinez Larrechea, 2003). It 
awards undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in Management, Social Science 
and Agricultural Management. 
    





SECTION 7: THE ROLE OF THE URUGUAYAN STATE 
 
 
The process of decentralising education that operated during the 19th and 20th 
centuries in the country meant that the Ministry of Education and Culture has 
become, in the long term, a "ministry without schools". In spite of this, the Ministry 
is in charge of leading national policies of education (Decree 407/85). As all the 
educational agencies are autonomous, it has no control over public education. 
Therefore, there are no central authorities to establish the strategies for the sector 
(Rama, 1994).   
 
In fact, the relationship between the Government and the educational public 
institutions operates through the Ministry of Economy and Finance which is 
responsible for delivering the State subsidies (Decree No 194/997).    
 
Also, due to the evolution of UdelaR´s role in the educational history of Uruguay, 
as discussed above (p.108), the Constitution and the laws have granted duties to 
the public University that, in other countries, would belong to a Ministry or an 
independent agency (Martinez Larrechea, 2003; Brunner and Becerra, 1999). 
There is an interesting example that illustrates this situation.  For some time, 
UdelaR considered that it had a regulating role over all University education in the 
country, even the private institutions (UdelaR, 1997). According to this view, 
UdelaR had to authorise the creation of private Universities. Only a national law 
that followed a public debate placed this duty within the frame of the Ministry of 
Education and Culture (Law No 15661). 
  




A possible consequence of this situation is reported by Lemes (2002) who pictures 
a Ministry of Education and Culture which lacks human and financial resources. 
This, he thinks, means that the Ministry is unable to address emerging duties in the 
sector, such as licensing or accreditation of private institutions.  A similar view was 
expressed by Reimers (1994) when reporting that several Ministries of Education 
in Latin America lacked trained human resources with the ability or expertise to 
deal with broad technical aspects in the educational field.   
 
For these reasons, a complicated scenario for Uruguay and its higher education 
emerges. It is agreed that educational policies and eventual reforms require 
decisions, structures and administrative critical mass, all of which, as shown by 
Lemes, the Uruguayan Government lacks.  
 
On analysing higher education policies in Uruguay, Bentancur (2002) observes the 
following key elements:  
a. There are very few Government policies. 
b. Governments do not have a strategic view about the higher education sector. 
c. Almost all legislation related to higher education is contained in budget laws in 
response to the financial bids coming from UdelaR, which suggests that the 
solutions are ad hoc. 
d. The Government´s main preoccupation is about impact on public expenditure 
and with macroeconomic variables. 
 
Martinez Larrechea (2003) adds that there is a déficit in co-ordination at the 
Uruguayan system of education. The public education institutions, ANEP and 
UdelaR are responsible for more than 90% of enrolments. At the same time, these 
are autonomous institutions and take their own decisions. The rest of the system,  




the private sector, operates within a frame of academic freedom and is only 





The aim of this chapter was to provide a vision of the context of Latin American 
and Uruguay with reference to higher education systems and show some key 
aspects of the Uruguayan case. 
 
A special section was devoted to the analysis of the public University UdelaR 
which faces severe management and governance problems due to increasing 
enrolments, scarcity of funds and political confrontations.  
 
In another sector (pp: 129-134 above), I have analysed briefly some key aspects of 
the new private sector, which is not only responding to the demands of a growing 
student population but is facing incipiently some challenges in the field of scientific 
research. 
 
Finally, I reviewed the current situation of the Ministry of Education and Culture, a 
―ministry without schools‖. The Ministry is in charge of leading national policies of 
education, but as all the educational agencies are autonomous; it has no control 
over public education and seems to have no role in the educational scenario.   




    











CHAPTER 4: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
  




Aim of the chapter 
 
This chapter complements Chapter 2 but is mostly intended to link the selected 
topic with a larger field of study, informing past and present policy and practice and 
providing a context for interpreting the new findings.  In addition, this review is 
intended to show that this research is an original contribution to the discipline that 
will help to clarify what is already known and will provide continuity with other 
research and projects that have already been undertaken. 
 
The chapter comprises three sections. The first is intended to present the studies 
that analyse and explain the concepts that serve as a base for the development of 
funding models in higher education. The second section reviews the literature 
about the models in action and the third section examines studies about the 
funding of higher education in various countries, including European, North 
American and Latin American cases. This will help in understanding whether the 
method adopted in Uruguay conforms to other established models or represents a 
different, innovative approach. 
 
 
    









The literature already discussed in Chapter 2 has demonstrated the evolution in 
funding models during the last 30 years.  The models analysed above have been in 
use -or are still in use- due to a context that favoured their application. However, it 
is clear that, in the last 20 years, higher education systems have had to address 
serious difficulties related, to a large extent, to the process of shifting from elite to 
expanded mass-based tertiary education under severe resource constraints. 
 
Certainly, it can be observed from the literature that there are significant linkages 
between the models of funding and the economic and political context (Brunner et 
al 1995; Albrecht and Ziderman, 1992a). That literature also shows the breadth 
and complexity of the subject. The explanation of their relevance requires 
placement of the finance of higher education within a broader context of societies 
with evolving needs. Public expenditure on higher education has emerged to be a 
significant part of total public expenditure, justified by the crucial role that higher 
education plays in the development of national economies. Modern societies need 
to invest in teaching and research to keep up with growing competition in the 




Various authors show the policy dimension in the use of funding models.   




For instance, Sheehan (1996) suggests that the construction of a framework of 
finance for higher education requires a reasonably clear understanding of the 
context of public policy goals for higher education and of the changing structure of 
society and economy. "Only within this frame", he explains, "is it that a funding model may be 
crafted" (p.1). In the same direction, Hauptman (1998) points out that funding is one 
of the principal public policy vehicles for higher education, while Bowen (1980) 
summarises this concept in saying that the allocation for higher education 
expenditures is ultimately determined by the amount of money that a society is 
willing to devote to the sector. In Latin America, ANUIES fully agrees with this 
approach arguing that the amount of funds that a society is able to devote to higher 
education reflects the importance that this society gives to knowledge (2000).  
 
Blondal et al (2002, p. 11) picture the meaning of the policy dimension as follows: 
“...public policy  enters the picture most directly through the arrangements for public funding of post-
compulsory education.” 
 
4.1.1. Expansion of enrolments 
 
An important theme underlying the model reforms agenda is the need for 
expansion driven by the demands of a growing population in higher education. The 
major forces for this expansion include: (a) the expansion of basic and secondary 
education which creates a strong potential demand for the tertiary level; (b) the rate 
of growth in the proportion of the cohort that opts to enter tertiary education 
(Johnstone et al, 1998, p.3); and (c) increasing emphasis on social equity, offering 
opportunities to groups traditionally under-represented in higher education.  
 
  




4.1.2. The financial crisis 
 
While the sector, throughout the world, experienced a tremendous expansion, the 
dominant theme of higher education in the 1990s was financial distress. The major 
factors which contributed to the ―fiscal crisis‖ were (a) the tendency of unit costs in 
higher education to rise faster than unit costs in the overall economy and (b) the 
increasing scarcity of public revenue due to the competition with other public needs 
like basic education, public infrastructure, health, the maintenance of public order, 
environmental stabilisation and restoration, and addressing the needs of the poor. 
 
Since the 1980s, a series of studies (Psacharopoulos, 1980; Bowen, 1980; Bogue, 
1982; Fielden, 1982) reported a dramatic increase in enrolments coupled with 
reduced Government spending and reductions in per student expenditures. Most of  
these reports pointed to the need for introducing changes in funding models and 
for the adoption of alternative strategies to address these problems. 
 
As the increasing demand for higher education services exceeded the capacity of 
the available public budgets, the place of higher education within public funding 
priorities became more complicated.   
 
Psacharopoulos (1980) commented:  
“higher education, the highest step in  educational stairs is usually placed at the lowest 
place in the list of educational priorities. The most common prescription for economic 
development is to give priority to basic education. This is to be expected when high 
proportions of the populations are illiterate or University  graduates remain 
unemployed." (p.1).  
  




Scholars like Psacharoupoulous represented a new school of thought in higher 
education studies based on works in the Economics of education. This school 
argued for "worldwide reform agenda for the finance and management of Universities and other 
institutions of higher education” (Johnstone et al, 1993, p.2). The dominant themes of 
various studies during the 1990s were financial distress and the belief that higher 
education was “…in crisis throughout the world.” (World Bank, 1994, p.1). 
 
In Latin America, enrolments in most of the public Universities rose while financial 
resources per student felt dramatically, and the shortfalls in per student funding 
resulted in major declines in the quality of higher education across both the private 
and public sectors (Moura Castro and Levy, 2000). Writing about developing 
nations, Lewis and Dundar (2002) pictured a terrible situation:  
“Buildings are deteriorating, most research laboratories lack modern equipment,teaching 
materials are missing, staff are underpaid and often underprepared, and outdated 
curricula are prevalent. Travel budgets and supplies are very limited. Not surprisingly, 
the share of library and publication expenditures are nearly invisible in the overall 
expenditures of most Universities (...) Most important, salaries of professors have 
dramatically deteriorated while shifting recruitment and commitment away from the 
profession. Faculty have taken on second and third jobs in order to maintain 
professional life standards.” ( p. 7). 
 
Johnstone (1993) identifies four major factors that contribute to this fiscal crisis: (a) 
an increasing enrolment pressure while there is inadequate higher educational 
capacity to meet the growing demand; (b) a tendency in unit costs in higher 
education to rise faster than unit costs in the overall economy; (c) increasing 
scarcity of public revenue; and (d) growing dissatisfaction with the rigidities and 
inefficiencies of the public sector .  






4.1.3. Changes to face the crisis 
 
In  the  majority  of  developing  countries,  economic  crisis  was,  by  far,  the  most 
important  factor  driving  the  introduction  of  ambitious  reforms  in  the  higher 
education sector since the 1980s (World Bank, 1997 p.151). 
 
How did the countries respond to the relative reductions in the availability of 
resources? The literature identifies responses that include: a) changes in public 
policies and reform of public sector financing (including budget, resource 
allocation, and expenditure models)  and b) a shifting of costs to direct 
beneficiaries, intended for the supplementation of public or Governmental 
revenues with non-Governmental revenues. 
 
4.1.3.1. Reforms in the public sector finance 
 
Financing of higher education has undergone important structural and functional 
changes over the past twenty years or so. The ways that Governments finance 
their institutions have been significantly modified in many countries.  
 
For the allocation of funds to higher education institutions, Governments use 
several approaches. Sometimes, Governments use a historical-negotiations-based 
approach. In other cases, we find formula-based mechanisms for the allocation of 
funds or performance based funding, which, in both cases, introduce a more 
objective and fair basis. In many countries, budget authorities make use of a  




combination of formulae systems, historical or negotiation-based models, and 
performance based systems.  
 
The evolution in the use of models of funding higher education systems  occurs for 
various reasons, but there is important literature that ties the evolution of models to 
the need to overcome the financial crisis and the problems of rising costs in higher 
education (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1992a;  Otten, 1996; and Gines Mora,1998). 
Other authors identify other needs, such as using more transparent, fair and 
predictable methods (Lang, 2004).  
 
In this section, I will analyse the literature about the operation and rationale of the 
finance models as provided by the literature. Most articles and books are intended 
to explain the concepts on which funding models are based and the consequences 
of the use of each of them, and offer suggestions about better models to be 
adopted when financing a system. These studies show that, within the context of 
scarcity of funds, there has been a movement away from historical, incremental, 
negotiated budgets to other systems that are perceived as more transparent and 
fair. 
 
Hereinafter this section will provide a brief review of the evolution of the models 
bearing in mind that Chapter 2 above (pp: 54-68) has already provided a 
description of each of them. 
 
Historical funding is identified as the traditional model of funding higher education 
systems worldwide (OECD, 1990; Schwartzman, 1993a; Brunner et al, 1995; 
Layzell, 1998; and Jongbloed, 2004).   
  




In the case of Latin America, for instance, the dominant funding model has been 
par excellence historical funding. Schwartzman (1993a) and Brunner et al (1995) 
reported that almost all countries in the region used a combination of annual fixed 
appropriations and ad hoc negotiations.  
 
These authors, together with Delfino and Gertel (1996), suggest that, in this 
continent, this historical model has resulted in low efficiency in the use of public 
funds and has created internal inefficiencies inside the Universities. Furthermore, 
these studies believe that this model has had negative effects in issues of 
efficiency and equity and in the performance of institutions.  
Delfíno y Gertel (1996, p.3), report that ―the  long lasting use of a historical model have 
created  inefficient management structures and (…) a perverse relationship between academic 
achievements and funding levels…” , because, as explained by  
Brunner (1993),  
 ―Political negotiations create a special relationship between the institutions and the 
State (the Government), in which “give and take” and corporative pressures, tend to limit 
the desirable transparency in the allocation of public resources” (p.21) 
 
During the 1990´s, several studies reported the evolution from historical funding 
patterns to alternative approaches, such as formulaic or strategic.  During these 
years, literature focused on new budgeting procedures, resource allocation, 
devolution and decentralisation, and on the results of the introduction of all these 
new approaches. It is certainly in that decade when several countries, including 
some Latin American countries, introduced formulaic approaches to cover 
elements of efficiency and transparency in public higher education funding. As we 
will see later in this chapter (p. 182) much of the budget reform agenda in Latin 
America results from recommendations by the World Bank (Johnstone 1991;  




1993b; Woodhall, 1992; World Bank, 1994; Ziderman and Albrecht, 1995; 
Johnstone, Arora, and Experton, 1998; Abeledo and Curcio, 2003). 
 
Already in the 1980s, several authors had introduced explanations about norms 
and formulae. For instance, studies by Morris and Sizer (1982) and Shattock and 
Rigby (1983) presented the existing approaches about resource allocation and 
funding methods in the UK. Interestingly, in "Resource allocations in British Universities", 
Shattock and Rigby devoted special attention to effects of the use of norms and 
formulae and highlighted that formulaic methods : a) have opened decision-making 
process to the scrutiny of academic departments; b) have increased confidence in 
the resource allocation machinery; c) have given academic departments a settled 
baseline for future planning;  and d) have introduced elements of certainty in the 
systems and the institutions.   
 
Similarly, Darling et al (1989) and Lang (2004) explained and analysed the use of 
formula funding among Universities and colleges in Canadian and American 
jurisdictions.   
 
In both countries formulae have been in use in many jurisdictions since the early 
1950s to allocate public funds among Universities and colleges. At least thirty 
American states and seven Canadian provinces use funding formulas of one kind 
or another (Lang, 2004,  p.1), and, according to this author, “...it is highly probable that 
formula funding in some form will continue as a major fixture in higher education finance.” 
 
However, Lang (2004) considers that, in Canada and the USA, some Governments 
and funding agencies are becoming wary of incentive and performance formulae 
due to political and financial reasons and explains:   




“The political reason is that (…)   formula funding can work in two directions. If a specific 
performance target is set, is visibly measurable by a "performance indicator," and is 
financed by earmarked funding, the effects of inadequate funding can be measured as 
well institutional performance. In other words, the Government's performance as a 
funding agent becomes visibly measurable too. The second reason is that incentive and 
performance formulas are expensive” (p. 34). 
 
More recent studies by the EURYDICE European Unit (2000) and by Jongbloed 
(2004) showed that, in European countries, one of the main trends of the 1990s 
and the 2000s was a move towards formula-based mechanisms. 
 
This funding approach induced institutions of higher education to adopt more 
transparent and flexible mechanisms in their internal allocations (Sandbach and 
Thomas, 1996, p.61). Additionally, while analysing the impact of national funding 
policies introduced in the United Kingdom since 1986, Thomas (2000) suggested 
that these policies had induced institutions to use a formulaic basis for resource 
allocations. Again, Thomas (2001) highlighted two main trends inside the 
institutions that had emerged as a result of the application of new frames of 
funding: (a) the use of  formulaic models induced by funding agencies and (b) the 
use of a strategy of decentralisation that permitted a more prompt response and 
clarified lines of accountability.   
 
However, formula funding was not the panacea. Already in the 1980s, Darling et al 
(1989) introduced critical concepts about this funding model. These authors found 
that, in Canadian provinces, there was a tendency to expect funding formulae to 
offset the effects of under-funding. They concluded that, whilst formulae provided 
stability, predictability, equitable allocations and accountability, they were just  




allocative devices that could not solve questions of insufficient funding. They 
affirmed: "those problems must be addressed by policies" (p.581).  
 
Layzell (1998) argued that, during the 1980s, there was an evolution from 
incremental and formula budgeting to  performance-funding categories intended to 
monitor the performance of public funded institutions through the use of 
accountability mechanisms (for instance, allocating resources  to institutions 
according to their achievement  of previously established goals, objectives or 
outcomes). This category, called "performance-based funding", was introduced in 
the State of  Tennessee in 1978 in order to provide incentive funding for academic 
performance of public colleges and Universities (Kaiser et al, 2001). 
 
Burke and Minnasians (2002) consider that, underpinning performance-based 
funding models is the linkage between performance and public accountability. 
These authors explain that the approaches were developed because of an interest 
in monitoring publicly funded institutions through a series of accountability 
mechanisms. 
 
Performance based categories were analysed earlier in Chapter 2 above (pp: 64-
68). Their importance has been outlined in the USA by Burke and Minassians 
(2003) who point out that they have been called “the most significant trend in State 
budgeting” by the Fiscal Survey of the States in the late nineties. Furthermore, the annual 
surveys by the Rockefeller Institute of Government show this practice as the 
budgeting phenomenon of the 1990s in public higher education; nearly three-
quarters of the States considered performance in budgeting for public colleges and 
Universities.   
  





Influence of the models on institutions 
In general, regulations have to do with the influencing of behaviour; for instance, 
trying to steer the decisions and actions of others according to certain objectives 
(Neave and van Vught, 1994,  p.3). Several authors found that national funding 
policies have influenced the internal financial systems of institutions 
(Thomas,1998; Field and Klingert, 2001; Montserrat et al, 1997; Newson,1993).  
 
For instance, on reporting findings from research at two United Kingdom 
Universities, Thomas (1998) points out that: ―turning now to the experience in the United 
Kingdom in seeking more efficient and effective methods of allocating increasingly scarce resources, 
the methodology at both at national and institutional level has become more formula-based. Greater 
transparency at a national level impacted on internal resource allocation procedures” (p. 5).   
 
Similarly, the Field and Klingert article analyses the evolution and impact of the use 
of resource allocation models in Universities of five European countries and is 
focused on the consequences of the funding models adopted by the Governments. 
These models, they think, represent a series of shifts that are increasing the scope 
for the distribution of resources inside the institutions. These shifts are the 
following: a) from line items to lump sum budgeting, b) from central control to 
decentralisation and c) from an emphasis on inputs towards an emphasis in 
outputs. These authors conclude that these developments have encouraged the 
use of internal mechanisms, like the resource allocation methods for instance, 
which would have been meaningless without those policies. 
 
In a later study, Thomas (2001) even pointed out that the British Government -
through HEFCE- has introduced constraints inside the institutions in relation to  




internal allocations. He argues that: "At the time when the UGC's funding methodology was 
clouded in mystery  heads of department  and deans were reliant on historical precedent and the 
power of their personality and departmental standing to influence resource allocations.  Once the 
Funding Council methodology became more transparent there appeared an additional tool in their 
armory: the figure published by the Funding Councils themselves, they now had the same figures on 
which to base their calculations and arguments" (p. 74). 
 
Similarly, Montserrat et al (1997) explain that Government financing is likely to 
exert influence on institutional behaviours and suggest that changes in the 
University sector will occur with the use of strong incentives coming from the 
Governments. According to Monserrat et al funding mechanisms may influence 
behaviours in strong ways, even stronger than administrative interventions.  
 
However, it is not only national funding policies that exert influence over 
institutional financial systems. Research by Jarzabkowski (2002) already 
mentioned above (p.51), examined the strategic implications of the resource 
allocation methodologies used on three Universities in the United Kingdom (LSE, 
Warwick and Oxford Brookes) and suggested that history, culture and structure 
influenced the choice of resource allocation methodologies and the degree of 
decentralisation. 
 
Furthermore, in an analysis about recent studies developed in the United Kingdom 
by Brown and Ramsden and by Bowden and Watson, Webber (2003) identified a 
direct relationship between institutional funding and institutional freedom pointing 
out that: "although Universities are constitutionally autonomous they are at the same time highly 
dependent of Government funding and therefore are highly exposed on changing political priorities.  




One of the inevitable consequences of dependence upon Government funding is the increasing 
demand to subject University activities to public scrutiny “ (p.93). 
 
4.1.3.2.0. Shifting costs to beneficiaries 
 
In the 1990s, together with the increasing scarcity of public funding, the analysis 
was focused on the costs of studies and placed them amongst the major issues of 
higher education policy. Within this frame, the literature shows that the other way 
that the reform agenda was implemented was  through a gradual transfer of the 
financial costs of higher education from Governments towards the students; in 
other words through the injection of private money into higher education. 
 
This concept, called “cost sharing,” as articulated in Johnstone (1986; 1992; 1993b), 
was one of the major recommendations from the World Bank and, for many 
experts, was considered as a solution for increasingly underfunded and 
overcrowded Universities in the developing world (Johnstone 1991; 1993b; 
Woodhall, 1992; World Bank, 1994; Ziderman and Albrecht, 1995; Johnstone et al, 
1998). As a consequence, the introduction of user fees or charges, as part of the 
cost recovery measures and efforts to share the cost of publicly financed services 
with users, was usually introduced as a condition for sectoral adjustment loans 
(World Bank, 1994).   
 
The need to raise additional funding to supplement Government revenue in the 
face of increasing demand for services is the key rationale for the introduction of 
user fees or charges. However, according to Johnstone and Shroff Mehta (2000, p. 
6) cost recovery does not only place emphasis on raising funds, but also on  




preventing over-use of services by consumers by making the latter more cost-
conscious. 
 
4.1.3.2.1. Rationale for tuition and other forms of cost sharing 
 
According to Johnstone and Shroff Mehta (2000, pp: 2-9), the principal rationales 
behind this shift are three: 
 
The first rationale is a financial one: there is a need for other-than-Governmental 
revenue within a context of increasing numbers of students, increasing per-student 
costs and declining tax-payer-based public funding. 
 
The second rationale is an ideological one: the notion of equity, which entails that , 
since there are high private rates of return—that is, personal benefits—of higher 
education, those who benefit should at least share in the costs. In a free higher 
education scenario: (a) education is paid for by all citizens; (b) through taxes that 
are collected through regressive systems; (c)  supporting a system in which the 
majority of the beneficiaries are from middle, upper-middle, and upper income 
families who could and would pay, at least, a portion of the study costs. 
 
A third rationale is the economic notion that tuition brings to higher education some 
of the virtues of the market: therefore 
(a)  a greater efficiency: that the payment of some tuition will make students 
and families more discerning consumers and the Universities more cost-
conscious providers and   




(b)  greater producer responsiveness: the assumption that the need to 
supplement public revenue with tuition, gifts, and grants will make 
Universities more responsive to individual and societal needs. 
 
Vossensteyn (2000, p. 3) adds a fourth rationale which refers to a practical notion: 
as the increasing demand for higher education services exceeds the capacity of 
public budgets, the higher education institutions, the students and their families 
must be creative in finding opportunities to finance the costs of study for growing 
numbers of students.  
 
Not everyone, however, shares these views. Some suggest that cost-sharing may 
prevent people from entering higher education, particularly students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds (Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000; Blondal et al, 
2002). Johnstone and Shroff Mehta (2000, p. 6) point out that, clearly, if public 
funding of higher education were to be cut, there would be a risk that participation 
might fall. This might explain why many students and families, both affluent and 
low-income, and both "left" and "right", often tend to oppose tuition. 
 
In addition, many public institutions and politicians have argued that low -or no-
tuition-fees- have provided greater equality of educational opportunity through 
providing greater access to historically under-served populations (Lewis and 
Dundar, 2002).  
 
Also, Vossensteyn (2000, p.3) explains that there is a vision which considers that 
the social benefits of higher education justify full public subsidies. In many 
countries, the answer to the question of “who should pay for higher education” traditionally  




has been “the Government.” These countries view higher education as a public 
service with public benefits (Vossensteyn, 2000, p.2).   
 
Barr (2004) explains this notion as follows: 
 “Since higher education creates social benefits it is right that there should always be a 
taxpayer contribution.(...) higher education matters no longer as a consumption good 
enjoyed by an elite but as an important element in national economic performance”( p. 
2). 
 
Considerable ambiguity still exists in the debate over whether tuition should be 
charged, and if so, to which students (Eurydice, 1999). Lewis and Dundar (2002) 
consider that around the questioning of which is the proper approach to tuition, 
there is a further political aspect that has to be considered too. These authors 
explain that many countries have been strongly opposed to any expansion of 
tuition or fees as a source of additional funding due to pressures from political 
grounds (pp: 11-13). 
 
Johnstone and Shroff Mehta agree with this view. As they see it, cost-sharing may 
not be easily accepted, especially in countries with dominant socio-political 
ideologies that hold higher education to be another social entitlement (Johnstone 
and Shroff Mehta, 2000, p.7). In these cases, these authors comment that some 
people worry that tuition may not lead to more resources for the University, or to a 
shift in public resources to other socially worthwhile programs, but simply to a shift 
of taxpayer resources from higher education to some other claims more politically 
forceful, including tax cuts for the wealthy (Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000 p.7).   
  




Besides, Blondal et al (2002) report that ―...countries which have introduced or raised fees 
risk to experience an increase in access disparities in the absence of effective and well targeted 
student aid mechanisms”(p. 32). 
 
Therefore, Governments should consider possible adverse effects on particular 
groups and introduce policies to minimise such negative effects on access by 
students from disadvantaged backgrounds. For instance, in many cases, loan and 
fee regimes have been introduced with elements of means testing and loan 
arrangements in ways that ensure that life time repayments are lower for 
graduates´ with lower incomes and or do not begin until graduates incomes exceed 
a set threshold in the future (Blondal, 2002, p.27). 
 
In the same direction, considering that, to a large extent, inequalities in the access 
to higher education are determined by what happens to various groups in primary 
and secondary education, Barr (2001) suggests the use of other measures to 
promote access, for instance:  
“… Financial incentives to Universities to widen participation. (…) Extra personal and 
intellectual support (to students), at least in the early days. (…) Raising aspirations of 
school children, for instance through the  promotion of Saturday Schools, visit days, 
visits by academics to schools to make the idea of higher education more tangible, visits 
by current students,(…) mentoring of schoolchildren by current University students. (…) 
More resources earlier in the education system, which is where the real barriers to 
access occur. This includes more resources for teaching. It also includes financial 









FIGURE 18: Advantages and disadvantages from tuition based systems according to the literature. 




ARGUMENTS AGAINST TUITION 
 
ARGUMENTS PRO TUITION 
 
  Tuition  may discourage University attendance.  
Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000  
 
  Imposing tuition or increasing it at a rapid rate might 
exclude potential students from poor or rural or otherwise 
disadvantaged families.  
Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000 
  Enrolments might be 
dampened for those whose access is already compromised by  
low income.  
Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000 
 
  While tuition is charged the educational activities may be 
supported  by offering financial assistance to individuals 
during their studies through loans (i.e., loans that do not 
depend on the credit worthiness—and thus the financial 
worth—of the family), or means-tested student grants. 
Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000 
 
  






    THE IDEOLOGICAL RATIONALE 
 
 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST TUITION 
 
ARGUMENTS PRO TUITION 
 






  Higher Education generates considerable positive 




  Higher Education has come to be regarded as a shared 




  Those who benefit should at least share in the costs. 
Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000 
 
  Tuition free Higher Education is actually paid for by all 
citizens, whether or not they know that they have been 
taxed. 
 Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000   
 
  Most taxes are collected through regressive 
taxes.  
Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000 
 
  A very disproportionate number of the 
beneficiaries of Higher Education are from middle, 
upper middle, and upper income families who 
could and would pay at least a portion of the costs 
of instruction if they had to.  










THE IDEOLOGICAL RATIONALE 
 
 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST TUITION 
 
ARGUMENTS PRO TUITION 
 
  Society is the major beneficiary of Higher 














  Tuition free Higher Education provides equal 
chances to rich and poor for gaining a University 
place  
Psacharoupoulous and  Papakonstantinou (2005)            
 
  There are demonstrably high private benefits 
received by the graduates and their families. 
Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000 
 
 
  There are private benefits that college students 
receive in the form of higher incomes by virtue of 
their college attendance and graduation. 
Hauptman, 1991 
 
  Benefits associated with education may accrue to 
individuals in the form of additional earnings, 
improved employment probability, stronger 
attachment to the labour market, better health and 
a range of other non-monetary benefits. Blondal 
et al, 2002 
 
  Higher Education students still tend to come from 
relatively favoured background. Blondal et al, 
2002 
 
  Financing arrangements tend to be regressive. 
Those not participating in Higher Education -- 
typically people from disadvantaged backgrounds 
and with modest income prospects -- do not 
benefit at all from public funding in this area. 








  An accompanying expansion of students’ access 
to loans to finance their education could offset  




THE IDEOLOGICAL RATIONALE 
 
 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST TUITION 
 
ARGUMENTS PRO TUITION 
    
  An accompanying expansion of students’ access 
to loans to finance their education could offset 
such effects, and the experience of countries that 
have combined an increase in tuition fees and an 
increase in student loan facilities suggest that 
there are no significant adverse effects on 
participation. Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 
2000 
 
  It is well-known that graduates on average have 
significantly higher earnings than non-graduates. 
Since higher education creates social benefits it is 
right that there should always be a taxpayer 
contribution. But given the robust evidence on 
private rates of return, excessive reliance on 
public funding is inefficient. Graduates should 
contribute to the costs of their degrees.  Higher 
education should not be free; its costs should be 









   
 
THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE 
 
 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST TUITION 
 
 
















  Public financing of provision has been the 
traditional means in most countries to 
encourage post-compulsory education 




  Tuition - as a price- brings to Higher Education 
some of the virtues of the market : 
 
(i) greater efficiency:  the payment of some tuition will make 
students more discerning consumers and the Universities 
more cost-conscious providers.  
(ii) responsiveness: will 
make Universities more responsive to individual and societal needs.  
Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000 
 
 
  Tuition  tends to reinforce the inequities already 















































THE PRACTICAL RATIONALE 
 
 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST TUITION 
 
 
ARGUMENTS PRO TUITION 
 
  Increases in tuition may not lead to more resources 
for the University and will not determine a shift in 
public resources to other socially worthwhile 
programs. It will determine a shift of taxpayer 
resources from Higher Education to some other 
claims that may be more politically forceful. 
Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000 
 
  Governments do not or cannot provide 
sufficient public revenue to Higher Education.  
Therefore, the continuing austerity will 
become  damaging to the point of severe 
enrolment limitations and increasingly 
inadequate quality Johnstone and Shroff 
Mehta, 2000;  Vossensteyn, 2000  
 
 
  Public funds are limited. As a result, Higher 
Education increasingly must compete for 
scarce public resources with other important 
public services, such as health care, 
infrastructure, and primary and secondary 









SECTION 2: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 
 
Empirical studies have analysed the evolution in the funding approaches in specific 
cases and show useful experiences from all over the world. This section will focus 
on cases that are identifiable or relevant for the research topic.  
 
4.2.1. European countries 
 
European countries have experimented with large scale changes in funding 
methods  since the 1990s, that Jongbloed and Salerno consider " the most important 
since the  emergence of the national higher education systems in the 19th and 20th centuries " 
(2004, p.18). According to Eicher (1998), these changes have entailed deep 
quantitative transformations and very important structural changes  that have 
occurred due to: a) a transition from élite to mass higher education which enrols 
between one-and two-thirds of the secondary school leaving age group, depending 
on the country; b) an evolution in the models of funding institutions; c) an increase 
in the application of tuition fees in different forms and methods; and  d) increasing 
problems in student aid systems requesting harmonisation. 
 
In addition, European integration has encouraged major changes in the systems of 
higher education in a move towards a more common structure. As pointed out by 
Jongbloed and Salerno (2004): 
 "...for the credentials of a higher education institution in one country to successfully 
transfer to another it is necessary to not only ensure that certain quality standards be 
met but also institutional and financial arrangements be made" (p. 18). 
  




A study by the EURYDICE European Unit (2000) analysed the reforms in higher 
education funding models in that continent from 1960 to 1998. It reported that, 
since the 1980s, the reforms had been oriented to provide increased autonomy to 
higher education institutions focusing on four main areas:  (a) a change from 
earmarked to lump-sum or block grant budgets for recurrent funding; (b) a move 
towards the introduction of more objective funding formulae; (c) the linking of 
funding to outputs rather than inputs; and (d) the introduction of contract-based 
funding. Other trends that were identified by this report were the provision of funds 
linked to the output of the higher education institutions and the encouragement to 
institutions to raise money by selling their teaching or research services, either 
through the provision of additional course programmes or research projects, or 
through contracts obtained on the open market with private organisations. 
 
Koelman (1998), Jongbloed and Salerno (2004) and Field and Klingert (2001) 
focus on the evolution of funding models. For instance, Koelman reports on about 
four generations of models of funding higher education in the Netherlands over 40 
years and provides a summary of the rationales of each model. The author argues 
that, in the Netherlands, there has been a constant evolution in models: from an 
earmarked input frame to an input funding model which later evolved to a frame 








































Interestingly, the model in use in the Netherlands is a mixture of all the former 
systems.  According to Boezerooy (2003, pp: 34-36) and to Beerkens et al 
(2005,  pp. 32-34 ) the income of Universities and hogescholen (professional 
education) derives from three ―flows of funds‖ and from tuition fees as follows: 
 
 The first flow of funds (core funds) is supplied by the Ministry of 
Education, Science and Culture and includes the basic block grant 
allocated for teaching, research and related activities.  
 
  The second flow of funds are allocations for research allocated through 
the Dutch research council funds to projects on a competitive basis.  
 
  The third flow of funds concerns contract research and contract teaching 
carried out for Government, non-profit organisations, private companies, 
charitable boards, and the European Community. For Universities this 
supplementary source of income has been growing fast since the early 
1980s. It now represents about 15% of University income for teaching 
and research. 
 
  Tuition fees are required but all regular full-time students at funded and 
designated institutions receive a basic grant for the nominal duration of a 
higher education program (4 or 5 years). This grant is called the 
―performance-related grant‖ because students receive it initially as a 
loan. If students show satisfactory academic performance, the loan 















Field and Klingert (2001) focus on the consequences of the use of the  
funding models. Discussing a survey developed by HUMANE, they argue that 
European Universities are implementing a wide range of administrative reforms 
while many countries are adopting new legislation and introducing funding 
mechanisms. One of the most significant consequences of these reforms is the 
extended use of resource allocation models (RAMs). Field and Klingert conclude 
that   
"...systems that had for decades continued in an incremental fashion using black box 
methods of funding now begin to adopt an increasing open style. Factors such as output 
based funding, the increasing demand for accountability, contract management, and 
lump sum budgeting have all provided an impetus for their development in Universities" 
(p. 84). 
 
4.2.1.1. United Kingdom 
 
Studies by Williams and Light (1999),  Allende and Morones Díaz (2000), Thomas 
(2001) and El Kawas and Massy (2004, p.223) provide a broad description of the 
evolution in funding models in the United Kingdom in the last  30 years, including 
an analysis of reforms introduced following the Jarratt and Dearing reports and the 
creation of Funding Councils and academic audits. They also provide deep 
analysis about formulae for funding teaching and research assessment exercises. 
All agree that the changes in the British system signify a major change in the 
relationship between Government and the University system, not just a new 
system of resource allocation and assessment. 
 
Thomas (2001) points out that it is only in the last 50 years that the British State 
has assumed responsibility of the vast majority of the expenditure on higher  




education. He explains that, in 1986, the University Grants Committee abandoned 
the historical allocations towards a methodology based on formulaic approaches 
and selectivity. It was the end of a funding pattern and the initiation of a model 
based on teaching and research components, in which the teaching component is 
calculated by student numbers and units of resource which differ between subjects. 
The research component is determined according to quality assessments from a 
specialised body.  
 
Further important reforms in the British funding system occurred in 1992 when 
regional (i.e. for England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) independent, non-
departmental higher education Funding Councils (respectively HEFCE, HEFCW, 
SHEFC and NIEC) were established            (Kaiser et al, 2001). 
 
The English funding model is described in detail every year by the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) when it communicates the annual 
allocation. Key features of the English model are the following:  
 
  Funds for teaching and research are provided as a block grant. Institutions are 
free to distribute this grant internally at their discretion. In addition, the 
Institutions receive student fees. The combined total of grant and tuition fees is 
referred to as "teaching resource" or simply as ―resource". Most of these funds 
are distributed by formulae, which take account of the volume and mix of 
individual institutions‘ teaching and research.  
  Research funds are distributed selectively under two main headings: quality-
related research and capability funding. Quality is measured in a periodic 
Research Assessment Exercise, about to be replaced by the Research 
Excellence Framework.   





  The calculation of institutional grants is based on a formula made up of a 
number of component parts, taking account of teaching and research factors. 
The resulting institutional allocation is a block grant that can be distributed 
within the institution at its own discretion as long as the funds are used for the 
purposes for which they are provided (Thomas, 2001). 
  Apart from the recurrent funding for teaching and research, HEFCE supplies 
other related funding for a wide range of purposes, including the additional 
costs of operating in the London area; liabilities inherited by institutions 
previously under local authority control; copyright libraries; museums, galleries 
and collections; and minority subjects (HEFCE, 2002).  
  In addition, each year HEFCE provides additional special funding for a wide 
range of purposes within earmarked schemes to address past under-
investment in the sector (HEFCE, 2005. p.22). These funds are reviewed 
regularly and, wherever appropriate, new initiatives are introduced or the funds 
are phased out or incorporated into formula-based allocations (Theisens, 
2003). 
 
Underlying these changes is a new view of higher education in the UK and, 
especially, a new view of the roles of Government funding of Universities. There is 
a new approach to higher education: a commitment to widening access, a 
recognition that the economic and social well-being in the UK requires that higher 
education accommodate more students and the recognition that funding for higher 
education cannot increase pro rata while participation increases. Therefore, 
according to this new view, costs per student must decrease as participation 
widens (El Kawas and Massy, 2004). 
  




Finally, a whole picture of the impressive changes that occurred in the UK´s 
funding system would not be complete if drastic changes in the tuition system are 
not mentioned. Until 1998, tuition-fees for British full-time students were paid by the 
Local Education Authorities (LEAs), which implied that the students themselves did 
not have to pay. Since September 1998, in England, home students have to pay 
the tuition fees themselves regardless of the discipline or programme of enrolment. 
Other students had to pay the fees themselves or even a full-cost covering rate 
(Kaiser at el, 2001). It is important to note that the arrangement applies in England 
and not elsewhere in the UK. 
 
Students of any age, on a full-time (or part-time course of initial teacher training) 
designated course (a course which qualifies for support) may get help towards 
fees. This is based on assessing their (parents‘) income. A student may have to 
contribute as well, if they expect to have any income, other than part-time earnings, 
while studying. If a student is eligible for a tuition subsidy, the subsidy will be 
directly paid to the University or college by the Student Loans Company. Moreover, 
all full-time students up to 54 are eligible for student loans covering (part of) the 
living costs, accommodation, food, clothes and travel (Theisens, 2003, pp: 37-38). 
 
Beginning in the academic year 1998-99, all full-time English students were 
charged £1000 annually, which they had to pay for themselves. Since then, trends 
have continued and, as a result of several consultations, a series of changes have 
been introduced to the system on a permanent basis, either because the amounts 
of up-front tuition have been increasing or because there have been shifts from up-
front fees to deferred tuition fees (Marcucci and Johnstone, 2006, p.65). In a White 
Paper named ―The future of education”,   the Government for the first time took a 
position on ―top up‖ fees. In 2006, a new Graduate Contribution Scheme was  




introduced, in which Universities were allowed to seek a contribution of between £0 
and £3,000 per year for each course. Legislation also required those institutions 
that wished to charge variable fees to have ―Access Agreements” in place which set 
out the action they would take in order to safeguard and promote access 
(Theisens, 2003. p. 39). In practise, almost every English University now charges 
the maximum fee. Very little of the perceived advantages of a more market based 
system have resulted. 
 
4.2.2. United States of America 
 
Trow considers that   the diversity of funding is at the heart of the diversity of 
character and function of American higher education. Colleges and Universities 
receive support not only from national, state and local Governments, but also from 
many private sources such as churches, business firms, foundations, alumni, 
students and from many other clients of other services (Trow, p. 41-42). 
  
The size and importance of the resources devoted to the sector is outlined by 
Duderstadt (2005, pp: 3-4) as follows: 
“In the simplest sense, today the United States spends roughly 2.6% of its GDP on higher 
education ($330 billion), with 55% of this ($180 billion) coming from private support (e.g., 
tuition payments, philanthropic gifts, or revenue from auxiliary activities such as college 
athletics) and 40% from Government; the states provide 20% ($67 billion), primarily through 
appropriations directly to institutions; and the federal Government provides the remaining 
25% ($81 billion ), through federal financial aid and subsidised loans and tax benefits to 
students ($60 billion), research grants and contracts to Universities ($21 billion), and other 
support for specific activities such as health care and agricultural extension.” 
  




An extensive literature review reveals the following distinctive features of the higher 
education system in the United States: 
 
  The largest source of funding, State support, is mainly provided direct to 
institutions as general operating support through annual appropriations. In 
addition, the Federal Government provides large amounts of financial aid in 
the form of grants, loans and work study appropriations (Breneman, 1994). 
  Higher education is the responsibility of the States, rather than of the federal 
Government. This federal system determines a diverse picture because 
each State responds based on its own unique political and social conditions 
(Callan, 2002, p.2). In addition, State funding is highly influenced by the 
States´ fiscal situations (Hovey, 1999 p.1; Zumeta, 2002, p.73).  
  There is a large dependence on private sources. Private higher education 
colleges and Universities are located in 49 of 50 states (Callan, 2002, p.13). 
As recently as 1950, half of all enrolments in higher education were in 
private institutions (Johnstone, 1993 , p. 1) . However, in recent years, their 
share declined to 22% primarily because of the creation and expansion of 
new public Universities in the 1960s and 1970s (Breneman, 1994, p.112). 
  Higher education was born as a private enterprise. Whilst the colonial 
colleges were created as private institutions, they considered themselves as 
public foundations. Consequently, they accepted public subsidies which 
took various forms; for instance, almost every colony aided the struggling 
colleges within its borders by granting them the right to run one or more 
lotteries (Brubacher and Rudy, 1976, p.6 and p.35). 
 
After 40 years of significant investment, the golden age of expansion in American 
higher education may have come to a close (Nolland et al, 2003) as public support  




of higher education has been dropping for the past two decades (Duderstadt, 2005, 
pp:3-4). The big change in recent years in patterns of financial support has been, 
not only the decline in the relative share of State support, but also the increase in 
tuition and fees (Kane and Orszag, 2003). 
 
The combination of the decline in State appropriations and political restrictions on 
raising tuition at public institutions has produced a marked decline in educational 
and general spending per full-time equivalent student at public schools relative to 
private schools (Kane and Orszag, 2003, p.3). 
 
This shift in the funding responsibility from State appropriations to student tuition 
has not been the result of a well planned or thoughtful policy discourse in many 
States (Callan, 2002). Duderstadt (2005) questions  
  “…why have the States been methodically disinvesting in public higher education over the past two 
decades?” (p.5) and identifies the following determinants:  “  In part it has to do with other 
competing priorities for state tax dollars” (p. 5) and to “…an  erosion in the perception of education 
as a public good that  deserves of strong societal support”  (p.8) and concludes that:   “ State 
and federal programmes have shifted from investment in the higher education enterprise 
(appropriations to institutions) to investment in the marketplace for higher education services 
(subsidised loans and tax benefits to students and parents)” (p.10). 
 
Breneman (1994) observes that this shift from tax-payers and parents to students 
can be considered a "privatisation" and identifies a tendency towards the 
emergence of "privately-financed public Universities" (p.111). This trend has been 
analysed, too, by Johnstone (1986; 1993; 1997; 1998) as mentioned above (p. 
147). Layzell (1998) describes that, together with "privatisation" trends, the United  




States has experimented with an evolution to performance-funding categories, as 
explained earlier in Chapter 2 above (p.59).  
 
This evolution in funding models entailed a significant change because, as 
described by Bogue (1982), until the 1980s, the pattern of funding higher education 
applied by almost all States in United States was the use of enrolment driven 
formulae, based on activities or size, ignoring achievement or institutional 
performances. In similar ways, on analysing the funding system in the United 
States, Shattock and Rigby (1983) point out that formula budget, and incremental 
budget, are reported as the most commonly used models of allocation public 
resources. However, they make this distinction: "the formula budget model represents the 
form in which a budget request is submitted, not the actual funds allocated" (p. 146). 
 
By the 1990s, financial constraints determined that higher education institutions 
began to face external demands, both from State and Federal Governments, as 
well as from the general public and State level agencies (Zumeta, 2001; Martinez, 
2002; Bogue and Aper, 2000). 
 
The introduction of performance based categories in higher education funding 
represents a consequence of this phenomenon. Burke and Servan (1998), Burke 
(2001b), Burke and Minnassians (2002) and Burke and Minnassians (2003) have 
studied the permanent expansion of performance based categories.  
 
According to Burke and Minassians (2002) 
 “Up to 2002 about 40 states used performance based categories in public colleges and 
Universities. (…). A. Performance Funding - (19 states).; B. Performance Budgeting -
(27 states). And C. Performance Reporting- (39 states)…(…) Many states employ more  




than one model in their accountability plan to measure institutional performance. For 
example, 70% of states with performance funding and 68% of those with performance 
budgeting also have performance reporting (p.12). 
 
Various authors have provided explanations about the use of performance funding 
categories considering the case of the State of Tennessee as a pioneer in the use 
of this model (Layzell, 1998; Kaiser et al, 2001; Burke and Minnassians, 2002; 
Colbeck, 2002; Burke and Minnassians, 2003). 
 
In 1979, Tennessee became the first of several states to implement a policy linking 
state budget allocations to indicators of college and University performance (Burke 
and Serban, 1998). According to the Tennessee Higher Education Commission 
(THEC), performance funding was an incentive-based funding programme for 
public higher education ―designed to stimulate instructional improvement and student learning" 
(THEC, 1990, quoted in Banta, Rudolph, Van Dyke, and Fisher, 1996). In practice, 
each institution submits a self-study to the Tennessee higher education 
Commission, which oversees the evaluation process and determines the amount of 
money to be distributed to each institution. THEC sets policy for the University of 
Tennessee System and the Tennessee Board of Regents, the state's two higher 
education systems.  
 
The Tennessee Performance Funding Initiative financially rewards exemplary 
institutional performance on selected measures of effectiveness, and gives 
institutions the chance to earn budget supplements on their education and general 
budgets for obtaining accreditation, demonstrating their students performed at or 
above national averages on standardized tests, providing evidence of client 
satisfaction, and receiving good ratings from peer reviews of their academic  




programs (Banta et al, 1996, p. 22). Burke (2001b, pp: 427-428) considers that the 
established programme in Tennessee represents a classic example of 
performance funding adopted by coordinating boards: it has been adopted without 
legislation or prescription, but gives importance to careful design, full consultation, 
phased implementation, and periodic reviews.  
 
4.2.3. Latin America 
 
In the last 40 years the region has experienced an impressive growth in student 
registrations while social and economic demands have grown simultaneously. 
However, the resources with which the Universities operated were widely seen as 
inappropriate (Arocena and Sutz , 2000, p.2; Cetto and Vessuri, 1998, p.58). Like 
in other regions of the world, most Latin American Governments showed a 
tendency to reduce public spending and to focus the remaining social spending on 
the most underprivileged sectors, like basic education, health care and poverty 
alleviation plans (Bentancur, 2002, p. 5; Ares Pons, 1997, p 5; Garcia Guadilla, 
2005, pp:15-16).  
 
The literature shows that, most of these measures resulted from recommendations 
by international and multi-lateral organisations like the World Bank or the 
International Development Bank (Ares Pons, 1997, p.3). Since the 1980s, the 
World Bank experts developed various studies and policy papers establishing 
strategies and priorities, which that lending organisation was able to support 
through long-term loans and technical assistance. Those studies commented on 
and compared the experience of various Governments in the reform of higher 
education, showed major concern on the efficient use of public resources and 
attempted to establish a framework of effective policy making.   




As a good example of these ideas, two of the most ambitious studies about  
funding models in higher education, both a basic source and guide on various 
themes about finance of the sector, are Albrecht and Ziderman´s "Funding 
Mechanisms for higher education" (1992a) and "Financing Universities in Developing Countries" 
(1995). Reporting for The World Bank, these authors focus on developing countries 
(including Brazil, Argentina and Chile) facing the dilemma of how to continue to 
expand University provision within a context of a lack of additional funding. With 
similar intentions, in 1994, the World Bank released "Lessons from experience", a 
landmark about recommendations for higher education finance in developing 



















Kent (1995) and Experton (1996) explain that the rationale of the World Bank´s 
thinking consisted of the following:   
 
  The main priority was basic education because investments in higher 
education have lower social rates of return than those in primary and 
secondary education and because investments in these levels have a more 
direct impact on poverty reduction.  
 
  An emphasis on the promotion of private higher education and cost-
sharing in order to help to free up scarce public resources for improving basic 
education. 
 
  An emphasis on the promotion of policy reforms that would increase 
efficiency and lower public costs of higher education. 
 
  Encouragement for a real shift in the role of the State in which its main 
responsibility was to establish a proper political frame for the co-ordination of 
the higher education sector, rather than to provide higher education (Salmi, 
1998 p.120).  





As a consequence of the particular roles played by the lending organisations, 
several Latin American authors reflect their preoccupation.  
For instance, Bentancur (2002) pictures a problematical modus operandi by the World 
Bank in the following way:  
“Funding was channelled to the Governments of many countries of the region including 
the conditions regarding the development of specific policies (restrictions to students 
access to Universities, imposition of tuition fees, etc.) were included in the sectoral 
adjustment loans (SECALs) which controlled the application for fresh funding for these 
countries’ national economies (p.5). 
 
According to this approach, rather than simple recommendations, the lending 
organisations exerted pressures on the Governments. Ares Pons (1997, p.4) points 
out that these institutions have used their enormous leverage to impose their own 
preferences, and finally raises the following question: Are Latin American countries the 
victims of coercion by international agencies? 
 
Meanwhile, UNESCO, another UN agency, has adopted a different position in the 
international debate about the issues surrounding Government funding for higher 
education. UNESCO had fewer resources to invest and oriented its work to build 
consensus among national decision makers in the identification of main issues and 
trends, and in the diffusion of best practices. Unlike the World Bank, this agency 
has stressed that, given higher education's status as a public good, no substitute 
could be found in the future for Government funding of higher education 
(UNESCO, 1998).  UNESCO also disapproved of the use of the limited concept of 
"rates of return" to higher education as a guide for funding policies. According to 
UNESCO, higher education is a long-term investment for a society rather than a  




burden on public finances. Therefore, the role of the State should remain essential 
in the finance of the sector (Kent, 1996; Luengo, 2003; World Declaration and 
Framework for Priority Action for Change and Development in higher education adopted by the World 
Conference on higher education, 9 October 1998). 
 
4.2.3.1. Analysis of the funding models in Latin America 
Description of models. 
 
A broadly based report called "Educacion Superior en America Latina. Una agenda de 
problemas, políticas y debates" authored by Brunner et al (1995) was the first study 
about higher education policies and related issues in the continent. The report 
provided a special analysis about the funding models used in the continent and 
described a major crisis in the funding of higher education in Latin America.  
According to Brunner at al, some interrelated factors were producing this crisis. 
These included:  
(a) the role of Governments, which operated as "benefactors", providing funds but 
absent in policy making;  
(b) the incremental-historical funding models used by the Governments; and  
(c) an "institutional paralysis" that tended to avoid the adoption of decisions for 
change in the system.  
The authors pointed out that, due to the interaction of these factors, the State was 
still unable to exert power in effective ways. The use of incremental-historical 
model has determined that the institutions counted with automatic funding with total 
independence from their performance while the Governments avoided 
confrontation with University constituencies (p.21). At the same time, it has 
awarded significant degrees of power to the institutions, because ―…whilst the 
Governments hold the economic power and even can apply punishments, all these resources are  




useless. Paradoxically, as the dependency on State funding is higher, the Governments are more 
unable to use financial mechanisms as a policy “pressure” or as a tool of control. Such resources are 
useless against the “guerrilla warfare” that Universities are willing to fight in order to increase their funding 
(pp: 27-28).   
 
Rather than just analysing the Latin American problems in the finance of the 
sector, other studies argued for the adoption of "the new directions in funding higher 
education".  Delfino and Gertel (1996) edited a series of studies that acknowledged 
the fact that most countries, certainly most Latin American countries, were facing 
serious financial crisis and proposed guidelines for future action. The 
recommendations of this study included the introduction of formula funding 
schemes, an intensive promotion of the private sector, collaboration with private 
business, cost-recovery (tuition), income-generating projects and the introduction 
of policies to promote quality and equity. They based their recommendations on 
two lines of action: (a) Governments should concentrate on policies of cost-
recovery and (b) institutions should introduce internal adjustments to improve the 
use of existing resources. The articles also recommended several ways of 
expanding financial resources for Universities, such as the introduction of formula 
funding schemes, collaboration with private business and income-generating 
projects. 
 
4.2.3.2. Ideological discussions about directions 
 
However, not everybody agreed with these ideas. Authors like Hidalgo (1997) and 
Bentancur (2002) recognised that Universities should expand financial resources 
but questioned the "new" directions explained above. These authors warned that 
these directions were to be framed within a global movement inspired in New  




Public Management approaches that  Yarzabal (2001) explained in the following 
way : 
“ In the 1990s the market was considered the articulator of the relations in the society. 
Under this frame, the State re-oriented its roles and promoted the adaptation of higher 
education institutions to the demands of the market, economic globalisation and neo-
liberal ideologies. These drove to a re-orientation of public policies which have moved 
from the attention of social demands and the expansion of higher education 
Institutions to non-regulated  privatisations, result- based assessments, politically 
oriented accreditation and a total reduction of public funds” (pp: 11-12). 
 
These authors conclude (like UNESCO) that, as education is a public good the 
State must remain as the main supporter of funds for higher education. 
 
4.2.3.3. The effects of New Public Management 
 
Some Latin American authors like Bentancur (2004), Narbondo et al (2003), and 
Ramos (2003) connect the New Public Management Movement with the measures 
adopted by Latin American Governments in the funding of higher education in the 
1990s.  
 
New Public Management is a body of managerial thought based on ideas 
generated in the private sector and imported into the public sector (Hood, 1991; 
1995) which stimulated an scholarly analysis of ideas that set the agenda for 
organisational change in a number of countries, including UK, Australia and USA 
(Barzelay, 2000). In the USA, Reinventing Government by Osborne and Gaebler (1992) 
played a major role in the process by which New Public Management  doctrines 
came to influence agenda-setting in the US Federal Government during the first  




Clinton Administration, inducing fundamental changes in public service delivery, 
such as using tax-financed voucher schemes to fund education (Barzelay, 2000). 
     
Larbi (1999, p.13) explains that the rationale of New Public Management  captures 
most of the structural, organisational and managerial changes taking place in the 
public services of most OECD countries in the late 1970s. According to this author, 
the broad orientations of New Public Management are explained by the marriage of 
two different streams of ideas:  
a) the first stresses business-type ―managerialism‖ in the public sector and comes 
from the tradition of the scientific management movement based on the ideas of 
“professional management expertise as portable,...paramount over technical expertise, requiring high 
discretionary power to achieve results . . . and central and indispensable to better organizational 
performance, through the development of appropriate cultures . . . and the active measurement and 
adjustment of organisational outputs” (Hood, 1991 p.6), and  
b) the second derives from the “new institutional economics” movement, which has its 
theoretical foundation in the ideas of public choice, transaction cost and principal-
agent theories, which have generated public sector reform themes based on ideas 
of market, competition, contracting, transparency and emphasis on incentive 
structures as a way of promoting efficiency in public service delivery.   
 
4.2.3.4. New Public Management and higher education 
 
Milliken and Colohan (2004, p. 382) suggest that managerialism is a private sector 
"solution" to the public sector "problem" because it reflects central Government‘s 
view that private sector corporate practices can be used to drive change. 
   




In the higher education context, there is no question that the drive for change and 
efficiency –doing more with less- was eagerly adopted by diverse Governments. 
For instance, according to Deem (1998, pp: 3-4) and to Fulton (2004, p. 157), in 
the UK, an early promotion of this New Public Management approach was the 
Jarratt Report of 1985. 
 
Deem (1998) describes that  “… the Jarratt Report is one very consistent with 'new 
managerialism', with emphasis on a compliance culture for University staff, national frameworks for 
degree work and academic standards and measurable student learning and research outcomes” 
(p.2). The Jarratt Report prescriptions laid particular emphasis on aligning 
University management processes with conventional approaches to management 
in the private sector, by improving management controls, strengthening line-
management hierarchy and reducing academic power. 
 
According to Deem (1998):  
“ ...as the higher education sector (...) has grown in extent, it is also increasingly being 
required to justify the expenditure of public funds and to demonstrate 'value for money'. 
Those who run Universities are expected to ensure that such value is provided and their 
role as academic leaders is being subsumed by a greater concern with the overt 
management of sites, finance, staff, students, teaching and research (...)  At the same 
time, the emphasis on competition between Universities for students, research income 
and academic research 'stars', has also served to stress the extent to which higher 
education can be described as operating under quasi-market conditions” (p.3). 
 
Deem identifies the adoption of new managerial techniques in higher education 
institutions in the use of internal cost centres and the monitoring of efficiency and 
effectiveness through measurement of outcomes and individual staff  




performances. Other features include attempts to change the regimes and cultures 
of organisations to more closely resemble those found in the private 'for profit' 
sector.  
 
Some research has been done about the adoption of New Public Management 
Theories in higher education. International studies include Jarzabkowski (2002) in 
the UK, Neumann and Guthrie (2006) in Australia and Salminen (2004) for Finland. 
 
In a study already mentioned above (pp: 51 and 154), Jarzabkowski (2002) found, 
based on three British Universities, that inside these institutions, there was 
increased application of theory based largely on the private sector including New 
Public Management. In this paper, Jarzabkowski examines the strategic 
implications of resource allocation models (RAMs) discussing four interrelated 
aspects of resource allocation, -degree of centralisation, locus of strategic 
direction, cross-subsidy, and locus of control- in a longitudinal study of three UK 
Universities: Warwick, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 
and Oxford Brookes. Findings suggest that RAMs are historically and culturally 
situated within the context of each University and this is associated with different 
patterns of strategic direction and forms of strategic control.  
 
In the same way, while analysing the use of New Public Management techniques 
in Australian higher education, Neumann and Guthrie (2006), report that, as a 
consequence of the ―fiscal crisis‖ of the State, in Australia there has been the 
promotion of ―new‖ management systems, which included the use of external 
sources of funding, an emphasis on the higher education institutions 
"responsiveness" to the needs of industry, tight management control and cost-
reductions.    





According to Neumann and Guthrie, in that in Australia, a new corporatised model 
of University management has emerged, based on business/market principles, “... 
edging out the traditional administrative systems focused on academic committees and professional 
(academic peer) judgements (…). Due to new managerialism, academic activities such as teaching 
and research have become calculable, marketable and tradable under the commercialised and 
managerialist regime in which Universities must now operate”. (p. 6).  
 
4.2.3.5. New Public Management and higher education funding 
 
Weiler (2001) links the application of the New Public Management ideas to higher 
education to the funding models explaining that  the State  "… is  moving away from its 
traditional role of comptroller and pre-emptor of a University's budgetary decisions in terms of "ex 
ante" and "ex post" operating systems. The old system (...) operated through rules and regulations 
set up in advance.(…) The new system is a steering system based on allocating resources on the 




Despite the concerns expressed by Yarzabal (2000, p.7), public higher education 
institutions in Latin America remain as predominantly tax-financed and their 
funding patterns largely rely on historical-block granting allocations. Therefore, 
although there is evidence that there have been significant pressures exerted by 
the lending organisations to introduce their ideas, these have not been so strong-or 
well-accepted- in the region in order to make significant changes in the funding 
models. As we will observe later, whilst most countries have introduced changes in  




their funding patterns, these do not represent a very important shift. Only the case 
of Chile represents a drastic change.  
 
In particular, reforms to increase reliance on cost-recovery through student 
payment in many cases have met with important resistance. The historically rooted 
concept of ―free public higher education‖, which rejects tuition-fees due to the belief 
that, as a public good, higher education belongs to a social welfare package which 
must be paid for through taxation levels, has proved to be still strong and healthy in 
the continent.   
 
The UNAM´s case, already mentioned above, is extremely interesting. On March 
15, 1999, the UNAM´s council passed the General Bylaw on Payments, a modest 
increase in the existing symbolic tuition fees system. As an immediate 
consequence, a student protest exploded and in April UNAM found itself paralysed 
for nearly one year. In addition, some other ―solidarity" strikes were initiated at the 
same time in other institutions (Levy and Arenas, 2000).      
 
After such an intense ―battle over tuition‖, its political arguments and ramifications 
still persist as a warning for those considering the hypothetical idea of introducing 
tuition fees in Latin American public Universities (Sotelo, 2000). 
 
Therefore, as I will analyse below, the funding models in the region have evolved 
during the 1990s. However, we will also see that, excepting the Chilean case, the 










Literature has revealed an excellent case study in Chile due to the changes that its 
funding model has experienced in recent decades.   
 
According to Riveros (1996), Chile possesses several unique aspects in the Latin 
American landscape due to the fact that the State holds a subsidiary role in funding 
the higher education system through the use of a demand-driven funding model. 
Chile is also the country within Latin America that allocates the lowest public 
funding to higher education relative to GDP. This situation arises from the 
significance of private contributions to the financing of higher education, a pattern 
that emerged from changes introduced in the 1980s under the influence of policies 
of cost recovery and growth of private provision (Thorn et al, 2004). Holms Nielsen 
et al (2002, p.5) explain that, in Chile, the massive expansion of tertiary education 
has been financed primarily by private sources. Public sector funding comprises 
only 0.6% of GDP which is compensated by a very high level of private sector 
funding amounting to approximately 2.7% of GDP. 
 
There has been a re-definition in the role of the National Government since the 
1980s (Bernasconi and Rojas, 2003; Holms Nielsen et al, 2002). All institutions, 
public and private, were compelled to charge tuition and public funding dropped 
substantially. Today, public subsidies are channelled to the higher education 
system utilising the following mechanisms: 
1)  Direct funding support to all traditional public Universities (Aportes Fiscales 
Directos). This subsidy is allocated on the following criteria: 95% is based on 
historical precedence and a process of political negotiation while 5% is  




allocated based on input, process and output criteria. This allocation 
represents 50% of the total allocation provided by the Government. 
2)  There is also indirect public support provided on a formula basis to all 
institutions (traditional and new institutions) linked to a best- student 
admission criteria (Aportes Fiscales Indirectos).  Albrecht and Ziderman (1993, 
p.47) explain that this indirect support is provided to institutions based on 
their ability to attract ―top students‖. This type of students are defined by 
Rodriguez Dias (1998, p. 7) as ―those very bright students from poor families whose 
secondary school leaving examination scored qualify them for scholarships and chose a high 
quality public University”. This funding channel operates similarly to a voucher 
system (there is a limited number of funding granted each year) but the 
students do not receive the money; it is allocated to the institution that they 
have chosen (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1993, p.47). This allocation represents 
10% of total Government support (Holms Nielsen et al, 2002, pp:4-5). 
3)  Funding for institutions (Fondo de Desarollo Institucional) for institutional 
development and quality improvement on a competitive basis. In this case, all 
public and private institutions are eligible for this funding. This allocation 
represents 9% of total Government support (Holms Nielsen et al, 2002, pp:4-
5). 
4)  Funding for students through loans and scholarships. This type of funding is 
available only for students enrolled in the traditional public and private 
Universities. This portion represents 31% of total Government support (Holms 
Nielsen et al, 2002, pp: 4-5) and is allocated directly to the students. The 
Fund is made up of three components: 
First: a University Loan Solidarity Fund (Fondo Solidario de Crédito 
Universitario) for those students with few resources and studying at state 
or private dependent Universities. The loan covers student fees totally or  




partially and repayment begins two years following graduation, 
contingent on income. It has a strong subsidy, is administered by each 
University and shows mixed success at recuperation. 
Second: a state guaranteed loan (Credito con garantía estatal) which 
students with scarce resources can use to pay fees at all higher 
education institutions. These resources are financed and administered 
by the banking system. . 
Third: scholarships that can be used to pay fees or student 
maintenance. On the other hand, and with the purpose of avoiding or 
limiting continuous fee increases by institutions and pressure on student 
aid schemes, the Government fixes ‗reference fees‘ according to the 
type of programs offered and their quality, reflected in accreditation 
results. 
 
4.2.5. Brazil  
 
Several authors have examined the Brazilian case which offers an interesting 
evolution. According to the World Bank (2000), in this country, since the late 
1990s, the Government has introduced changes in the historical, block funding 
model towards a more rational model using some formulae and contracts. The 
funding model has also been used to introduce changes in the performance of the 
higher education system and to introduce strategies to link funding of public 
institutions with their performance.  
 
Changes in the Brazilian system of funding for higher education include:  
  Public institutions are allowed greater autonomy receiving fiscal 
appropriations through block grants, on the basis of performance contracts.  




The allocation for each institution is determined using a formula -considered 
"simple and transparent"- that "rewards" changes that show improvements 
in productivity in accordance with policy goals of greater access, quality, and 
efficiency.  
  The creation of loan schemes in private institutions. 
 
Nevertheless, Schwartzman (2002) considers that the changes introduced in the 
funding system in Brazil are small and the system still requires major changes. 
Only 10% of funds are allocated according to some objective criteria. According to 
this author: 
"...public allocations are still strongly tied to historical patterns. 90% of allocations- those 
which fund salaries- are considered as "automatic". National laws have created a rigid 
system of administration of human resources in the Universities. The required changes 
will have to deal with the introduction of alternative policies in University personnel which 
may allow different uses of the funds allocated to institutions" (p. 8). 
 
Nevertheless, Schwartzman considers that the reported changes have already 
produced some impact on the behaviour of institutions, promoting concern for 
aspects of quality and efficiency. For instance, performance-based funding is 
allocated on the basis of indicators of success in graduation and quality in research 




A series of studies describe how the funding model utilised by Argentinean higher 
education has been changing since the mid-1980s.    
  




Pugliese (2003) edited a series of studies which examined the traditional funding 
model in Argentina, characterised by historical allocations only augmented with 
incremental-negotiated appropriations. Tejeiro (2001) termed this model as 
"politicking budgeting", a mechanism that, he explains, “is  based on the institution’s previous 
allocation plus some lobbying activity in Congress" (p.1).  
 
According to Broto and Macchi (2003, pp:166-167), the use of negotiated 
budgeting contributed to a fatigue in the system and, during the 1990s, created the 
conditions for the introduction of a new funding model which combines historical -
block granting allocations based on formulae with  special appropriations for 
strategic programmes. 
 
The resulting model combines some formulae (7% of total allocations) with 
historical allocations. Formula funding has been introduced to provide an incentive 
system for the Universities. The Government is turning to financial incentives as a 
more effective way of influencing national Universities than administrative controls 
alone, particularly given the high degree of autonomy these institutions enjoy.  
 
 According to Abeledo and Obeide (2003), the new funding scheme for public 
Universities is used with  "an intention of  moving away  from traditional historical funding" 
(p.169). However, Garcìa de Fanelli (1999), Fernandez Lamarra (2002), Greco 
(2003) and Delfino (2002), consider that the resulting model is a combination of old 
and new features, a combination of historical allocations and small provisions 
based on formulae. These authors explain that, beyond intentions, the Argentinean 
model still remains the same due to a very high proportion of block granting (93%) 
based on historical criteria. 
  




For instance Delfino points out that "... the changes introduced by the Government , as 
recommended by the World Bank, still fail to introduce patterns of institutional efficiency at the public 
higher education institutions" (p.11). Delfino considers that there are some elements 
that remain unchanged, for instance: (a) only a small portion of public funds are 
allocated with some objective criteria; (b) the biggest portion of funds, the one 
corresponding  to salaries, is still allocated with a historical basis and is considered 
"untouchable"; (c) some public institutions (most notably the University of Buenos 
Aires, the biggest in the country) still offer huge resistance to the current funding 
model and delay the introduction of the recommended changes. 
 
Even more, Garcia de Fanelli (1999, p.3) adds that: 
  The greatest part of the public funding to the national Universities is still 
determined through a mechanism based on the institution‘s previous 
allocation and lobbying activity in Congress.  
  Public funding is still not keeping up with the significant expansion in student 
enrolments.  
  Financial resources for funding research projects, scholarships, equipment, 




As already mentioned in Chapter 1 above (p.23), technical analysis about higher 
education in Uruguay is scarce. This is related to the fact that Uruguay has a small 
system and that the public University was monopolistic until the 1980s. Only some 
changes in the system, related to the creation of a private sector, have determined  




the emergence of some critical mass and of incipient technical analysis in relation 
to the field. 
 
Literature relating to higher education has concentrated upon a description of the 
system (Brunner and Becerra, 1999; Martinez Larrechea, 2003; and  Martinez 
Sandres, 1999), focusing on the following key elements: (a) the Ministry of 
Education and Culture lacks of functions of co-ordination, supervision or regulation 
of the higher education system and does not exert influence over educational 
institutions, including UdelaR; and (b) the legal framework has positioned the 
public University in  the centre of gravity of the system while it suffers major 
problems of management and finance. 
 
Little work has been done on the question of the finance of the system and the 
Uruguayan funding model has not been studied before. Only two studies by 
Bentancur (2002) and Oddone and Perera (2004) have analysed matters that can 
be seen to be relevant to the topic of this thesis. 
 
Bentancur, a political scientist, has analysed the role of the Uruguayan 
Government and its historical and unique relationship with the public University, but 
has not explored concepts around the funding patterns. Meanwhile, Oddone and 
Perera have focused on economic issues, describing the sources of funding in the 
University system and providing a description of the newest source at UdelaR´s 
funding: the graduate tax. Their study also provides a special analysis of the 
economic returns of University education in Uruguay, developing the calculation of 
the economic gains in individual wages associated with increasing levels of higher 
education attainment. This was the first time that this kind of economic analysis 
was developed in reference to higher education in this country.   





4.2.7.1. Literature about tuition fees in Uruguay 
 
Analysis about the imposition of tuition fees in Uruguayan higher education 
institutions is relatively scarce. Only Galmes (1992) and Bentancur (2004) have 
studied the likelihood of charging tuition fees and both focus in the negative effects 
of the introduction of tuition fees.  
 
In 1992, Galmes carried out a study about the viability of introducing tuition fees in 
the Universidad de la República. The purpose of the study was to identify 
weaknesses and strengths of the adoption of tuition fees as an alternative funding 
source in the public University.   
 
The findings reported a series of problems that the introduction of tuition-fees 
would cause to the public University. While reporting various complications, 
Galmes pointed out that: 
“…It is very difficult to determine the ability of families to pay tuition fees in Uruguay, 
because in this country there is not a income tax . The University would not be able to 
determine who is in the condition of paying a fee. It would only rely in the declaration of 
the student. The University would not be able to check the income of the families. The 
net result of the application of a tuition fee would cause serious problems to the 
University administration , in its management and control structures” ( p.45). 
 
Galmes´s study has been consistent with the dominant view sustained by the 
public University authorities and has been an important basis for UdelaR in 
deciding whether the introduction of tuition fees would have negative effects for 
students and the University.  





In the same direction, while analysing the use of the graduate tax, Bentancur 
(2004) suggests that, considering that there exists a graduate tax, the imposition of 
a tuition fee scheme would entail a double imposition, because the student would 
pay fees as a student, and after graduation a tax as a graduate, concluding that ― 
As we see it, the imposition of a tuition fee would be unjust (...)  public funding must remain as 




The review has identified the rationale that underpins the application of each model 
of funding and has positioned the topic within a larger field of study.  
 
Literature shows that, worldwide, higher education is facing problems because it is 
a costly enterprise which faces competing imperatives for public spending. As a 
result, there has been a movement away from historical-incremental-negotiated 
budgets to other systems that are perceived as more transparent and fair. This 
evolution has occurred for a series of reasons, including the need to react to 
financial crisis and the need to use more transparent, predictable and visible 
models. Furthermore the literature highlights a more recent demand from 
Governments and the public for more accountable models that enable the 
performance of the systems to be monitored. 
 
Another aspect that has deserved an important attention in this Chapter has been 
the role of the use of tuition-fees as a financial source, and, therefore, a way to 
face the increasing financial crisis. As universities are underfunded and the 
financing of universities in many countries is regressive, many authors observe that  




it is necessary to bring in private finance in the form of tuition fees, but in ways that 
do not dissuade students from poor backgrounds. 
 
This chapter has shown, finally, that the topic has been barely addressed in 
Uruguay. Technical analysis about higher education in Uruguay has been scarce, 
probably related to the fact that Uruguay has a small system and that critical mass 
on the field is, still, small. 
 
Therefore, this analysis is an original contribution to the discipline. The next 
chapter will show how the study methodology was developed. 
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5.0. Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to describe in detail the research methods undertaken in this 
thesis. It comprises three sections. Sections 1 and 2 outline the way in which the 
research approach was developed around the research questions. The following 
sections provide analysis about other relevant aspects of the implementation 
strategy of the study, including a description of the research tools that were utilised 
(Section 3), the analysis of the data (Section 4), and a consideration of validity 
issues (Section 5). 
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SECTION 1: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
5.1. The research questions 
 
The design of any study begins with the selection of a topic and a research 
methodology. Two general approaches are widely recognised: quantitative 
research and qualitative research.  
 
Quantitative research is an inquiry into an identified problem, based on testing a 
theory, measured with numbers, and analysed using statistical techniques 
(Creswell, 2003), and “data is gathered to  be counted, evaluated, statistically tested and 
measured” (State of Victoria DET, 2005, p.10). By contrast, a study based upon a 
qualitative process of inquiry focuses on holistic, subjective meaning and 
experience. Its goal is to understand a social or human problem from multiple 
perspectives (Malterud , 2001).    
 
Creswell (2003) suggests that, in the case of qualitative research, the research 
questions should begin with words such as ‗'what‘ or ‗how‘, as these will convey an 
open and emerging design, whereas ‗why‘ questions are more relevant to 
quantitative research.   
 
Qualitative research places the researcher within a naturalistic setting. This 
approach uses interviews, focus groups, observations and case studies to examine 
the experiences of individuals and groups. Sources of information in qualitative 
research include analysis of documents and programmes in which the researcher 
seeks to explore the ways individuals, systems and organisations behave and 
respond within a specific setting (State of Victoria DET).  
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In order to answer the research question of this study, a qualitative approach was 
employed because, as showed by Campbell- Evans (1992), it enables the 
researcher to consider the whole situation and seeks to understand what are the 
elements that are "inter-acting" and determining the research phenomenon.  
 
One of the purposes of this research was to obtain and use stakeholders´ 
perceptions and perspectives. These people are those who, for different reasons, 
are closely related to the phenomenon or are actively involved in the organisation 
or system performance. As I saw it, a direct contact with the stakeholders would 
strengthen an awareness of the social reality to the point where the phenomenon 




















Figure 19: Stakeholder identification 
Stakeholders identification 
 
According to Freeman (quoted by Mitchell, p.853), the concept of stakeholder is associated with the 
principle of who or what really counts, in other words to elements of relevance and salience.  
 
Under this frame, I first reviewed the stakeholder literature laying out the various explicit and implicit 
positions about who and what really counts. After that, I analysed the Uruguayan context, considering 
the situational uniqueness of Uruguay in which there is a historical predominance of the public 
University,  an incipient importance of the private sector and a weak involvement of the Government, 
represented by the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Finance and the Office of 
Planning and Budget. 
 
Following Clarkson, (1995, p.16) and Savage (1991, p.2), I found two categories of stakeholders: 
 
 Those who have formal official or contractual relationships and have a direct and necessary 
economic impact upon the sector. These are called ―primary stakeholders‖, i.e. presidents, rectors, 
members of governing boards, teachers,  students, Government officers, University 
administrators, practitioners and members of unions. 
 
 Secondary stakeholders, those who are not directly engaged in the sector´s activities but are able 
to exert influence or are affected by the activities. They might influence or affect, or are influenced 
or affected, but are not essential for its survival, i.e. connoisseurs, academics, technical advisors 
at the Legislature, policy analysts. 
  
























In some way, all these people have created the current model either by doing 
something or by avoiding doing something, and are those who are most 
knowledgeable about the phenomenon (Trochim, 1996). Moreover, these same 
people will shape the next funding model. 
 
It was very important to provide findings that could be understood by others, not 
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practitioners. In this context, the project was not intended just to theorise, but to 
provide evidence of elements that may help to understand directions or substance 
for required changes (Campbell-Evans, 1992). Also, ordinary people and 
practitioners ―operate" within the model like the one that will be identified, 
described and analysed. These people will have a view, available, usable and 
"friendly", that will help us to understand what is really going on. 
 
The highly practical nature of this research also distinguishes a project undertaken 
within the framework of a professional doctorate, as is the case with this research 
from a project undertaken for a traditional PhD. 
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SECTION 2: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
5.2. 1. Specific method of qualitative measurement.  
 
In this study, the methods of data collection that emerged from the research 
question were all non-quantitative. I used different sources of data: documents, 
literature, semi-structured interviews, a focus group and parliamentary and press 
discourses. The logic behind data collection was to use multiple sources of 
evidence under the rationale of triangulation (Yin, 2003).  
 
Following the collection of data, I examined the texts and coded them, going 
through data again and again, comparing each element with all other elements, 
looking for key issues, recurrent events, or activities in the data that become 
analytical categories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). From that analysis,  certain 
themes emerged which captured or summarized the contents of all data. 
 
5.2.2. Why select this specific method? 
 
Clearly, one of the key elements of this research was that information was scarce 
or was not available. Before this study, there was no examination of resource 
allocation in Uruguayan higher education, no theory and no prior construction. 
Rather, a range of random, disconnected, decisions occurred with no attempt to 
provide any oversight or co-ordinating rationale. Only when the data was collected 
and gathered was it possible to learn about and to answer the following questions: 
 
RQ. 1. What is the current model of funding higher education in Uruguay in 
reference to the following elements: 
ORQ 1.1 How are funds provided? 
ORQ 1.2 What criteria are used to determine allocations?  
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ORQ 1.3. What are the degrees of decentralisation? 
ORQ 1.4. With what requirements for accountability? 
ORQ 1.5. Which are the historical and political factors that influence resource 
allocation? 
ORQ 1.6. To what extent is the Uruguayan Government utilising the current model 
of resource allocation as a means to influence the behaviour of the publicly funded 
University? 
RQ: 2. Is the current model likely to change according to the views of decision 
makers in the sector? 
ORQ 2.1. Are the historical/policy factors that shape the current model likely to 
change in the future? 
ORQ 2.2. Are public subsidies likely to grow in the near future? Are there other 
sources of funding, like tuition fees, likely to be considered as alternative sources 
of revenue in public higher education? 
 
That was the project‘s raison d´etre: the collection and retrieval of data and 
information in order to analyse and characterise a model and predict how it may 
evolve or change. 
 
A priori, it was known that the state of the art of the information was the following: 
  There was no available data about the origin of the funds that each institution of 
higher education received from sources other than from the ―traditional‖ budget. In 
particular, it was important to learn if there were funds obtained from research 
councils, research and teaching contracts, consultancies or fees paid in clinics or 
hospitals.  
  There was not compiled data about the relative importance of tuition within the 
sources of funding in the private institutions. It is perceived that these institutions 
rely on tuition, and the amount of the tuition-fees is sometimes available in sources 
(i.e. institutional web-pages) that are available to the general public. However the 
volume of the resource was not known.   
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  There were no written directives, guidelines, objectives or policies - or at least 
certainly none publicly available- explaining the model and the criteria used to 
allocate funds to each institution or what are the goals or objectives that support 
the current models.  
  There was no compiled information about regulations or directives about the 
degree of decentralisation existing between the institutions and the respective 
funding authorities. 
  There was no information about directives or regulations about accountability 
procedures once the funds have been received by the institutions and have been 
expended.  
 
For readers of this thesis from a European or North American background, there is 
a very stark contrast here. The absence of authoritative information, data or 
procedures about higher education in Uruguay is a reality which outsiders often 
find surprising and difficult to comprehend. 
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In order to obtain a more complete picture, as well as the stakeholder´s 
perspectives, multiple sources of evidence were used. The multi-modal tools that 
were chosen tried to address several questions from different perspectives. These 
various techniques also enabled the researcher to cross-check data coming from 
the different sources.  Not least, the aim was to avoid any reliance on only one 
source of data and to make the different methodologies contribute to an overall, 
agreed set of conclusions (Rezabeck, 2000). 
 
FIGURE 20 : Triangulation 
 
As pictured in FIGURE 20, the techniques that were used were the following: 
interviews, focus groups and unobtrusive methods: 
 
  A total of 16 interviews were carried out, including University Presidents or 
Vice Presidents, members of University governing boards, University  
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administrators, senior Ministry officers, legislators, advisors at the 
Legislature and academics. The list of interviewees is included in ANNEX 3.  
 The focus group members included academics, experienced practitioners 
and technicians. The list of the members is included in ANNEX 3. 
 The interview data was integrated with information drawn from the focus 
group, archived parliamentary speeches and observations; field notes; and 
gathered policy documents including internal, memoranda and letters.  In 
particular the following documents were considered: 
  National level regulations, including Constitution, laws and decrees. 
  Ministry-level documents related to accounting, procurement and 
budgeting requirements. 
  University regulations by UdelaR, UCUDAL, ORT, UM. 
  University Strategic Plans by UdelaR, UCUDAL,ORT, UM. 
  Self assessment reports UdelaR, UCUDAL, ORT, UM and 
accreditation reports by MERCOSUR accrediting agencies. 
  Country papers by World Bank, UNDP and UNICEF. 
  UNESCO documents 
  Country and institutional statistics and budget data 
  Altogether three Universities UdelaR, UCUDAL, ORT and four Ministries 
were visited. These included: the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education 
and Culture, Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Office of Planning 
and Budget (which holds the status of a Ministry according to the Uruguayan 
Constitution). Further evidence was found through internet web-pages and 
media reports. 
  The data was collected from 2004 to 2006 covering a period from 1994 to 
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Interviews are defined as conversations with certain purposes that enable a flexible 
and adaptable way of finding out things. Through the use of the interview 
technique, it was expected to: 
 
  obtain an understanding about the general context,  
  fill the gaps of information that persist after the use of the other techniques. 
  see what the decision-makers feel about the funding model and its 
operational aspects, and what are their priorities in this aspect, and  
  learn about their perceptions and experiences in order to construct  a 
general vision of what is going on and how the funding model will evolve or 
change. 
 
According to Partington (2001), the use of this technique enables the researcher to 
gain explanations and information on materials that are not directly accessible: 
perceptions, attitudes and values, matters that are difficult to obtain by alternative 
methods. However, in this case, the use of interviews was also intended to fill in 
the gaps that emerge from the other techniques in use.  
 
Selection of interviewees 
Purposeful sampling was used to ensure that the respondents would provide or 
generate the information requested for the needs of the investigation and the 
research questions. The selection criteria used included identifying individuals who:  
(a) were deemed knowledgeable or experienced about the area, and (b) held 
representation of the different perspectives associated with this study.  
First.  I mapped out the population of interest, or target population (see:  FIGURE 19, 
p. 195 above). This target population included primary and secondary stakeholders 
according to Clarkson, (1995, p.16) and Savage (1991, p.2), (p.194 above).   
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Second.  Once I was clear about the target population, I identified and created a 
list of potential individuals who, I considered, were able to provide relevant 
information to answer the research questions because they had their knowledge or 
experience in the area, either because 
  they held positions that enabled them to inform this study‘s research 
questions by providing their thorough perspective, or   
  their professional connection to the topic and ability to inform the 
research questions of this study with both overarching views and 
practical details as necessary. 
 
At this stage, I felt that certain groups would not be able to provide relevant 
information to answer the research questions and were left behind. Such the case 
of the students who, initially,  were included in the primary stakeholders´ groups 
(FIGURE 19, p. 195 above) because they had a contractual relationship with the higher 
education institutions. I considered that the students did not have the required 
knowledge, expertise and experience in the field and, therefore, were not able to 
provide useful information for analysis.  
Third. I narrowed down my list trying to get a diverse set of representatives of 
primary and secondary stakeholders with different backgrounds and from different 
sectors in order to provide diverse perspectives. In this task I consulted with people 
familiar with the groups under consideration because it was important to recruit 
individuals who could represent their stakeholder groups. 
  
The final group had a diverse mix of respondents which, I felt, ensured a variety of 
perspectives. For example, the list included people from different institutions, either 
from  Government,  private and  public institutions, such as Senior Officers from 
Universities, Ministries, Unions, administrators, technicians, members of  
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Parliament, advisors at the Legislature, members of University councils and 
committees. 
 
The uniqueness and the size of the Uruguayan Higher Education system 
determined the following aspects:  
 
  That the target population was small and, consequently, the number of 
interviewees was relatively small.  However, I was able to interview a large 
proportion of the population.  
  That several interviewees were, at the same time, Government officers or 
MPs and University members, either as officers, administrators or teachers.  
Interestingly, three of the interviewees (two MPs and one advisor at the 
Legislature) were ex-members of UdelaR´s Councils (either at the Central 
Council or at Faculty councils) as representatives of the student union 
during the period 1994 to 2004.  
  
 
According to the aims of the project, there were two kinds of interviews:  
 
  The first type of interviews was intended to obtain information about the two 
components of the research: the existing model and the possible new 
model.  These were interviews held with University officers or with officials 
of Ministries or other funding authorities.   
 
  The second type of interviews, in this case with legislators or advisors at the 
legislature, was intended to obtain their perceptions and insights about 
possible changes or evolutions in the model.  
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Interviews with legislators and selected officers were developed to obtain 
information directly. Most of the interviewees (10/16) were people in charge of 
crafting the policies in the field. Others were professionals that operate the 
institutions (University administrators) or members of the institutional bodies that 
set their internal policies.  
 
5.3.1.1. Type of questions 
 
A structured interview guide was used in all interviews. The questions to be 
addressed during the interview were sent to the interviewee at least one week 
before the appointment. All questionnaires included semi-structured questions.  
 
The questionnaires used during the study are attached in ANNEX 3. 
 
5.3.1.2. Interview procedures 
 
Face-to-face interviews were selected over telephone calls or written surveys 
because of the small number of participants and the possibility of improved 
openness in face-to-face interviews (Gillham, 2000). In two cases, however, it was 
necessary to develop the interviews by telephone, because the interviewees were 
not available in other ways. 
 
  The selected individuals were contacted by e-mail to request their 
permission to participate. When an appointment had been agreed, the 
individuals were sent by e-mail a short introduction to the study, its main 
aims and research questions, together with a set of questions to be 
addressed during the interview (see: ANNEX 3) at least one week before 
the appointment.  
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  A request to permit audio tape-recording was included in this exchange of e-
mails. In some cases participants asked for a further verbal explanation 
about the questions as a preliminary to answering.  
  The interviews were conducted on a private one-on-one basis at their 
workplace in order to help them to be at ease and to overcome 
apprehension, and thus increase openness. At the commencement of the 
interview each respondent was asked if they consented to audio-tape 
recording of the conversation. This approval existed in all cases.  
  The time used for each interview varied between 30 minutes and two hours. 
  All interviews were undertaken between May 2004 and June 2005.  
 
5.3.1.3. Interviews with University representatives and officers of funding 
authorities 
 
In the case of the interviews with University representatives or with officers of 
funding authorities, the questions were centred upon the elements that could 
provide information about the existing model of finance (funding methodology and 
criteria, decentralisation, accountability) in each institution. These questions added 
to the information that was obtained through the use of unobtrusive methods. 
 
They were also asked if they considered that the existing model should evolve or 
change and, if so, what should be the features of an alternative model. 
 
5.3.1.4. Interviews with legislators or advisors at the Legislature 
 
Legislators interviewed had been elected in the elections held in October 2004. 
These legislators were selected bearing around that they have a background of 
involvement in educational matters. However, it is important to bear in mind that 
none of the current legislators showed a clear affiliation or involvement in higher 
education issues. As a result, it was also considered important to interview certain  
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officers that operated as advisors to the new Legislature. These officials are people 
with a long involvement in University matters, especially with reference to UdelaR.  
 
The list of interviewees and their positions is shown in ANNEX 3. Each has been 
assigned the pseudonym of "Interviewee" coupled with a letter of the alphabet 
corresponding to the sequence in which his participation occurred. In this way, 
anonymity for the interviewees was assured. 
 
 5.3.2.0. Focus group 
 
One focus group was developed with researchers and practitioners in higher 
education administration and policy.  
 
The focus group is a technique that gathers selected individuals to discuss and 
comment, from personal experience, the topic or problem of research (Rezabeck, 
2000). This methodology utilises interaction to explore topics in more detail and 
draw out feelings of participants (Nelson, 1997). As stated by Gibbs (1997), inter-
action is a crucial feature in focus groups as it enables participants to ask 
questions to each other as well as to re-evaluate and reconsider their own 
understandings of their specific experiences. However, it can also lead to one 
participant exerting influence over the others. 
 
The aim was to involve people in an organised discussion. It was intended to gain 
information about their views or experiences around the funding issues and the 
possible evolution of the model. The assumption was that the use of this technique 
would provide a larger amount of information in a shorter period of time as the 
gathering would involve many people who would interpret things in different ways 
or would see things from different perspectives. The focus group was also 
considered as a key source of information offering various perspectives of how the  
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funding model operates, what are its weaknesses and strengths, and how it may 
evolve or change.  
 
The general intention was to obtain the participants´ insights. The assumption was 
that through the use of this technique the people were more likely to reveal their 
opinions or thoughts through social gathering and interaction (Gibbs, 1997). 
Members of the focus group were asked to express their opinions about the 
funding model and were expected to state what they believed.  
 
The list of the participants in the focus group is included in ANNEX 4.  Each has 
been assigned the pseudonym of "Interviewee" coupled with a letter of the 
alphabet.  
 
5.3.2.1. Rationale for creating the group 
 
Participants were chosen not on a random basis but purposely. The main criterion 
for inclusion was that the persons possessed special qualifications which would 
enable them to understand the higher education sector´s situation and analyse it. 
 
They were expected to have particular or ―expert‖ knowledge, either because some 
have developed studies about higher education issues coming from different 
disciplines (political science, public administration, economy and sociology) or 
because they were practitioners with wide experience in the field.  
 They were chosen carefully through personal contacts or references from peers or 
colleagues. 
 
Homogeneity was preserved to make group members feel comfortable (Gibbs, 
1997) and to enable coherent conversations. This was a key aspect in building the 
group; participants should not feel threatened. Also, people need to feel  
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comfortable with each other and to feel that they are meeting with others whom 
they think of possessing similar characteristics (Gibbs quoting Morgan, 1997). 
 
5.3.2.2. Reason for using this tool 
 
The main interest was to obtain the views from selected informants about the 
topics involved. In addition, as mentioned above, the use of this technique enabled 
us to gain a larger amount of information in a shorter period of time as the 




Some days in advance of the focus group session, all the participants were 
provided with some of the data that was collected within the project. The focus 
group was developed after the interviews and documentary collections so many 
aspects about the current model were already known and it was even possible to 





5.3.2.4. About the participants in the focus group. 
 
Participants were individuals with a common background, age and demographic 
characteristics that were selected on account of their experience and background, 
or their considerable experience, in higher education management.  
This encouraged the group to speak freely. 
 
Members also represented several different sectors of the Uruguayan higher 
education system. That is, some of the members were from the public University,  
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others were from the private Universities and one was an officer at the Ministry of 
Education and Culture. 
 
All participants were individuals with specialist knowledge, who offered their 
personal views (not necessarily an official view) based on experience and 
expertise. 
 
5.3.2.5. About the focus group gathering 
 
Only one focus group could be run due to the scarcity of people with the required 
characteristics. There was not enough people in the country with these 
characteristics.     
 
Ten participants were invited but not all of them were available. While most 
respondents identified for inclusion in the focus group were within my reach and 
access, four individuals, which I believed to be invaluable for informing this study, 
either did not respond to my inquiries or were unable to participate at the time that 
the focus group was conducted. In the event, the group comprised six members. 
 
After the introduction and comments, they were asked to talk generally about the 





























5.3.2.6. Ethical issues about the focus group 
 
As already mentioned, all members of focus groups were informed in advance and 
provided with appropriate detail about how the data would be used and how it 
would be disseminated. A written invitation was sent to each of them in advance 
with that purpose. 
 
Focus group participation was voluntary. The primary means of communication 
was telephone and e-mail. Those who expressed interest in participating in the 
focus group were sent more information about the procedures and topics to be 
discussed.  
 
I began the gathering with some affirmations about the model that could challenge 
the participants and "push" them to express their opinions. These assertions were: 
 
  In the Uruguayan model there is a co-existence of different models of financing higher 
education between public and private institutions. Basic funding of public institutions 
was from Government funds.  
 
  Accountability, according to  the modern term, was absent. Whilst  the Government 
required  numerical information that institutions should provide within a prescribed 
format of indicators, allocations were not provided according to these criteria. 
Therefore, the follow up in the use of resources and accountability was not connected 
with resource allocation.  
 
  Finance of private institutions relied  on fees paid by students.  Institutions were 
exempted by the State from the payment of certain taxes, but this had little meaning 
in final costs. There was a weak framework of accountability. 
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Full information about the purposes and uses of their contributions was given. 
 
Anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed.  
 
5.3.2.7. Focus group organisation 
 
Some key elements of the organisation were the following: 
 
  The focus group session was developed after the interviews, in order to test 
or triangulate the elements that had emerged from interviews.  
  The meeting was tape recorded and transcribed.  
  The work of the focus group was predominantly conducted by the 
researcher who operated as the moderator.  
  Number of participants: As suggested by Gibbs (1997), the focus group was 
composed of six members. The session lasted two hours.  
  The focus group session drew upon the experiences of individuals who have 
a high level of knowledge in the field. A wide range of information and 
knowledge surfaced within the discussion among these people. Reactions, 
discussion, supporting and contrary points were brought to light, and added 
into the discussion.  
  The members of the focus group were first asked to consider an initial 
question from the researcher, respond with their thoughts, feelings, 
experiences and suggestions, and then react to the responses given by the 
various members of the group. In this way, a discussion was generated. 
They were, then, asked to react to the responses given by the various 
members of the group. Subsequent questions were then posed to the group 
after everyone had had a chance to comment and react to the others‘ 
comments. 
 
5.3.3.0. Unobtrusive methods  
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Documentation and archival records are called "unobtrusive methods" because 
they do not demand an intrusion in the research context. In this study, 
documentary information was most important to corroborate or augment evidence 
(Yin, 1994). 
 
Through this research technique a wide range of qualitative information was 
obtained. Relevant documents, such as policy statements, mission statements, 
transcriptions of meetings, newspaper articles, and technical papers related to 
University budgets, were obtained and analysed. In addition, I worked over archival 
records from the Uruguayan Parliament in order to analyse speeches from 
members of Parliament and University leaders. 
 
The analysis of documents provided insights into important social and political 
issues related to higher education policy making. As well, it was particularly useful 
in trying to understand the philosophy of those involved in the decision-making 
processes related to University funding and to provide insights of a group of people 
that cannot be observed or noted in another way. In many ways, the parliamentary 
speeches revealed conceptual underpinnings shared by the congressional 
community and offered understanding about how MPs conceive the different 
relationships that they have with the higher education sector, either with the 
























Finally, I have to point out that rather than developing a detailed linguistically-
textually based analysis I developed a pragmatically and interactionally based 
analysis. I extracted the significant concepts in the texts that provided a conceptual 
repertoire of how those individuals (the MPs) see certain matters from their 
particular points of view. As I see it, this procedure enables a better understanding 
of how the policy-making cycle works in Uruguay.  
 
For instance, it was remarkable to observe that there are no references at all to 
University tuition-fees in the policy-documents authored by the political parties that 
were analysed.  This is, certainly, a sensitive issue and it may be inferred that 
political parties have preferred to exclude its treatment in written documents. 
However, I certainly could find several contributions about this matter (tuition) by 
the MPs of all parties during a series of congressional sessions. This example 
certainly applies to other matters too, such as to the conflicting relationship 
between the Parliament and the public University. 
 
It is very important to recall that, in this study, the use of the 
congressional speeches was oriented to complement other 
data. My intention of using those speeches as sources of data was 
pragmatic; it is evident that congressional texts offer a significant 
amount of information that is not available from other sources (i.e. 
from policy documents). In this case, the difficulty was simply that 
some critical views from the political community about certain 
University issues were not registered in written official policy 
documents. Therefore, the difficulty was practical, the information 
that was regarded as vital in providing evidence for a given analytical 
point was missing in the other sources. 
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5.3.3.1. National and institutional regulations 
 
There are national and institutional regulations that govern the financial system, 
covering allocations, ways to allocate, criteria, accountability and auditing 
procedures. At national level, these include: the National Constitution and a series 
of laws that regulate the accounting systems exerted by the public bodies to all 
institutions that administer public funds. At sectoral and institutional levels, these 
include a series of laws and decrees that rule the linkage between the institutions 
and the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance.  
 
All these regulations are included in ANNEX 1 and have already been listed in 
page 201 above.  
 
Organisational charts or diagrams: These figures are useful to understand the 
relationship between the institution and the funding authority, and showed the 
steps and locations required to exercise forms of decentralisation, devolution, 
control and accountability and patterns of hierarchies and decision-making 
structures. I could obtain these diagrams from the University Planning Offices. 
These documents are listed in ANNEX 2. 
 
Technical papers: including reports from consultants, documents from political 
parties, self assessment reports, accreditation reports, and other working and 
interim papers. These documents are listed in ANNEX 2 and have already been 
listed in page 201 above. 
 
Institutional statistics and budget data. I could obtain this data from the 
Planning Offices at the public and the private Universities.  
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5.3.3.2. Archival records 
 
A systematic search of relevant documents, communications or memos about the 
funding system of each institution was undertaken, either inside them or in the 
archives of Ministries or Parliament. 
 
 Many of these documents that have been produced in a normal course of affairs, 
specified roles and relationships (Yin, 1994) and provided understanding about the 
general context. These documents are listed in ANNEX 1.  
 
5.3.3.3.0 Parliamentary speeches 
  
As a complementary source, this study examined the speeches of members of 
Parliament. The use of this data enabled a greater understanding of policy 
construction than was possible only from the official textual discourse. This 
analysis was employed to demonstrate interests and motivations and as a tool to 
analyse competing and contradictory claims. 
 
The study of parliamentary speeches focused on debates developed from 1994 to 
2004 on University funding. During that period, both Parliament chambers gathered 
1698 times and, in those sessions, I found 91 speeches related, specifically, to 
University funding. Some other official legislative records were analysed too, such 
as those of the Parliament Committees involved, i.e., the Education Committee and 
the Budget Committee, both in the High Chamber and the Low Chamber. In these 
cases, the hearing testimonies before congressional committees were recorded too 
and were available to the general public at the Parliament archives.  
 
In general, the statements made in the Parliament by its members are read by the 
MPs and are intended for the parliamentary record. Therefore they are recorded to  
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be transcribed in official records (see ANNEX 7 in which I include a transcription of 












5.3.3.3.1. Reasons to develop the analysis of parliament speeches 
 
The funding model and all the aspects related to the finance of higher education 
are largely an agenda for public policy. As such, it is driven mainly by public 
persons such as legislators or leaders, whether elected or unelected, or those in 
positions of power who influence them. In the Uruguayan system, legislators are 
expected to hold a privileged position in the higher education funding allocation 
process, as almost all University funding comes from public revenues that are 
determined in laws which are enacted by the Parliament. 
 
Last, but not the least, as commented above, parliamentary speeches provided 
insights that could not be obtained from the other sources. As explained by Van 
Dijk (1993), the study of political cognition largely deals with the mental 
representations that people share as political actors. Political information 
processing is often a form of discourse processing because much political action 
and participation is accomplished by discourse (p.5).  
 
 
It is important to recall that, during the period 1994-2004, the Parliament 
had a majority of members from the ―traditional‖ parties: the Colorado Party 
and the Blanco Party. Only since 2005, when the Frente Amplio Party won 
the national elections, has the Parliament had a majority of members from 
this party. As explained in Chapter 3, the Blanco and the Colorado Parties 
have a conservative orientation, while the Frente Amplio is defined as a leftist 
party.   
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5.3.3.3.2. Parliamentary speeches: selection criteria. 
 
Discourse has the important property that it may show what information is 
“important”, “prominent” or “relevant”.  Relevance is a relative notion (Van Dijk, 1997) and, 
in our case, such a decision was made within the framework of a theory and 
relevance to the research questions. 
 
This was certainly critical. While reading and analysing a large number of sessions, 
I was under risk of getting lost in the jungle of a multitude of discursive structures 
and strategies. How to make a reasoned choice of relevant, or at least interesting, 
speech was essential. 
 
The choice of references was based on theoretical and practical arguments that 
linked the speeches with our aim to understand political and ideological beliefs and 
insights into the ways MPs speak about the theme ―University funding‖ and about 
the social representations they share (or do not share) about the theme. There was 
a focus, too, on those discourses that expressed or implied the opinions of MPs that 
are shared by a group, i.e. by their own parties.  
 
5.3.3.3.3. Use of quotations 
 
  Quotations are presented in Chapter 6 with a linking commentary and have 
been  selected  to  illustrate  such  features  as:  the  strength  of  opinion  or  belief, 
similarities between respondents, differences between respondents, the breadth 
of ideas. Many of the quotations will ―speak for themselves”. 
 
  Special indication is provided when a unique minority voice is presented.  
 
  In all the cases, quotations are taken from the corpus, put together with the 
discussion, and used as evidence for the ongoing argument.  
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5.3.3.3.4. Meaning of parliamentary speeches 
 
Finally, the parliamentary speeches can only be understood if they are considered 
in their social and psychological context. Words and utterances do not carry 
meaning by themselves. Texts must be interpreted with respect to a knowledge 
base, which includes knowledge of the local environment (the context in which the 
speech is delivered) and knowledge of the particular and the surrounding 
ideologies. Therefore, speeches cannot be interpreted without specifying that 
knowledge base. Van Dijk (1999, 2000a) explains that ideologies play a crucial role 
while analysing discourses. Ideologies must be viewed as interpretation 
frameworks which organise sets of attitudes in a society. Therefore, ideologies 
provide the cognitive foundation for the attitudes, goals and interests of the groups 
that integrate a society (Van Dijk , 1999, p.2). 
 
5.3.3.3.5. Positive features of parliamentary speeches as a source of data. 
 
In this study the analysis of parliamentary speeches was extremely useful because 
its use enabled me to fill in the gaps of information that persisted after the use of 
the other techniques. 
 
There are other advantages to consider related to its use: 
 
  It provided valuable historical/cultural insights; 
  It enabled me to understand the conditions behind a specific "problem"; 
  It helped to reveal the motivation and politics involved in arguing for or 
against a specific statement, or value (Van Dijk, 2000b); 
  It provided an understanding about the general context, and helped me 
to see what the decision-makers feel about the funding model (and  
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several other issues) and its operational aspects, and what are their 
priorities in this aspect ;  
  Finally, I learned about their perceptions in order to construct a general 
vision of what is going on and how the funding model will evolve or 
change. 
 
5.3.3.3.6. Limitations of the analysis of parliamentary speeches 
 
I have made clear already that the purpose of utilising this analysis was not to 
provide definite answers but to expand my knowledge about political agendas or 
motivations. Nonetheless, I understand that there are strict limitations on the 
inferences that I can make with this kind of analysis. For example:  
 
  Inferences about motivation or intent cannot normally be made. The 
analysis is only analysis of what is in the text. I cannot utilise possible “hidden 
meanings” (Ariel del Val, 1999, p.5). 
 
  While analysing the texts, it became very clear that discourses are 
incomplete and implicit in the sense that much information is not expressed, 
but only understood to be implied or presupposed (Bolivar and Kohn, 1999, 
p.10). In addition, while talking about delicate issues, such as tuition-fees or 
the relationship between the public University and the Parliament, I found 
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SECTION 4: DATA ANALYSIS  
 
5.4.0. Introduction  
 
Data analysis and interpretation focuses on organising and reducing information, 
making inferences and attaching meaning to organised information (Worthen and 
Sanders, 1987). In addition, the researcher has to report and document his or her 
analytic processes and procedures fully and truthfully so others may evaluate the 
credibility of the researcher and his or her findings.  
 
Qualitative data analysis consists of identifying, coding, and categorising patterns 
found in the data (Byrne, 2001). I analysed the collected data thoroughly and 
converted it to analysable forms. At the simplest level, the analysis undertaken 
involved examining the assembled data to determine how they answered the 
research questions. 
 
Data emerging from documents, interviews, the focus group and the Parliamentary 
and news discourses was analysed through content analysis.  
 
5.4.1. Content analysis 
 
Berelson defined content analysis as "a research technique for the objective, systematic, and 
quantitative description of manifest content of communications" (Berelson, 1974, p.2). It is 
used to determine the presence of certain words, concepts, themes, phrases, 
characters, or sentences within texts or sets of texts and to quantify this presence 
in an objective manner.  
 
The use of content analysis enables us to predict or infer phenomena that cannot 
be observed directly. In fact, the inability to observe phenomena tends to be the 
primary motivation for using content analysis  
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Krippendorf ( 2004) describes content analysis as ―....an empirically grounded method 
exploratory in process and predictive and inferential in intent (…) what  distinguishes content analysis 
from other methodologies of enquiry, is its analysis of data from their contexts of their uses 
.‖(p.xviii).   
 
To conduct a content analysis on a text, content is quantified objectively according 
to explicitly formulated rules (Worthen and Sanders, 1987, p.315). The text is 
coded, or broken down, into manageable categories and then examined. The 
results are then used to make inferences about the messages within the texts, the 
writer, the audience, and even the culture and time of which these are a part.  
 
I used content analysis in the following way: I examined the texts and coded them 
for the existence of certain words or concepts. In looking at this texts, I was 
interested not only in quantifying these words, but in examining how they were 
related, i.e. whether there was a stronger presence of positive or negative words 
used with respect to a specific argument or respective arguments.  In addition, 
some qualitative data can be dealt with in a quantitative way. If an idea appeared in 
the data frequently, it was reasonable to count how often it appeared. But, it must 
be made clear that simple counts were used to provide a useful summary
 of some 
aspects of the analysis and that these figures do not represent a statistical sample.  
 
The major purpose of the use of content analysis was to identify patterns in text 
and the themes or major ideas emerging from the sources of data. As I was 
working through the different categories, links were made between categories to 
demonstrate how the themes emerged and how conclusions about the findings 
were drawn.  
 
The analysis contributed to the gradual building of an explanation that linked 
elements of collected data to themes. Matters alluded to in interviews, the focus  
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group and the Parliamentary speeches were identified and categorised around 
specific ideas. This general approach, called ―constant comparative analysis‖, 
involves taking pieces of data and comparing them with all others that may be 
similar or different in order to develop conceptualisations of the possible 
relationships between various pieces of data. 
 
The process that I followed may be summarised as follows:  
1. Marking and coding was done manually as it was considered that the size of 
available data was manageable. 
2. All collected data was read and re-read, line by line, and divided into meaningful 
analytical units and coded around themes with a thematic list. A coding frame was 
developed to facilitate the analysis of the content of interview transcripts and to 
characterise each comment. This frame is included in ANNEX 6. 
3. Data was displayed in a matrix which enabled me to extrapolate from the data 
enough to begin to discern systematic patterns and interrelationships (see an 
example in ANNEX 9). 
4. The accounts of references and answers to a certain issue were explored in 
order to identify patterns of convergence between data sources. 
5. Data was organised and meaningfully reduced or reconfigured. The process 
involved selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data that 
appeared in the different sources. As expected, this analysis gradually drove 
towards an explanation that linked elements of collected data to themes. 
6.  A template containing full data was developed. Although, I did not
 seek to 
quantify data, the "final" template helped me to interpret and write up my findings. 
7. Throughout the course of the analysis the following questions were asked: 
  What patterns and common themes emerge? 
  Are there any deviations from these patterns?  
  What interesting or new elements emerge from the responses?  
  Do any of these patterns or findings suggest that additional data may need 
to be collected?  
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Finally, collected data was contrasted with what has been previously said in the 
literature about similar data; was oriented to areas in the literature that I had not 
previously considered and triangulated with the literature as a way to validate my 
impressions.   
 
Specific steps undertaken in the analysis of parliamentary speeches. 
 
As mentioned above, I analysed the transcriptions of 1698 sessions. While reading 
each session, I first developed a search for general statements among the 
following categories of data: ―University funding‖, ―University budget‖, ―University 
finances‖. The raw data was brought together on the basis of their similarities into 
categories.  I first created broad categories, and then related them to 
subcategories. When the core categories were decided, minor categories were 
discarded as irrelevant. 
 
The choice of categories for analysis depended on the research questions.  
I used the concept of ―relevance‖ (Van Dijk, 1997) which entailed that the decision 
of the category was made within the framework of a theory and relevance to the 
research questions. The core categories that were, finally, selected were the 
following: a) funding allocation criteria, b) University autonomy with reference to 
funding model, c) lack or scarcity of funds, d) views about the use of the allocated 
funds, e) tuition-fees and f) Parliament-University relationship. 
 
The category headings were the basis for the data analysis. In Chapter 6, under 
each heading, extracts of data are taken from the corpus and put together with 
discussion. 
 
ANNEX 9 shows the analysis of the category tuition-fees. 
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SECTION 5: ISSUES OF VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
 
 
Though the concepts of validity and reliability developed within the quantitative 
tradition require strict procedures, they can still be employed within the qualitative 
study as hallmarks to check if the information is adequate. The concept of 
―reliability‖ is concerned with the degree to which the analysis or findings can be 
repeated by another researcher.  
 
Some strategies were implemented during the research process to ensure the 
attainment of its rigour and maintain reliability. These methods were the following: 
 
  Use of multi-modal methods. The use of various sources of data enabled 
the comparisons for congruity and added perspectives (Yin, 1994). 
 
  Triangulations: Availability of different sources of data enabled me to make 
counter checks (Trochim, 1996). I compared the results from either
 two or 
more different methods of data collection (i.e.
 interviews and discourses) or, 
more simply, two or more data
 sources (for example, interviews with 
members of different interest
 groups).  
 
  Interviewees were asked to check transcripts of their statements. 
 
  The interpretation of data was corroborated with the interviewees who 
provided the ideas. 
 
  Colleagues were consulted in order to share project evidences. Their 
interpretations and impressions were requested. 
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  In this study I relied on literature for definitions and provided them when 
appropriate. 
 
Limitations   
 
I identify the following limitations: 
 1. I am aware that this study will not provide a basis for generalising our findings 
for other countries, but I do not aim at generalisation.  
2. Interviews with various researchers, University officers and MPs and a focus 
group were a primary source of information for our in-depth studies. I needed to 
complement the missing information with other sources of evidence, such as the 




In this chapter I described the research methods undertaken in this thesis.  
 
In order to answer the research questions of this study, a qualitative approach was 
employed because it enabled me to consider the whole situation and to understand 
what were the elements that were "inter-acting" and determining the research 
phenomenon.  
 
The methods of data collection that emerged from the research question were all 
non-quantitative. I used different sources of data: documents, literature, semi-
structured interviews, a focus group, parliamentary and press discourses. The logic 
behind data collection was to use multiple sources of evidence under the rationale 
of triangulation (Yin, 2003). The multi-modal tools that were chosen tried to 
address several questions from different perspectives.  
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Data emerging from documents, interviews, the focus group and the Parliamentary 
and news discourses was analysed through content analysis. The analysis 
contributed to the gradual building of an explanation that linked elements of 
collected data to themes. Matters alluded to in interviews, the focus group and the 
Parliamentary speeches were identified and categorised around specific ideas. 
 
Finally, I reviewed some strategies which were implemented during the research 
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CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH FINDINGS 
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Aim of the chapter 
 
The results presented in this chapter comprise the findings from the three types of 
data source: interviews, focus group and documentary analysis. The data are 
presented by research question integrating the data from the different types of 
source through triangulation (Trochim, 1996). This technique uses multiple 
methods to investigate a single phenomenon, but was limited in this case to a 




As described in Chapter 5 (pp 212-233 above), documentary data from legislation, 
policy documents, institutional charts and institutional communications were 
gathered to provide a series of systemic and macro-institutional perspectives. Data 
from semi-structured interviews conducted with institutional administrators and 
policy makers, and from a focus group of experts in the field were collected to 
provide the systemic perspective. Finally, a series of parliamentary and news 
discourses from decision makers in the sector were collected in order to 
complement the data collected from the other sources. 
 
The data were organised around the research questions and then interpreted 
thematically, using the procedure of constant comparison (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967).  
 
As already mentioned, to ensure the anonymity of the participants, both at 
interviews and in the focus group, each has been assigned the pseudonym of 
"Interviewee" coupled with a letter of the alphabet corresponding to the sequence 
in which his or her participation occurred (e.g. Interviewee A, Interviewee B, 
Interviewee C), and potentially identifying characteristics have been either omitted 
or disguised.   
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In the case of data that was extracted from congress discourses and news 
discourses, the name and the affiliation (i.e. political party or union) of the source is 
identified because these officers have reflected their opinions in texts that are 
publicly available. 
 
Despite the presence of an interview guide outlining various aspects for potential 
discussion, the interviews and the focus group tended to focus on the broad 
categories that are identified in the operational questions associated with the 
research questions, as shown in Chapter 5 (p.224 above). The comments and 
perspectives of the interviewees, as well as those from MPs and University 
constituencies, are presented within the context of these categories. 
 
Organisation of this chapter 
 
As already explained in Chapters 1 and 5, this study was oriented to answer two 
research questions and their related operational questions. This section will 
present the emerging data directly relevant around those research questions. All 
data is presented utilising the structure that was established for the operational 
questions.   
 
6.1. Which is the current model of funding higher education in Uruguay 
How are funds provided? 
 
6.1.I. Funding provided to UdelaR 
Sources: Policy documents (Uruguayan Constitution, Law No 12549 and Law No 15903), UdelaR´s 
"Consensos para la transformacion de la UdelaR", interviews, Focus Group and Parliamentary 
discourses. 
 
The main sources of funding for UdelaR are the following:  
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6.1.I.i. State funding. 
 
The data revealed a six stage process for the allocation of funds from the 
Government to UdelaR: 
 
First step. Preparation of the University budget proposal.  
Allocations to UdelaR are based on requests, the budget proposal, elaborated by 
the University within a so called  ―global frame‖, which means that the University 
does not have to explain how it projects to use the funds  (National Constitution 
Art. 220, Organic Law 12549, art . 23). Each five years, UdelaR`s budget is 
approved by the Parliament in the National Budget Law (Constitution, art 220). This 
is preceded by a procedure described in the University law (Organic Law No 
12.549, art 23): in each Faculty, the Faculty Council prepares a budget project (bid) 
and sends it to the Central University Council which considers it and can introduce 
changes.  
 
Second step. Submission of the budget proposal. 
The Central University Council submits the overall University bid (University budget 
bid) to the Government which can introduce changes on it. If there are 
modifications introduced by the Government, both projects (the modifications and 
the original University bid) must be submitted to the Parliament as a part of the 
National Budget (Constitution, art.220). At this stage, as in all the budget process, 
the Government operates under the advice of the Office of Planning and Budget. 
The final decision is taken by the Parliament in the National Budget Law.  
 
The University budget bid which is submitted to the Government  includes  a sum 
of requests that invariably exceed the final allocation by a wide margin (Focus 
Group; Senator R Sanabria Colorado Party MP, December 8, 1995; FIGURES 14  
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above, p. 122, and 21  below). Thus, in 2005, the sum requested exceeded the sum 
allocated by 28.4% (FIGURE 14 above, p. 122). 
 
FIGURE 21: Difference (between resources requested by UdelaR and resources allocated to UdelaR by Budget Laws in 
years  2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005). In Uruguayan Pesos. 
 
Source: SUI UdelaR  (2007). 
 
 












Budget Law  
  235 
Once the University bid is introduced in the Parliament, UdelaR´s officials negotiate 
a final budget with the legislators (Interviewees A and B, Focus Group).  
 
A major point of the discussion with the legislators is about increments in grant that 
which are needed because the UdelaR asserts property rights to use the current 
base, arguing that new initiatives should be funded as adds-ons (Interviewee B, 
Focus Group).  
 
Fourth step. Enactment of the National Budget Law, including the allocation 
of funds to the public University. 
Funds are allocated and received by UdelaR as a block grant. While allocating the 
funds, the Parliament does not refer to any specific elements (i.e. students, staff), 
rather it only refers to the amount of money that is allocated.  
Most of interviewees (10/16) described  the basic model as ―block granting‖, which 
means that the funds are received as a block grant in ways that the University can 
spend the money for whatever it deems necessary (Interviewees A and B).  
 
The block comprises two parts: a basic grant, based on the historical, current base, 
and an incremental grant, negotiated by the legislators and University officials 
oriented to fund special programmes. Both are received as blocks (Interviewee B). 
The basic grant is a block that contains a certain sum based on past experience 
(the former allocation).  
 
The major discussion is about how much of an increase will be provided for special 
programmes (Focus Group), because since 1995, the National Budget Law 
allocated (earmarked) some special grants to specific educational and research 
programmes of UdelaR including: continuing education programmes, International 
co-operation programmes, support of research activities and  building edifices and 
facilities of the University hospital (Laws No 16320 and 16662, Interviewee L).  
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The final allocation is determined in the National Budget Law through funds that 
are allocated on a five-year basis.  
 
Fifth step: Supply of funds to the public University. 
Funds are supplied by the Government through the National Treasury, part of the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (Law 15903, art.533). 
 
State funding comes from tax-collection, particularly VAT and the graduate tax. 
These funds are collected and administered by the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance (through the General Taxes Office) and are appropriated according to the 
status of the public purse managed by the National Treasury (Law No 15903, 
art.533). 
 
Two of the interviewees (Interviewee A and Interviewee B, both University 
administrators) reported that, whilst funds are allocated to institutions, the grant 
does not pass over to the University. State appropriations are under the control of 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which operates like a public cashier. The 
grant is held by that Ministry to be called upon as reserves. Both interviewees 
claimed that this arrangement implies that appropriations depend on the state of 
the public purse: if the State collects more taxes, the institutions will receive the 
complete appropriation. However, if there are fiscal constraints, they will receive 
less funds. Thus, there is no guarantee that the University will actually receive the 
funds as agreed in the budget.  
 
At the Parliament, Senator Alberto Couriel (Frente Amplio MP) confirmed this 
situation as: “perverse and complicated mechanisms that have been imposed by the Government 
offices (which) determine that the already scarce funds turn to be even smaller“(September 25, 
1997). 
 
Sixth step: Account of the use of funds  
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Each year, the University Council also presents an account of the use of allocated 
funds and proposes the changes in the budget allocations that it considers that are 
required (Law No 12549, art 23). This account is submitted to the Government 
which can introduce changes on it. If there are modifications introduced by the 
Government, both projects (the modifications and the original University proposal) 
must be submitted to the Parliament as a part of the Annual Law of Account 
(National Constitution, art. 215). The National Constitution allows changes to be 
introduced to the National Budget Law through the Annual Law of Account in 
special circumstances (National Constitution art. 214).  
 
FIGURE 22: Six stage process for the allocation of funds from Government to UdelaR  
 
 
6.1. I.ii. Other funding sources for UdelaR 
6.1. I.ii.a. Donations, contracts and services 
 
UdelaR receives 9% of its total income from alternative sources, such as 
donations, contracts and services. This data emerges from the study “Indicadores de 
Account of the use of funds. UdelaR is free to use the block grants at own discretion due to 
its autonomy. The account of the use  of funds is  a formality.
Supply of funds to the public University through the Ministry of Economy and Finance.
Enactment of the National Budget Law,  including the allocation of funds to the public 
University. Allocations follow historical patterns and are appropriated through block grants
The Parliament considers the University budget proposal. Negotiations between legislators 
and University officials.
Submission of the budget proposal by the Government to the Parliament
UdelaR proposal is prepared and sent to the Parliament. 
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la Universidad de la Republica” which was developed in 2001 by the Planning Office of 
UdelaR (FIGURE 23). Unfortunately there is no updated available data about income 
from donations, contracts and services at all-University level.  
 
FIGURE  23: UdelaR`s Faculties  alternative sources of income in 2001. 
  --%-- 
AGRONOMY  21 
ARCHITECTURE  5 
ECONOMICS  23 
LAW  5 
ENGINEERING  18 
MEDICINE  2 
DENTISTRY  5 
CHEMISTRY  4 
VETERINARY  4 
HUMANITIES  3 
HOSPITAL  N/A 
ARTS  1 
PSYCHOLOGY  2 
NURSING  1 
SOCIAL SC  2 
BASIC SC  4 
LIBRARY SC  N/A 
MUSIC  N/A 
COMMUNICATION SC  N/A 
FOOD SC  N/A 
Source: ―Indicadores de la Universidad de la Republica‖, UdelaR (2001). 
 
Chiancone et al (2005, pp: 31-32) report that, the UdelaR Faculties have 
developed different strategies to obtain funds from contracts of consultancy  
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services. While the Faculty of Engineering has important customers in the public 
sector, i.e. the National Electricity Agency and the National Telecommunications 
Agency, the Faculty of Chemistry has small size customers.  
 
One of the most successful Faculties in this matter has been the Faculty of 
Economics which has provided technical support to several Ministries and public 
agencies in areas of institutional redesign and general management. (SUI, 2001, 
p.32). 
 
Chiancone et al do not provide data about the amount of funds that these Faculties 
obtain through contracts or services.  
 
6.1.I.ii.b. Levy of the Graduate Tax 
 
In 1994, an additional source of funding was introduced with the creation of a tax 
called "The Solidarity fund additional" which represents taxation over UdelaR´s 
graduates (Law 16524). 
 
This law was created with the specific intention of providing new funds to UdelaR. 
Graduates from UdelaR have to contribute on an annual basis with a fixed amount 
of US$ 264 per year for twenty five years, or until retirement. Income from this 
graduate tax is allocated into a fund - called "The Solidarity Fund" that is supplied to 
UdelaR to finance estates, libraries and some specific programmes in rural areas. 
The public University receives this funding annually and is free to use it within the 
purposes mentioned above. 
 
Chiancone et al (2005, pp.34-35) report that income from the collection of the 
graduate tax in 2004 represented 3.7% of University total budget.  
 
6.1. I.ii.c. Tuition-fees from post-graduate programmes  
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Another source of funding is represented by tuition-fees that are charged in post-
graduate programmes. In 2000, UdelaR approved a regulation called the ―Post-
graduate Ordinance of the UdelaR‖ which established that tuition fees could 
eventually be charged in post-graduate courses. 
 
The proposal to charge fees to post-graduate students in certain programmes 
(professional programmes) came from the Rector, Rafael Guarga. According to his 
view, charging fees would not affect the University´s root-based values of free 
higher education because “... we talk about post-graduate programmes, those programmes that 
are beyond the undergraduate studies... post-graduates are not students, they are graduates. Then, 
we can charge tuition – fees in the post-graduate programmes, and in this case we do not violate the 
Constitution or the Law....” (La Republica, August 4, 2001). Besides, according to his 
view, “tuition free higher education is a rule and charging tuition fees to post-graduate students is 
only an exception to the rule” (La Republica, August 4, 2001). 
 
The adoption of the University ordinance was preceded by great debate at councils 
and union assemblies at the University. The University unions presented different 
views. For instance, the students represented in the FEUU were opposed to 
charging any kind of fees. Their message was: “Tuition free education is an 
unquestionable rule without exceptions” (La Republica, June 19, 2001). 
 
The teachers´ union represented in ADUR adopted a more flexible position, 
arguing that charging fees to post-graduate programmes could be considered as 
an exception to the rule. This union therefore approved the Rector´s proposal to 
charge tuition for certain, professional-oriented, programmes (ADUR, 2001). 
 
I cannot provide data about the amount of funds that UdelaR`s Faculties are 
levying through this type of tuition-fees because there is no available data either at 
UdelaR or at the Ministry of Education and Culture.    
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6.1. I.ii.d. Tuition fees from undergraduate programmes 
 
Although the Organic Law 12549 established that University teaching is free of 
charge, a law passed in 1991 (Law 16226) authorised UdelaR to charge tuition-
fees to those students who can afford it. In legal terms, Law 16226 revoked Law 
12.549. 
 
However, UdelaR has refused to use this authorisation based on the following 
elements: 
  First, a study by Gottifredi and Hidalgo in 1995 showed that, if a progressive 
fee were applied (from US$ 50 to 150 per month) to students whose families 
belong to the three quintiles of highest income in the population, the 
potential collection would represent from 10 to 15% of the University budget 
(Gottifredi and Hidalgo, 1995). 
  The introduction of tuition-fees would entail implementing political and 
administrative operations, considered ―complex‖ by UdelaR`s officers, 
which, according to their views, would cause major disruption (UdelaR, 
2001). 
  The fee collection would only represent relatively modest resources to the 
University and would not solve its basic needs (UdelaR, 2001). 
At the Parliament, this decision to refuse the legal authorisation to charge tuition-
fees was criticised several times by the MPs from the Blanco Party and Colorado 
Party, especially when the Congress had to consider the University budget bids in 
1995 and 2000. For instance, on one of these occasions, Senator Alberto Heber 
(Blanco Party MP) considered that: 
“The University is not using a right to charge tuition fees, furthermore...an obligation to 
charge tuition fees...because these  should be considered an obligation, an obligation to 
charge tuition to the wealthy. In this matter the University shows lack of solidarity. 
“Solidarity” is not about asking for more funds, which entails more taxes, higher rates of  
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inflation and, finally, a punishment to the poor. …However, the University avoids this 
discussion... it has been authorised to use this right many years ago and it is still 
avoiding this debate...” (December 7, 1995).  
 
6.1. II. Funding of other public institutions. 
Sources: Policy documents (Uruguayan Constitution) and  Interviews. 
 
The budget for military educational institutions is allocated on a five year basis in 
the National Budget Law, through the allocation to the Ministry of Defence (FIGURE 
24 below, page 259). This Ministry determines what are the allocations for all its 
programmes, including the higher education programmes that operate inside it 
(Interviewee D).   
 
This process begins with a budgetary request submission from the head of the 
military educational institution who estimates the number of courses that will be 
taught in the coming five years, and, therefore, the needs for that period. There 
follows a process in which that request is submitted to the military authorities and 
later to the Minister of Defence and to the Executive Branch (in this case: the office 
of the President of the Republic).  
 
The process results in a procedure described in the National Constitution (art. 
214). Each five years, the Executive Branch prepares a budget proposal, which 
includes two parts: an application for its own units (for example: the Ministries and 
the Planning Office) and an application for the rest of the publicly owned entities 
(for instance: public entities of education, UdelaR and ANEP) and public 
corporations.  
 
The Government submits this budget proposal to the Parliament as a National 
Budget Law proposal (National Constitution, art. 168, inc.18 and art. 220). The  
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budget of the Ministry of Defence, as one of the Government´s units, is included in 
the whole Government budget proposal.  
As described above, during all the budget process, the Government operates 
under the advice of the Office of Planning and Budget. The final decision about 
allocations is taken by the Parliament in the National Budget Law. 
 
FIGURE 24:  Budget allocations to institutions 
 
 
6.1.III. Funding of private institutions 
Sources: Institutional documents, interviews and Focus Group. 
 
In the private sector, almost all funding comes from tuition paid by students 
(Oddone and Perera, 2004, pp:26-27; Interviewee C). Oddone and Perera estimate 
that tuition fee income represents more than 90% of their total income  (p.26), 
which was confirmed by Chiancone et al (2006, p.45) as shown in FIGURE 25 below: 
 
FIGURE 25 Evolution of tuition fee income in private Universities (2000 to 2005) 


































































Source: Chiancone et al ( 2006, p. 40). 
 
Fees vary between subjects, but  an average fee  would represent an amount of 
US$ 200 per month (Martinez Larrechea, 2006; Universidad ORT, http:// 
www.ort.edu.uy, and El Observador ( 04/06/2006).  
 
Martinez Larrechea (2006, p.98) shows that each University charges fees which 
vary from programme to programme. These fees are set by each institution 
according to its own criteria and considerations. Interestingly, Martinez Larrechea 
finds out that UCUDAL, ORT University and the Universidad de la Empresa charge 
similar fees in ―professional‖ programmes like Engineering,   Accounting and Law. 
According to Chiancone and Martinez Larrechea (2006, p.34) only the Universidad 
of Montevideo charges fees that are, comparatively, 50% higher.   
 
In addition, due to Constitutional regulations (art. 69), private education institutions 
are tax–exempted, both at national and local levels. 
 
Oddone and Perera (2004, pp 30-32) report that the private institutions provide 
significant financial support to students through a number of special admission 
schemes and scholarships. In general, these scholarships are awarded based on 
two different considerations: a) academic merit, oriented to award academically 
talented students; or b) financial need, oriented to help disadvantaged students 
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with costs associated with their higher education. Oddone and Perera´s findings 
suggest that the use of different scholarship programmes in the private institutions 
introduces elements of competition in the market. 
 
6.2. Criteria used to determine allocations. 
Sources: Interviews, Focus Group, Parliamentary discourses 
 
Funding criteria are based on historical allocations and incremental-categorical 
funding. Many interviewees (8/16) and several statements at Congress concurred 
to demonstrate that the criteria used to allocate the basic block grant funds are 
historical (Interviewee C and Representative Martin Ponce de Leon, Frente Amplio 
MP, July 23, 1998 and October 3, 2001). 
 
Funding relies heavily on historical allocations that are always the same and are 
expected to be the same. According to Interviewee J :“The base is the historical 
allocation.... at least until now” 
 
Interviewee L pictured the concept well as follows  
“Allocations are determined based on historical precedence…historical criteria. Allocations 
are the same, each year, because it is expected to occurr in that way…everything must 
remain the same. It seems to be that the University has to keep an inercial balance… 
everything must remain the same, if we expect to introduce new programmes, they will 
demand incremental allocations…” 
 
Schwartzman (1993a) has referred to this type of funding as "bureaucratic" due to the 
ways in which allocations are decided. Allocations are made without consideration 
to internal working, enrolments, institutional performance or cost changes and, as 
shown by Pratt (1987), quality is rarely considered. 
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However, the data that emerges from this study shows that the historical funding 
model traditionally used has changed during the 1990s converting the model from 
a historical to a historical/ incremental model (Laws No 16320 and 16662, 
Interviewees L and N, Focus Group). During these years, the late 1980s and the 
1990s, the Parliament introduced special allocations for certain projects in the 
National Budget Laws.    
 
Parliamentary speeches reveal that this innovation was introduced by the Blanco 
party´s legislators. These legislators considered that categorical funding was 
positive because, while receiving earmarked funding, UdelaR would ―...avoid an 
internal debate and ... use the funds quickly, avoiding discussions about how to allocate the funds 
internally” (Senator Luis Alberto Heber, Blanco Party MP, December 6, 1995). 
 
This is a point that deserves special attention because, generally speaking, the 
leftist MPs expressed disagreement about the worth of allocating earmarked  
funds. For instance, several Frente Amplio MPs found this situation, in general, 
unsatisfactory and argued that funding certain, earmarked projects represented a 
violation of University autonomy . According to Senator H Sarthou (Frente Amplio 
MP, December 7, 1995), 
” We consider that University autonomy means that we cannot establish how the 
University can use the allocated funds. These has to do with our conception about the 
University. If we supply funds  to certain programmes, we will be establishing how the 
University must use the funds, and that will be a violation of the University autonomy”           
Furthermore, Frente Amplio MP, H Korzeniak, showed that he had quite negative 
feelings towards this new mechanism which, he considered, was utilised by the 
Parliament to decide which University programmes would receive funding and 
which would not. According to his view, and based on the concept of University 
autonomy, only UdelaR could and should decide how to use the allocations 
(Senator H Korzeniak, Frente Amplio MP, July 22, 1998).  
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Additionally, Senator Marina Arismendi (Frente Amplio MP) expressed her 
suspicion about earmarking funds because: 
“…whilst the Parliament does not supply the funds that the University requests because 
-it is said- they are not available, the funds “appear”to supply “certain” programmes. This 
entails a violation of University autonomy. I will never vote a proposal which will entail a 
violation of autonomy. (December 5, 1995)  
 
5. Interestingly, most participants in the focus group suggested that, in this 
approach, the Parliament showed an intention of linking funds to strategies which 
were determined in the laws, something considered as positive by the focus group 
participants (Interviewees L and N).   
 
However a negative aspect of the model was pointed out by one of the 
interviewees (Interviewee N) who considered that this new model lacked political 
compromise. He judged that:  
 "We have a logic of incrementalism. The State has not assumed that it must have 
policies about higher education and that is why there are no policies for the finance of 
higher education” 
 
6.3. Autonomy as a distinctive element 
Sources: Policy documents: National Constitution; Law No 12549; Law No 15.661; Decree No 
308/995; Interviews. 
 
6.3.I. Public institutions 
 
All public educational entities Uruguay function with extensive autonomy. 
The Higher, Secondary, Primary, Industrial and Arts education institutions are ruled 
by one or more autonomous councils (National Constitution, art 202). UdelaR is  
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defined by the National Constitution as an autonomous institution which means 
that it develops its activities with a total independence from the national 
Government (Law 12549, art. 1-5). 
 
This independence was confirmed in this research. Most of interviewees 
emphasised that degrees of decentralisation are very high (6/7). Decentralisation 
was associated by many (6/7) with autonomy.  
 
However, there was a notable exception: military higher education. Interviewee E 
(University administrator) described a very different picture: 
"My institution has no autonomy. All guidelines, and institutional objectives and study 
programmes are set and established by the military authorities and we are submitted to 
hierarchy. In addition , there is not academic freedom." 
 
6.3.II. Private institutions 
 
Private institutions operate with full independence from public authorities and are 
only subject to inspections in case of irregularities (Decree No.308/995).  
According to their private status, they are ruled by the Private Law (Interviewee C). 
This interviewee revealed that, whilst the Ministry of Education and Culture 
requests annual reports, these are not reviewed or examined at all. Thus, a high 
level of autonomy is enjoyed with minimal and ineffective oversight by 
Government. 
 
6.4. Requirements for accountability. 
Sources: Policy documents (National Constitution art. 208; Law No 12549; MEF/ CEPRE, 2000); 
Interviews; Parliamentary discourses. 
 
6.4.I. Controls over UdelaR. 
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UdelaR develops its functions with very significant autonomy (The Organic Law 
12549, arts.1-5). According to the Constitution and the laws, as a public entity, it is 
subject to the following controls:  
 
6.4. I.i. By the Court of Accounts 
 
All expenditures made by public entities are submitted to accounting controls 
exerted by an independent body called the Court of Accounts (National 
Constitution art. 208). This Court is a national body created by the Constitution (art. 
208). Its jurisdiction extends to national and local Government and to all bodies 
that use public funds or properties. It conducts pre-audit, concurrent and special 
audit functions. The powers to perform these audits are mandated by the 
Constitution (art. 211) and by national legislation (Law 15903). It performs its 
functions ―on site‖ through its own staff who are registered accountants.   
 
The Court cannot decide or take actions on the audit findings, does not discharge 
judicial functions and cannot develop investigations. When it finds irregular uses of 
funds, or other infractions, it must report all the irregularities to the Legislative, 
Executive and Judiciary Powers.   
 
6.4. I.ii By the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Law 15903, art 549 and art 
550) 
 
The National Accountant Office, part of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, is in 
charge of internal control over all economic-financial acts performed by  bodies 
mentioned by the Constitution (art. 220).  
 
6.4. I.iii. By the Office of Planning and Budget 
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This office is a part of the Office of the President of the Republic (CEPRE). The 
office requires that all public agencies submit reports of their annual activities and 
prepares a complete National report integrating all the information collected from 
the different agencies.   
 
6.4. I.iv. By the Parliament 
 
The Organic Law 12549 established extensive autonomy under the inspiration of 
the Cordoba Movement, which considered that political autonomy would prevent 
external (political) interferences in academic affairs (Van Aken, 1990). Such a wide 
autonomy means that the Government and, in particular, the President of the 
Republic or the Ministries cannot review or change University decisions, and that 
the Parliament can only exert an indirect control over the public University through 
the discussion and the allocation of budget funds. In addition, every year, UdelaR 
has to submit an accounting report to the Parliament. 
 
However, it is clear from the debates in Parliament that there was disagreement as 
to what extent the University was obliged to provide information to the Congress. 
Speeches in Parliament demonstrate that, in this matter, the political parties held 
opposite points of view.  
 
While the Frente Amplio MPs considered that, as an autonomous institution, 
UdelaR´s only linkage with the Parliament was related to discussion of the budget 
allocation (Representative Silvana Charlone, August 27, 1997), the Blanco Party 
MPs considered that the Parliament had a right to know how the public University 
utilises the allocated funds. According to Senator Luis Alberto Heber: “The University 
is funded by public funds, community resources. In spite of  considering its autonomy, we deserve to 
know how the University funds are been utilised.” (December 6, 1995). Furthermore, other 
Blanco Party MPs showed an apparent preoccupation about the lack of information 
from UdelaR, because, according to their view, University autonomy should not  
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entail a lack of accountability (Senator Guillermo Garcia Costa, Blanco Party MP, 
October 3, 2001). 
 
6.4.2. Controls over private institutions 
Sources: Policy documents  Law No 15.903 and  Decree No. 308/995, Interviews. 
 
The Ministry of Education and Culture can require inspections in private 
Universities if there are serious irregularities (Decree No. 308/995).  However, the 
interviews show that, in fact, these controls are oriented to the application of legal 
formalities and do not cover the use of funds. Furthermore, Interviewee C reported 
that these controls are not performed at all. 
 
Interviewee C pointed out that "...according to the laws, private institutions are controlled by 
the Ministry (of education). We ( private institutions) submit financial reports annually . However , as I 
see it , these  controls are not really exerted. We have never received observations or comments 
about  those reports".  
  
While some interviewees, such as Interviewee H (advisor at the Legislature), 
indicated that "The Ministry of Education and Culture should pay attention to the control of private 
institutions...” others considered that   "...sometimes It is better if the institutions are not 
controlled and sometimes it is not" (Interviewee J, legislator).  
 
6.5. Historical and political factors that influence resource allocation 
Policy documents; Interviews; Focus Group; Parliamentary debates; Press discourses. 
 
The data derived from interviews, focus group discussion and parliamentary 
speeches was used to compare the opinions expressed, looking for possible 
convergence or divergence within each group about a series of elements that 
emerge as key factors that interact to influence the allocation of public funds to 
UdelaR.  
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A list of themes emerges from the data and may be ordered according to their 
overall importance or relevance. These themes were as follows: 
 
  Lack of involvement of Government agencies in the process of allocating 
resources to higher education. 
  Perceptions and beliefs about the autonomy of UdelaR and the 
consequences. 
  Perceptions and beliefs of distrust between the University and the related 
political powers. 
 
6.5.1. Lack of involvement of Government agencies in the process of 
allocating resources to higher education 
 
All members of the Focus Group and several respondents were explicit and 
outspoken about the absence of involvement of the Government agencies in the 
cycle of resource allocation to higher education institutions. 
 
The Ministry of Education and Culture remained outside the budget cycle (Brunner 
and Becerra, 1999). Whilst allocations were determined by a National 
(quinquennial) Budget Law, they were appropriated by the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance. The Ministry of Education has no involvement in higher education 
funding; allocations are determined by the Parliament based on the bids submitted 
by the University directly without any consultation with that Ministry.  
 
 
This is certainly a key feature of the Uruguayan model: all the cycle of allocating 
resources to the educational public entities is developed in a scenario in which the 
body in charge of leading national policies of education has no legal authority to 
exert influence or to intervene.  
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Interviewee N (University administrator) remarked that  
"...the State has no mechanisms to set priorities and therefore is not really involved in 
the finance of higher education. (...) The State has not assumed that it must have 
policies about higher education and that is why there are no policies for the finance of 
higher education. It is always easier to receive more and more funds than re-distributing 
funds". 
 
In addition, at the focus group, all participants agreed that the Government lacks 
mechanisms for setting strategies at all levels and therefore for the funding of 
higher education.    
 
One of the participants remarked: “While considering the public funding of higher education 
we should recall that the various administrations have not assumed that they have to construct 
national policies of higher education. They do not assume their role on setting strategies…”  
 
Interviewee I had a similar opinion, stating: 
“ I feel that, in Uruguay, during the last 30 or 40 years, there has not been (creation of ) 
policies in relation to higher education. Uruguay has little debate about this issues…” 
 
6.5.2. Existing perceptions and beliefs about the autonomy of UdelaR and 
their consequences. 
 
Institutional autonomy, as it is conceived in Uruguay and in Latin America, is a key 
element which arises while trying to understand how the current model has been 
shaped and operates. Certainly, this issue was raised on a regular basis either in 
the interviews, at the focus group session and in the Congress debates.  
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The literature offers some theoretical background about the concept of autonomy. 
Today, the concept of autonomy is conceived as a shifting notion which is 
historically dated, and which should be understood as a relational feature at a 
given moment in time and space. 
 
In the modern Western University system, the concept of University autonomy 
emphasises “the power of a University or college ... to govern itself without outside controls” 
(Berdahl et al., 1971, 8). Autonomy, along with academic freedom, is defined as 
intrinsic to the nature of the University, and as a pre-condition if a University is to 
best fulfil effectively its role and responsibilities toward society (Neave, 1998). The 
expression of autonomy is that Governments not only fund the institutions, but 
delegate, voluntarily, much of their power over them, and thus give them a large 
measure of independence in the use of the funds they provide (Trow, 1996, p.4). It 
is perceived as a basic value and as the key element that allows for the 
transformation of the institution from the inside and guarantee the freedom of 
research and teaching (Felt, 2002, p.14). 
In Latin America, institutional autonomy is considered to be a supreme, jealously 
guarded value, even protected by the National Constitutions, which maintains 
certain unique features. Autonomy is judged as “the essence of University life. It defines 
the relationships between the State and the society. It entails that the University is the owner of its 
own destiny” (Naisthat and Toer, 2006, p.4).   
 
The notion of University autonomy was already embedded in the colonial 
Universities which were founded under the inspiration of the Spanish Universities 
of Salamanca and Alcala de Henares, and which, like all the original Universities, 
were founded on a principle of collegial self-governance. However, clearly, the 20th 
century Cordoba Reform, also strengthened the notion of University autonomy. 
The Reforma, which considered political autonomy as one of the most important 
values to defend, established an extremely ample concept of autonomy. It  
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comprised not only the freedom of an institution to run its own affairs, but also its 
right to select its own authorities and to operate within a frame of self-Government. 
This frame, called “the co-Government system” signified that the University community, 
teachers, students and graduates, selected and were represented in the University 
bodies which ran the institution and which appointed the University authorities 
(Rectors, Deans and members of Councils). The Reforma was based on the 
assumption that Universities required this broad autonomy (comprising the classic 
concept autonomy and the co-Government system) to withstand external 
pressures or intrusions from political authorities (The Cordoba Manifesto, p.3).  
 
In Uruguay, as in the Latin American pattern, autonomy is considered a key 
concept “…closely linked to UdelaR´s history and to its future” (Senator Marina Arismendi, 
Frente Amplio MP, December 5, 1995) and is associated with the Cordoba belief 
that “… political corporations cannot interpret or judge  about knowledge, culture or scientific 
research‖(Senator Helios Sarthou, Frente Amplio MP, December 6, 1995). 
The Uruguayan National Constitution and the Organic Law have instituted a model 
in which UdelaR functions with the widest autonomy comprising both the ―classic‖ 
concept of autonomy (freedom to run its own affairs) and the co-Government 
system. In relation to budgetary and financial aspects, University autonomy entails 
that, while submitting the budget request, UdelaR does not have to explain how it 
projects to use the proposed funds (Constitution art.220). In addition, as already 
mentioned, according to the legal frame, UdelaR is only submitted to formal 
(accounting) controls.    
Some historical background has to be considered at this stage in order to 
understand the relevance of the concept of University autonomy in Uruguay. In 
1973, a civilian-military coup d'etat conducted by President Juan Maria Bordaberry 
dissolved the Uruguayan Parliament and began a 12-year repressive dictatorship.  
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As one of the principal measures adopted by the new authorities, University 
autonomy was eliminated and University elected officials (the Rector, Deans and 
most members of councils) were outlawed, detained and jailed. The student 
organisation FEUU was also banned. 
 
In 1985, after a period of negotiations between the military and the political parties, 
Uruguay re-gained a democratic system and UdelaR recovered its full autonomy. 
Within this historical context, the concept of autonomy holds key political and 
ideological connotations and any accusation of interference, intrusion or violation of 
University autonomy is to be considered with extreme care. 
 
All sources used in this study show that the Uruguayan concept of autonomy is to 
be observed as a key principle in the management of funding of higher education. 
Moreover, all sources agreed that autonomy has to be considered in the broadest 
sense. This means that the Government is expected to respect University 
autonomy because it is embedded in legislation and because it has been instituted 
precisely to set limits to what the Government can do with respect to the public 
University. 
 
In the interviews, I found that all respondents confirmed that the degrees of 
decentralisation within which UdelaR operated were very high and almost all 
interviewees (14/16) associated this feature with institutional autonomy.  
 
In the Parliament, I found that speeches are predominantly positive about the worth 
of autonomy (Representative Julio Aguiar, Colorado Party MP, August 21, 1997; 
Senator Helios Sarthou, Frente Amplio MP, December 6, 1995) because “….since 
1958, autonomy is in the heart of the history and the future of the University”  Senator M 
Arismendi, Frente Amplio MP, December 5, 1995).    
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However, there are indications that the conservative MPs from the Colorado and 
the Blanco Parties and the leftist Frente Amplio MPs hold dissimilar perceptions 
about “how wide” this autonomy should be.  
 
Frente Amplio MPs consider that  ―... University matters should be kept outside the political 
interests (Senator Helios Sarthou, December 6, 1995) because autonomy is 
“...complete and absolute and it has been established by the law to protect the University from 
external pressures, specially from the political parties” (Senator Helios Sarthou, December 6, 
1995).  
 
 According to this view, the role of the Parliament in relation to University affairs is 
restricted to the allocation of a budget. For instance, according to Representative 
Silvana Charlone (Frente Amplio MP): ―Due to University autonomy, the only linkage 
between the State and the University is placed in the  moment of the budget allocation” (August 21, 
1997) 
 
On the other side, both Colorado Party and Blanco Party MPs usually take a more 
distant stance and consider that University autonomy has limits and that the 
Parliament is entitled to talk and consider matters related to the public University. 
Their argument is typified by to Senator Wilson Sanabria, Colorado Party MP:  “We 
don´t mean to attack the University, we wish to analyse some University matters” (December 6, 
1995). 
 
Further, according to the Representative Gustavo Penades (Blanco Party MP): 
“There is a misunderstanding about the concept of autonomy. Autonomy does not mean to be 
independent of what is going on in this country, or being independent of the general feelings in this 
Parliament.. We must develop a debate about the future of UdelaR, and about its aims” (May  5,  
2004). Similarly, Senator Guillermo Garcia Costa (Blanco Party MP) wondered:  “… 
is.. that autonomy or autarchy? University autonomy does not entail to receive funds and to be  
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independent to use them without providing information. The Parliament must receive information from 
the University about how the allocated funds are utilised every year.” (October 3, 2001) 
 
Some consequences emerge from these diverse perceptions and beliefs about 
autonomy.  
 
The approach to University autonomy manifested by the Frente Amplio MPs 
implies a notion of autonomy which stands as a barrier of protection to  prevent 
intrusions in University matters. For instance, Representative Silvana Charlone 
(Frente Amplio MP) claimed that “the discussions about  the University of the Republic has to 
be developed by the own University within its own bodies. This matter does not belong  to  the 
political system” (August 21, 1997). Other Frente Amplio MPs also viewed some 
demands, comments or critics about University functioning made at the Parliament 
as an undermining of autonomy or even as interventionism (Senator Jose 
Korzeniak, December 7, 1995; Senator Marina Arismendi, December 5, 1995; 
Senator Helios Sarthou, December 7, 1995). 
 
On the other hand, several statements by the Blanco Party and Colorado Party 
MPs demand Congress discussion about University issues and an involvement  
which should not be limited to the votation of the budget laws (Representative 
Daniel Corbo  Blanco Party, August 21, 1997; Senator Maria Julia Pou, Blanco 
Party MP, October 4, 2000). Moreover, Colorado Party MPs proposed a open 
discussion about all University issues because, as stated by one of those MPs, “ I 
want to be clear, we do not want to exert control over the University, we want to discuss about 
University projects and priorities” (Senator Hugo Fernandez Faingold, December 6, 
1995). 
 
Another consequence to consider is that the allocation of funds to certain 
programmes instituted by the Parliament in the 1990s has created a space for the 
consideration of certain University issues at the Parliament.   
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As already commented above (p. 247), the introduction of the model of allocating 
funds to specific projects has received major criticism from the Frente Amplio MPs 
who have considered it as a violation of University autonomy. Statements by MPs 
Senator Helios Sarthou (December 7, 1995) and Senator Marina Arismendi 
(December 5, 1995) say that they consider that the concept of University autonomy 
relied on two elements: the University bid does not have to explain how the 
University will use the funds to be allocated and that the University has the 
freedom of using the allocated funds according to its own decisions, with total 
independence from the Parliament. Therefore, if the Parliament allocates funds to 
certain projects it “…undermines autonomy” (Senator Helios Sarthou, Frente Amplio 
MP, December 7, 1995; Senator Marina Arismendi, Frente Amplio MP, December 
5, 1995)  
 
At the same time, Blanco Party and Colorado Party  MPs are very outspoken about 
the merits of categorical funding and explain that “ our political message seeks for the 
discussion of priorities and to focus on special projects” (Colorado Party MP Senator Hugo 
Fernandez Faingold, December 6, 1995). And as a result “...we propose an increment of 
7.000.000 which is oriented to specific programmes. We don´t intend to violate the autonomy, this 
amount is oriented to discuss together with the University about its priorities” (Senator Luis 
Alberto Heber, Blanco Party MP, December 5, 1995).  
 
Against this background it is interesting that, according to Interviewee A and B and 
to the members of the Focus Group, the new model of allocating funds to specific 
programmes was the result of negotiations between University officials and 
Parliament members (Interviewee B, Senator Luis Alberto Heber, Blanco Party MP, 
December 5, 1995). Hence, UdelaR´s officials have agreed to use this system, in 
spite of the resistance of some Frente Amplio MPs, and their own beliefs about 
autonomy.  
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Senator Guillermo Garcia Costa (Blanco Party MP) contributed to a better 
understanding of this matter, suggesting that “…at last we allocated funds to almost all 
UdelaR´s Faculties. All the Faculties received funding. In the beginning UdelaR resisted this model of 
allocating funds, but it had no choices, and - at last- it decided to accept the funds and to devote 
them to the specific objectives that were established in the law”.(September 6, 2000) 
 
6.5.3. Existing perceptions and beliefs of distrust between the University and 
the political powers. 
 
Another important theme noted by several respondents and appearing throughout 
parliamentary debates is a sentiment of distrust between UdelaR and the 
Parliament.  
 
Trust must be considered one of the fundamental links between public higher 
education and society, because, based on it, the society provides funding support 
without the requirement that the institutions account specifically and in detail for the 
use of those funds (Trow, 1996). 
  
Several statements by Frente Amplio MPs refer to this feeling as “embedded  in the  
beliefs  of the political right” represented in Parliament by the Colorado Party and the 
Blanco Party (Senators Daniel Diaz Maynard and Reinaldo Gargano, Frente 
Amplio MPs, May 17, 1994) due to the historical fact that the public University has 
frequently confronted the political powers represented historically in those parties 
(Senator Daniel Diaz Maynard, Frente Amplio MP, December 5, 2001, December 
7, 1995, July 12, 1998). 
 
Furthermore, some Frente Amplio MPs, considered that certain Colorado Party 
and Blanco Party legislators held negative sentiments about the Universty. Senator 
Jose Korzeniak (Frente Amplio MP) pictures his feelings as follows: “ It makes me  
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remember  those people who  get bored of their mothers and decide to  send them to   a nursing  
house” (December 7, 1995).  
 
Although both Colorado Party and Blanco Party MPs rejected this accusation, they 
also admited that they had apprehensions about the functioning of the University 
because “There is general understanding that there is a general disconfort with the University of the 
Republic. On one side it is said that (the institution) lacks of resources and on the other side ( the 
institution) does not provide the services that it must provide”  (Representative Juan Federico 
Bosch, Blanco Party MP, August 21, 1997). 
  
Also, while Blanco Party MP Juan Federico Bosch talked about “a divorce between the 
University  and the Parliament” (August 21, 1997), he considered that the latter was 
entitled to discuss University matters because “the University is not only a problem  for the 
University people...all the country must participate in the discussion about it...including   the 
politicians, too..“ (August 21, 1997).  
 
Several statements refer to MPs from both sides who expect to receive, or not, 
information about University matters, and especially about the utilisation of funds. 
 
While conservative Colorado Party and Blanco Party MPs considered that the 
Parliament should expect to receive financial information from the University 
(Senator Guillermo Garcia Costa, Blanco Party MP, September 6, 2000, and 
Representative Gustavo Penades, Blanco Party MP, May 5, 2004), the leftist 
Frente Amplio MPs reacted by considering that institutional autonomy determined 
that the use of funds was an internal decision that could not be considered at the 
Parliament (Senator Marina Arismendi, December 5, 1995; Senator Helios 
Sarthou, December 7, 1995).  
 
An important element perceived at the legislature was the recognition of an 
endemic lack of funding at the public University (Senator Mariano Arana, Frente  
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Amplio MP, May 17, 1994; Senator Jose Korzeniak, Frente Amplio MP, May 17, 
1994 and December 6, 1995; Senator Alberto Couriel, Frente Amplio MP, 
September 12, 1996; Senator Maria Julia Pou, Blanco Party MP,  July 16, 2003).   
 
Parliamentary speeches show that MPs from all parties shared the view that the 
scarcity of funds had caused major problems for the University and that the 
University was developing its duties in conditions of major distress. However, I 
found considerable disagreement in the Parliament about how the University must 
face these problems related to inadequate funding.  
 
Several statements by Blanco Party and Colorado Party MPs show concern about 
the ways that the public University had faced the problems related to lack of 
funding; for example they asked “ ... if  resources are so scarce, why is the University so 
resistant to charge a tuition-fee?. (Colorado Party Representative Ruben Diaz, 
December 7, 1995). Moreover, Blanco Party and Colorado Party legislators agreed 
that, as there is a legal authorisation to charge tuition-fees, UdelaR must –at least- 
consider the possibility of charging them (Senator Luis Alberto Heber, Blanco Party 
MP, December 6, 1995; Senator Luis Hierro Lopez, Colorado Party MP, 
September 12, 1996).  
 
Representative Ronald Pais (Colorado Party MP) summarised the opinions of the 
legislators of the conservative parties as follows : “We are placed in a complicated 
economic context, in particular we have a high public burden. Within this frame I wonder what it has 
been done inside the University, to learn about the possibility of charging some kind of tuition-fee and 
how much funding  would be provided by charging a fee. I think that these would entail a signal for 
the society, as it would mean a student contribution to the University cost” (December 5, 2001).  
 
However, the Frente Amplio legislators reacted strongly and expressed 
disagreement  with this position because according to their views “…  the debate  
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(about tuition-fees) has to be developed by the own University within its own bodies” 
(Representative Silvana Charlone August 17, 1997). 
 
It is important to observe that the debate about tuition holds an important position 
in the discourses relating to University matters at the Parliament. These debates 
also show that there is significant disagreement between the MPs about this point. 
The debate about the authorisation awarded to UdelaR to charge tuition-fees (and 
why UdelaR has not used that authorisation) was not only based on the practical 
argument that tuition- fees could be charged to augment public revenues. 
Parliamentary speeches show that MPs judged that there were other reasons 
which underlay the debate about the levy of tuition-fees in University programmes.  
 
 
They may be grouped as follows:  
  arguments about tuition based on ideological reasons  
  arguments about tuition based on social reasons  
  arguments about tuition based on practical reasons  




  Arguments about tuition based on ideological reasons 
Ideological arguments against the application of tuition in Uruguay are based on 
the key concept that, as society is the major beneficiary of higher education (i.e. 
higher education is primarily a public good), these must be considered a social 
entitlement and, therefore, that higher education must be tuition-free.  
 
This idea has been asserted at the Parliament by Frente Amplio MPs. According to 
Senator Helios Sarthou: “Our Constitution establishes that all individuals must have access to  
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education. It does not matter if they are rich or poor, all must have the same access. We consider 
that within this frame a tuition free education has played a key role as an instrument of social mobility. 
Therefore we consider that it is extremely important to keep and safe guard this principle. We do not 
agree with charging tuition at the University” (October 13, 1998). 
 
At the same time, the arguments that favoured the application of tuition, based on 
ideological assumptions, tried to demonstrate that free higher education was 
supported (funded) by all citizens while graduates and their families (most of them 
from middle or upper classes) received high private benefits.   
 
In this context, Senator Luis Alberto Heber (Blanco Party MP) judged that “ All the 
sociey is paying taxes to support ths studies of a few, who benefit, grow and probably will improve 
our society, but in particular, will benefit their own lifes, and will become richer” (December, 6, 
1995). Whilst, Representative Daniel Corbo (Blanco Party MP) also considered 
that ―We have to question if the tuition free system is a falacy. It has been instituted to serve as an 
instrument towards equity and democracy in our society. However we see that ( in the University) 
enrolment  there is no representation of all the sectors of our society.” (August 21, 1997).  
 
  Arguments about tuition based on social reasons 
The objection to imposing tuition based on social assumptions considers that 
tuition might exclude potential students from disadvantaged backgrounds, while the 
rationale that supports the application of tuition considers the notion of equity: the 
view that those who benefit of higher education should (or should not) share the 
costs. 
In Parliament, I found several speeches that refer to these ideas. For instance, 
Senator Jorge Gandini (Blanco Party MP) considers that ―the University has to admit that 
most of its students drive fancy brand-new cars. We can see those cars in the University parking lots.  
  265 
Those students certainly can pay for their education. Those students can act with solidarity, and 
support the studies of those who cannot afford for their education” (December 6, 1995).  
 
In addition, Representative Guillermo Gonzalez Alvarez (Blanco Party MP) 
commented as follows: “I wonder why the University is not considering the possibility of charging 
a tuition fee considering that it has an authorisation to do so. According to our experience and to what 
we have heard, almost 80% or 90% of University students come from families that can afford a 
tuition-fee because the greatest majority or at least half of them had previously attended private 
(Primary and Secondary) schools. Those families had payed more than 300 or 400 hundred (USA) 
dollars per month in private schools. But when they arrive to the University, the system is completely 
free. During twelve years the family is paying more than 4000 (USA) dollars at the private system but 
in the higher level … this is tuition-free” (September 15, 2000). 
 
  Arguments about tuition based on practical reasons 
This rationale assumes that the collection of tuition-fees might supplement and 
augment scarce public revenues.  
 
Representative Ronald Pais (Colorado Party MP) supported this vision stating that 
“ We are placed in a complicated economic context, in particular we have a high public burden.(…) 
charging a fee.(…)  would mean a student contribution to the University cost and an individual and 
personal effort of those involved in the University matters” (December 5, 2001). 
 
  Arguments about tuition based on economical reasons 
Arguments about the convenience of charging tuition based on economic reasons 
assume that tuition brings some of the benefits of the market to higher education, 
and, in particular, the presumption of greater efficiency. They assume that the 
payment of tuition-fees will ensure that students will become more conscientious 
consumers. 
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For instance, Representative Gabriel Pais (Colorado Party MP) argued that ―As I see 
it, the student contribution could be a very positive aspect, because the student will apreciate more 
for what he pays… if there is some kind of individual or family financial effort the student will be more 
careful with his studies and his courses… he will attend classes because it will not be a societal 
burden.” (September 15, 2000). 
 
6.6. Resource allocation as a means of influencing the behaviour the publicly 
funded University 
Source: Interviews; Focus Group; Parliamentary debates 
 
All data collected in this study revealed that the strength of University autonomy 
has determined a particular role to be played by the Government. According to 
Interview B “...It really has no role at all in this scene, it is absent of all discussions and therefore 
keeps no influence over the budget allocations.” 
 
One of the interviewees (M)  commented: 
“When we talk about the State, about what State are we talking about? Is it  the 
Government, is it the UdelaR... because as I see it, the one who defines the University 
policies in this country is UdelaR... or even worse, we don´t know who is in charge of 
setting the policies at the National levels…”  
 
Another (Interviewee L) reflected:  
“The State is indeed an outsider, an entity without legitimacy to demand some kind of 
performance or behaviour. As it has no strength to propose anything, it has no strength 
to co-ordinate, and therefore it has no power to provide orientation or guidance. In this 
scenario...who will consider its orientations?” 
 
However,  there  is  one  aspect  which  emerges  as  a  potential  tool  in  order  to 
influence  behaviours:  categorical  funding.  As  the  Parliament  is  in  charge  of 
allocating  all  the  funds,  at  least  the  majority  of  funds  that  the  public  University  
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receives, one could expect that this body could exert some kind of influence, if it so 
wished. 
 
Indeed, incremental-categorical funding is perceived as a means to induce actions 
(Interviewee A and Focus Group). For instance, Interviewee A commented: 
“… Funding certain projects or programmes… I think it is really acceptable.UdelaR 
would accept them. I think about projects oriented to specific strategies in health 
problems, innovation issues, in matters considered of high interest by the Congress or 
the Government…” 
 
Most interviewees and Focus group members revealed that, according to their 
views, Parliament has used incremental budgeting to induce the University to 
develop actions in specific fields that it considered strategic. Additionally, most 
respondents (7/12) considered that this type of incremental funding must be 
observed as a positive innovation. It is certainly considered as the only way that 
Parliament has introduced elements of strategy (national strategies) and priorities 
into University funding. 
 
At the same time, a negative aspect is that, as the discussion is focused on the 
increment, it only relates to a small part of the allocation. The block element is 
―untouchable‖ and is considered to be a given by UdelaR (Interviewee B, Focus 
Group).   
 
Furthermore, Interviewee N considered this new model lacked any sense of 
political compromise. He judged that: “It is always easier to receive more and more funds 
than re-allocating funds". 
 
However, as reported above, at the Parliament, statements by the Frente Amplio 
MPs questioned this model of allocating resources. Several MPs considered that, 
as the University enjoys wide autonomy, the Parliament cannot direct allocations  
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(under the risk of violating University autonomy); it must just provide the funds 
(Senator Jose Korzeniak, Frente Amplio MP, December 7, 1995).  
 
6.7. Is the current model likely to change according to the views of decision 
makers in the sector? 
Sources: Policy documents: Political parties proposal for the  National elections held in October 2004, 
Frente Amplio  IV CONGRESO "Hector Rodríguez","El Uruguay Social" 6 de setiembre 2004 Ciclo: 
"Una transición responsable"; Blanco Party , Programa para un gobierno de compromiso nacional Dr 
Jorge Larrañaga; Statements made to the press by Ministries and politicians; Interviews; Focus 
Group; Parliamentary discourses. 
 
6.7.1. Documents of political parties 
 
A review of the policy documents written by the political parties suggests that these 
do not include consideration of the current patterns of finance of higher education 
or any recommendations about possible changes about it; higher education does 
not figure prominently in political debate or electoral argument. 
 
Uruguay had national elections in October 2004. For that occasion, the political 
parties published their programmes containing their proposals and promises for 
action in all areas.  
 
Hereinafter, I will show how those documents referred to the topics that are under 
consideration in this study. 
 
6.7.1.I. By the Frente Amplio 
 
This party won the October 2004 elections; the President of the Republic and all 
his Ministers belong to this party. During the campaign, the basis of the Frente  
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Amplio´s proposal about education was to increase the amount of funds devoted to 
all educational sectors to 4.5% of GDP. 
  
Policy documents presented by Frente Amplio considered that "The educational sector 
needs a significant increment in the allocation of funds, in percentages of GDP, in order to get 
adjusted to the recommendations of agencies like UNESCO" (Frente Amplio IV CONGRESO 
"Hector Rodríguez", p.3). 
 
Mr Tabaré Vazquez, who was elected President of the Republic in October 2004, 
declared during the presidential campaign that "We are committed to devote the biggest 
efforts to increase the resources for education" ("El Uruguay Social" 6 de setiembre 2004, Ciclo: 
"Una transición responsable"). However there were no specific comments about the 
funding of higher education. 
 
6.7.1.II. By the Blanco Party  
 
The Blanco Party received close to 30% of total votes in the country in the October 
2004 elections. The document written by this party mentions the Solidarity fund, 
created during a blanco administration, and recommends its use as revenue in the 
construction of  a University campus intended to provide room and board to 
students coming from locations placed far from the capital city, Montevideo 
("Programa para un gobierno de compromiso nacional Jorge Larrañaga", available in:  
http://www.alianzanacional.com.uy/) 
 
Also, in August 24, 2004, the press reported that, during the presidential campaign, 
the blanco presidential candidate, Jorge Larrañaga, promised in public to increase 
the educational expenditure by 50% which would entail an increase in total close to 
4.5% of GDP(Ultimas Noticias August 24, 2004, p.5). 
 
Again, however, there was no specific reference to the funding of higher education.   
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6.7.1.III. By the Colorado Party 
 
The Colorado Party had close to 10% of the votes in the October 2004 elections. 
The document written by this Party does not mention higher education in any way, 
including its finance. 
 
6.7.2. Public statements made by officers from the elected Government 
 
After the elections on August 12, 2005, the Minister of Education and Culture 
declared to the press that "The Government is committed to allocate this year the claimed 4.5% 
to the sector, which is one of the Governmental priority principles" (Diario La Republica: 
http://www.diariolarepublica.com/2005/larepublica.htm). 
 
FIGURE 26 below shows references to the research questions in policy document by 
political parties. As we can see in those documents, there was no consideration 
about the current patterns of finance in the sector or recommendations about 
possible changes in the future. 
 
FIGURE 26:  Policy documents by political parties: reference to the research questions. 
BASIS FOR A NEW MODEL  FRENTE AMPLIO  BLANCO PARTY 
COLORADO 
PARTY 
BASED ON FORMULA:  no  no  no 
BASED ON QUALITY  no  no  no 
BASED ON PROGRAMMES OR 
STRATEGIES  no  no  no 
CONTROL OVER THE USE OF FUNDS  no  no  no 
REQUIREMENTS OF ACCOUNTABILITY  no  no  no  
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6.7.3. Interviews and Focus Group 
 
In discussion about possible changes to the arrangements for funding higher 
education, most interviewees (8/12) indicated that the current model was likely to 
change. Other interviewees (4/12) affirmed that the current model would not 
change, although, in their view the system would receive more funding. 
 
Overall, the participants (8/12) took the view that the system would receive more 
funds because there would be an increase of the educational expenditure in total, 
close to 4.5% of GDP. 
 
Most concurred with interviewee I: 
 
"I think there will be changes in the next future in order to make available more funds in order  to 
ensure  that the national allocations are equal or similar (in percentages of GDP) to the regional 
allocations to higher education"  and with interviewee J that  "there will be more funds for higher 
education in the next years". 
 
Interviewee B (University administrator) expressed similar sentiments stating that :"I  
don´t expect that there will be changes in the current model ... but there will be more funds". 
 
All participants of the focus group agreed that the public educational system as a 
whole would receive more funds and that, as a consequence, public higher 
education would receive more funds. However,  the participants felt that these 
would not imply a change in the system. All concurred that the model would remain 
the same. Interviewee L (University administrator) expressed the group's view 
when he explained that: "I think that there must be more funds for higher education but that the 
current model must be repeated, it will remain the same".  
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6.8. Future changes 
Sources: Interviews, Focus Group. 
 
As the Frente Amplio was successful in 2004 elections and it keeps a majority in 
the current composition of the Parliament, all interviewees and members of the 
Focus Group expected  major changes in some of the factors which shaped the 
model. 
 
6.8. 1. About the lack of involvement of Government agencies in higher 
education policies 
 
Several respondents concurred that, in the future, the Ministry of Education and 
Culture would be more involved in higher education issues. According to 
interviewees I and H (both advisors at the Legislature), the Ministry of Education 
and Culture would be more involved in the creation of public policies in the sector, 
and that such policies would also be more concerned about the status of private 
higher education.  
 
Interviewee I explained that "...a leftist Government (like the one that has been elected) may 
facilitate the adoption of public policies in education. This has been the case of Spain and Chile" 
while interviewee H advised that:"The Ministry will show a preoccupation with what is going on 
in the private sector of higher education". 
 
However, several other interviewees doubted that the Ministry of Education and 
Culture would be in a position to develop some kind of discussion about higher 
education policies. Interviewee F (officer at the Ministry of Education and Culture) 
stated that: 
 "I think that the Ministry of Education and Culture will not give priority to these themes. 
It  has already established the guidelines for change and the funding aspects are not a  
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priority for the Ministry. However there could be some changes in the current balance 
within public and private funding".  
 
Some interviewees (all of them advisors at the Legislature) agreed that external 
advice by international agencies, such as IDB or the World Bank, might help to 
analyse the funding system in higher education. It was suggested by Interviewee H 
that: 
 "International agencies may help to introduce changes in the model. This has been 
the case in Argentina. In this country we have seen  that  the international agencies 
provided funds for improvements in higher education, such as FOMEC (a fund created 
within a major loan from the World Bank to the Argentinean Government oriented to 
improve the quality of higher education institutions)."  
 
6.8. 2. About the existing perceptions and beliefs about autonomy 
 
Although institutional autonomy has been a value that has been historically 
preserved and defended by the Frente Amplio MPs, most of the respondents (7 
/12) affirmed that, as the new Government would  be more involved in higher 
education policies, it might introduce ―elements of strategy‖ in the allocation of 
funds to the system of higher education. One of the interviewees expressed the 
views of several others when he explained that:  
"The Ministry of Education and Culture may allocate some funds through competition. 
For instance... this is the case with research projects...why not with other University 
programmes?" (Interviewee F). 
 
Most of the interviewees that answered this question (10/12) suggested that 
incentives would be used to promote the application of national policies or reflect 
political priorities. For instance, two of the interviewees (Interviewees A and K) 
considered that allocations might seek to reward those institutions committed to  
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addressing areas of high national priority. Interviewee A (University administrator) 
explained: 
“Budget allocations may be linked to certain national-level issues that the Legislature or 
the Government consider “strategic”, for instance, projects oriented to face, consider or 
solve wide, national- based, problems. Such the case of the role of higher education in 
the creation of  a national scientific research system, or in the national health system…” 
 
Besides, Interviewee K (legislator) stated that 
“ …I think that allocations may be associated to certain strategic fields. Besides, the 
Parliament  must  consider that, the public University has already received funding  for 
certain projects, specially international funds, with excellent  outcomes.” 
 
6.8. 3. Use of formulae 
 
While considering alternative funding models, most of the respondents (8/12) 
explained that a new model would not consider the use of formulae.   
 
Interviewee J (legislator) explained why, according to his view, the Parliament will 
not use formulae in the allocation of resources for higher education: 
“The use of formulae is a possible approach to this issues… but this is a political matter 
and, in this particular case, we (the Parliament) must apply political considerations.” 
 
However, one of the interviewees (interviewee K, legislator) disagreed with most of 
the interviewees who answered this question. He pointed out that, according to his 
view, the use of formulae, is feasible and might help to improve institutional 
performance. He commented: 
“We (the Parliament) may allocate resources based in formulae. It could improve 
institutional performance. I can remember that, even inside UdelaR, in some areas there 
has been resource allocation considering formulae” 
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6.8. 4. Use of quality considerations 
 
None of the interviewees believed that the future model will utilise considerations of 
quality. Interviewee J (legislator) claimed that  
"... we cannot use quality control in the public University... however it could be worth to 
use them in the private institutions." 
 
Only one of the interviewees (Interviewee K, legislator) explained why, according to 
his view the funding model will not link quality considerations to budget allocations. 
His comment was:  “....UdelaR will never approve it....”  This assertion introduces an 
explanation or, at least, a possible reason why the element ―quality‖ is to be 
avoided in the allocation of funding to the sector. It certainly suggests that UdelaR 
is in the position of introducing a “veto” about certain discussions. 
   
However, it is really paradoxical to realise that, although the Frente Amplio MPs 
have traditionally stated that the Parliament is not entitled to get involved in 
University matters due to the broad concept of University autonomy, the 
interviewees considered that, in the future, the Parliament would introduce 
incentive funding to UdelaR associated with national strategic fields. We must 
recall that in the 1990s and the early 2000s, several Frente Amplio MPs 
considered this as a violation of autonomy. 
 
6.8.5. Alternative sources of funding 
Sources: Interviews; Parliamentary speeches 
 
All views expressed in the course of data collection suggest that public allocations 
to the educational system would rise to 4.5% of Uruguayan GDP. This could mean 
that the educational system would receive more funds because there would be an 
increase of the educational expenditure. 
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6.8.6. Alternative sources: tuition-fees. 
 
Based on interview evidence and analysis of speeches in Parliament, the 
introduction of a tuition fee scheme in UdelaR looks very unlikely, at least in the 
next future, due to the following elements: 
 
a)  the availability of additional Government funding will mean that there will not 
be less pressure to introduce alternative funds to complement public 
revenues.  
 
b)  the ideological and political predominance of the Frente Amplio Party in the 
Parliament. Historically, the Frente Amplio legislators have supported the 
belief in free higher education. 
 
We must recall that the possibility of charging tuition-fees was introduced by the 
Blanco Party MPs in the 1990s. All discourses supporting a tuition-fee scheme at 
UdelaR came from the conservative Colorado and Blanco Parties legislators. All 
discourses from Frente Amplio MPs are clearly manifested against charging tuition.  
 
6.8. 7. Alternative sources: the solidarity fund (Graduate Tax) 
 
The solidarity fund, in other words, the Graduate Tax, has looked like a ―politically 
correct‖ option to utilise in order to complement public subsidies.  
 
Statements at the Parliament supported this view (Senator Luis Alberto Heber, 
Blanco Party MP, December 7, 1995). MPs from all parties joined to consider that 
the imposition of a graduate tax has instituted a fair and equitable system in which 
University graduates contribute to support the costs of their higher education under 
a scheme of a deferred payment (Senator Ruben Correa Freitas, Colorado Party 
MP, December 8, 2000).    
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Furthermore, discourses by the University Rector, Dr Rafael Guarga, showed full 
support to utilise and improve the collection of this tax. ―This tax is a reasonable 
contribution from graduates, who repay through taxation upon entering the workforce. Rather than 
being a levy on all taxpayers the solidarity funds is an intelligent deferred payment scheme, that only 
applies to those who benefit from higher education studies”.(September 15, 2000) 
 
In addition, one of the interviewees (Interviewee I, advisor at the Legislature) 
recommended an increase in the graduate tax scheme because this would  
introduce more funding in the system. According to his view: 
"The graduate tax scheme should be improved and strengthened. This tax combines with 
intelligence that education is a mixed (public and private) good. It acts like a delayed tuition 




In this chapter I presented the data that emerged from the three types of data 
sources: interviews, focus group and documentary analysis. The data were 
presented around the research questions integrating the data from the different 
types of source through triangulation and then interpreted thematically, using the 
procedure of constant comparison.  
 
The data revealed the following elements:  
 
  The National budget is the dominant source of public higher education 
finance. UdelaR´s budget relies, mostly, in the allocation of funds from the 
National Budget Law.  
 
  Funds are allocated and received by UdelaR as a block grant and it relies 
heavily on historical allocations.  
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  Government agencies remain absent in the cycle of resource allocation to 
higher education institutions. UdelaR develops its functions with the widest 
autonomy and it is, only, subject to the formal controls. 
 
  Other public higher education bodies receive their allocations on a five year 
basis in the National  Budget Law, through their mother institutions.  
 
  In the private sector, almost all funding comes from tuition paid by students 
estimate that tuition fee income represents more than 90% of their total 
income. They are submitted to formal control from the public authorities. 
These controls are oriented to the application of legal formalities and do not 
cover the use of funds.  
 
  An important element that emerges from data is a shared agreement about 
an endemic lack of funding at the public University. However, there is 
important disagreement about the ways how UdelaR should face this 
problem and about the possible use of tuition fees.  
 
  I found that the introduction of a tuition fee scheme in UdelaR looks very 
unlikely due to ideological and political reasons. However, there is wide 
agreement about the worth of the imposition of a graduate tax which is 
considered a fair and equitable system in which University graduates 
contribute to support the costs of their higher education under a scheme of a 
deferred payment. 
 
  While considering alternative funding models, most of respondents 
explained that a new model would not introduce the use of formulae or 
quality aspects. 
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  As perceived by interviewees and Focus Group members and several 
political actors, public allocations to the educational system would rise to 
4.5% of Uruguayan GDP, which, in principle will imply that the sector will 
experience some relief to the problems related to lack of funding. However, 
according to data, we cannot predict that the model of funding will change. 
 
In the next chapter all this findings will be reviewed and analysed in  extenso (page 
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Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the study on the current model of financing 
higher education in Uruguay and its possible evolution or change according to the 
views of decision makers in the sector. 
 
It comprises three sections. In the first section the purpose, justification, method, 
context, and findings of the study are reviewed. The next section identifies some 
key areas where the study has contributed to the higher education literature. The 
chapter concludes with recommendations for practice and further research and, 
finally, I proceed to a critical reflection of the study‘s strengths and weaknesses 
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SECTION 1: OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
7.1.1. Purpose and justification 
 
The purpose of this study was to provide an analytical view of the current model of 
financing higher education in Uruguay and its possible evolution or change 
according to the views of stakeholders. 
 
I have tried to explain the importance of developing this study showing that there 
are no previous studies about this topic in Uruguay.  A review of the Uruguayan 
higher education literature suggested that there has been no technical analysis 
about the funding model of higher education in the country. In addition, the funding 
authorities, in the case the Congress and the Ministries involved in the funding 
cycle, do not provide an official explanation about the method utilised to allocate 
funds to the sector. Thus, whilst some recent studies mention aspects related to 
institutional budgets, none -excepting Oddone and Perera (2004)-concentrates on 
financial concepts and none are oriented to the analysis of the model of funding at 
the system level.  
 
Also, funding arrangements in use in the rest of the system are almost ignored in 
existing literature. Only some general aspects are known. For instance, I already 
knew that private Universities were, mainly, supported by tuition (Martínez 
Larrechea, 2003, p. 98 and Oddone and Perera, 2004, pp: 26-27) and that other 
public institutions of higher education received appropriations from their ―mother‖ 
institutions (Brunner and Becerra, 1999, p.13). However, nothing had been written 
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The analysis was guided by the following Research Questions (RQ) and data were 
sought in relation to the following operational research questions (ORQ): 
RQ. 1. What is the current model of funding higher education in Uruguay in 
reference to the following elements: 
ORQ 1.1 How are funds provided? 
ORQ 1.2 What criteria are used to determine allocations? 
ORQ 1.3. What are the degrees of decentralisation? 
ORQ 1.4. With what requirements for accountability? 
ORQ 1.5. Which are the historical and political factors that influence resource 
allocation? 
ORQ 1.6. To what extent is the Uruguayan Government utilising the current model 
of resource allocation as a means to influence the behaviour of the publicly funded 
University? 
RQ: 2. Is the current model likely to change according to the views of decision 
makers in the sector? 
ORQ 2.1. Are the historical/policy factors that shape the current model likely to 
change in the future? 
ORQ 2.2. Are public subsidies likely to grow in the near future? Are there other 
sources of funding, like tuition fees, likely to be considered as alternative sources 
of revenue in public higher education? 
 
I have addressed these questions on the basis of a theoretical framework and 
conceptual tools provided in Chapters 2 and 4. As was shown in these two 
chapters, during recent decades higher education worldwide has experienced 
notable changes in its funding systems. The landscape of higher education  
finance has been complicated by several issues in recent years, including 
competition for resources with other sectors (Booth, 1982), concerns about 
efficiency and effectiveness in the use of funds (Thomas, 2001), and the 
convergence of several economic and demographic forces. Without any doubt, 
today, no country can provide through the State as much budget as is wanted by  
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its society. 
 
These factors have placed constraints on Government funding to higher education 
throughout the world and have given impetus to a series of innovative dimensions 
of financing and budgeting in the sector. As a result, there have been notable 
changes in two main aspects: 
 
First, there has been an evolution in the models used to provide funds to 
institutions. Whilst many Governments still  transfer funds using historical models 
based on past allocations and, therefore, ignoring institutional performances or 
other objective criteria, since the 1980s there has been a clear move to other 
models to allocate public funds among Universities, like formulae and 
performance-based models. 
   
Formula funding was originally conceived as a more rational and non-political 
distribution of funds among higher education institutions, using objective criteria, 
providing a clear insight in the distribution of funds among higher education 
institutions and facilitating comparisons between institutions (Jongbloed, 2001). 
However, in the 1990s, some states in USA considered that simple reports of 
numbers or inputs were not enough to satisfy expectations of productivity or 
efficiency and began to link part of the budget allocations to performance 
measures based on the underlying concept that higher education institutions were 
motivated to improve their performance when performance was linked to budget 
allocations. 
 
As we saw in Chapter 4, formulaic or performance based models are currently in 
use in several countries, including North American, European and some Latin 
American countries. Interestingly, Uruguay´s neighbours, Brazil and Argentina, 
have introduced, at least partially, some aspects of both these models in their 
funding models.   
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Second: in the past quarter century, most developed and developing countries 
around the world introduced policies of cost recovery (Thorn et al, 2004). Within 
this context, many countries introduced tuition-fees or introduced substantial 
increases in existing tuition into higher education sectors hitherto supported 
primarily, or wholly, by public revenues (Johnstone, 1998, p.8). This phenomenon, 
called ―the shift of costs to parents and students‖ (Johnstone and Shroff Metha, 
2000, p.2), entails a transfer in the burden of higher educational costs from the 
general taxpayer or general citizen to parents and students.  
 
 Even though in the Latin American region, public Universities remain reluctant to 
move towards cost sharing, the endemic problems associated with a shortage of 
funds have pushed institutions to search and introduce alternative funds, including 
those coming from tuition-fees. Today in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Peru, Bolivia and Mexico public institutions are accepting an increasing proportion 
of their students on a fee-paying basis. (Garcia Guadilla, 2005).  
 
Contextual information about the region and the country and about its system of 
higher education relevant to the analysis of the findings was presented and 
summarised in Chapter 3.  
 
It revealed that Latin American Universities present common patterns and 
problems. Public institutions have inherited and preserved the model of Spanish 
Universities, oriented to dispense education to economic, political and religious 
élites. Research, technological development, and post-graduate training emerged 
late and with difficulties, and, as a result, research activities are scarce and the 
number of individuals working in scientific activities is low if we compare it with the 
numbers of some industrialised countries. 
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In spite of all these factors, public Universities, have had a significant role in the 
creation of knowledge in the region (Arocena and Sutz, 2001, p.65; Cetto and 
Vessuri, 1998, p.5) and have remained as the main vehicles for scientific research.  
 
Public institutions share, too, some key features. They have suffered a major 
expansion as middle-class women went to work and continued to study and at 
evening courses opened everywhere for working lower-middle class sectors 
(Schwartzman, 1999). Today, various of the largest Universities of the region have 
an enrolment of 60.000 students or more. This enrolment expansion was, 
principally, absorbed by the public Universities, some of which grew to 
unmanageable proportions (Kent 1998, p.3) and suffered a consequent over-
saturation in the number of students per classroom. 
 
However, in the region access to higher education is still insufficient and reveals 
severe inequities. Most students at the tuition-free public Universities come from 
the middle class; the very rich and the very poor are only a minority. In the 
meantime, the public resources devoted to sustain this expansion have not been 
able to maintain the expenditure per student. 
 
 All these elements interact in a scenario of political activism, locally considered to 
be a normal aspect of the University experience. Under the influence of the 
Cordoba Reform, student organisations have maintained close links with workers' 
organisations and labour unions, frequently joining them in demonstrations and 
protests. Student centres inside the Universities are usually connected with, 
identified with, and supported by national political parties. They are, too, the most 
important protectors of the Latin American sacred values of co-Government and 
tuition-free education. Reforms to increase reliance on cost-recovery through 
student payment in one form or another are often not politically viable and are, in 
many cases, met with major resistance. 
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The literature reveals that reforms in the funding models in the region have 
occurred in a somewhat lighter fashion. Historical funding is still the most popular 
model. Certain countries, like Brazil and Argentina, have introduced partial 
changes and are slowly moving to alternative models. Only Chile represents an 
exception in the region with a unique and drastic shift in its funding model. It is the 
country within Latin America that allocates the lowest public funding to higher 
education relative to GDP.  
 
The Uruguayan higher education system was shown as unique in the continent. 
The country has only one public University which is, also, an institution that is 
known by its co-Government regime (students, teachers and graduates) in which 
student access is non-competitive, tuition is free, and unconditional public 
subsidies constitute, almost, the only source of income. 
 
The public University was born together with the Republic and, in many ways, it 
represents the principles of the Uruguayan citizenship. Open access, tuition-free 
courses and shared-governance are considered the representation of the 
embedded values of democracy, justice and equity. However, as the only public 
University in the country, UdelaR had to face the burden of massive enrolments. In 
40 years, enrolments have grown more than 400% while financial resources fell 
almost equally sharply.  
 
Today, the literature suggests that unlimited access and its consequent 
massification might be connected with low performance of the institution, high 
drop-out rates and programme-completion times far longer than expected 
(Bentancur, 2004, p. 10). If we consider the current conditions in which courses are 
taught in the majority of the public University´s Faculties, it becomes evident that 
such openness has an impact in the quality of the resulting teaching. Various 
observers have pictured the following scenes: classes taught in big rooms or even 
in locations not specifically designed for teaching (cinemas, amphitheatres, etc), an  
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extremely low teacher/student ratio (Bentancur, 2003, p.17), poor libraries (Senator 
Jose Korzeniak, Frente Amplio MP,  December 9, 1995) and poor conditions at 
research facilities (Senator Maria Julia Pou, Blanco Party MP, December 17, 
2000). Nonetheless, University management structures are reported to be 
collapsed and decision-making processes face constant obstacles while internal 
discussion is resisted.  
 
In this scenario, the Ministry of Education and Culture appears like an absent actor. 
Even though, according to the Uruguayan law, the Ministry is in charge of  leading 
national policies of education (Decree 407/85), as all the educational  agencies are 




This study employed a qualitative approach in order to obtain a more complete 
picture, as well as the perspectives and perceptions of people involved in higher 
education. For the data collection phase of the study, multiple sources of evidence 
were employed under the rationale of triangulation (Yin, 2003). The study has used 
documents, literature, semi structured interviews, a Focus Group and speeches at 
Parliamentary sessions. 
 
The multi-modal tools that were chosen tried to address several questions from 
different perspectives. Using these various techniques enabled me to use their 
respective benefits and to cross-check data coming from the different sources. Not 
least, the aim was to avoid the reliance on only one source of data and to make the 
different methodologies interact with the others (Rezabeck, 2000). 
 
The Parliamentary narrative addressed the period between 1994 to 2004. The 
interviews took place between 2004 and 2005 and were undertaken with University  
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managers and policy makers from various fields, including the higher education 
system, the Congress and the Government.   
 
I organised and analysed the collected data thoroughly. At the simplest level, the 
analysis undertaken involved examining the assembled data to determine how they 
answered the research questions. Qualitative data analysis involved identifying, 
coding, and categorising patterns found in the data (Byrne, 2001). The data was 
categorised by using descriptive, topic and analytical coding. The categories have 
been derived from both the interview protocols and the themes emerging from the 
corpus. 
 
The veracity and credibility of the analyses were enhanced through the explicit 
reporting of the procedures employed, by incorporating the successive stages of 
analysis into the structure of each chapter of findings, and through the extensive 




Research findings were presented, summarised and discussed in Chapter 6. 
Hereinafter, there is a synthesis of the findings of the study together with the 
research described in the literature review to answer the two research questions.  
 
The research questions posed at the end of Chapter 1 have provided an 
organisational framework for this study. This section shows how the findings have 
confirmed, disconfirmed and extended previous research in the field. 
 
 
RQ. 1. What is the current model of funding higher education in Uruguay in 
reference to the following elements? 
ORQ 1.1 How are funds provided?  
  291 
 
 In the Uruguayan model, there is a co-existence of different models of financing 
higher education between public and private institutions. Like in most countries, 
public education is financed from general revenues collected by the Government. 
The National budget is the dominant source of public higher education finance and 
is oriented to fund the institutions and not the students. In this way, funding is 
supply driven not demand-led. 
 
 According to our calculations, in 2004 the public University, UdelaR received 87% 
of its funding supplies from the Government through the Budget Law block grant 
allocation. In addition, Chiancone et al (2005) report that, during 2004, the 
graduate tax supplied 3.7% of University revenues. Other funding from private 
sources came through research contracts and services which represent 9% cent of 
total income. This number assumes that UdelaR maintained the same amount of 
funds collected from contracts and services which were reported in 2001, which 
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FIGURE 27: UdelaR´s total funding  
 
 
UdelaR does not charge tuition although there is national legislation that allows the 
public University to charge it (Law No 16226).  
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Other public institutions are funded through their mother organisations. Moreover, 
they do not charge tuition. Funds from the National Budget Laws are allocated to 
the mother organisation (for instance: a Ministry), and this organisation allocates 
funds to the higher education programmes that operate inside it. All these results 
confirm assertions in literature by Martinez Larrechea (2003), Brunner and Becerra 
(1999) and Oddone and Perera (2004).  
 
Private institutions rely on tuition levying (Interviewee C). In addition, they are 
exonerated from paying taxes (Constitution, art. 62) which implies a State indirect 
subsidy. All these results are consistent with Martinez Larrechea (2003), Brunner 
and Becerra (1999), Oddone and Perera (2004). Funds from other sources, for 
instance, for research or contracts, are insignificant (Interviewee C)( FIGURE 29). 
 
FIGURE 29:  Private universities total funding 
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UdelaR receives allocations through block grants on a quinquennial basis 
determined by the National Budget Laws. Allocations are determined by the 
Parliament and are based on requests submitted to the Parliament following an 
initial study by the Office of Planning and Budget. The allocation process is based 
on an automatic device of providing the same allocation that was provided in the 
previous Budget Law augmented with appropriations for specific projects. 
 
The new appropriations are the result of negotiations between University 
representatives and Parliament members, as already described by Brunner and 
Becerra (1998, p.8) and by Interviewees L, M, N, O, P and Q. At the Focus Group 
one of the participants was very clear about how these negotiations occur: “...(During 
the budget discussion), UdelaR operates at the Parliament  through a series of lobbies that excerpt 
pressure  over different Parliament members or groups.” 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the National Budget Laws allocated some special 
grants to specific educational and research programmes of UdelaR (Laws No. 
16320 and 16226; Interviewees L and O). 
 
UdelaR is free to use the funding block grant at its own discretion due to its 
autonomy established in the National Constitution and by the law (Law No 12549). 
The State audits the use of allocated resources through accounting controls 
(National Constitution art. 211-213), but no public response is requested about the 
internal allocations or other elements such as unit costs, strategic uses or 
operational aspects.  
 
Allocations are determined by the Parliament in a National Budget Law but are 
appropriated by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The Ministry of Education 
has no involvement in higher education funding. 
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For other higher education institutions (i.e. military higher education Institutions), 
funds are allocated on a five-year basis in the National Budget law, through the 
allocation to the Ministry of Defence. This Ministry allocates funds for the higher 
education programmes that operate inside it under the frame of strategies 
established by the military authorities (Interviewee D). 
 
ORQ 1.2. What criteria are used to determine allocations? 
 
The criteria to allocate funds to UdelaR are, mostly, historical. The budget 
allocation is based on the previous year's allocation which is only augmented due 
to the annual fiscal cycle. Any new "fresh" resources are allocated to special 
projects.  
 
Since the 1980s, the National Budget Laws allocated some special grants to  
specific educational and research programmes of UdelaR such as in: a) Continuing 
education; b) Support for international co-operation; c) Support for research 
activities; and d) New buildings and facilities of the University hospital (Laws No 
16320 and 16662, Interviewee  L).    
 
This new appropriations have resulted from negotiations between University 
representatives and Parliament members.  
 
 In addition, each year the University Council presents a proposal for the use of 
allocated funds and proposes the changes that it considers are required (Law No 
12549, art 23) which have been negotiated between the public University 
representatives and the funding authorities (Interviewees  B, J, L, M, N, O, P and 
Q). 
 
As already discussed in Chapter 2 (p.51), this is the most traditional type of 
funding in Latin American countries (Schwartzman, 1993a), a model that has been  
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fully described by Layzell (1998), Schwartzman (1993a), Pratt (1987), Albrecht and 
Ziderman (1993) and Jongbloed (2001), among others.   
 
This study suggests that Uruguay mirrors the regional pattern in which very little 
strategic planning occurs in the financing process (Schwartzmann et al, 1995). 
However, it suggests, too, that the traditional historical funding mode used in 
Uruguay has been evolving during the 1990s converting the model into a 
historical/incremental model. In this case, the increases, or new funds that are 
allocated to the system, are tied to certain specific purposes determined in the 
Budget laws. This has been the pattern followed by the Parliament since the late 
1980s and during the 1990s; it has introduced new funds to the system -the 
incremental funding- but has oriented them to fund certain projects.    
 
In this way, funding relies on: (a) historical allocations which are actually the 
biggest part of the allocations, which are always the same and are expected to be 
the same; and (b) new allocations (increases) focused on certain projects which 
are specified in the Budget Laws by the Parliament (Laws No. 16320 and 16662; 
Interviewees A, B, L and N). 
 
In the other public institutions, such as the military higher education institution, 
dependent on the Ministry of Defence, interviews show that funds are allocated 
following opaque criteria. It appears that the priorities set by the military authorities 
are kept in the dark and the allocation of resources is kept confidential between 
those in power positions (Interviewee C).  
 
 Private institutions set their own funding criteria according to their strategic or 
developmental plans. Interviews and a review from the legal framework suggest 
that these institutions operate with full autonomy according to the regulations of the 
Private Law. As private institutions, they operate with total independence from  
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public authorities and are only requested by the Ministry of Education and Culture 
to submit annual financial reports.    
 
The evidence suggests that, in this model, the legislators accept past allocations 
and decide only about the allocation of increments, as described by Layzell (1998, 
p.106). In literature, this model has been named ―incrementalism‖. Its use reveals a 
conservative nature of decision making at the Legislature and at the political 
system by and large.  
 
As I see it, incrementalism provides a number of benefits: 
 
  The current budget decision is the product of previous decisions. Legislators 
accept past allocations and decide only on the allocations of increments;  
  It reduces political conflict or, in some cases, reinforces an existing 
equilibrium of political forces;   
  Budget allocations are predictable;  
  It is simple and is easily understood by all; 
  It allows decision makers to focus more closely on the few new 
programmes. 
 
However, incrementalism might entail, too, a lack of political compromise as getting 
attention for an issue on the agenda may cause a struggle with other eligible policy 
matters.   
 
Besides, if I consider the case of Uruguay, it is clear that a change in the 
incremental model would overwhelm the system. A new, more rational or strategy-
based model would require data, calculations and would open discussions and 
conflict. The answer to this dilemma is, again, incremental decision-making.  
 
ORQ 1.3. What are the degrees of decentralisation?  
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Resources are allocated by the Parliament to UdelaR on a fully decentralised 
basis. The public University keeps broad decision-making powers over 
expenditures such as staff salaries, consumables and equipment. It preserves, as 
well, full control over earned income from research grants and contracts (Law No 
12549). UdelaR is defined by the National Constitution as an autonomous 
institution which means that it develops its activities with a total independence from 
the national Government. In addition, it keeps control and is entirely responsible for 
the use of the block grant. As a consequence, eventual gains and losses are under 
institutional control, as described by Brinkman and Morgan (1997).  
 
In the other public institutions (i.e. the military higher education institution 
dependent of the Ministry of Defence), all funding decisions are taken by central 
authorities and there is no decentralisation at all. This was pointed out by 
Interviewee D, confirming reports by Brunner and Becerra (1999). 
 
Private institutions operate in a fully decentralised way from the Government 
(Interviewee C).  
 
ORQ 1.4. With what requirements for accountability? 
 
UdelaR is an autonomous institution and develops its activities with a total 
independence from the national Government. It is subject to various controls, all 
accounting controls, exerted by different bodies: the Court of Accounts, the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance and the Parliament (National Constitution, art 211-213, 
Decree No 194/997).  
 
The other public institutions, such as those submitted to military control, do not 
have autonomy. They are submitted to confidential military rules (Interviewee D). 
However, like all public institutions, these institutions are submitted to various  
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accounting controls, exerted by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Court of 
Accounts and by the Parliament.  
 
Private institutions operate with total independence from public authorities and are 
only requested by the Ministry of Education and Culture to submit annual financial 
reports (Decree No 308/995). Findings in this study suggest that these reports are 
not considered or analysed by that Ministry (Interviewee C).  
     
This is consistent with Bentancur (2002) who describes the high degree of 
autonomy of the private institutions and compares this status with the autonomy 
determined by the Constitutions and the laws for the public University. According to 
Bentancur "this situation is  due to the lack of effective policies to create structures to oversee and 
verify their performance"(2002, p. 12).  
  
This study suggests a particular approach to accountability in Uruguayan higher 
education. Resources are allocated to the system on a decentralised basis and 
institutions keep broad decision-making powers. The Government applies no 
control on institutional performance or efficiency. Findings reveal that   institutional 
autonomy is considered the raison d´etre of this approach.    
 
Information gathered for this study suggests that Governmental agencies hold very 
little concern about the use of public funds. Internal use of public appropriations 
has bureaucratic controls and is only monitored through the conventional 
accounting audits prescribed by law. 
Considering the distinction made by Trow, mentioned in Chapter 1 (p.29), findings 
in this study suggest that, in Uruguay, the National Government uses a frame of 
legal/financial accountability that Trow has defined as: “the obligation to report  how 
resources are used: is the institution doing what it is supposed to be doing by law, are its resources 
being used for the purposes for which they are given?”(1996, p.8). 
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This study could not identify any evidence of the use of New Public Management 
ideas in the mechanisms used by the Government in relation to higher education 
as expected by Hidalgo (1997) and Bentancur (2002). Yarzabal (2001) even 
warned that the use of those ideas by Latin American Governments would 
determine: “.. re-orientation  of  public policies (...) to  non-regulated  privatisations, result- based 
assessments,  politically oriented accreditation and a total reduction of public funds” (pp: 11-12). 
This study shows that, at least in the case of Uruguay, none of these have 
occurred.  
 
ORQ 1.5. What are the historical and political factors that influence resource 
allocation? 
 
From the evidence provided by the parliamentary speeches, I have identified the 
following elements: 
 
  That the Government agencies are not involved in the process of 
allocating resources to higher education.  
We found general agreement about this point which is certainly a key feature of the 
Uruguayan model. All the cycle of allocating resources to the educational public 
entities is developed in a scenario in which the body in charge of leading national 
policies of education has no legal authority to exert influence or intervene.  
 
This finding is supported by earlier research developed by Brunner and Becerra 
(1999). 
 
  That the existing perceptions and beliefs about the autonomy of 
UdelaR have consequences on the allocation of resources.  
The outcomes of this study indicate that autonomy, as it is conceived in Uruguay 
and in Latin America, is another key element that arises while trying to understand 
how the current model has been shaped. Certainly, this point was raised regularly  
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at the interviews, at the focus group session and in the Congress debates.  
 
The approach to University autonomy manifested by the MPs from the leftist party 
Frente Amplo implies a notion which stands as a barrier of protection to prevent 
intrusions in University matters. The message is “due to autonomy the University is 
untouchable”. Even stronger, some speeches by Frente Amplio MPs Senators Marina 
Arismendi (December 5, 1995) and Helios Sarthou (December 7, 1995) show that 
they consider demands, comments or critiques about University functioning made 
at the Parliament as an undermining of autonomy or even as interventionism.  
 
  That there exists distrust between the University and the political 
powers. 
We found an evident sentiment of distrust between UdelaR and the Parliament. 
Several statements by Frente Amplio MPs indicate that they consider that this 
feeling is embedded in the beliefs of the political right (Colorado and Blanco Party) 
due to the historical fact that the public University has frequently confronted the 
political powers represented, historically, in those parties. However, in various 
cases I found statements by Colorado and Blanco Party denying this consideration. 
 
  Finally, a perceived important element at the legislature is the recognition, 
by all groups, of an endemic lack of funding at the public University. 
However, I found considerable disagreement at the Parliament about 
how the University must face those problems related to inadequate 
funding. For instance, several legislators agreed that, as there is a legal 
authorisation to charge tuition-fees, UdelaR must, at least, consider the 
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ORQ 1.6. To what extent is the Uruguayan Government utilising the current 
model of resource allocation as a means to influence the behaviour of the 
publicly funded University? 
All collected data in this study reveals that the essence of University autonomy, 
within the particular notion of autonomy that is held in Uruguay, has determined a 
particular role to be played by the Government. It really has no role at all in 
this scene; it is absent from all discussions and therefore exerts no influence 
over the budget allocations (Interviewee N, Focus Group)  
 
Moreover, it is my belief that Resource Dependence Theory has not been 
used as a driver of change in the higher education sector. An interpretation of 
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through resource dependence, rather than self induced changes. This does not 
appear to be true in the case of Uruguay, or only to a very limited extent 
(considering the orientations given in Parliament to incremental funding). 
 
The findings in Chapter 6 indicate that the Uruguayan State has not used the 
strong position that could have been expected according to the descriptions of the 
Resource Dependence Theory described in pages 43-44.  Furthermore, as 
described by Lemes (2003, p.19), at present the Ministry of Education and Culture 
has important problems to resolve before it can approach policy making, co-
ordination and reform implementation within the higher education system.  
 
RQ: 2.  Is the current model likely to change, according to the views of 
decision makers in the sector? 
 
Most of the respondents were positive about this point. They suggested that 
Uruguay would devote more funds to finance higher education. This general 
sentiment was based on the fact that political leaders and Government officers had 
announced that the educational sector will receive increased funding in a future 
New Budget Law. For instance, the current Minister of Education and Culture has 
announced that "...the Government is committed to allocate this year the claimed 4.5 % to the 
educational sector which is one of the Governmental priority principles" (Diario La Republica: 
August 12, 2005 www.diariolarepublica.com/2005/larepublica.htm). 
 
However, as several interviewees suggested, whilst the system would receive 
further funding, the funding model will remain the same because of a “logic of 
incrementalism” (Interviewee N).   
       
Slight, or at least, less important changes are likely to be introduced without 
introducing   a new funding model. This study suggests that funding authorities 
might be interested in a resource allocation scheme oriented to fund strategic  
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programmes and even to introduce funding through competitive schemes 
(Interviewee F).   
 
This study suggests, also, that further funding might be originated in the collection 
of the graduate tax, and that this scheme could be improved in ways to introduce 
more funding to the system.  
 
ORQ 2.1.Are the historical/policy factors that shape the current model likely 
to change in the future? 
 
A review of the policy documents written by the political parties revealed that they 
do not have any clear strategies about the current patterns of finance of higher 
education. Furthermore, they do not make any recommendations about possible 
changes in the funding model.  
 
However, according to most of the respondents, the current model was likely to 
change. A minority of interviewees affirmed that the current model would not 
change although the system would receive more funding. 
 
Overall, the participants agreed that the system would receive more funds because 
there would be an increase of the educational expenditure in total close to 4.5% of 
GDP. 
 
All participants in the Focus Group agreed that the public educational system as a 
whole would receive more funds and that, as a consequence, public higher 
education would receive more funds.  
 
Nevertheless, the participants felt that these developments would not imply a 
change in the system. All concurred that the model will remain the same.  
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Several respondents concurred that, in the future, the Ministry of Education and 
Culture would be more involved in higher education issues.  According to 
interviewees I and H (both advisors at the Legislature), the Ministry of Education 
and Culture would be more involved in the creation of public policies in the sector, 
and that such policies would be most concerned about the status of private higher 
education. However, several other interviewees doubted that the Ministry of 
Education and Culture would be in a condition to develop some kind of discussion 
about higher education policies.  
 
It emerges as an interesting point that, whilst institutional autonomy has been a 
value historically preserved and defended by the Frente Amplio MPs, most of the 
respondents affirmed that the new Government would be more involved in higher 
education policies and will introduce ―elements of strategy‖ in the allocation of 
funds to the system of higher education.  
 
ORQ 2.2. Are public subsidies likely to grow in the near future? Are there 
other sources of funding, like tuition fees, likely to be considered as 
alternative sources of revenue in public higher education? 
 
As the Frente Amplio won the 2004 elections and held a majority in the current 
composition of the Parliament, all interviewees and members of the Focus Group 
expected that, as promised, public allocations to the educational system will rise to 
4.5% of Uruguayan GDP. This would entail that, as all the educational system 
would receive more funds, there would be an increase in the funding for the public 
University and other higher education public institutions. 
 
The introduction of a tuition-fee scheme looked very improbable in the short term 
because the availability of further funding would reduce the pressures to introduce 
alternative funds to complement public revenues. Moreover, the ideological and 
political predominance of the Frente Amplio party in the Parliament (historically  
  306 
placed against tuition-fees) would certainly abort discussions about cost-recovery 
in the public University. At the same time, the graduate tax, looked like a more 
―politically correct‖ option to utilise in order to complement public subsidies.  
 
Several statements at the Parliament supported this view and there was general 
agreement that the imposition of a graduate tax had instituted a fair and equitable 
system in which University graduates contributed to support the costs of higher 
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SECTION 2: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
First. The evidence presented in this study confirms that, in the Uruguayan model, 
the National Budget is the dominant source of funding of public higher education 
while private institutions rely on tuition levying. Public funding is oriented to fund 
the supply and is allocated to institutions through block grants.  
 
The allocation process is based on an automatic device of providing the same 
allocation that was provided in the previous Budget Law augmented with 
appropriations for specific projects. These new appropriations are the result of 
negotiations between University representatives and Parliament members. This 
study reveals that in Uruguay the model of funding is historical-incremental-
negotiated, according to the description of models made in Chapter 2 pages 49-53 
above.  The model pictured in this study is consistent with descriptions by Layzell 
(1998, p.106) and Schwartzman (1993a).   
 
The criteria to allocate funds to public institutions are historical/incremental. As a 
result the provisions rely, in most cases, not on future but on past actions. In 
addition, they reflect strategy and deliberate policies only in a very small proportion 
of allocations. This study suggests that there exists inadequate linking between the 
funding allocations and strategy. 
 
Public institutions are free to use the funds at their own discretion. Institutions 
operate in fully decentralised ways. In the case of UdelaR, this is linked to legal 
aspects bearing in mind that the Constitution and the laws establish its broad 
autonomy. These aspects might also be re-inforced by cultural and historical 
elements described in Chapter 3, pages 109-114. 
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The State audits the use of allocated resources through accounting controls within 
a framework of legal/financial accountability, a somehow ―no-brainer‖ procedural 
accountability. Findings in this study suggest that University autonomy is 
considered the raison d´etre of the system and that there is a clear connection 
between institutional autonomies and the idea of accountability, because, due to 
their autonomy, institutions are not obliged to an academic accountability as 
defined by Trow (1996, p.8).   
 
This is consistent with Trow (1996, p.6) who concludes that: 
“Whatever we might call all this, it is accountability in name only. It much more resembles the 
reports by a civil service in a defeated country to an occupying power, or by state-owned 
industrial plants and farms to central Government in a command economy. In all such cases, the 
habits of truth- telling erode, and reports flowing up from the field come to have less and less 
relation to the facts on the ground that they represent. So a central problem is how to create a 
system of accountability that does not punish truth-telling and reward the appearance of 
achievement”. 
 
 Whilst it is the main provider of funds, the State is not involved in the process of 
higher education and budget allocations “are a consequence of the combinations of the 
actions of pressure groups   over the Parliament” (Interviewee L). This is consistent with 
Bentancur (2002), Martinez Sandres (1999), Brunner and Becerra (1999) and 
Martinez Larrechea (2003) who have pointed out that the Uruguayan Governments 
have been absent from policy setting in higher education. 
 
Second. This study suggests that the State is not using the funding model as a 
tool to introduce changes in the sector and that probably would not use it in the 
future with such intentions. The analysis of data presented in Chapter 5 supports 
this interpretation and pictures a Ministry of Education and Culture with weak 
capacities to oversee the system, unable to exert influences over it and not 
prepared to assume a leading role in the scene of higher education.   
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At last, now that we have examined the characteristics of the funding model utilised 
in the finance or Uruguayan higher education, let us briefly re-visit some the 
characteristics that, according to some authors, should underpin a funding model 
(Serban, 1998 p.16; Burke, 1998, p.12; and Marks and Caruthers 1999, p.3)   
 
















At a first glance, it seems clear that the model is not achieving most of the desired 
characteristics developed by the literature. However, at the same time, the model 
is simple and easy to administer from a Government, institution and student 
perspective. Also, it is predictable, as it is largely based in past allocations which 
are already known.  
 
Nevertheless, it is evident that:  
 
BE STRATEGY- BASED  No 
 




PROVIDE INCENTIVES  No 
 
REWARD PERFORMANCE  No 
 
BE EQUITABLE  No 
 
BE SIMPLE  Yes 
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  The current model is not strategy-based. I could not identify any kind of 
strategies on the historical block allocation. Some incipient strategy can be 
found in the incremental allocations, but the impact is minimal. 
 
  The current model does not provide adequate funding. In practice, the 
Government, the Parliament and even the institutions themselves ignore 
how much funding is needed to fulfil its approved mission. There is 
apparently no awareness of costs or needs. 
 
  The current model does not provide incentives for quality or rewards for high 
or improved performance. This arises from the historical block allocation. 
However, there is some evidence that the incremental categorical block has 
been utilised to introduce some incentives for the development of certain 
activities and programmes.   
 
  The current model is not equitable. The model does not recognise 
institutional differences and missions.   
 
  The current model is not flexible. The model is not responsive to changes in 




Third. This study suggests that Uruguay will devote more funds to finance higher 
education. This general view reflects the fact that political leaders and Government 
officers have announced that the educational sector will receive increased funding 
in a future Budget Law.  
 
Some interviewees suggested that, whilst the system would receive further 
funding, the model would remain the same (Interviewees L and N). In addition,  
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according to one of the interviewees, changes in the funding model will not occur 
because “the State is not involved in the finance of higher education" (Interviewee N).  
 
Some changes, which can be considered of lesser importance, are likely to be 
introduced without introducing a new funding model. This study shows that, 
according to the views of stakeholders, the funding authorities might, increasingly, 
use the mechanism of allocating funds oriented to special programmes and, in this 
way, introduce some kind of strategic orientations. In addition, this study suggests 
that further funding might be provided through the collection of the graduate tax 
and that this scheme could be improved in ways to introduce more funding to the 
system, i.e. increasing the tax sum in ways that reflect the costs of University 
instruction. 
 
This study suggests that it is unlikely that a future model will consider the use of 
formulae or quality considerations. 
 
The outcomes of this study also indicate that, as the pressures to introduce 
alternative funds to complement public revenues will probably be diminished, due 
to the availability of supplementary funds, the introduction of a tuition fee scheme 
in UdelaR is unlikely. 
 
The resulting situation is paradoxical. As observed by respondents and as 
announced by various Government officers, budget allocations for public higher 
education will be increased in very important proportions. However, as the 
incremental model in use relies on the absence of strategies and real analysis or 
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FIGURE 32:  Summary of the model of funding higher education in Uruguay   
Government 
strategies 
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SECTION 3: FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
7.3. 1. Financial crisis 
 
In Uruguay, there is a perception that public higher education is in endemic 
financial crisis due to growing enrolments (Errandonea, 1990). While between 
1960 and 2000, the Uruguayan population of individuals aged between 20 to 24 
years grew by 26% (Lemes, 2003), the growth of UdelaR´s population grew by 
457% (MEC, 2006). At the same time, the amount of recurring public resources 
allocated to higher education has decreased on a permanent basis in real terms 
(Oddone and Perera, 2004). 
 
These dramatic financial declines in per student support have led to major 
concerns about diminished quality, while staff are underpaid, buildings are 
deteriorating and  most research laboratories lack modern equipment. 
 
Oddone and Perera (2004) have shown that Uruguay devotes fewer funds to the 
system of higher education than the rest of its neighbour countries. In FIGURE   33  
below, Uruguay is placed with other countries in the region and some others in the 
developed world. It can be seen that Uruguayan expenditure on education is 
significantly smaller than its neighbours in the region. 
 
FIGURE 33 : Total expenditure on educational institutions and administration as a % of GDP. All sources (2005). 
 
  All levels  Tertiary education (*) 
UNITED KINGDOM  5.9  1.1 
USA  7.2  2.6 
SPAIN  4.9  1.2 
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Based in: UNESCO-UIS/OECD 2005 Education trends in perspective – analysis of the World Education indicators, available in: 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/TEMPLATE/pdf/wei/WEI2005.pdf 
 (*) In the case of Uruguay, ―tertiary education‖ should be identified only with UdelaR  Funding to the rest of the  
sector is allocated to the Ministries and ANEP  and not directly to the higher education institutions.  Information 
about the amount of these appropriations is not available.  
 
Oddone and Perera (2004) deepen thinking on the issue in the following way:  
" According to UNESCO, in 1964 in Uruguay,  public expenditure in education  was similar to the 
regional average.  But, during the mid 1990s Uruguayan public expenditure in education 
represented less of the 2/3 of regional averages (p.16)."   
 
Certainly all this information has to be considered as a key element for the analysis 
of the funding element in higher education. It is clear that, in Uruguay, most 
stakeholders perceive that the state is devoting inadequate funding to higher 
education. Most perceive that this funding is not only inadequate but insufficient. 
 
As we could expect, this study indicates that the majority of stakeholders are, 
primarily, concerned with the insufficient  amount of funds devoted to the sector. 
Quantity appears to be a greater concern than strategy or efficiency of use. 
 
Probably, as a direct result of this concern, it was expected that the new 
Government would devote a major increase in the funding of the public educational 
sector as a whole and of UdelaR in particular. It had announced that funding for the 
educational sector would rise to 4.5% of GDP. Under this policy, UdelaR funds 
would be augmented in more than 80% (Interviewee B).  
 
BRAZIL  N/A  N/A 
ARGENTINA  4.7  1.1 
PARAGUAY  6.6  1.6 
CHILE  7.5  2.2 
URUGUAY  2.8  0.6  
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However, this study also pointed out that the majority of stakeholders were not  
paying attention to the merits or problems of the current mode of funding the 
sector.   
 
At this stage and after understanding the importance of the funding models in the 
management of higher education, some fundamental questions could be: "How 
much funding is sufficient? . or: ―what are the elements that will guide the new 
allocations?  Quality, widening access...?" These questions become more 
essential, and more difficult, as the availability of funds seems to be changing. 
None of these questions can be answered right now. Nevertheless, it is important 
to indicate that the promises made by the new Government do not link the new 
allocations  with special or "strategic" purposes, such as a projection of the State‘s 
needs on economic, social, or political directions.   
 
Whilst it is clear that those promises represent the way that the new authorities 
express their concern about the importance of supporting higher education and a 
recognition that the sector has been historically underfunded, just to increase the 
available funds without constructing a rationale might reinforce the existing 
incremental model. In this model, as we saw, the discussions, when they exist, are 
not centred in policies or strategies but on the increments. This move might also 
reinforce the traditional resource allocation model described in this study in which 
institutional accountability is an absent concept due to historical and cultural 
reasons.  
 
7.3.2. The consequences of the model  
 
Several lessons can be learned from the findings in Chapter 6 which have 
highlighted that the current model determines a series of consequences.  
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1. As mentioned in Chapter 3 (p.127 above), in Uruguay, the process of 
decentralising education that operated during the 19th and 20th centuries has 
resulted in the fact that, in the long term, the Ministry of Education and Culture has 
become a "ministry without schools", that has no control or supervision over public 
education in the country. Whilst there is a Ministry of Education, all the educational 
agencies are autonomous and there are no authorities to establish the strategies 
for the sector (Rama, 1994).   
 
2.  As a consequence, the relationship between the Government and the 
educational public institutions operates through the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance which is responsible for delivering the State subsidies. This situation 
hardly represents a policy of decentralisation.  On the contrary, all evidence 
suggests a de facto abdication of responsibility by the central authorities. 
 
3.  This study shows that there is a general understanding amongst the 
respondents that the absence of Government control in higher education is a 
positive fact. For many, there is an assumption that this absence reinforces 
institutional autonomies. However, at the same time, others perceive that this 
situation shows the lack of a strategic and systematic approach to public policies in 
higher education. Probably, the interaction of these elements might have led to a 
situation in which there is no overall policy structure to co-ordinate the various 
public policies that affect the financing of higher education. 
 
4.  This study also suggests that the net result of not having a rational strategic 
approach is that institutional policies are often leading to actions that are contrary 
to the expressed goals of the policies. This is clear when we talk about the 
unresolved, but crucial, question concerning equity in access. Does the system of 
public funded higher education with free tuition schemes provide equity in 
opportunities such as in access between different socioeconomic groups? The 
evidence shows that, while the stated goal of public policies is to provide more  
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access for the poor, most students at UdelaR come from the middle and upper- 
middle class (UdelaR, 2000). As a result, State funding for public institutions 
disproportionately benefits middle and upper- middle class students since they 
constitute the bulk of enrolments in these institutions. 
 
So far, the combination of policies of no tuition, open admissions and lack of 
assistance to needy students at the public institutions, seems to perpetuate, rather 
than helping to reduce, the inequities that characterise the Uruguayan society. 
They certainly suggest that the non-tuition policies are not a sufficient condition for 
the provision of greater equity in access to higher education. But, even worse, 
current arrangements are, in practice, socially and economically regressive 
because those not participating in higher education, typically people from 
disadvantaged backgrounds and with modest income prospects, do not benefit 
from public funding in this area (Blondal et al, 2002, p.7).   
 
Brunner (1993, pp: 61-63) pictures this phenomenon at the regional level as 
follows:  
“The combination of a free higher education (free for the benefitiaries) and automatic public 
funding is explosive from the equity point of view. In practice, it means that a high proportion of 
students at the public sector (who  come from the three highest quintiles of the income 
distribution) receive education at no cost  and later receive significant economic advantages in 
their professional lives. Only a small proportion of low income students is benefitted with the 
same system.” 
 
In similar ways, Lewis and Dundar (2002) and Blondal et al (2002), suggest that 
most countries who have historically offered free higher education as a perceived 
means of expanding access to working-class students, eventually found that 
participation rates among those students had not increased  and that most of the 
subsidies had been received,  largely, by middle- and high-income students. 
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However, we cannot ignore the fact that the imposition of tuition is observed with 
special distrust in Uruguay as there is a rooted ideology of free education, which 
views higher education as a basic societal obligation. It is also believed that 
holding to a non-tuition policy will also ensure access disadvantaged low-income 
students. Let us recall that this ideology has been defended in Parliament by the 
leftist Frente Amplio, currently in power. However, this study indicates, too, that 
most of discourses by conservative MPs are also opposed to with the imposition of 
tuition-fees at UdelaR.   
 
Moreover, some perceive that tuition is much more than an economic issue and 
reflects a traditional distrust of Government motives within higher education. As 
they see it, tuition is not a means of diversifying support and, thereby, of reducing 
the financial pressures on the budgets and the financial dependence on the state. 
What is more, they consider that, even though high and middle class students are 
effectively over-represented in the classrooms, the main concern is that there are, 
also, students that come from lower socio-economic sectors. Therefore, they do 
not believe that increased fiscal input from the better-positioned students would 
allow reductions in University public spending or that it could be re-oriented to 
other social objectives or increase the scholarship system benefiting their excluded 
peers.  
 
Unfortunately, the result of all this views is that the proposed ―equity policies‖ are 
not necessarily leading to their expected results. The outcomes are just the 
opposite. 
 
5. It is our belief that the Resource Dependence Theory has not been used as a 
driver of change in the higher education sector in Uruguay. An application of the 
Resource Dependence Theory might persuade Government and institutions to 
introduce changes through resource dependence, rather than self induced 
changes.  
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The findings in Chapter 6 indicate that the Uruguayan State has not used the 
strong position that could have been expected according to the ideas of Resource 
Dependence Theory described above in pages 44-45. Furthermore, as shown, 
currently the Ministry of Education and Culture has important problems to develop 
policy making, co-ordination and reform implementation within the higher education 
system. As already mentioned, Lemes (2002) has reported that, due to a lack of 
human and financial resources, the Ministry of Education and Culture is clearly 
unable to address emerging issues in the sector. Similar problems were described 
by Reimers (1994), in reporting the condition of education in Latin America, 
showing that several Ministries of education in the region lack trained human 
resources with the ability or expertise to deal with broad technical aspects. 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that, if Uruguay decides to elaborate a new framework of 
higher education, the Ministry of Education and Culture has to re-think its role in a 
changing scene, while considering the particular institutional setting in which the 
higher education sector is operating. A Ministry of Education and Culture with new 
roles will need expertise, technology and other resources and a "re-inforced" 




SECTION 4: RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
Recommendations from this study fall into two main groups: those for future 
research and those for use by policy makers and practitioners in the sector. 
 
7.4.1. Recommendations for further research 
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1.  How and in what ways the absence of public policies about the finance of 
higher education is increasingly significant in Uruguay is a matter of future 
research. Technical literature reported in Chapter 4 suggests that State funding 
mechanisms are increasingly significant for the application of policies in the sector 
in several countries of various regions. This study has shown that the funding 
model used in Uruguay is a historical/incremental model which relies on former 
allocations and does not consider at all institutional performance or quality aspects. 
Furthermore, the country lacks policies of widening access in broad terms. 
 
It also suggests that this model is the result of the actions and in-actions of a 
State that remains outside of sectoral public policies.  
In particular, it might be worthwhile to explore in which new ways the model of 
allocating resources in Uruguay might be linked to the performance of the public 
institutions, specially to the performance of UdelaR. As commented in Chapter 3 
(pp:116-119 above), UdelaR is experiencing severe problems at all levels. This 
performance might be determined by a series of elements, including the way 
resources are allocated to the institutions from central authorities and are utilised 
inside them. The linkage between the model of funding used in Uruguay and the 
institutional behaviour at UdelaR is a matter of future research. 
 
2. Other aspects of interest that emerge from this study are the linkage 
between resources and behaviours that has been analysed by the Resource 
Dependency Theory.  Literature cited above suggests that, in the higher 
education sector, the allocation of resources has  been used as a  tool  to induce 
change within the system and the institutions. Moreover, Zinberg (quoted by 
Newson, 1996, p. 285) and Mora (1997), observed that many Governments see 
financial incentives as a more effective way of influencing the pattern of activities in 
higher education institutions than administrative intervention. These incentives, 
they think, have been a more effective influence on the functioning of Universities 
and are likely to induce changes in attitudes at institutional levels.     
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This consideration confirms a strong linkage between resources and behaviours 
described by Pfeffer and Salancik which should be studied by future research with 
a special focus on the Uruguayan case, especially in relation to the public 
University. 
 
3. The potential use of financing policies as tools to influence behaviours 
requires a closer and deeper inspection of the incentives structure. In the 
current poor policy framework within which institutions operate, funding has no 
relationship with incentives.  
 
Furthermore, this study reveals that the current patterns may be driving to 
disincentives. This is clearly the case if we consider the ways how the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance appropriates resources to UdelaR. Interviewees have 
revealed that the State allocations are appropriated to UdelaR in ways that do not 
favour an efficient use of funds (Interviewees A and B). Certainly those procedures 
do not permit UdelaR to manage its resources.  A minimal stability is required, 
which clearly is not assured today. 
 
In addition, the current model of allocating resources to institutions, mainly 
based on historical precedence and ad hoc negotiations, may be considered 
a disincentive per se. The introduction of a model of funding institutions using 
objective criteria, based on predictable and open procedures to allocate public 
resources, may operate as an incentive for better and more accountable use of 
resources.  
 
4.  However, while analysing the use of incentives, some further aspects should be 
considered: 
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  Not all incentives may be the “right“ incentives and their choice is 
critical because, if they do not reflect the fact that the University system (and 
its autonomy) is deeply embedded into the nation´s history and culture, they 
may have adverse and unintended effects. To that end, particular attention 
might be devoted to developing an incentive structure that fits with the 
country´s particular case and the possible consequences of its use.    
 
  As described above, Uruguay is suffering a critical economic and social 
situation. However, this study reveals that the Government is committed to 
devote more funds to the higher education system. If further funding is to 
be introduced into the system, the Government might pay special 
attention to utilising a portion of allocations as incentives towards the 
achievement of State goals, such as improvement of quality in teaching and 
research, promotion of efficiency and enhancement of student access. 
 
For instance, a possible linkage between funding and access should be 
explored. If maintaining and improving access is an important political goal, the 
Government should consider the use of some kind of student-based funding 
techniques like those used in Chile. This system, which is called an ―indirect 
approach‖ because funding is channelled via students rather than directly to 
institutions (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1993, p.46), may guarantee an ―education for 
all‖ in better ways than the current system of no tuition and might induce UdelaR to 
a revision of its current ―no tuition‖ frame. 
 
5. Another fundamental aspect while considering the use of an incentive frame, is 
the source of the funds that the incentives will allocate. Indeed, these may 
influence the effectiveness of the system because, if funds are new or additional, 
the University may choose to ignore the incentive and forego whatever funding it 
might have provided. As stated by Lang (2003, p.12):  
  
  323 
“ If,  however, the funds available for allocation come from existing public grants to colleges and 
Universities, the incentive may be as much a stick as a carrot, and as such will be harder for 
institutions to ignore, regardless of their autonomy.”  
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7.4.2. Recommendations for practice. 
 
7.4.2.1. Improve the graduate tax scheme 
 
This recommendation is not very surprising, but may be important. The creation of 
the graduate tax has implied the replacement of the traditional "no fee" approach to 
higher education financing. By definition, the introduction of the graduate tax 
signifies that, rather than being a levy on all taxpayers, the tax applies only to 
graduates. It is, indeed, the most significant change in the scenario of a tuition-free 
public higher education in the last 20 years.   
 
Furthermore, it is this aspect of the Uruguayan case that deserves further analysis.  
Since the 1990s, there has been considerable debate about the desirability of the 
introduction of tuition fees in public higher education. For many people, a situation 
of no tuition was regarded as a basic right (UdelaR, 1999) and, in some ways, the 
goal of achieving access for all became an end in itself.  
 
This situation was confirmed by Johnstone (1997) who explained that inauguration 
of tuition where such a policy does not yet exist is a politically difficult act, 
regardless of its merits. Vossensteyn (2000) explains that, in theories of economic 
behaviour, this phenomenon is called "the endowment effect". He points out that, based 
on this effect, people often ask a much higher compensation for giving up an object 
than they would be willing to pay to acquire it.    
 
However, it is interesting to observe that, in the end, the fee debate was 
superseded by the introduction of the graduate tax without any significant 
resistance. The creation of this tax entailed a recognition, for the first time, that 
users can contribute to support the system and that users are, actually, 
beneficiaries from higher education. In this sense, higher education is both a public 
and a private good. In addition, the existence of a graduate tax implies a belief that  
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students may not be able to finance their education at the time of their studies and, 
therefore, are allowed to reimburse, at least in part, the aid that they receive from 
the society from their future earnings (Eicher, 2000). 
 
The graduate tax is becoming an increasingly important element of higher 
education funding and is creating an innovative situation in Uruguay. For the first 
time, a special tax collects funds for higher education according to a pre-
established procedure: all income collected through this tax is put into a fund 
whose revenues are reallocated to the public University and oriented to certain 
programmes that have been linked to strategies set by the Parliament in the law.    
 
Oddone and Perera (2004) are the only authors who have studied the context of 
this tax. However, there is still no analysis about its effectiveness. Oddone and 
Perera's research suggests that, whilst this tax provides 4% of University revenue -
a very small proportion of University finance-it has the potential to grow if some 
changes are introduced in its composition.     
 
However, prima facie, it seems clear that the current taxation scheme is regressive 
because:   
 
(a)  The amount of the tax has no relationship with the costs of instruction and, 
therefore, all graduates pay the same charge. There is also no consideration of the 
rates of return of the different disciplines. 
 
(b) The payment schedule is fixed. This implies that graduates with high income 
are not allowed to repay rapidly and that graduates with high incomes pay the 
same tax of those with lower incomes. Only those graduates who attest  an income 
lower than US$ 170 per month are exonerated from payment.  
 
The scheme, therefore, is in need of some modifications as follows:  
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  The tax must reflect some percentage of the total cost of instruction. 
Otherwise, an unintended consequence can be that certain graduates may 
be asked to pay more than the cost of their programmes. A new system may 
introduce tariff bands in order to differentiate between costs and the 
presumed benefits from studying in a particular programmes 
 
  Some graduates, for instance graduates with very low income, may be 
exempted from making repayments. 
 
  The system might induce UdelaR to use the fund as a mechanism to 
recover costs. That also means that UdelaR will actually have to know and 
measure its costs, e.g. how much does it cost to educate a lawyer or an 
engineer? Such information, at present, is totally unknown. 
 
  Uruguay might learn from international experience in this matter. The case 
of Australia, for instance, deserves a careful consideration. In Australia, a 
graduate tax was introduced in the 1980s within a frame called higher 
education Contribution Scheme (HECS). During the 1990s, the scheme was 
evaluated, modified and improved, and has become an important element of 
higher education funding. Some key features of Australian HECS are the 
following : 
 
  Payment arrangements are based on the student´s capacity to pay. In this 
scheme, students have the choice of either paying their tuition fees‚ up front 
at the beginning of each semester and receiving a 25% discount, or 
repaying their HECS debt through an income-contingent liability scheme 
after graduation (Kaiser et al, 2001; Wagner, 1996). 
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  All units of study are divided into three bands according to instructional 
costs and to rates of return of disciplines. The amount of HECS payable 
depends on which band a student‘s units of study fall within. 
 
  Graduates with dependants are exempted from making repayments if they 
qualify for a medical care levy exemption (DEETYA, 2003; Kaiser et al, 
2001).  
 
7.4.2.2. Learn about what is going on in the higher education finance of 
neighbouring countries. 
 
While it is seldom possible to apply policies or practices from one country to 
another, important lessons can be learned from abroad (Boyer, 1993). The world 
has become increasingly interconnected and, in particular, the regional linkages 
have become very active due to the creation of MERCOSUR, the regional 
economic association between Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. 
MERCOSUR has Chile and Bolivia as external associated members.   
 
A perspective of what is happening in the rest of the MERCOSUR countries is 
essential in understanding how funding models have evolved in countries with 
significant similarities with Uruguay in cultural and historical aspects. As shown in 
Chapter 4 (pp: 180-186 above), Uruguayan neighbours (Brazil, Chile and 
Argentina), have introduced changes in their funding models in the last years. This 
perspective might help to analyse patterns, reactions and alternatives about these 
matters.  
 
  Brazil has introduced a strategy in which funding for public institutions is 
linked to improved access, increases in the quality of education and 
improvements in institutional performances (World Bank, 2000). Public 
institutions receive fiscal appropriations through block grants   on the basis  
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of performance contracts. The allocation for each institution is determined 
using a formula, considered "simple and transparent", that "rewards" 
changes that show improvements in productivity in accordance with policy 
goals of greater access, quality and efficiency. In granting institutions 
greater autonomy, the Government is requiring that institutions be 
accountable to their stakeholders. 
 
Nevertheless, Schwartzman (2002) laments that the Brazilian model still requires 
further improvements because public allocations are still strongly tied to historical 
patterns  as 90% of allocations are devoted to salaries; only 10% of the total 
budget is allocated  through performance funding on the basis of indicators of 
success in graduation and quality in research and post-graduate education.  
 
  The Chilean higher education system was changed profoundly in 1981 
following structural and financial reforms introduced by Pinochet´s military 
Government. The range of institutions grew from originally 8 public and 
private Universities (called the ―traditional‖ Universities) into a total of 257 
tertiary institutions encompassing 68 Universities (public and private), 70 
private professional institutes and 119 private technical training centres 
(Holms Nielsen et al, 2002).  
 
The funding model was modified completely. Government funding, which entailed 
almost 100% of higher education finance support before the 1980s (both public 
and private Universities received public support), dropped to 50% and all 
Universities were induced to charge tuition. The new system abandoned the terms 
public and private and simply distinguished between institutions that received fiscal 
support and those that did not (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1993, p.47).     
 
Today public institutions receive budgetary allocations from the Government 
whereas the private institutions finance their budgets with tuition and fees (World  
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Bank, 1995, p.63). Public subsidies to public institutions rely on the combined 
criteria of a historical-negotiated model and formula funding. This allocation 
represents 60% of the total public appropriation, including funds from the Direct 
Public support (50% Aportes Fiscales Directos) and funds from an indirect public 
support  (10% Aportes Fiscales Indirectos),  already explained in pages 180-183 above. 
These funds are provided on a formula basis to all institutions (traditional and new 
institutions) linked to a best- student admission criteria. 
 
The rest of the subsidies are appropriated based on the principle that ―State 
funding follows the student‖. This allocation is divided in two parts: (a) 9% of this 
support is allocated to the all institutions on a formula basis based to a best-
student admission procedure and (b) 31% is awarded directly to students through 
loans and scholarships.  
 
  In Argentina, since the 1990s, the Ministry of Education (through the 
Secretariat of University Policy) has introduced a new funding scheme: the 
budget traditionally negotiated in the Parliament is progressively substituted 
by allocation mechanisms based on performance criteria (Thorn et al, 2004). 
In this way, since 1997, the total budget is distributed through the new 
scheme bearing in mind the following items:  
   87% is devoted to salaries and  
  13% is distributed through a new scheme that considers special 
programmes (new buildings, salary incentives to professors, research programs 
and scholarships) and an amount which is distributed through a funding formula 
based on unit cost per student in each discipline. 
 
7.4.2.3. Re-examine and discuss the model and the frame of funding of 
higher education. 
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This study provides information to examine the current funding frame for higher 
education in Uruguay. Its findings certainly suggest that this frame of funding is a 
part of the whole problem, together with the funding model, and that both elements 
deserve further analysis and discussion.   
 
In FIGURE 32 below I summarise the funding cycle and, at the same time, the 
Uruguayan funding model. Certainly, it provides a picture of certain key aspects 
that emerged from this study such as: the predominance of the public University, 
the absence of the Ministry of Education and Culture and the significant role of 
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FIGURE 34: University funding cycle 
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Indeed, Uruguayan society deserves a discussion about the funding of 
higher education, which includes not only the funding model but also the 
frame of funding and other aspects, such as: who allocates the funds and 
what bodies oversee the behaviour and performance of the sector on behalf 
of the Uruguayan citizens. 
 
This study shows that, in the current frame, the funds are allocated by the 
Parliament through laws based on requests made by the institutions. This frame 
lacks an agency or a body with oversight of higher education. The Parliament is not 
involved in the sector, and, in practice, it should not be involved, because it is the 
body that allocates resources to all the activities that receive public funding in the 
country, such as Education, Health Care, Social Security and Defence. The 
Parliament was created to vote the laws in which funds are allocated, but was not 
created to be the funding agency of all those sectors. Its current role has to be 
reviewed. 
 
The Parliament is a body that reflects the result of different and conflicting forces. It 
is the arena for negotiations focused on approving legislation and the national 
budget. However, it is neither prepared nor positioned to develop a technical 
analysis or discussion about the sector´s matters. Furthermore, it is a body which 
lacks technical structures and expertise.  
 
It is clear that there must be another body created to undertake this analysis. Some 
specialised body, probably the Ministry of Education and Culture -or another 
independent body, for instance an intermediary or buffer body such as exists in 
other countries- should take care of what is going on in the sector. The final 
question is, however, whether politicians are willing, and able, to place this duty in 
a technical, rather a political, body. 
    





Funding for Education 
 
Education has been a priority of the current administration. Despite immediate 
concerns with the fiscal deficit, and after a notable discussion with the teachers´ 
unions, in 2008 the Government recognised the need to dedicate more resources 
to this sector and, as promised, set 4.5% of GDP as the target figure for total 
education expenditures.  
 
The 2007 Budget Law, passed in 2008, confirmed additional budget allotments of 
which US $ 134.000.000 was earmarked for education. With this increase, 
education has funds equivalent to 4.5% of GDP, as requested for years and as 
promised by the Frente Amplio Party, now in the Government. 
 
As an example of the highest priority of this point, the President of the Republic 
declared that ―the Government is acting responsibly and is meeting the commitment of granting 
4.5% of GDP to education and maintaining a needed balance and fiscal responsibility in order to 
respect and maintain a healthy economy.” (El País Digital, 22 April, 2008), 
http://www.elpais.com.uy/08/04/22/pnacio_342484.asp 
 
Funding for UdelaR 
 
In total, during the last three years, the 2005 Budget Law No 17.930, the 2006 
Budget Law No 18.172 and the 2007 Budget Law No 18.362, have increased 
UdelaR´s allocation in 31% and have allocated an increase of $ 929.000.000 (US$  
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40.000.000)(ANNEX 10). Following a pattern already described in this study, 
UdelaR was requesting an increase of more than 60% in its budget allocations.  
 
The increase of funds represents an allocation to higher education close to 0,79% 
of GDP. UdelaR was requesting 0, 85% of GDP. 
 
The new Budget laws have mirrored the pattern of former laws which has been 
already described in this study and have allocated funds as follows:  
1.  82% as a block grant and  
2.  17% of the increments are allocated to ear-marked funds to specific 
programmes, including:  
  Development of new post-graduate programmes 
  University programmes in inner Uruguay (outside the capital city 
Montevideo) 
  New buildings 
  Joint programmes with ANEP 
  Joint projects with industry. 
As predicted in this study, the allocation process remained the same, based on an 
automatic device of providing a block grant allocation augmented with 
appropriations for specific projects.   
 
Besides, the Ministry of Education and Culture was maintained outside the 
discussion of the new appropriations. The main actors in the discussion were the 
Parliament, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, UdelaR and the teachers´ 
unions and the focus in the discussion was centred, only, in the amount of the 
funds. Interestingly, there were no mentions or considerations about quality 
aspects or to strategic elements.  
  
  335 
    




Abadie P, Landoni P,  Martinez F and Romero (2007) Relevamiento y análisis de 
posgrados nacionales. GMI/ ANII. Montevideo (In Spanish) 
 
Abadie P  and  Pereira J S (2001)  Estudio de las carreras de grado de  la 
Universidad de la República (Uruguay)  para su caracterización y clasificación en 
torno a modalidades de enseñanza y a los  principales componentes de  sus 
costos, Rectorado de la UdelaR, UdelaR. Montevideo (In Spanish) 
 
Abeledo C and Obeide S ( 2003)  La politica de financiamiento de la SPU: un 
marco conceptual. In: Pugliese  JC (ed)   (2003)  Politicas de Estado para la 
universidad argentina. M Ey C, Secretaría de Asuntos Universitarios, Republica 
Argentina (In Spanish) 
 
Ahumada MM (1990)  An Analysis of State Formula Budgeting in Higher 
Education.   In: DW Breneman, LL Leslie and  RE Anderson (1993) Finance in 
Higher Education. ASHE Reader Series, Needham Heights, Mass., Simon and 
Schuster 
 
Albornoz O (1993) Education and Society in Latin America, London, Macmillan  
 
Albrecht D and Ziderman  D (1992a)   Funding mechanisms for higher education, 
The World Bank Discussion Papers No.153 
  
  337 
Albrecht D and Ziderman D (1992b) Student loans and their alternatives:  
improving the performance of deferred payment programs, Higher Education, 23, 
pp.357-374. 
 
Altbach, P.G. (ed.) (1991)  International Higher Education: An Encyclopedia. 
Garland Publishing, Inc. v. 506 
 
Allende CM and Morones Diaz G (2000)  El financiamiento de la educación 
superior en el Reino Unido. Secretaría General Ejecutiva, Revista de Educacion 
Superior en linea.  ANUIES, Mexico ( In Spanish) 
 
ANUIES (2000)  Una propuesta para la educación superior en el Siglo XXI, Area 
de Estudios de la Educación Superior Documentos de trabajo Nº 97 ( In Spanish) 
 
Ares Pons (1997)  Comentarios sobre Higher Education in Latin America and the 
Caribbean a strategy paper. Universidad de la Republica, (In Spanish). 
 
Ariel del Val, F. (1999). Política y comunicación. Conciencia cívica, espacio público 
y nacionalismo. Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata (In Spanish) 
 
Arocena R and Sutz R (2000)  Challenges for Public Higher Education in Uruguay.  
International Higher Education, Spring 2000 . Available in 
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/soe/cihe/newsletter/News19/Newslet19.html 
 
Arocena R and  Sutz J ( 2001)  La Universidad Latinoamericana del 
FuturoTendencias - Escenarios – Alternativas Colección UDUAL 11 
Primera edición: 2001 (In Spanish) 
 
Banta T W (1986)   Performance Funding in Higher Education: A Critical Analysis 
of Tennessee's Experience, Boulder, Colorado, NCHEMS.  
  338 
 
Barbato C and Cecilio R (eds) (1994)  Universidad: el debate tras la fachada. 
Editorial Fin de Siglo. Montevideo (In Spanish) 
 
Barbe Perez H (1959)  Los servicios de enseñanza y la Ley Organica de la 
Universidad.  Apartado de la Justicia Uruguaya Publicacion de la oficina de 
apuntes del Centro de Estudiantes de Notariado  (In Spanish). 
 
Barr  N (1989) Student Loans: The Next Steps. Edinburgh: Aberdeen University 
 
Barr N  (2001) Funding higher education: policies for access and quality House of 
Commons Education and Skills Committee Post-16 student support Session 2001-
02 HC445, (TSO, 2002), pp. Ev 19-35. 
 
Barr N ( 2004), "Higher Education Funding," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
Vol. 20, No. 2 (Summer), pp. 264,  
 
Barr N  and Crawford I ( 2005), Financing Higher Education: Answers from the 
U.K. (London and New York: Routledge). 
 
Barzelay M (2000) The new public management: a bibliographical essay for Latin 
American (and other) scholars.  In: V congreso internacional del CLAD  sobre la 
reforma del estado y de la administración pública, Santo Domingo, Republica 
Dominicana, 24 - 27 oct. 2000 
 
Berelson, B (1952)  Content  Analysis in Communication Research. New York: 
Free Press.  
 
Bennet  A and Alexander G   (1997)  Research Design Tasks in Case Study 
Methods   Paper presented at the MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study  
  339 
Methods, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA), Harvard 
University, October 17-19, 1997. 
 
Bentancur N ( 2002)   Políticas universitarias en el Uruguay de los noventa: una 
crónica de inercias, novedades y rupturas.  In:  Uruguay: la reforma del Estado y 
las políticas públicas en la democracia restaurada, M. Ester Mancebo et al 
(Comps.). EBO - ICP, Montevideo, 2002. ( In Spanish)  
 
Bentancur N ( 2003)  Cinco dilemas universitarios de comienzos de siglo  Revista 
Uruguaya de Ciencia Política - 14/2004 - ICP – Montevideo. ( In Spanish)  
 
Bernasconi  A  (2003)   Private Higher Education with an Academic Focus: Chile's 
New Exceptionalism, International Higher Education, Summer 2003 
 
Bernasconi A and Rojas F ( 2004)  Informe sobre la Educación Superior en Chile 
1980-2003   IESALC UNESCO ( In Spanish) 
 
Blaug M (1982) The Distributional Effects of Higher Education Subsidies. In: 
Economics of Education Review v2 n3 p209-31 Sum 1982 
 
Blondal S, Field S and Gironard N (2002)  Investment in human capital through 
post-compulsory education and training: selected efficiency and equity aspects. 
Economic  Department Working Paper No. 333, ECO/WPK(2002)19, Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development. Available in: http:// 
www.oecd.org/eco 
 
Bogue E G (1982) Allocation of Public Funds on Instructional Performance/Quality 
Indicators In:   International Journal of Institutional Management in Higher 
Education,  v6 n1 p37-43 Mar 1982 
  
  340 
Bogue E G and Aper A ( 2000)  Exploring the Heritage of American Higher 
Education: The Evolution of Philosophy and Policy. Phoenix: Oryx (American 
Council on Education/Oryx Press Series on Higher Education), 2000.  
 
Bolívar A and  Kohn C. (eds) (1999). El discurso político venezolano. Un estudio 
multidisciplinario. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, Facultad de 
Humanidades y Educación - Comisión de Estudios de Postgrado. Fondo Editorial 
Tropykos (In Spanish) 
 
Booth C (1982)   DES and the treasury In: In:  Morris A and Sizer J (eds) 
Resources and higher education. SRHE. Monograph 51 
 
Bowen H R  (1980)  The costs of higher education. How much do colleges and 
universities spend per student and how much should they spend. Jossey-Bass 
Publishers. 
 
Boyer E (1993)  Introduction.  In: Altbach Ph and Johnstone DB (eds) The funding 
of Higher Education International perspectives. Garland studies in Higher 
Education Vol 1, Garland Publishing Inc.  New York and London 1993.  
 
Bozerooy P (2003)  Higher Education in the Netherlands. Country report. CHEPS. 
Available in : http://www.utwente.nl/cheps/documenten/netherlands.pdf  
 
Breneman D W (ed.) (1994)   ASHE Reader on Finance in Higher Education (1994 
edition). Needham Heights, MA: Ginn Press 
 
Brinkman P and Morgan A ( 1997)   Changing fiscal strategies for planning   In:  
Peterson M, Dill D, Mets L and associates (eds) Planning and management for a 
changing environment. Jossey Bass 
  
  341 
Brotto A and Macchi J ( 2003)   El financiamiento universitario 2002-2003 in 
Pugliese JC (ed ) Politicas de Estado para la universidad argentina. Ministerio de 
Educacion Ciencia y Tecnologia SPU, Argentina 2003 ( In Spanish)    
 
Brovetto J (2002)   La educación superior para el siglo XXI. In:  Tünnerman, C y 
L￳pez Segreira, F  ―La educaci￳n en el horizonte del Siglo XXI‖. Colección 
IESALC/UNESCO Caracas. ( In Spanish) 
 
Brubacher  J S and Rudy W ( 1976)    Higher Education in transition. 3
rd ed.  
Harper Collins 
 
Brunner  J J (1990) Universidad, sociedad y Estado en los 90.  Nueva Sociedad 
No 107, Mayo-Junio, pp.70-76. ( In Spanish) 
 
Brunner J J  (1993) Estudio comparado sobre financiamiento 
de la Educacion Superior en seis paises de America Latina: estado actual, 
tendencias e innovaciones.   Facultad latino americana de Ciencias Sociales, 
Ministerio de Educación de Chile y  Universidad de Concepción( In Spanish). 
 
Brunner  J J  (1994)   Estado y Educación Superior en America Latina.  In Neave G 
and Van Vught F (eds)  Prometeo Encadenado Educación Superior en Europa. 
Gedisa, Barcelona. (in Spanish). 
 
Brunner J J (1997)   Educación superior, integración económica y globalización In:  
Perfiles Educativos, Vol.XIX, Num. 76-77: 6-15  ( In Spanish) 
 
Brunner J J, Balan J, Courard H, Cox Ch, Durham E, Garcia de Fanelli AM, Kent 
R, Klein L. Lucio R, Sampaio, Serrano M and  Schwartzman S (1995)   Educación 
superior en America Latina. Una agenda de problemas, políticas y debates en el 
umbral del año 2000. Universidad de Colombia. Santa Fe de Bogotá  (in Spanish).  
  342 
 
Brunner J J and Becerra M  (1999)  La Educacion Superior en el Uruguay entre el 
bloqueo y la transformación The World Bank Paper Presented in Aportes para la 
Universidad del Siglo XXI  Octubre 1999, Ministerio de Educación y Cultura MEC - 
Banco Mundial Montevideo 1999. ( In Spanish) 
 
Burke J  (2001a)  Accountability, reporting, and performance: why haven‘t they 
made more difference? The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government Keynote 
Address 39th Annual Conference Research and Planning Group for California 
Community Colleges May 3, 2001 
 
Burke J (2001b)     Paying For Performance In Public Higher Education. In Dall 
Forsythe (ed), Quicker, Better, Cheaper? Managing Performance in American 




Burke  J  and  Serban   (1998)  Performance funding for Higher Education: fad or 
trend. San Francisco California, Jossey Bass  
 
Burke  J  and Minassians H  (2002)   Performance Reporting: The Preferred ―No 
Cost‖ Accountability Program The Sixth Annual Report , The Nelson A. Rockefeller 
Institute of Government, SUNY, NY 
 
Burke  J  and Minassians H  (2003)   Performance Reporting: real accountability or 
accountability lite. The seventh  Annual Report , The Nelson A. Rockefeller 
Institute of Government, SUNY, NY 
 
Byrne M (2001)   Data analysis strategies for qualitative research - Research 
Corner AORN Journal, Dec 2001.   
  343 
 
Castañeda  J G ( 1993)  Utopia unarmed. The latin left after the cold war. Alfred 
Knopf, New York. 
 
Campbell-Evans G  (1992)  Seek first to understand and then to be understood: A 
qualitative research approach In :  Issues In Educational Research Vol 2, No 1 
 
CEPAL ( 1996)  Marginalidad e integracion social en Uruguay. Comision 
Economica para America Latina y el Caribe Oficina de Montevideo Proyecto URU 




Cetto A and  Vessuri H  (1998) America Latina y el Caribe UNESCO World 
Science Report 1998, pp. 57-77, UNESCO, Paris (in Spanish) 
 
CIPFA  (1997)   Resource allocation models in further and higher education. A 
compendium. CIPFA, The chartered institute of public finance and accountancy. 
 
Clarkson M ( 1995) A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating 
corporate social performance. In Academy of Management. The Aacdemy of 
Management Review Vol. 20, No. 1; 92-117. 
 
Coombs P and Hallak KJ  (1972)  Managing educational costs. Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Corbin J  and Strauss A  (1990) Grounded Theory Research - Procedures, Canons 
and Evaluative Criteria,  Qualitative Sociology, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1990,  
  
  344 
Creswell  J W (1998)   Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among 
Five Traditions.   Sage Publications, Inc., Thousand Oaks, CA 
 
Creswell J W (2003)  Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed 
methods approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Consejo de  Rectores de  Universidades Europeas (2001) Universidad 2000,  
Joseph Briscall,  Consejo de Rectores de Universidades Españolas (In Spanish) 
 
CUA  Resource  allocation group    (1983) Resource allocation in US universities.  
In: Challenges.  Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Chapman  B (1997)   Commentary to  Demand  for American higher education: 
prices, college attendance and federal policy. In  Miller P and Pincus J (eds) 
Funding higher education: performance and diversity. Evaluations and 
investigations program. Higher  Education Division. DEETYA. 
 
CHEMS (1998)   Principles of delegated budgeting guidelines for universities. 
CHEMS  paper 25. 
 
Chiancone A, Veiga L and  Borraz F   (2006) Diversificación de las fuentes de 
financiamiento de las instituciones universitarias  Presented in Seminar ―Caminos 
de la Educación Superior‖ , 5- 6 april, 2006,  Montevideo, Uruguay. IESALC-
UNESCO. (in Spanish). 
 
Chiancone  A  and Martínez Larrechea E (2007)  La educación superior en 
Iberoamérica 2006: Informe de Uruguay. CINDA, Universia. (in Spanish). 
  
  345 
Darling A, England M, Lang  D W, Lopers-Sweetman R (1989)  Autonomy and 
control: a university funding formula as an instrument of public policy Higher 
Education 18: 559-583 Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. The Netherlands.  
 
Deem R (1998) New managerialism and higher education: the management of 
performances and cultures. In:  International Studies in Sociology of Education, 
Vol. 8, No. 1, 1998, Lancaster University, United Kingdom 
 
Delfino  J ( 2002)  La gestión financiera de la Educación Superior   Documento de 
Trabajo No 97 Area de Educación Superior,  Universidad de Belgrano. Buenos 
Aires, Argentina. (in Spanish). 
 
Delfino J and Gertel H (eds) (1996)  Nuevas direcciones en el financiamiento de la 
educación superior. Ministerio de Cultura y Educación. Serie Nuevas Tendencias. 
Gobierno de la Nación. República Argentina. (in Spanish) 
 
DEST Australia  (2003)  Overview of HECS, Australian Taxation Office. Available 
in: http:// www.hecs.gov.au 
 
Diario La Republica (2005)    Presupuesto para la Educacion Declaraciones del 
Ministro Jorge Brovetto. Agosto 12, 2005. Available in:  http:// 
www.diariolarepublica.com/2005/larepublica.htm) (in Spanish). 
 
Diaz A,  Scarsi  R,  Touya E and Wschebor M ( 1993) Documento de los cuatro 
decanos In: Barbato C and Cecilio R (eds). Universidad: el debate tras la fachada. 
Editorial Fin de siglo    (in Spanish). 
 
Didriksson A (2002)  Las macrouniversidades de América latina y el Caribe  
Documento de Trabajo.IESALC-UNESCO Caracas (In Spanish) 
  
  346 
Didriksson A and Yarzabal L ( 2004)   El cambio en la Educacion Superior y la 
Cooperacion Internacional, las propuestas de UNESCO, En Politicas Publicas y 
Educacion Superior, ANUIES, Mexico (In Spanish). 
 
Eicher JC (1998)  The cost and  financing of Higher Education in Europe. In:  
European Journal of Education Vol 33.  No.1, 1998 
 
Eicher JC (2000) The financing of education: an economic issue? In European 
Journal of Education Vol 35.  P. 33-39   
 
El Kawas E and Massy W F Britain`s performance based system In Massy W F 
(ed) (2004) Resource allocation in Higher Education. The University of Michigan 
Press Ann Arbor  
 
Errandonea A (1990)  Los ciclos básicos como respuesta a la masificación 
universitaria en América Latina. El caso de las ciencias sociiales en la universidad 
uruguaya. In:  Revista  de ciencias sociales  No 5 Fundación de Cultura 
Universitaria (In Spanish) 
 
EURYDICE European Unit  (2000) Two decades of reform in Higher Education in  
Europe:1980 onwards   Eurydice Studies  D/2000/4008/1ISBN 2-87116-292-1.   
Available in :  http://www.eurydice.org 
 
Experton W  (1996)  Financiamiento de la educación superior.  In: Delfino J and 
Gertel H (eds) Nuevas direcciones en el financiamiento de la educación superior. 
Ministerio de Cultura y Educación. Serie Nuevas Tendencias. Gobierno de la 
Nación. República Argentina (in Spanish). 
 
Felt U ( 2002) University autonomy in Europe Changing paradigms an Higher 
Education policy. Available  in http://www.magna-charta.org/Documento_Felt.pdf  
  347 
  
Fernandez Lamarra N (2002) La Educacion Superior en Argentina  
IESALC/UNESCO, Caracas  (In Spanish). 
 
Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios del Uruguay (2005)  La FEUU hacia el 
Pledur   2005-2009, Montevideo (In Spanish). 
 
Field T and Klingert J ( (2001)  Resource allocation models. In: Perspectives. 
Volume 5 number 3 , 83-88. 
 
Fielden J (1982)  Strategies for survival In: Morris A and Sizer J (eds) Resources 
and Higher Education. SRHE. Monograph 51 
 
Folco, C and Urruzola JP (2004) A propósito de la construcción de una política 
territorial universitaria. Documentos del Rectorado,  Universidad de la República, 
Uruguay. (In Spanish). 
 
Frente Amplio (2004)    IV CONGRESO "Hector Rodríguez"  Propuesta de grandes 
lineamientos programáticos para el gobierno 2005-2010.  Available in: 
http://www.ps.org.uy/DOC_CONG_FA.htm (In Spanish) 
 
Fulton O (2003)   Managerialism in UK universities.  Unstable hybridity and the 
complications of implementation. In: Amaral A, Meek L and Larsen I (Eds) The 
Higher education management revolution,pp.155-178;  Higher education dynamics, 
Douro Series, Springer. 
 
Galmes  M (1992) Estudio de factibilidad de arancelamiento en la universidad 
Instituto de estadística. Facultad de Ciencias Economicas y Administración 
Universidad de la Republica (In Spanish) 
  
  348 
García de Fanelli A (1999)  The Funding of Higher Education in Argentina CIHE 
International Higher Education, Boston College. 
 
García de Fanelli A (2000)  Innovaciones en los mecanismos de financiamiento 
universitario: la experiencia de la Argentina, Chile y México. In: La educación 
superior, el estado y el mercado: Las reformas de los años noventa en América 
Latina. México, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. (In Spanish) 
 
García de Fanelli A (2005) Political Crisis at the University of Buenos Aires. In:   
International Higher Education Countries and Regions,  Number  44, Centre of 




García Guadilla  C (1998) Situación y Principales Dinámicas de Transformación de 
la Educación Superior en América Latina. Ediciones CRESALC-UNESCO, 
Caracas, 1998. (In Spanish) 
 
García Guadilla, C (2002) Tensiones y Transiciones. Educación latinoamericana 
en los albores del tercer milenio, Editorial  Nueva Sociedad y Cendes. (In Spanish) 
 
García Guadilla C (2005)  Financiamiento de la Educación Superior en 
América Latina. In  GUNI UNESCO, Educación Superior en el Mundo 
2006. El Financiamiento de las Universidades, Ediciones MundiPrensa, 
Madrid, Barcelona, México. (In Spanish) 
 
Garcia Guadilla  C (2007)  Financiamiento de la Educacion Superior en America 
Latina. In:Sociologias, Porto Alegre, ano 9, nº 17, jan./jun. 2007, p. 50-101. (In 
Spanish) 
  
  349 
Gibbs  A  (1997)  Focus Groups.   In: Social Research update. Issue Nineteen. 
Departament of Sociology, University of Surrey. 
 
Gillham B. (2001)  Case Study Research Methods. London: Continuum 
 
Glaser B and Strauss A (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research. Chicago, 1967 
 
Gonzalez Rozada M  and  Menendez  A ( 2001)  Public university in Argentina: 
subsidizing the rich? Economics of Education Review 21 (2002) 341-351 
  
Gonzalez  L E (1999)  Postsecondary Education Evolution in Chile.  In:  Altbach P 
(Ed) Inernational Higher Education New Perspectives on Global Higher Education 
Challenges ISSN: 1084-0613 
 
Greco  C ( 2003)  Financimiento de las universidades nacionales. Modelos  de 
asignacion presupuestaria. Analisis y tendencias actuales.  Presented in Congreso 
Latinoamericano de Educacion Superior en el siglo XXI 18-20 September 2003. 
San Luis Argentina ( In Spanish)  
 
Grompone  J  (1994)  Verdadera oposición a la falsa oposición  In: Barbato C and 
Cecilio R (eds). Universidad: el debate tras la fachada. Editorial Fin de siglo    (In 
Spanish) 
 
Hauptman A M (1991)  New Ways of Paying for College. New York: 
ACE/Macmillan  
 
HEFCE (2002)   Funding Higher Education in England .  How HEFCE  allocates its 
funds  April 2/18 Guide. Available in 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/pubs/hefce/2002/02_18/02_18cover.pdf  
  350 
 
HEFCE (2005)   Funding Higher Education in England .  How HEFCE  allocates its 
funds  July 2005/34 Guide. Available in  
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/pubs/hefce/2005/05_34/ 
 
Hendel D,  Bunton S,  Risbey K and  Goldfine L (2004) Inside, Outside, Upside-
down? Probing the Linkages among Accountability Pressures, State Government, 
and Higher Education Funding and Performance Presented at the Annual 
Conference of the Association for the Study of Higher Education Kansas City, MO, 
November 5, 2004. 
 
Hidalgo  JC  (1997)  Financiamiento de la educación superior In: Yarzábal L (ed)  
La educación superior en el siglo XXI Colección respuestas Ediciones CRESALC 
UNESCO  (in Spanish) 
 
Holland  J (2001)  Developing a grounded theory of the market for information and 
governance,  Working Paper 2001/2. Department of Accounting & Finance, 
Glasgow University Working Paper Series. Available in: https://dspace.gla.ac.uk/ 
bitstream/1905/130/1/2001-2.pdf  
 
Holm-Nielsen L,  García Zúñiga P and  Hansen T N (2002)  Chile - Human 
Resources for the Knowledge Economy. The World Bank .Human Development 
Department LCSHD Paper Series No. 78 
 
Hood C  (1995)  The new public management in the 1980s: variations on a theme 




  351 
Hovey H (1999)  State spending for Higher Education National Centre Public Policy 
Higher Education State policy research Inc. Available in: 
http://www.highereducation.org/reports/hovey/hovey.pdf 
 
Idaho Board of Education (2005)  Measuring Up 2004. The Idaho Report Card on 
Higher Education.  Available in:  
http:// www.boardofed.idaho.gov/ChangingDirection/ Documents/Jan6-
2005MeetingMaterials/MeasuringUp2004cd.pdf –  
 
Inter-American Development Bank  (1997)   Higher Education in Latin America and 
the Caribbean: A Strategy Paper, Sustainable Development Department No EDU 
101 IDB 1997  
 
Inter-American Development Bank (2000)  Country paper Uruguay. Approved by 
Board Programming Committee: September 19, 2000. Approved by Board of 
Executive Directors: October 11, 2000.  Available in: http:// www.idb.org 
 
Jarratt Committee (1985). Report, Steering Committee for Efficiency Studies in 
Universities under the Chairmanship of Alex Jarratt. London: CVCP.   
 
Jarvis C  (2000)   Organizational theory.  Business Open Learning. Available in: 
http://  www. sol.brunel.ac.uk/bola/appraisal/develprop.html  
 
Jarzabkowski P (2002)  Centralised and decentralised? Strategic implications of 
resource allocation models. Higher Education quarterly Volume 56, No. 1, January 
2002 pp 5-36 
 
Johnstone D B  (1986)  Sharing the costs of Higher Education: Student Financial 
Assistance in The United Kingdom, The Federal Republic of Germany, France, 
Sweden, and the United States. New York: The College Board.  
  352 
 
Johnstone D B (1993)  The Costs of Higher Education: Worldwide Issues and 
Trends for the 1990s. In: Altbach, P G and Johnstone D B, The Funding of Higher 
Education: International Perspectives. New York: Garland Publishing. 
 
Johnstone D B  (1997)  Financing Higher Education: who should pay and other 
issues. CCGSE. University at Buffalo. SUNY. Available in :   
http:// www.gse.buffalo.ed/FAS/Johnson/Readings.htm 
 
Johnstone D B  (1998) Financing Higher Education: Who Should Pay and Other 
Issues.  In:  Altbach PG ,  Berdahl R  and  Gumport PG  (eds) American Higher 
Education in the 21 st Century:Social Political, and Economic Challenges. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Johnstone D B  and Shroff-Mehta P  (2000)  Higher education and accessibility: an 
international comparative examination of tuition and financial assistance policies. 
CCGSE. University at Buffalo. SUNY. Available in : http://  
www.gse.buffalo.ed/FAS/Johnson/Readings.htm 
 
Johnstone D B (2003)  The US Higher Education System: Structure, Governance, 
and Finance.  Available at : 
http://www.gse.buffalo.edu/org/IntHigherEdFinance 
 
Johnstone D B,  Arora A and Experton W (1998)  The Financing and Management 
of Higher Education: A Status Report on Worldwide Reforms, Washington, DC: 
The World Bank. [Prepared in conjunction with the October  1998 UNESCO World 
Conference on Higher Education, Paris, October 5-8, 1998.] 
  
  353 
Jongbloed  B (2001)   Performance-based Funding in  Higher Education: an 
international survey  working paper no. 35 Centre for the economics of education 
and training   Monash university – Acer, March 2001  
 
Jongbloed  B (2004)   Funding Higher Education: options, trade-offs and dilemmas.  
Fulbright Brainstorms 2004 - New Trends in Higher Education.  CHEPS, University 
of Twente.  The Netherlands 
 
Jongbloed J and Salerno   C (2004) Funding and recognition CHEPS prepared for 
OCW, The Netherlands.  Available in : http:// www.minocenw.nl/bhw/92/bgo092.pdf  
 
Kaiser F, Vossensteyn H and  Koelman J (2001) Public funding of Higher 
Education.  A comparative study of funding mechanisms in ten countries CHEPS-
Higher education monitor. Center for Higher Education Policy Studies. Available in: 
http://www.minocw.nl/bhw/84/index.html   
 
Kaiser F,  Beverwijk J,  Cremonini L , Dassen  A, Jongbloed B, Kaulisch M, 
Kottmann A, Luijten-Lub A, Salerno C, Leisyte L, Vossensteyn H and  Weert de E  
(2006)  Issues in higher education policy 2005: An update on higher education 
policy issues in 2005 in 10 Western countries. Den Haag, Ministerie van Onderwijs, 
Cultuur en Wetenschap, 2006, 63 p.Series: Beleidsgerichte studies Hoger 
onderwijs en Wetenschappelijk onderzoek, 121 Available in:  
http://www.minocw.nl/documenten/beleidsgerichtestudies121.pdf 
 
Katzman R  and Figueira F ( 2001)  Panorama de la infancia y la familia en 
Uruguay. IPES; Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Comunicación, Universidad 
Catolica del Uruguay. Montevideo (In Spanish) 
  
  354 
Kane T J  and Orszag PR (2003)  Funding Restrictions at Public Universities: 
Effects and Policy Implications Brookings Institution Working Paper, September 
2003 
 
Kent R  (1995)   Two Positions in the International Debate About Higher Education: 
The World Bank and UNESCO.  Meeting of the Latin American Studies 
Association, The Sheraton Washington, September 28-30, 1995. 
 
Kent R (1996) The World Bank and UNESCO on Higher Education In:  
International Higher Education, Spring 1996  
 
Koelman J (1992) The funding of universities in the Netherlands: Developments 
and trends. Higher Education Volume 35, Number 2, pp 127 - 141 , March 1998 
 
Koelman J ( 1998)  The funding of universities in the Netherlands. Developments 
and trends. In: Higher Education 35: 127-141,1998, Kluwer. 
 
Kolb Ch (1995)  Accountability in postsecondary education. In Financing 
Postsecondary education:the federal role. Departmento of Education USA.  
Available in:  http://  www.ed.gov/offices/OPE 
 
Krippendorf K  (2004) Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology. 2nd 
edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 2004  
 
Lang  D ( 2004)  The political economy of performance funding.  Presented at the  
Taking Public Universities Seriously Conference  University of Toronto, December 
3-4, 2004  
  
  355 
Layzell D  (1994)  Background paper university funding mechanisms: an 
international comparison Task Force on Resource Allocation Ontario Council on 
University Affairs 7th Floor,  700 Bay Street Toronto, Ontario MSG 1Z6 July 1994 
 
Layzell D  (1998)  Linking performance to funding on public  institutions of higher 
education. In:  European Journal of Education. Vol 33. No.1, 1998 
 
Layzell D and  Caruthers J K (1995)  Performance Funding at the State Level: 
Trends and Prospects, Presented in Annual Meeting of The Association for the 
Study of Higher Education, Orlando, Florida 
 
Lemes R  (1988) Juventud, sociedad y universidad In  Revista  de ciencias 
sociales  Noo 4 Fundación de Cultura Universitaria  (in Spanish) 
 
Lemes R ( 2002)  La acreditación de la educación superior en el Uruguay. 
Programa de aseguramiento de la calidad,movilidad académica y educación 
superior transnacional, Ediciones IESALC/UNESCO, Caracas, 2002 
 
Levy D (1980)  University and Government in Mexico: Autonomy in an 
Authoritarian System. New York, Praeger . 
 
Levy D (1986)  Higher Education and the State in Latin America - Private 
Challenges to Public Dominance. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1986 
 
Levy  D (1995)  La educación superior y el Estado en Latinoamerica. Desafios 
privados al predominio público. México, CESU-FLACSO-Porrua 1986)  (In 
Spanish). 
  
  356 
Levy D  (1997)   Latin America and the change in change.  In Green M F  (ed) 
Transforming Higher Education  views form leaders  around the world. The Orxy 
Press 
 
Levy D and  Arenas J (2000) The Tuition Battle at Mexico‘s National University. In:   
International Higher Education, Centre of International Higher Education Boston 
College.  Available in: 
http://bc.edu/bc_org/avp/soe/cihe/newsletter/News16/text4.html 
 
Lewis D and Dundar H (2002)  Equity effects of Higher Education in developing 
countrie: access, choice and persistence.   In David W. Chapman and Ann E. 
Austin (eds), Higher Education in the developing world, Westport Greenwood 
Press. 
 
Malterud K  ( 2001)  Qualitative research standards, challenges and guidelines. 
The Lancet Qualitative research series, Vol  358, Issue 9280, Pages 483-488,   
August 11, 2001. 
 
Marks J  and Caruthers J  (1999)   A primer of funding of Public Higher Education. 
Southern Regional Education Board. Atlanta GA. 
 
Marquis C (2000) Innovation Funds for Universities Discussion paper presented in 
Nigeria University System Innovation Project (NUSIP)SEPTEMBER  2000. Availble 
in http://www.worldbank.org/afr/teia/pdfs/marquis_innov.pdf 
 
Marquis C (2002)  Nuevos proveedores de Educación Superior en Argentina y 
Brasil. CONICET, IES/2002/ED/PI/6 (In Spanish). Available in: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001398/139829s.pdf.  
  
  357 
Martinez Larrechea E (2003)  La Educación  Superior  en el Uruguay , 
IESALC/UNESCO, Caracas  (in Spanish). 
 
Martinez  Sandres F (1999)  Sistemas de información y de evaluación 
universitaria. Aplicación  y contribución en materia de educación superior. 
Fundación de Cultura Universitaria. (in Spanish)  
 
Martinez Sandres F (2004)  Evolución de la Educación Superior en el Uruguay. 
¿Isla o aislamiento?.  Paper presented in: 4to. Congreso Internacional de 
Educaci￳n Superior:  ―La universidad por un mundo mejor‖. Febrero, 2004. La 
Habana. Cuba. (In Spanish). 
 
Martinez Sandres F,  Abadie P and  Romero C ( 2004)  Diagnostico y Desarrollo 
de los Posgrados en Uruguay . IESALC/UNESCO, Caracas ( In Spanish). 
 
Martinez, MC (2002) Understanding State higher education systems: Applying a 
new  framework. The Journal of Higher Education, 73(3), 349-374 
 
Martins DH (1975) Principios constitucionales de la Enseñanza  In Martins et al La 
Enseñanza Publica y Privada en el Uruguay. Ediciones  Juridicas  Amailo 
Fernandez,  Montevideo. (In Spanish) 
 
Massy  W (ed) (2004) Resource allocation in Higher Education The University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.  
 
Massy W,  Hulfactor F and  Michael C   (1993) Optimising Allocation Strategy. In:  
Altbach P y  Johnstone B D (Eds.), The Funding of Higher Education. International 
Perspectives, New York, Garland Publishers 
  
  358 
McKeown M and Layzell  D (1986)  State Funding Formulas for Higher Education: 
trends and issues, Journal of Education Finance, 19, 3, 319-346 
 
Michael  S  ( 2002) Higher Education Finance: Formula Funding Issues For  Ohio 
Presented at the Ohio Board of Regents‘ Funding Commission, Longaberger 
Alumni House, April 8th, 2002 Ohio State University 
 
Milliken, J  and  Colohan G. (2004) Quality or Control? Management in Higher 
Education. Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management Vol. 26, No. 3. 
 
Ministerio de Educación y Cultura  (2003)  Anuario estadístico de Educación 2002 
MEC, Dirección de Educación (In Spanish). 
 
Ministerio de Educación y Cultura  (2005)  Anuario estadístico de Educación 2004 
MEC, Dirección de Educación ISSN 0797- 6038    (In Spanish). 
 
Mitchell R, Agle B, Wood D (1997) Towards a theory of stakeholders identification 
and salience: defining the principle of who and what really counts. In : Academy of 
Management Review 1997, Vol 22, No. 4, 853-886. 
 
Moloney D and  Grotevant S (1997)  Collegiate and  Departmental Performance 
Indicators: The measures that Matter! Paper presented at the 37
th Annual 
Association for Institutional Research Forum, May 19, 1997,   Lake Buena Vista,   
Florida. Available in:  
http:// www.irp.udel.edu/air/airforum.97/ TRACK4/16-413/air-or.rtf  
 
Monreal S ( 2005)  Universidad Catolica del Uruguay: un largo camino hacia la 
diversidad, UCUDAL, Montevideo, 2005 (In Spanish). 
  
  359 
Montserrat J (1997)  La financiación de la enseñanza superior en los países de la 
OCDE. Tendencias y modelos Revista Iberoamericana de Educación  (In 
Spanish). 
 
Mora J G (1997) Financiación y diversificación de la educación superior, ponencia 
presentada en las Jornadas de Reflexión: Retos presentes y futuros de la 
Universidad, Consejo de Universidades e IVIE, Valencia, Septiembre (In Spanish). 
 
Mora  J G  (ed)  (1998)  Editorial of Finance of Higher Education in Europe.  
European Journal of Education, vol 33. No 1  
 
Moura Castro C and Levy D ( 2000) Myth reality and reform: Higher Education 
Policy in Latin America.  Inter American Development Bank, Washington DC 
 
Naisthat F  and  Toer P (2006) Democracia y representación en la Universidad. El 
caso de la Universidad de Buenos Aires desde la visión de sus protagonistas.  
Buenos Aires, Editorial Biblos, 2006 (In Spanish) 
 
Narbondo P,  Peters G, Ramos C and Rockman B A (2003) La reconstrucción 
gerencial del estado. Enfoques políticos sobre la nueva gestión pública. In Ramos 
C (ed) (2003) La reconstrucción gerencial del estado Instituto de Ciencia Política . 
Embajada de los Estados Unidos de América, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 
Montevideo (In Spanish)  
 
Neave G ( 1998) Autonomy, Social Responsibility and Academic Freedom 
Thematic debate World Conference on Higher Education.Higher Education in the 
Twenty-first Century Vision and Action UNESCO, Paris, 5-9 October 1998 
 
Neave G  (1998) The Evaluative State Reconsidered In:  European Journal of 
Education v33,  n3,  p265-84.  Sep 1998  
  360 
 
Neave G (2002)  Anything Goes: or   How the Accommodation of Europe's 
Universities to European Integration Integrates an Inspiring Number of 
Contradictions In:  Tertiary Education and Management Volume 8, Number 3, 
Springer Netherlands  
 
Neave G and Van Vught F  (eds)  (1994)  Prometeo Encadenado: Estado y  
Educación Superior en Europa. Gedisa, Barcelona. (in Spanish). 
 
Nelson J (1997)  The use and misuse of Focus Groups.  Available In: http:// 
www.groupsplus.com  
 
Neumann R  and  Guthrie J (2001) The Corporatisation of Research in Australian 
Higher Education, Macquarie Graduate School of Management, MGSM WP 2001-




Newson J ( 1993)    Constructing the post industrial university: institutional 
budgeting and university-corporate linkages In:  Altbach P and Johnstone B, eds, 
The funding of Higher Education International perspectives. New York, Garland 
Publishers 
 
Niesker A (1992)  Educacao Brasileira  Editorial Melhoramientos. Brasil (In 
Portuguese). 
 
Noland B,   Bogue G,  Ness E (2003) Noble dreams and fiscal realities: framing 
strategic redirection policy in times of retrenchment.  Paper presented at the 
Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of Higher Education Portland, 
Oregon November 15, 2003  
  361 
 
OECD (1990) Financing Higher Education: Current Patterns, Paris, OECD 
 
OECD (1996). Education at a glance. Paris, OECD 
 
OECD (2002)  Education at a glance Paris, OECD. Available in:   http:// 
www.oecd.org/eco 
 
OECD (2002)   Investment in human capital through post-compulsory education 
and training: selected efficiency and equity aspects.  Available in: http:// 
www.oecd.org/eco 
 
Oddone G and Perera M (2004) Educación Superior  en Uruguay. Descripción y 
financiamiento IESALC/UNESCO, Caracas (In Spanish). 
  
Olivera JHG  (1964)  Aspectos económicos de la educación  In: La Economía 
Clásica Actual, Ed. Macchi, Bs As, Argentina (In Spanish). 
 
Osborn  T N  (1976)  Hgher Education in Mexico Texas Western Press, The 
University of Texas  
 
Osborne D  and Gaebler T (1992) Reinventing government: how the 
entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the public sector from schoolhouse to 
statehouse, city hall to the pentagon. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
 
 
Otten C (1996)  Principles of budget allocations at institutional level.   Higher 
education management March 1996, Vol.8. No.1 IMHE, OECD. Pp 69-83 
  
  362 
Partido Colorado ( 2004) La revolucion del centro. Bases programaticas del 
Partido Colorado por un cambio hacia la modernidad. Available in : http:// 
www.partidocolorado.com.uy/ (In Spanish)  
 
Partido Nacional (2004)  Programa para un gobierno de compromiso nacional 
Jorge Larrañaga .  Available in: http://www.alianzanacional.com.uy/)   (In Spanish) 
 
Partington G (2001)  Qualitative research interviews: identifying problems in 
technique. In: Issues in Educational Research Vol II . 
 
Pfeffer  J and  Salancik G (1978)  The External Control of Organizations, Harper & 
Row, 1978, pp 39-61  
 
Pfeffer J (1992)  Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations, 
Boston, Mass, Harvard Business School Press, 1992, PP 83-110,111-125, 247-
265 
 
Piper C, Schuh J, Huba M and  Shelley M ( 2004) Funding models in community 
colleges in ten Midwest States. Community College Review, Winter 2004 
 
Polidano  C (1999)   The new public management  in developing countries  IDPM 
Public policy and management working paper, No 13, November 1999. IDPM, 
University of Manchester. p. 59-89 
  
Pratt J (1987) The economics of Higher Education  In: Thomas H and Symkins  T 
(eds) Economics and the management of education: emerging themes. The 
Falmer press. Taylor and Francis 
    
  363 
Psacharopoulos G (1980) Higher Education in Developing Countries: A cost-
Benefit Analysis Staff Paper No. 440, World Bank, Education Department, 
November, 1980  
 
Psacharopoulos G(1994) Returns to investment in education: A global update. 
World Development, 22(9), 1325-1343 
  
Psacharopoulos G and Papakonstantinou G (2005) The real university cost in a 
‗‗free ‘‘higher education country Economics of Education Review 24 (2005)103 –
108.  Available in:  
http://  www.elsevier.com/locate/econedurev 
 
Pugliese  JC  (2003)  Politicas de Estado para la universidad argentina. M Ey C, 
Secretaría de Asuntos Universitarios, Republica Argentina (In Spanish) 
 
Punch K  (1998)  Introduction to social research . Quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. London Sage 
 
Puryear J and Brunner JJ (1995)  Education, equity and economic  
competitiveness in the Americas: an Inter American dialogue project. Vol 1: key 
issues. OAS  Col.  Interamerican Bank  of Development. 
 
Rama G (1994)  La universidad  no es para todos  In: Barbato C and Cecilio R 
(eds). Universidad: el debate tras la fachada. Editorial Fin de siglo    (in Spanish). 
 
Rama C (2002)  Las macrouniversidades en América Latina en el Siglo XXI. 
Presented in I Encuentro de Rectores de las Macrouniversidades Públicas de 
América Latina   y el Caribe Caracas, 13 - 14 de junio del 2002 (in Spanish). 
  
  364 
Ramos C (ed) (2003) La reconstrucción gerencial del estado. Enfoques políticos 
sobre la nueva gestión pública. Instituto de Ciencia Política . Embajada de los 
Estados Unidos de América, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Montevideo (In 
Spanish) 
 
Reimmers  F  (1995) Education finance in Latin America.  Perils and opportunities. 
In Puryear J and Brunner J J (eds) Education, equity and economic  
competitiveness in the Americas: an Inter American dialogue project. Vol 1: key 
issues. OAS  Col.     Interamerican Development  Bank   
 
Republica Argentina (2001)  Propuesta metodológica  para la asignación de 
recursos a alas universidades nacionales. Ministerio de Educación de la Nación. 
Secretaria de Educación Superior. (in Spanish) 
 
Republica Oriental del Uruguay (1959)  Ley 12549 Orgánica de la Universidad del 
República (in Spanish) 
 
Republica Oriental del Uruguay (1966) Constitución Nacional (in Spanish) 
 
Republica Oriental del Uruguay (1989) Ley 15903 Normas de ordenamiento 
financiero  (in Spanish) 
 
Republica Oriental del Uruguay ( 1994) Ley de Presupuesto 16320 (in Spanish) 
 
Republica Oriental del Uruguay  (1997) TOCAF Decreto 194/997 Ministerio de 
Economia y Finanzas (in Spanish) 
 
Republica Oriental del Uruguay ( 1999a)  Guía para la construcción de indicadores 
de gestión. Oficina de Planeamiento y Presupuesto. CEPRE, SEV, Feb 1999  (in 
Spanish)  
  365 
 
Republica Oriental del Uruguay ( 1999b) Ley de Presupuesto 16662  (in Spanish) 
 
República Oriental del Uruguay (1999c) Aportes para la Universidad del Siglo XXI,  
Ministerio de Educación y Cultura - Banco Mundial - Octubre 1999 (in Spanish) 
 
Republica Oriental del Uruguay ( 2001) Leyes 16524 y 17451 Fondo de solidaridad  
(in Spanish) 
 
Reyes Abadie W and Perez Santarcieri ME (1992)  Historia de la cultura en 
America Latina. Segunda Parte: El Reino de Indias. Impresora Cordon, 
Montevideo (in Spanish) 
 
Rezabeck R (2000)   Online focus groups Electronic discussions for research In 
FQS Vol 1. No. 1. 
 
Riveros  L (1996) Crisis y renovación de la politicas universitarias del Estado In : 
Delfino J and Gertel H (eds)   Nuevas direcciones en el financiamiento de la 
educación superior. Ministerio de Cultura y Educación. Serie Nuevas Tendencias. 
Gobierno de la Nación. República Argentina. (in Spanish) 
 
Robinson R (2002) Output-Driven Funding and Budgeting Systems in the Public 
Sector Discussion Papers in Economic, Finance and International Competitiveness 
School of Economics and Finance Discussion Paper No. 101, February 2002 ISSN 
1324-5910. Queensland University of Technology 
 
Rodrigues Dias M A (1996) The challenge of higher education on the threshold of a 
new century. Presented in Symposium on the future of universities, 5 December 
1996, Santiago de Chile, Chile (Council of the United Nations University) 
  
  366 
Rodrigues Dias M A (1998)   Higher Education for the Tweny First  Century: vision 
and action for the coming century. Prospects Vol XXVIII, No 3, September 1998 
 
Salminen A ( 2003) New Public Management and Finnish public sector 
organizations: the case of universities. In: Amaral A, Meek L and Larsen I (Eds) 
The Higher education management revolution, pp. 55-70; Higher education 
dynamics, Douro Series, Springer. 
 
Sandbach J and Thomas H (1996)   Sources of fund s and resource allocation.  In: 
Warner D and Palfreyman D (eds)  Higher education management: the  key 
elements . SRHE and Open University Press 
 
Schwartzman S (1991) Latin America: Higher Education in a Lost Decade 
Published in, Prospects. (Paris, UNESCO), Vol. XXI, N 3, 1991, p. 363-373.  
 
Schwartzman S  (1992)  Brazil. In Clark B  and Neave G , The Encyclopedia of 
Higher Education, Pergamon Press, 1992, vol. I, 82-92. 
 
Schwartzman S  (1993ª) Financiamiento de la educacion superior       In: Estado y 
Mercado en el Financiamiento de la Educación Superior, Notas para el Debate 8, 
Grupo de Estudios Para el Desarrollo - GRADE, Lima, 1993, 75-92 ( In Spanish)  
 
Schwartzman S (1993b) Policies for Higher Education in Latin America: the context  
in Higher Education 25, 1, January, 1993, 9-20. 
 
Schwartzman S (1993 c) Notas sobre os sistemas de ensino superior da América 
Latina.  Notas prévias preparadas para o projeto de Estudos Comparados sobre 
Política de Educação Superior para a América Latina - 1993-4. (In Portuguese) 
  
  367 
Schwartzman S (1994)  La Universidad Latinoamericana entre el Pasado y el 
Futuro  Presented in: Seminario de Rectores, Adonde va la Educación Superior en 
Latinoamérica, Banco Interamericano del Desarrollo - Unión de Universidades de 
América Latina, Washington, 17-19 de noviembre, 1994. ( In Spanish) 
 
Schwartzman S (1996)  Las Universidades Latinoamericanas en Contexto.   In: 
Malo S y Morley S (eds)   La Educación Superior en América Latina - Testimonios 
de un Seminario de Rectores, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo y Unión de las 
Universidades de América Latina, 7-28, 1996 (In Spanish). 
 
Schwartzman S ( 1999) Latin America: National responses to world challenges in  
Higher Education. In Altbach P and Peterson P (eds) Global challenge and national 
response. Council on International Exchange of Scholars, April 1999. Mcgill. 
 
Schwartzman S (2001)  El futuro de la educación en América Latina y el 
Caribe.UNESCO. Santiago de Chile. (In Spanish) 
 
Schwartzman J ( 2002)  O financiamento das institucoes de Ensino Superior no 
Brasil.  In  Arrosa Soares MS (coord)  A educacao superior no Brasil, 
IESALC/GEU.  (In Portuguese)   
 
Schwartzman S,  Bomeny M H,  and Costa V (1984) Tempos de Capanema. Rio 
de Janeiro, Editora Paz e Terra. ( In Portuguese)   
 
Schwartzman, S and Klein ( 1994)  Higher Education policies in Brazil 1970-1990 
In: Higher Education,  Volume 25, Number 1 Springer Netherlands  
 
Slaughter S and Leslie L (1997) Academic capitalism. Politics, policies and the 
entrepreneurial university. The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
  
  368 
Scott  WR (1998) Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 
 
Schugurensky D ( 2002)  1918,  Students ignite democratic university reform in 
Cordoba, Argentina. Department of Adult Education, Community  Development 
and Counselling Psychology. The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the 
University of Toronto, OISE/UT). Available in: 
http://fcis.oise.utoronto.ca/~daniel_schugurensky/assignment1/1918cordoba.html 
 
Serban A M (1998) Precursors of Performance Funding In Burke JC and Serban 
AM eds  Performance Funding for Higher Education New Directions for Institutional 
Research  Jossey Bass Publishers 
 
Shattock M and Rigby G (eds)  (1983) Resource allocation in British universities. 
Editors. CUA Resource allocation Group,  SRHE. 
 
Savage G, Nix T, Whitehead C, Blair, J (1991)  Strategies for assessing and 
managing organizational stakeholders. In:  Academy of Management Executive, 
1991, Vol. 5, No. 2, 61-75. 
 
Sheehan J (1996) Modelos para la asignación de fondos públicos entre 
universidades. In: Delfino J and Gertel H (eds)   Nuevas direcciones en el 
financiamiento de la educación superior. Ministerio de Cultura y Educación. Serie 
Nuevas Tendencias. Gobierno de la Nación. República Argentina (in Spanish). 
 
Shin J and  Milton S (2004 ) The effects of performance budgeting and funding 
programmes  on graduation rate in public four-year colleges and universities. 
Education Policy Analysis Archives, 12(22). Available in: 
http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v12n22/. 
  
  369 
Shugurenski D (2002)   1918, Students ignite democratic university reform in 
Cordoba, Argentina . OISE/University  of Toronto. Available in 
http://fcis.oise.utoronto.ca/~daniel_schugurensky/ 
 
Sizer J  (1982)  Better the dirigiste devils we know.   In:  Morris A and Sizer J (eds) 
Resources and higher education. SRHE. Monograph 51 
 
State of Victoria Australia (2005) Research@work   Department of Education and 
Training Office of Learning and teaching. Paper 4   Published by the Department of 
Education and Training state of Victoria, Australia  in 
http://www.det.vic.gov.au/det/resources/papers.htm 
 
Steger H A  (1974)   Las universidades en el desarrollo social de la America 
Latina, FCE   (In Spanish) 
 
St John E Parsons M eds ( 2004) Public Funding of Higher Education Changing 
contects and new rationales The Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore and 
London 
 
Tejeiro M ( 2001)   Arancelamiento si, Gatopardismo.  Centro  de Estudios 
Publicos, Argentina. Available in : http://  www.cep.org.ar          or in: http:// 
www.cep.org.ar/articulo.php?ids=82 
 
Theisens H  (2003) Higher Education in the United Kingdom Country report May 
2003 CHEPS. Available in  
http://www.utwente.nl/cheps/documenten/unitedkingdom.pdf 
 
The Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation (1994)     The 
program evaluation standards, 2nd edition, Sage publications. 
  
  370 
The Task Force  in Higher Education (2000)  Higher education peril and promises. 
The World Bank publications 
 
The World Bank (1994)  Higher education The lessons from experience, The World 
Bank series: development in practice. 
 
The World Bank (2000) Brazil:   Higher Education Sector Study Report No. 19392-
BR 
 
Thomas H  (1998)  Reform and change in financial management: the need for an 
holistic approach.  Higher Education Management July 1998, Vol. 10, No. 2  
 
Thomas H ( 2000)   Power in the resource allocation process  the impact of rational 
systems Journal for Higher Education Policy and Management  vol 22 Number  2 
 
Thomas H (2001)  Managing financial resources.   Managing universities and 
colleges: guides to good practice. Open University Press  
 
Thorn K,  Holm Nielsen L and Jeppesen JS ( 2004) Approaches to result- based 
funding in Tertiary education. Identifying finance reform options in Chile. The World 
Bank Working Paper WPS 3436. 
 
Thorne S (2000)  Data analysis in qualitative research Evid. Based Nurs. 
2000;3;68-70 doi:10.1136/ebn.3.3.68 . Available in:  
 http://www.ebn.bmjjournals.com,  03/29/05 
 
Torello M (2003)   Indicadores de educación superior de la universidades  de 
AUGM . Asociación de Universidades del Grupo Montevideo.  (in Spanish). 
  
  371 
Torello M  (2004)     Educacion, gasto, desarrollo humano y equidad. Documentos 
de Trabajo del Rectorado.  Universidad de la Republica. Montevideo (in Spanish). 
 
Trochim W (1996) Introduction to validity  Available in: 
 http://www.trochim.human.cornell.edu 
 
Trow M (1996)  Trust, markets and accountability in Higher Education: a 
comparative perspective. Research & occasional paper series: CSHE.1.96 Center 
for studies in Higher Education. Graduate school of public policy. University of 
California, Berkeley 94720 
 
UdelaR  (1995)   Recurso de revocación contra el Decreto Noo. 308/995 del 11 de 
agosto de 1995.   Dirección General Jurídica  de la  Udelar.  (in Spanish) 
 
UdelaR (1997) La Universidad de la República en un  tiempo de cambios. 
Universidad de la República. (in Spanish). 
 
UdelaR (1999) Consensos para la Transformación de la Universidad de la 
Republica. Available in: 
http://www.csic.edu.uy/EMC/homefolder/invest/Consensos.pdf  (In Spanish) 
 
UdelaR (2000)  Algunos tópicos sobre la educación en Uruguay,  una 
aproximación desde la economía. Documentos de trabajo del rectorado  Nº 2 
Secretaría del Rectorado de la Universidad de la República Mayo de 2000 
Available in http:// www.rau.edu.uy/sui (in Spanish) 
 
UdelaR (2001a) Estadísticas básicas Catálogo 2001.Universidad de la República. 
Dirección General de Planeamiento. Available in  
http:// www.rau.edu.uy/sui  (in Spanish). 
  
  372 
UdelaR (2001b) Indicadores de la Universidad de la República. Direccion General 
de Planeamiento universitario Available in  
http:// www.rau.edu.uy/sui (in Spanish) 
 
UdelaR (2001c) Plan Estratégico de la Universidad de la República. Serie 
Documentos de Trabajo del Rectorado No.10 Available in  
http:// www.rau.edu.uy /sui(in Spanish) 
 
UdelaR (2002a) Informe para la Comision Programatica Presupuestal Facultad de 
Psicología. .Universidad de la República. Dirección General de Planeamiento. (in 
Spanish). 
 
UdelaR (2002b)  Estadísticas básicas Catálogo 2002.Universidad de la República. 
Dirección General de Planeamiento. Available in 
 http:// www.rau.edu.uy/sui (in Spanish). 
 
UdelaR (2003a)  Estadísticas básicas Catálogo 2003.Universidad de la República. 
Dirección General de Planeamiento. Available in 
 http:// www.rau.edu.uy/sui  (in Spanish). 
 
UdelaR (2003b)   Presentacion ante la Camara de Diputados Rendicion de 
Cuentas 2002, 04/08/03. Available in http:// www.rau.edu.uy/sui  (in Spanish). 
 
UdelaR (2003c ) Balance de ejecución presupuestal Resumen general Ejercicio 
2002. Direccion General de Planeamiento universitario (In Spanish) 
 
Ultimas Noticias  (2004)  24  de agosto de 2004,  page 5,  Declaraciones de la 
Federacion Uruguaya del Magisterio sobre el aumento en el gasto en Educación. 
(In Spanish) 
  
  373 
UNDP (2003) Objetivos de desarrollo  del milenio en Uruguay  Documento base 
para la discusión nacional.  Ediciones Trilce, Montevideo (In Spanish). 
 
UNDP (2004) Human Development Report. Available in  
http:// www.undp.org 
 
UNDP (2005)  Desarrollo Humano  en Uruguay. Programa de Naciones Unidas 
para el Desarrollo, UNDP, Uruguay (In Spanish). 
 
UNESCO (1998) World declaration on higher education for the twenty-first century: 
vision and action,  October 1998 
 
UNESCO (1998)  Higher Education with XXI century vision and action.  
Commission report on management  and financing ED-99/HEP/WCHE/Vol.III-2, 
October 1998 
 
UNESCO (2001)  Análisis de Prospectivas de la Educación Superior en América 
Latina y el Caribe. UNESCO. Santiago de Chile, 2001. (In Spanish) 
 
UNESCO  (2005)   Finance Indicators by ISCED levels, UNESCO Reports in 
Education, UNESCO.  Available in: 
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=219 
 
UNICEF (2002) Estado de la infancia en Uruguay . La pobreza es de los niños. 
Available in:   http//www.onunet.org.uy  (In Spanish) 
 
Universidad ORT (2005)  Sobre ORT.  Available in : 
http://www.ort.edu.uy/index.php?id=AAAJ&oreja=6, (In Spanish) 
  
  374 
Van Aken M (1990) Los militantes una historia del movimiento estudiantil 
universitario uruguayo desde sus origenes hasta 1966, Fundacion de Cultura 
Universitaria, Montevideo (In Spanish) 
 
Van Dijk  T (1979) Relevance Assignment in Discourse Comprehension 
 Discourse processes 2, 113-126  
 
Van Dijk T (1984). Prejudice in Studies. London: Sage. 
 
Van Dijk T (1993) Principles of critical discourse análisis In Discourse and society.  
Sage (London, Newbery and New Delhi) vol 4 (2), pp 249-283 
 
Van Dijk T (1997). Political discourse and racism: Describing Others in Western 
parliaments. In: Riggins, Stephen Harold. (Ed.), The language and politics of 
exclusion:Others in discourse. Communication and human values, Vol. 24. (pp. 31-
64). .  
 
Van Dijk T ( 1999) El analisis critico del discurso in Anthropos (Barcelona)  186, 
septiembre-octubre. 1999, pp. 23-36 (In Spanish) 
 
Van Dijk T  (2000a). On the analysis of parliamentary debates on immigration. In 
M. Reisigl & R. Wodak (Eds.), The semiotics of racism. Approaches to Critical 
Discourse Analysis. (pp. 85-104). 
 
Van Dijk T (2000b). Parliamentary Debates. In R. Wodak & T. A. van Dijk (Eds.), 
Racism at the Top. Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in Six European 
States. (pp. 45-78). Klagenfurt, Austria: Drava Verlag. 
 
Van Dijk T (2003). Knowledge in parliamentary debates. Journal of Language and 
Politics, 2(1), 93-129.   
  375 
 
Van Dijk T (2004). Text and context of parliamentary debates. In Paul Bayley (Ed.), 
Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Parliamentary Discourse. (pp. 339-372). 
Amsterdam: Benjamins. 
 
Van Vught   F  (1997) Using policy analysis for strategic choices In: Peterson M, 
Dill, D and Mets L (eds) Planning and Management for a changing environment, 
Jossey Bass San Francisco.  
 
Van Vught F (1994) Autonomy and Accountability in Government/University 
Relationships. In: Salmi  J and Verspoor A (Eds) Revitalising Higher Education. 
London: Pergamon Press. 
 
Vessuri  H (1993) Desafíos de la educación superior en relación con la formación y 
la investigación ante los procesos económicos actuales y los nuevos desafíos 
tecnológicos. Revista Iberoamericana de Educación, N° 2, Madrid (In Spanish)  
 
Vossensteyn  H (2000) Cost sharing and understanding student choice: 
developments in Western Europe and Australia. Paper presented in "Global higher 
education exchange conference: Paying for higher education, emerging trends, 
challenges and solutions" AED Conference center; Washington DC, USA 
December 5-6, 2000. CCGSE. University at Buffalo, .SUNY.  Available in :   
http:// www.gse.buffalo.ed/FAS/Johnson/Readings.htm 
 
Vossensteyn H  (2004) Fiscal Stress: Worldwide Trends In Higher Education 
Finance NAFSAA  Journal of student financial aid,  VOL. 34, NO. 1, 2004, 39-55 
 
Wagner A (1996) Financing Higher Education: new approaches new issues. In : 
Higher Education Management, Vol 8 , No. 1 , 1996, IMHE, OECD. 
  
  376 
Webber G ( 2003) Funding in UK universities:living in the edge. In : Perspectives, 
Volume7, number 4, 2003, Taylor and Francis Ltd. 
 
Weiler H (2001) States and Markets:   Competing Paradigms for the Reform of 
Higher Education in Europe.  Occasional Paper No. 16.National Center for the 
Study of Privatisation in Education.Teachers College, Columbia University 
 
Weiler H (2001)  States and Markets: Competing Paradigms for the Reform of 
Higher Education in Europe  Occasional Paper No. 16 National Center for the 
Study of  Privatisation in Education Teachers College, Columbia University 
 
Whiteside J, Hendel D,  Dundar H  and Kvavik R (1997) Closing the loop:  
Institutional performance measures. Presented  at the 37 th Annual Forum of the 
Association for Institutional Research, Orlando, Florida. 
 
Williams G L (1992) Changing Patterns of Finance in Higher Education, SRHE. 
and Open University Press. 
 
Williams G L (1992)  The British experience in an international context In  
Williams G L  Changing patterns of finance of Higher Education. SRHE and Open 
University Press. 
 
Williams G L and Light G (1999)  Student income and costs of study in the United 
Kingdom. In : European Journal of Education, vol. 34, no, I. 
 
Worthen B and Sanders J (1987)  Educational evaluation. Alternative approaches 
and practical guidelines. Longman  
 
Yarzabal  L  (2001) Impactos del neoliberalismo sobre la Educacion Superior en 
America latina , CIPEDES, No.1, (12) pp 9-15, Campinas  
  377 
 
Yin R  (1994) Case study research design and methods 2nd edition  Applied social 
research methods series volume 5 
 
Ziderman  A and Albrecht D (1995)  Financing Universities in Developing 
Countries. Washington, DC: The Falmer Press. 
 
Zinberg D (1991) The Changing University: How Increased Demand for Scientists 
and Technology is Transforming Academic Institutions Internationally. Dordrecht, 
The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Zumeta W (2000) Accountability: Challenges for Higher Education. In The NEA 
2000 almanac of Higher Education (pp. 57-71). Washington DC: National 
Education Association. 
 
Zumeta W (2001) Public policy and accountability in Higher Education: Lessons 
from the past and present for the new millennium. In D. E. Heller (Ed.) The states 
and public Higher Education policy: Affordability, access, and accountability (pp. 
155-197). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
 
    
  378 
    
  379 
     
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
FACULTY OF LAW, ARTS & SOCIAL SCIENCES 
School of Management 
 
Funding higher education in Uruguay: 











    





ANNEX 1 ............................................................................................................. 383 
CONSTITUTION AND UNIVERSITY LAWS ....................................................... 383 
1.  National Constitution ...................................................................................... 384 
2. Law No.  12.549 .............................................................................................. 386 
LEY ORGANICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE LA REPUBLICA ............................ 386 
LEY Nro. 12.549 .................................................................................................. 386 
(Publicada en el Diario Oficial el 29 de Octubre de 1958) ................................... 386 
Aprobacion del presupuesto de la UdelaR .......................................................... 386 
3. Law Nº 16.226, Art. 407   and  law Nº 16.736, Art. 595 ................................... 388 
4. Budget laws  ..................................................................................................... 389 
5. Laws and decrees about the private universities  ............................................. 395 
Decreto Ley Nro. 15.661 ..................................................................................... 395 
DECRETO Nº 308/995 ........................................................................................ 396 
DECRETO DE ORDENAMIENTO DEL SISTEMA DE ENSEÑANZA ................. 396 
6. Law about the Graduate tax                                                                                         
Law N. 16.524 ..................................................................................................... 410 
7.CEPRE Regulations ......................................................................................... 417 
Ministry of Economy and Finance ....................................................................... 417 
Presidencia de la República Oriental del Uruguay .............................................. 417 
ANNEX 2 ............................................................................................................. 428 
DOCUMENTS FROM THE POLITICAL  PARTIES ............................................. 428 
1.   FRENTE AMPLIO ......................................................................................... 429 
2. BLANCO PARTY  ............................................................................................. 431 
3. COLORADO PARTY ....................................................................................... 445 
ANNEX 3 ............................................................................................................. 449 
INTERVIEWS ...................................................................................................... 449  
  381 
1.   Request of interview ...................................................................................... 450 
2.  List of interviewees ......................................................................................... 452 
3.  Questionnaire for university officials ............................................................... 454 
(public institutions)  ............................................................................................... 454 
4.  Questionnaire for university officials ............................................................... 457 
(private  institutions) ............................................................................................ 457 
5.   Questionnaire for  members of parliament .................................................... 459 
6. Questionnaire for  members of parliament ...................................................... 461 
7. Questionnaires in Spanish............................................................................... 463 
ANNEX 4 ............................................................................................................. 475 
FOCUS GROUP  .................................................................................................. 475 
1. Invitation to participants  ................................................................................... 476 
Fecha .................................................................................................................. 476 
2.  Participants  of the  focus group  ............................................................. 478 
3.  Basis for the discussion at the focus group .................................................... 479 
ANNEX 5 ............................................................................................................. 484 
MATRIX OF QUESTIONS  ................................................................................... 484 
MATRIX OF QUESTIONS  ................................................................................... 485 
Current model  ...................................................................................................... 485 
ANNEX 7 ............................................................................................................. 487 
SAMPLE OF PARLIAMENTARY SESSIONS ..................................................... 487 
ANNEX 8 ............................................................................................................. 542 
REFERENCES AT PARLIAMENTARY SESSIONS ............................................ 542 
ANNEX 9 ............................................................................................................. 552 
ANALYSIS OF CATEGORY TUITION ................................................................ 552 
BLANCO PARTY ......................................................................................................................... 553 
COLORADO PARTY ................................................................................................................... 554 
BLANCO PARTY ......................................................................................................................... 568 
ANNEX 10 ........................................................................................................... 572 
NEW BUDGET LAWS SINCE 2005 .................................................................... 572  
  382 
LEY DE PRESUPUESTO AÑO 2005 .................................................................. 573 
Nr 17.930............................................................................................................. 573 
Ley Nº 18.172  ...................................................................................................... 576 
RENDICIÓN DE CUENTAS Y BALANCE DE EJECUCIÓN PRESUPUESTAL 
EJERCICIO 2006 ................................................................................................ 576 
RENDICIÓN DE CUENTAS Y BALANCE DE EJECUCIÓN PRESUPUESTAL - 
EJERCICIO 2007 ................................................................................................ 578 
 
    
















CONSTITUTION AND UNIVERSITY LAWS  
  384 
 
 
1.  National Constitution 
 
CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA 
SECCIÓN XI 
DE LOS ENTES AUTÓNOMOS 
Y DE LOS SERVICIOS DESCENTRALIZADOS 
 
CAPÍTULO II 
Artículo 202. La Enseñanza Pública Superior, Secundaria, Primaria, Normal, 
Industrial y Artística, serán regidas por uno o más Consejos Directivos 
Autónomos. 
 
Los  demás  servicios  docentes  del  Estado,  también  estarán  a  cargo  de 
Consejos Directivos Autónomos, cuando la ley lo determine por dos tercios 
de votos del total de componentes de cada Cámara. 
 
Los Entes de Enseñanza Pública serán oídos, con fines de asesoramiento en 
la elaboración de las leyes relativas a sus servicios, por las Comisiones 
Parlamentarias.  Cada  Cámara  podrá  fijar  plazos  para  que  aquellos  se 
expidan. La ley dispondrá la coordinación de la enseñanza. 
 
Artículo 203. Los Consejos Directivos de los servicios docentes serán 
designados o electos en la forma que establezca la ley sancionada por la  
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mayoría absoluta de votos del total de componentes de cada Cámara. 
 
El Consejo Directivo de la Universidad de la República será designado por 
los órganos que la integran, u los Consejos de sus órganos serán electos por 
docentes, estudiantes y egresados, conforme a lo que establezca la ley 
sancionada por la mayoría determinada en el inciso anterior. 
 
Artículo 204. Los Consejos Directivos tendrán los cometidos y atribuciones 
que determinará la ley sancionada por mayoría absoluta de votos del total de 
componentes de cada Cámara. 
 
Dichos  Consejos  establecerán  el  Estatuto  de  sus  funcionarios  de 
conformidad con las bases contenidas en los artículos 58 a 61 y las reglas 
fundamentales que establezca la ley, respetando la especialización del Ente. 
 
Artículo 205. Serán aplicables en lo pertinente a los distintos servicios de 
enseñanza, los artículos 189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 198 (inciso 1 y 2), 200 y 
201. 
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2. Law No.  12.549 
 
 
LEY ORGANICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE LA 
REPUBLICA 
LEY Nro. 12.549 
(Publicada en el Diario Oficial el 29 de Octubre de 
1958) 
Aprobacion del presupuesto de la UdelaR 
 
 
Los  presupuestos  de  la  Universidad  son  aprobados  por  el  Parlamento  a 
traves de ley (art 220) 
 
Art.23  -PREPARACION  DE  LOS  PRESUPUESTOS  -Los  proyectos  de 
presupuestos preparados por cada Consejo de Facultad, serán enviados al 
Consejo  Directivo  Central  con  la  anticipación  necesaria  para  permitir  su 
consideración y aprobación. El Consejo Directivo Central podrá introducir en 
los  proyectos  recibidos  las  modificaciones  que  estime  convenientes.  Los 
proyectos  de  presupuestos  de  la  Universidad  comprenderán  los  rubros 
necesarios para el pago de las retribuciones personales y gastos de todas 
sus reparticiones. Se proyectarán estableciendo separadamente las p artidas 
globales para gastos y retribuciones de todo su personal.  
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Art.24  -EJECUCION  DE  LOS  PRESUPUESTOS  -Anualmente  el  Consejo 
Directivo Central presentará al Poder Ejecutivo la rendición de cuentas y el  
balance  de  ejecución  presupuestal  correspondiente  al  ejercicio  vencido, 
dentro  de  los  seis  meses  siguientes.  Conjuntamente  podrá  proponer  las 
modificaciones que estime indispensables en los presupuestos de sueldos, 
gastos y recursos. 
El  Consejo  Directivo  Central  podrá  disponer  las  trasposiciones  de  rubros 
requeridas  para  el  mejor  funcionamiento  de  sus  servicios,  dentro  de  las 
partidas de retribuciones como así también de las fijadas para gastos en los 
presupuestos. 
El  sobrante  de  rubros  al  final  de  cada  ejercicio,  acrecerá  los  rubros 
disponibles del ejercicio siguiente. 
 
 
    
  388 




Ley Nº 16.226 
Artículo 407.- Facúltase a la Universidad de la República a cobrar una 
matrícula a sus estudiantes que se hallen en condiciones económicas de 
abonarla. Al presentar el mensaje de su Presupuesto y Rendiciones de 
Cuentas deberá incluir el detalle de la utilización proyectada y ejecutada de 
tales . 
 
Ley Nº 16.736 
Artículo 595.- Facúltase a la Universidad de la República a crear el "Fondo 
de Solidaridad Estudiantil", que tendrá como objeto otorgar becas para 
vivienda, alimentación y traslado, a estudiantes universitarios del interior del 
país que estudien en la capital y a estudiantes de bajos recursos 
económicos, que en ambos casos demuestren regularidad y rendimiento en 
sus estudios. Serán recursos del Fondo de Solidaridad Estudiantil lo que 
disponga la Universidad de la República para ese fin y los provenientes de 
donaciones o legados. A los efectos de obtener mayores recursos para el 
mencionado Fondo, la Universidad de la República también podrá disponer 
el pago obligatorio de una o varias "Cuota de Solidaridad" cada año, por 
parte de todos aquellos estudiantes cuyo poder adquisitivo, personal o 
familiar, así lo permita. 
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UNIVERSIDAD DE LA REPUBLICA 
Artículo 200.- Increméntase el rubro 0 de la Universidad de la República en el 
equivalente a U$S 18:161.765, (dólares de los Estados Unidos de América 
dieciocho millones ciento sesenta y un mil setecientos sesenta y cinco). 
Artículo 201.- Consolídase la partida establecida en el artículo 424 de la Ley 
Nº 16.320, de 1º de noviembre de 1992, con cargo a Rentas Generales y con 
el destino previsto en el artículo 408 de la Ley Nº 16.226, de 29 de octubre 
de 1991, la que tendrá carácter permanente. 
Artículo 202.- Consolídase la partida establecida en el artículo 425 de la Ley 
Nº 16.320, de 1º de noviembre de 1992, con cargo a Rentas Generales y con 
destino a los gastos de funcionamiento del Hospital de Clínicas "Doctor 
Manuel Quintela", excluidas las retribuciones personales, la que tendrá 
carácter permanente. 
Artículo 203.- Consolídase en el presupuesto universitario global la partida de 
$ 552.319, (pesos uruguayos quinientos cincuenta y dos mil trescientos 
diecinueve), a precios de 1º de enero de 1993, destinada a atender las 
retribuciones y cargas legales correspondientes a los funcionarios de la 
Universidad de la República comprendidos en el artículo 14 de la Ley 
Nº 15.783, de 28 de noviembre de 1985.  
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Artículo 204.- Otórgase una partida anual de $ 1:392.800, (pesos uruguayos 
un millón trescientos noventa y dos mil ochocientos), equivalentes a 
U$S 400.000, (dólares de los Estados Unidos de América cuatrocientos mil), 
para financiar el dictado de cursos intensivos de actualización, 
especialización y reciclaje de graduados. 
Artículo 205.- Otórgase una partida anual de $ 2:089.200, (pesos uruguayos 
dos millones ochenta y nueve mil doscientos), equivalentes a U$S 600.000, 
(dólares de los Estados Unidos de América seiscientos mil), a efectos de ser 
utilizada como contrapartida de convenios de carácter nacional o 
internacional. 
Artículo 206.- Otórgase una partida anual de $ 696.400, (pesos uruguayos 
seiscientos noventa y seis mil cuatrocientos), equivalentes a U$S 200.000, 
(dólares de los Estados Unidos de América doscientos mil), a efecto de 
apoyar las actividades que desarrollen los investigadores que se han 
perfeccionado en el exterior. 
Artículo 207.- Asígnase una partida anual, con destino al programa de 
Bienestar de Funcionarios de la Universidad de la República. 
Para financiar el déficit actual del pago de las cuotas mutuales de los 
funcionarios docentes y no docentes $ 6:077.259, (pesos uruguayos seis 
millones setenta y siete mil doscientos cincuenta y nueve), equivalente a 
U$S 1:745.336, (dólares de los Estados Unidos de América un millón 
setecientos cuarenta y cinco mil trescientos treinta y seis). 
Artículo 208.- Otórgase una partida anual de $ 1:392.800, (pesos uruguayos 
un millón trescientos noventa y dos mil ochocientos), equivalentes a 
U$S 400.000, (dólares de los Estados Unidos de América cuatrocientos mil), 
destinada a la mejora de gestión de los servicios universitarios.  
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Artículo 209.- Otórgase una partida anual de $ 2:785.600, (pesos uruguayos 
dos millones setecientos ochenta y cinco mil seiscientos), equivalentes a 
U$S 800.000, (dólares de los Estados Unidos de América ochocientos mil), 
con destino al proyecto "Construcción, Reparación y Mantenimiento del 
Hospital de Clínicas Doctor Manuel Quintela". 
Autorízase a la Universidad de la República a gestionar un programa con 
financiamiento externo para el reciclaje del Hospital de Clínicas "Doctor 
Manuel Quintela". 
Artículo 210.- Otórgase una partida anual de $ 2:785.600, (pesos uruguayos 
dos millones setecientos ochenta y cinco mil seiscientos), equivalentes a 
U$S 800.000, (dólares de los Estados Unidos de América ochocientos mil), a 
efecto de atender el funcionamiento del Hospital de Clínicas "Doctor Manuel 
Quintela". 
Artículo 211.- Las partidas asignadas a la Universidad de la República por el 
artículo 615 de la Ley Nº 16.170, de 28 de diciembre de 1990, incluidas en el 
Inciso 24 "Diversos Créditos", serán transferidas, por la Contaduría General 
de la Nación, al Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República". 
Artículo 212.- El Fondo Permanente que se asigne al Inciso 26, Universidad 
de la República, será equivalente a tres duodécimos 
de la suma total asignada en el respectivo Presupuesto para Inversiones y 
Gastos de Funcionamiento, con la excepción de la correspondiente a 
retribuciones de servicios personales, cargas legales y prestaciones de 
carácter social y suministros de bienes o servicios efectuados por 
organismos estatales y paraestatales. Dicho monto será ajustado 
anualmente al 1º de enero de cada año, de acuerdo a los créditos 
permanentes vigentes a esa fecha.  
  392 
Artículo 213.- Facúltase al Poder Ejecutivo a incorporar a los beneficios 
establecidos por el artículo 462 de la Ley Nº 16.226, de 29 de octubre de 
1991, a las empresas contribuyentes del Impuesto a las Rentas de Industria 
y Comercio, Impuesto a las Actividades Agropecuarias, Impuesto a las 
Rentas Agropecuarias e Impuesto al Patrimonio, por las donaciones que 
realicen a la Universidad de la República. 
El contribuyente entregará su donación a la Universidad de la República 
debiendo ésta expedirle recibo de donación y constancia firmada. 
El Poder Ejecutivo reglamentará las formas en que le serán canjeados al 
contribuyente los recibos otorgados por la Universidad de la República por 
certificados de crédito. 
Artículo 214.- Destínase la suma equivalente a U$S 300.000, (dólares de 
los Estados Unidos de América trescientos mil), con destino a la creación de 
una Escuela Técnica de producción lechera en Bañados de Medina, 








Artículo 462.- Las empresas contribuyentes del impuesto a las Rentas de la 
Industria y el Comercio, Impuesto a las Actividades Agropecuarias, Impuesto 
a las Rentas Agropecuarias e Impuesto al Patrimonio, gozarán de beneficios  
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tributarios por las donaciones que realicen para la compra de alimentación 
escolar, útiles, vestimentas, equipamiento, construcciones y reparaciones a 
escuelas públicas que atiendan a las poblaciones más carenciadas. 
El 75% (setenta y cinco por ciento), del total de las sumas entradas 
convertidas en UR (unidades reajustables) a la cotización de la entrega 
efectiva de las mismas, se imputará como pago a cuenta de los tributos 
mencionados. El 25% (veinticinco por ciento), restante podrá ser imputado a 
todos los efectos fiscales como gastos de la empresa. 
La Administración Nacional de Educación Pública, (ANEP), publicará para 
cada año civil la lista de escuelas que atienden la población más carenciada; 
y autorizará contribuciones hasta un máximo de 7 UR, (siete unidades 
reajustables), por alumno, que no podrá superar 1:500.000 UR, (un millón 
quinientas mil unidades reajustables), al año, en el total de escuelas 
beneficiarias. La empresa contribuyente podrá sugerir la escuela que desea 
beneficiar. 
El contribuyente entregará su donación a la Inspección Departamental de 
Educación Primaria para la compra de los bienes y servicios, debiendo 
expedirse el recibo correspondiente e indicará la escuela elegida. 
Dentro de los treinta días siguientes de recibida la donación se deberá poner 
a disposición de la Dirección de dicha escuela, los bienes y servicios 
aludidos, dejándose constancia firmada. 
El Poder Ejecutivo dentro de los noventa días de promulgada la presente ley, 
reglamentará la forma en que le serán canjeados al contribuyente los recibos 
otorgados por la Inspección Departamental de Educación Primaria, por 
certificados de crédito.  
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Artículo 463.- Declárase que el Estado, los organismos comprendidos en el 
artículo 220 de la Constitución y los Gobiernos Departamentales, gozan de 
inmunidad impositiva, tanto nacional como departamental, por sus bienes y 
actividades no comerciales ni industriales. 
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Decreto Ley Nro. 15.661 
UNIVERSIDADES PRIVADAS 
 
Se establecen disposiciones para los títulos profesionales que otorguen las 
Universidades Privadas. (Publicado en "Diario Oficial" el 20 de noviembre de 
1984). 
 
El Consejo de Estado ha aprobado el siguiente: 
 
PROYECTO DE LEY 
 
Artículo 1.- Los títulos profesionales que otorguen las Universidades Privadas, 
cuyo funcionamiento haya sido autorizado por el Poder Ejecutivo, para su validez 
deberán ser registrados ante el Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, que organizará 
el Registro correspondiente. 
 
Artículo 2.- Los Títulos a que se refiere el artículo anterior tendrán, una vez 
registrados, idénticos efectos jurídicos que los expedidos por la Universidad de la 
República Oriental del Uruguay, e independientemente de éstos. 
 
Artículo 3.- Derogase toda disposición que directa o indirectamente se oponga a lo 
preceptuado por esta ley.  
  396 
 
Artículo 4.- Comuníquese, etc. 
 
Sala de Sesiones del Consejo de Estado, en Montevideo, a 23 de octubre de 
1984. 
 
GREGORIO C ALVAREZ –  




DECRETO Nº 308/995 
DECRETO DE ORDENAMIENTO DEL SISTEMA DE 
ENSEÑANZA 
 
Apruébase el Ordenamiento del Sistema de Enseñanza terciaria Privada y fíjanse 
sus cometidos. 
 




I)  Que el mencionado Decreto-ley confiere a los títulos profesionales que 
otorguen las Universidades Privadas cuyo funcionamiento haya sido 
autorizado por el Poder Ejecutivo, una vez registrados ante el Ministerio 
de Educación y Cultura, idénticos efectos jurídicos que los expedidos 
por la Universidad de la República. 
II)  Que la aplicación de esas disposiciones legales referentes a la validez y 
eficacia de los títulos profesionales, hace necesario establecer por vía  
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reglamentaria los conceptos de "universidad" y de "título profesional", y 
consecuentemente los requisitos mínimos necesarios para reconocer a 
Cierta enseñanza la calidad de "universitaria".  
 
III)  Que la notoria proliferación de instituciones privadas que ofrecen 
públicamente enseñanza post-secundaria, hace aconsejable establecer, 
en la misma oportunidad, un régimen que permita otorgar un 
reconocimiento oficial de calidad a aquéllas que acrediten ante el 
Ministerio de Educación y Cultura el adecuado nivel académico de la 
enseñanza impartida y de los títulos que expidan. 
 
 
IV) Que a los efectos indicados en los numerales anteriores, el Poder Ejecutivo se 
ajustará a conceptos y requisitos generalmente admitidos, que han sido objeto de 
larga elaboración en el medio cultural y académico nacional einternacional, y en 
organismos internacionales como la UNESCO y la OIT.  
 
Todos esos antecedentes, así como las legislaciones de Argentina, Brasil, Costa 
Rica, Chile, España y Estados Unidos de América, fueron considerados en las 
deliberaciones que culminaron con el documento acordado en la Comisión 
Consultiva convocada por el Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, integrada por 
representantes del propio Ministerio, de la Universidad de la República y de 
instituciones privadas que funcionan en el país.  
 
V) Que todo ello se hará con el más estricto respeto a la libertad de enseñanza, 
garantizada por el artículo 68 de la Constitución de la República, que es inherente 
a la personalidad humana (Constitución, artículo 72) y forma parte 
de las bases fundamentales de la nacionalidad (Constitución, artículo 80 Nº 6º). 
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Atento: a lo dispuesto por el artículo 168 numeral 4º de la Constitución de la 
República, 
 





De la enseñanza terciaria universitaria y no universitaria: conceptos y principios 
generales. 
 
Artículo 1.- (Enseñanza terciaria). Se considera enseñanza terciaria la que, 
suponiendo por su contenido que sus estudiantes hayan cursado con aprobación 
los ciclos completos de enseñanza primaria y secundaria o técnico-profesional en 
institutos estatales o privados habilitados, profundiza y amplía la formación en 
alguna rama del conocimiento. La enseñanza terciaria es libre, conforme a lo 
dispuesto por el art. 68 de la Constitución de la República. 
En todas las instituciones docentes de enseñanza terciaria se atenderá 
especialmente la formación del carácter moral y cívico de los alumnos 
(Constitución, art. 71). 
 
Artículo 2.- (Enseñanza universitaria). A los efectos del artículo 1 del Decreto-ley 
Nº 15.661, de 29 de octubre de 1984, se considera universitaria la enseñanza 
terciaria que por su rigor científico y profundidad epistemológica, así como por su 
apertura a las distintas corrientes de pensamiento y fuentes culturales, procure 
una amplia formación de sus estudiantes que los capacite para la comprensión 
crítica y creativa del conocimiento adquirido, integrando esa enseñanza con 
procesos de generación y aplicación del conocimiento mediante la investigación y 
la extensión de sus actividades al medio social.  
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CAPITULO II  
De la autorización para funcionar y del reconocimiento de instituciones de 
enseñanza terciaria universitaria y no universitaria.  
 
Artículo 3.- (Autorización para funcionar como institución de nivel universitario). El 
Poder Ejecutivo otorgará la autorización para funcionar prevista en el artículo 1 del 
Decreto-ley Nº 15.661, de 29 de octubre de 1984, a aquellas instituciones que, 
cumpliendo con los requisitos formales y sustanciales previstos en los artículos 
siguientes, proyecten impartir enseñanza universitaria en una o más áreas de 
conocimiento. 
Artículo 4.- (Tipos de instituciones universitarias). Las autorización prevista en el 
artículo 3º podrá solicitarse para: 
a) realizar las actividades de enseñanza, investigación y extensión en tres o más 
áreas disciplinarias no afines, orgánicamente estructuradas en facultades, 
departamentos o unidades académicos equivalentes; las instituciones 
autorizadas conforme a este apartado utilizarán la denominación "Universidad". 
b) realizar las actividades de enseñanza, investigación y extensión en una o más 
áreas disciplinarias afines, o en dos no afines orgánicamente estructuradas en 
facultades, departamentos o unidades académicas equivalentes; las 
instituciones autorizadas conforme a este apartado utilizarán la denominación 
"Instituto Universitario". 
Artículo 5.- (Reconocimiento de instituciones de enseñanza terciaria no 
universitaria). Las instituciones de enseñanza terciaria no universitaria podrán 
solicitar al Ministerio de Educación y Cultura el reconocimiento del nivel académico 
adecuado de la enseñanza impartida y de los títulos expedidos por ellas, según 
pautas de valoración generalmente aceptadas en el ámbito nacional e 
internacional. Esas instituciones se abstendrán de utilizar la denominación 
"Universidad" o sus derivados, de atribuir carácter "superior" a la enseñanza que 
impartan, y de aplicar a los títulos que expidan las denominaciones referidas en el 
artículo 19 de este decreto.  
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Las instituciones universitarias podrán además impartir enseñanza y expedir títulos 
de nivel no universitario, haciendo constar expresamente ese carácter en los 
respectivos planes de estudio, programas y títulos, y podrán solicitar para 
ellos el reconocimiento previsto en el inciso primero. 
No serán consideradas las solicitudes de reconocimiento que refieran a carreras 
no universitarias cuya duración sea inferior a 750 horas-reloj de clases distribuidas 
en un lapso inferior a un año y medio lectivo. 
Artículo 6.- (Alcance de la  autorización para funcionar y del reconocimiento de 
nivel académico). La autorización para funcionar como institución universitaria y el 
reconocimiento de nivel académico de instituciones terciarias no universitarias 
referirán a las carreras, incluidas en la solicitud inicial o en las solicitudes de 
inclusión posteriores, que cumplan con los requisitos formales y sustanciales 
contenidos en el presente decreto. 
Artículo 7.- (Revocabilidad de la autorización para funcionar y del reconocimiento 
de nivel académico). La autorización para funcionar como institución universitaria y 
el reconocimiento de nivel académico de instituciones terciarias no universitarias 
se otorgarán inicialmente con carácter provisional por un lapso de cinco años. 
Durante ese lapso podrán ser revocados por apartamiento relevante de las 
condiciones tenidas en cuenta para su otorgamiento o por incumplimiento de los 
planes y programas de desarrollo presentados para ese lapso. 
Vencido el lapso inicial de cinco años, la autorización para funcionar como 
institución universitaria y el reconocimiento de nivel académico de instituciones 
terciarias no universitarias sólo podrán ser revocados por apartamiento relevante 
de las condiciones tenidas en cuenta para su otorgamiento o por manifiesta 
inadecuación superviniente de la enseñanza impartida a la evolución científica, 
técnica o artística ocurrida. 
La revocación puede recaer sobre la actividad global de la institución o sobre una 
o más carreras incluidas en ella. 
Lo establecido en este artículo será sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto por el Decreto-Ley 
Nº 15.089 de 12 de diciembre de 1980.  
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Artículo 8.- (Diligencias probatorias). Los hechos relevantes para las decisiones 
previstas en este Capítulo podrán acreditarse por cualquier medio de prueba no 
prohibido por la ley. El Ministerio de Educación y Cultura podrá disponer de oficio 
las diligencias probatorias que estime necesarias para comprobar el cumplimiento 
de las condiciones tenidas en cuenta para el otorgamiento de la autorización o 
reconocimiento, y de los planes y programas de desarrollo, así como la 
adecuación de la enseñanza impartida a la evolución superviniente, incluyendo las 
inspecciones que considere pertinentes. 
 
CAPITULO III 
De la naturaleza jurídica y de los estatutos de las instituciones de enseñanza 
terciaria. 
Artículo 9.- (Naturaleza y estatutos de las instituciones de enseñanza terciaria). 
Las instituciones de enseñanza terciaria que pretendan la autorización para 
funcionar (art. 3º) o el reconocimiento de nivel académico (art. 5º), deberán estar 
constituidas como asociaciones civiles o fundaciones sin fines de lucro, con 
personería jurídica. A tal efecto, la resolución aprobatoria de estatutos y de 
reconocimiento de personería jurídica, o aprobatoria de reforma de estatutos, 
según corresponda en cada caso se dictará conjuntamente con la autorización 
para funcionar o el reconocimiento de nivel académico, previo cumplimiento de 
todos los trámites requeridos por ambos actos jurídicos. Además de las 
disposiciones comunes a las entidades de su naturaleza, sus estatutos deberán 
prever: 
a) Órganos de dirección administrativa y académica y procedimientos de 
designación de sus integrantes, la mayoría de los cuales deberán ser ciudadanos 
naturales o legales, o bien contar con una residencia en el país no inferior a tres 
años. 
b) Fines, objetivos y misión de la institución. 
Artículo 10.- (Estatutos de instituciones universitarias). Los estatutos de 
instituciones universitarias (artículos 3 y 4) deberán prever la participación de  
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docentes y estudiantes en los órganos de asesoramiento académico o en los    
órganos de dirección. Deberán establecer también que los titulares de cargos de 
dirección académica (Rector, Decano, Director de unidad académica o 
equivalentes) deberán poseer grado universitario y experiencia académica no 
inferior a cinco años. Esos estatutos consagrarán un régimen que permita a la 
institución ejercer, dentro del marco legal y reglamentario vigente, las siguientes 
atribuciones con plena autonomía institucional y académica: 
a) Reformar sus estatutos, definir sus órganos de dirección y de asesoramiento  
decidir su integración y forma de designación o elección de sus integrantes, y 
establecer sus funciones. 
b) Elegir sus autoridades. 
c) Crear carreras de grado y post-grado. 
d) Formular y desarrollar planes de estudio, de investigación científica y de 
extensión y servicios a la comunidad. 
e) Establecer el régimen de acceso, permanencia y promoción del personal 
docente y no docente. 
f) Establecer el régimen de admisión, permanencia y promoción de sus 
estudiantes. 
g) Otorgar grados académicos y títulos. 
h) Designar y remover a su personal. 
i) Administrar sus bienes y recursos. 
j) Impulsar y participar en emprendimientos que favorezcan el desarrollo 
académico. 
k) Mantener relaciones de carácter educativo, científico y artístico con instituciones 
del país y del extranjero. 
 
CAPITULO IV 
De la solicitud de autorización para funcionar y de reconocimiento de nivel 
académico.  
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Artículo 11.- (Solicitud de autorización para funcionar y de reconocimiento de  nivel 
académico: requisitos comunes). La solicitud de autorización para funcionar o de 
reconocimiento de nivel académico en su caso se presentará ante el Ministerio de 
Educación y Cultura, acompañando la siguiente documentación e información: 
1) Estatutos de la institución. 
2) Antecedentes de la institución en actividades de enseñanza, si los tuviera. 
3) Datos personales, con expresión de antecedentes profesionales, académicos y 
en actividades de enseñanza, de los integrantes de los órganos de dirección 
administrativa y académica, con indicación de los cargos que ocupan. 
4) Proyecto institucional fundamentando los programas o unidades académicas. 
5)Carreras ofrecidas. 
6) Personal docente acorde a la oferta de carreras prevista, con expresión de los 
antecedentes profesionales, académicos y en actividad de enseñanza de sus 
integrantes. 
7) Personal de apoyo y de servicios complementarios a la tarea docente, acorde a 
la oferta de carreras prevista.  
8) Bibliotecas, laboratorios o equipos técnicos acordes a la oferta de carreras 
prevista. 
9) Vinculaciones interinstitucionales existentes y previstas, si las hubiere. 
10)Servicios de información y comunicación interna. 
11) Planta física disponible, número de aulas y oficinas  acordes a la oferta de 
carreras prevista. 
12) Inventario inicial y balances constitutivos y posteriores con certificación 
profesional; acreditación de un patrimonio suficiente en función de la oferta de 
enseñanza, plan financiero institucional, con expresión de apoyos financieros 
externos si los hubiera. 
13) Plan de desarrollo en un plazo de cinco años en materia de carreras ofrecidas, 
personal docente, apoyo técnico y administrativo, infraestructura y proyección de 
sus recursos económicos.  
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Artículo 12.- (Carreras ofrecidas). La información sobre las carreras ofrecidas 
requerida en el art. 11 Nº 5, incluirá los datos siguientes: 
a) Pertinencia y objetivos de la carrera. 
b) Plan de estudios: objetivos, orientaciones metodológicas, asignaturas, duración 
total, carga horaria global y por asignatura, sistema de previaturas, perfil esperado 
del egresado. 
c) Programa analítico de cada asignatura. 
d) Bibliografía básica de cada asignatura. 
e)Director o responsable académico de la carrera. 
f) Docentes de cada asignatura. 
g)Régimen de evaluación de los estudiantes. 
h)Régimen de asistencia de los estudiantes. 
Artículo 13.- (Requisitos del personal docente). A los efectos de la autorización o 
del reconocimiento, el personal docente (artículo 11 Nº 6º) deberá cumplir con los 
siguientes requisitos: 
a) Las tres cuartas partes del personal docente asignado a cada carrera, como 
mínimo deberá poseer al menos un grado de nivel equivalente al de su 
culminación. 
b) El 10% (diez por ciento) del personal académico, como mínimo, deberá 
acreditar experiencia en investigación o docencia no inferior a cinco años. 
c) La mayoría absoluta del personal académico deberá estar integrada por 
ciudadanos naturales o legales, o bien residentes, en el país por un lapso no 
inferior a tres años, con un dominio solvente del idioma español. 
Artículo 14.- (Solicitud de autorización para funcionar como institución 
universitaria). La solicitud de autorización para funcionar como institución 
universitaria deberá acompañar, además de la prevista en el artículo 11, la 
siguiente información: 
a) Tareas de investigación programadas y plan de desarrollo en un plazo de cinco 
años.  
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b) Tareas de extensión programadas y plan de desarrollo en un plazo de cinco 
años. 
c) Programa de publicaciones, si existiera. 
Artículo 15.- (Actualización de información). Las instituciones de enseñanza 
terciaria autorizadas o reconocidas deberán actualizar ante el Ministerio de 
Educación y Cultura toda la información referida en este Capítulo, anualmente 
durante el lapso inicial de cinco años del artículo 7 inciso 1, y posteriormente cada 
tres años. 
Artículo 16.- (Gastos de tramitación). Todos los gastos que insuma la tramitación y 
evaluación de las solicitudes de autorización o reconocimiento, y de las inclusiones 
posteriores de nuevas carreras, incluyendo los asesoramientos o peritajes que se 
requieran, serán de cargo de la respectiva institución de enseñanza. 
El Ministerio de Educación y Cultura podrá requerir el depósito anticipado del 




De los títulos profesionales. 
Artículo 17.- (Concepto de título profesional). A los efectos de los artículos 1 y 2 
del Decreto-Ley Nº 15.661, de 29 de octubre de 1984, se entiende por título 
profesional el que acredita haber cursado con aprobación en instituciones 
universitarias, los estudios correspondientes a una carrera universitaria completa 
de carácter científico, técnico o artístico, incluyendo las que carecen de propósitos 
utilitarios inmediatos. 
Artículo 18.- (Validez de los títulos profesionales otorgados por instituciones 
universitarias privadas). Los títulos profesionales otorgados por instituciones 
privadas sólo serán válidos cuando la otorgante haya sido autorizada para 
funcionar como institución universitaria por el Poder Ejecutivo de conformidad con 
las normas de este decreto, y hayan sido registrados ante el Ministerio de 
Educación y Cultura.  
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Cumplidos tales requisitos, esos títulos tendrán idénticos efectos jurídicos que los 
expedidos por la Universidad de la República, independientemente de éstos.  
Artículo 19.- (Tipos de títulos profesionales universitarios). Los títulos profesionales 
expedidos por instituciones universitarias serán de siguientes niveles: 
a) Licenciatura universitaria: será el título acreditante de la culminación de la 
carrera de primer grado terciario. La duración de los estudios respectivos no 
será inferior a 1.800 horas-reloj de clases, distribuidas en un lapso no inferior a 
cuatro años lectivos; 
b) Especialización: será el título acreditante de la culminación de estudios 
específicos de profundización en una disciplina o conjunto de disciplinas afines, 
comprendidas en la carrera universitaria de primer grado. La duración mínima será 
de un año lectivo. 
c) Maestría o Magíster: será el título que acredite la culminación de estudios de 
complementación, ampliación y profundización de los estudios universitarios de 
primer grado, y de tareas de investigación que impliquen un 
manejo activo y creativo de conocimiento, incluyendo la elaboración de una tesis o 
memoria final. La duración mínima será de dos años lectivos. 
d) Doctorado: será el título que acredite la culminación de estudios de 
complementación, ampliación y profundización de los de maestría, y el desarrollo 
de tareas de investigación original superior, mediante la elaboración 
de una tesis. La duración mínima será de tres años lectivos. 
Artículo 20.- (Reválida de asignaturas). Los títulos  profesionales expedidos por 
instituciones universitarias se fundarán en estudios cursados y aprobados 
en la propia institución que lo otorga. 
Por excepción, podrán fundarse en asignaturas revalidadas, cursadas y aprobadas 
en la Universidad de la República o en otras instituciones universitarias, siempre 
que su número no exceda de los dos tercios del total de asignaturas que 
conforman la respectiva carrera. 
Si se trata de asignaturas cursadas y aprobadas en la República, deberán haberlo 
sido en la Universidad de la República o en instituciones universitarias cuyo  
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funcionamiento haya sido autorizado por el Poder Ejecutivo y formando parte de 
carreras incluidas en esa autorización. 
Artículo 21.- (Reválida de títulos). La reválida de títulos profesionales extranjeros 
es competencia exclusiva de la Universidad de la República, con exclusión de toda 




Del Consejo Consultivo de Enseñanza Terciaria Privada. 
Artículo 22.- (Cometidos) Créase en el Ministerio de Educación y Cultura el 
Consejo Consultivo de Enseñanza Terciaria Privada, con el cometido de asesorar 
al Poder Ejecutivo y al Ministerio de Educación y Cultura en las solicitudes de 
autorización para funcionar (art. 3º) o de reconocimiento de nivel académico (art. 
5º), en las solicitudes posteriores de inclusión de nuevas carreras (art. 6º), y en la 
revocación de los respectivos actos (art. 7º). Podrá también proponer las 
modificaciones que entienda convenientes al régimen establecido en el presente 
decreto. 
El dictamen del Consejo Consultivo previamente a la resolución del Poder 
Ejecutivo o del Ministerio de Educación y Cultura en su caso será preceptivo pero 
no vinculante. Si el órgano decisor se apartara del criterio del Consejo Consultivo, 
deberá hacer constar en la parte expositiva de la resolución los fundamentos por 
los cuales adopta decisión divergente. 
Los dictámenes del Consejo Consultivo serán públicos y estarán a disposición de 
quien quiera conocerlos en el ministerio de Educación y Cultura. 
Artículo 23.- (Integración). El Consejo Consultivo de Enseñanza Terciaria Privada 
estará integrado por ocho miembros designados por el Poder Ejecutivo, quienes 
serán ciudadanos de destacada trayectoria académica que no ocupen cargos en 
órganos de dirección en instituciones de enseñanza terciaria públicas o privadas. 
Tres de los miembros serán designados a propuesta de la Universidad de la 
República, dos a propuesta del Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, uno a propuesta  
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de la Administración Nacional de Educación Pública y dos a propuesta de las 
instituciones universitarias autorizadas a funcionar como tales. Si el Poder 
Ejecutivo entendiera que alguno de los propuestos no cumple con los requisitos 
establecidos en el inciso anterior, podrá requerir nueva propuesta. Si las 
propuestas no fueran formuladas dentro de los treinta días siguientes al 
requerimiento que el Ministerio de Educación y Cultura formule a quien 
corresponda, el Poder Ejecutivo podrá proceder a la designación prescindiendo de 
la respectiva propuesta.  
Los miembros del Consejo Consultivo de Enseñanza Terciaria Privada, que 
permanecerán tres años en sus cargos, actuarán con autonomía técnica en el 
desempeño de sus funciones de tales y su permanencia no estará condicionada 
al mantenimiento de la confianza del o los proponentes. 
Artículo 24.- (Presidencia del Consejo). La Presidencia del Consejo Consultivo de 
Enseñanza Terciaria Privada corresponderá al integrante que el Poder Ejecutivo 
designe con esa calidad, entre los propuestos por el Ministerio de Educación y 
Cultura o la Universidad de la República. 
Artículo 25.- (Asesoramientos previos). Para emitir su dictamen, el Consejo 
Consultivo podrá requerir los asesoramientos y peritajes que estime pertinentes. 
Cuando se trate de una autorización para funcionar como institución universitaria 
privada, requerirá necesariamente la opinión de la Universidad de la República, 
que deberá expedirse dentro del plazo de sesenta días contados a partir del 
requerimiento formal con agregación de antecedentes. Transcurrido ese plazo sin 
reconocimiento de la Universidad de la República ,podrá prescindirse de su 
opinión. 
Artículo 26.- (Pronunciamiento del Consejo). El Consejo Consultivo de Enseñanza 
Terciaria Privada sesionará con la presencia de cinco de sus integrantes. 
Los discordes con el dictamen del Consejo podrán hacer constar y fundar su 
disidencia.   
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Si el Consejo Consultivo no emitiera su dictamen dentro del plazo de 120 días 
contados a partir de la fecha en que el asunto fue sometido a su consideración, el 
órgano de decisión podrá resolver prescindiendo de su opinión, tomando en 




Artículo 27.- (Primera integración del Consejo Consultivo de Enseñanza Terciaria 
Privada). Los miembros que integren inicialmente el Consejo Consultivo 
permanecerán un año en sus cargos, transcurrido el cual se procederá a la 
designación de nuevos integrantes de conformidad con el artículo 23. 
Artículo 28.- (Institutos autorizados y carreras reconocidas). Las instituciones 
autorizadas a funcionar y las que tengan carreras reconocidas se considerarán 
incluidas en el inciso 2 del artículo 7, disponiendo de un plazo de tres años 
para adecuarse a todas las disposiciones de este decreto. 
Artículo 29.- (Denominación provisoria de los títulos profesionales universitarios). 
La denominación de los títulos profesionales expedidos por instituciones 
universitarias privadas podrá apartarse de las previstas, en el artículo 19, 
únicamente para equipararse a la de los que expida la Universidad de la República 
por similar carrera y nivel. 
 
Artículo 30.- Comuníquese, publíquese, etc.- 
 
SANGUINETTI - SAMUEL LICHTENSZTEJN 
(*) Publicado en "Diario Oficial" el 29 de agosto de 1995.  
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6. Law about the Graduate tax                                                                                         
Law N. 16.524 
 
Ley N° 16.524. 
BECAS PARA ESTUDIANTES DE LA 
UNIVERSIDAD DE LA REPUBLICA Y DEL NIVEL 
TERCIARIO DEL CONSEJO DE EDUCACION TECNICO 
PROFESIONAL 
CREASE UN FONDO DE SOLIDARIDAD, PARA FINANCIAR LAS 
MISMAS 
 
El Senado y la Cámara de Representantes de la República Oriental del 






Créase un Fondo de Solidaridad que tendrá como destino financiar un 
sistema de becas para estudiantes de la Universidad de la República y del 
nivel terciario del Consejo de Educación Técnico-Profesional (Administración 




El Fondo será organizado y administrado por una Comisión Honoraria  
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integrada con seis miembros que serán designados, uno por el Ministerio de 
Educación y Cultura, que la presidirá, cuyo voto decidirá en caso de empate, 
uno por la Universidad de la República, uno por el Consejo Directivo Central 
de la Administración Nacional de Educación Pública, a propuesta del Consejo 
de Educación Técnico- Profesional, uno por la Caja de Jubilaciones y 
Pensiones de Profesionales Universitarios, uno por la Caja Notarial de 
Jubilaciones y Pensiones y uno por el Banco de la República Oriental del 
Uruguay. 
Dicha Comisión establecerá: 
A) Las directivas generales a las que se ajustarán la Universidad de la 
República y el Consejo de Educación Técnico- Profesional para asignar las 
referidas becas, conforme a lo dispuesto por los artículos 6° y 7° de la 
presente ley.  
B) Los mecanismos de contralor de los correspondientes aportes. 
C) La forma de acreditar la calidad de sujetos pasivos de la obligación de 
aportar y la de beneficiarios de las becas. Asimismo deberá determinar 
anualmente el porcentaje de lo aportado que le corresponderá administrar a 




El Fondo se integrará con aportes anuales efectuados por todos los 
egresados 
en actividad que posean título profesional expedido o revalidado por la 
Universidad de la República o por el nivel terciario del Consejo de Educación 
Técnico-Profesional, una vez cumplidos los diez años de expedición o 
reválida del mismo.  
  412 
El aporte anual será como mínimo el equivalente a un Salario Mínimo 
Nacional determinado de acuerdo a lo que disponga la reglamentación 
dictada por el Poder Ejecutivo a propuesta de la Comisión Honoraria creada 
por el artículo anterior. 
Los profesionales universitarios deberán efectuar su aporte ante la Caja de 
Jubilaciones y Pensiones de Profesionales Universitarios o ante la Caja 
Notarial de Jubilaciones y Pensiones en su caso. Dicho aporte será debido 
en 
forma solidaria con el respectivo aportes jubilatorio y deberá hacerse efectivo 
en forma simultánea al mismo en un solo pago anual o en cuotas. 
Los egresados del nivel terciario del Consejo de Educación Técnico-
Profesional pagarán su aporte al contado en forma anual o en cuotas, ante 
cualquier dependencia del Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay, 
el que a tales efectos habilitará una cuenta especial. 
Anualmente se exigirá a todo profesional, tanto en organismos públicos como 
en empresas privadas, que acredite estar al día con dichos aportes mediante 
constancia que expedirán la Caja de Jubilaciones y Pensiones de 
Profesionales Universitarios y la Caja Notarial de Jubilaciones y Pensiones. 
Para el caso de los egresados de los cursos de nivel terciario del Consejo de 
Educación Técnico- Profesional bastará la presentación del recibo de pago 
otorgado por el Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay. En caso de no 
hacerlo, no podrán realizar trámites oficiales ni percibir sueldos o 




Quedarán exceptuadas de la obligatoriedad del aporte aquellos profesionales  
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con más de diez años de antigüedad desde la expedición del título respectivo 
que acrediten, mediante declaración jurada ante la Comisión Administradora 
del Fondo, no percibir ningún tipo de ingresos derivados de su condición de 
profesionales universitarios o de egresados de los cursos de nivel terciario 
del 




El Fondo financiará las becas con parte del capital y la renta. 
Anualmente, la comisión podrá asignar hasta un 70% (setenta por ciento) del 
monto disponible. Sólo en casos de excepción y por razones fundadas podrá 
financiar becas con el 30% (treinta por ciento) restante. 




Las becas tendrán un monto máximo de dos Salarios Mínimos Nacionales 
por 
mes, durante el tiempo que dure, según el programa oficial, cada período 




La Comisión sólo concederá becas a los estudiantes que carezcan de 
recursos económicos suficientes. 
Para la concesión de las becas se tomarán en cuenta los siguientes criterios:  
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a)Situación socio-económica 
b) Procedencia geográfica. 
c) Rendimiento y aptitudes. 
La reglamentación, dictada a propuesta del Ente de enseñanza respectivo, 
determinará los niveles mínimos de cumplimiento del programa de cursos o 
exámenes de cada año lectivo, que serán indispensables para poder 
usufructuar la beca en el siguiente año, salvo circunstancias de fuerza mayor, 
debidamente acreditadas. 
La Comisión podrá establecer prioridades temáticas a los efectos del 




La Caja de Jubilaciones y Pensiones de Profesionales Universitarios, la Caja 
Notarial de Jubilaciones y Pensiones y el Banco de la República Oriental del 
Uruguay deducirán de cada aporte recibido al 1% (uno por ciento) por 
conceptos de gastos de administración. 
La Comisión Administradora del Fondo utilizará y administrará hasta un 1% 
(uno por ciento) de los aportes recibidos para sus gastos de funcionamiento, 





La Universidad de la República y la Administración Nacional de Educación 
Pública enviarán a la Comisión Administradora del Fondo, dentro de los 
primeros treinta días de cada año, la nómina completa de quienes hayan227  
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obtenido títulos profesionales comprendidos en la presente ley durante el año 
inmediato anterior y la fecha exacta en que se produjo su expedición. 
La Universidad de la República proporcionará a la Comisión, asimismo, la 
información registrada en el Servicio Central de Bienestar Universitario, a 
efectos de establecer la coordinación necesaria para el debido cumplimiento 




(Transitorio). Dentro de los tres meses inmediatos a la fecha de vigencia de 
la 
presente ley las autoridades de la Universidad de la República y de la 
Administración Nacional de Educación Pública enviarán a la Comisión 
Administradora del Fondo, que deberá ser nombrada en un plazo de treinta 
días, la nómina completa de los profesionales egresados así como la fecha 
de expedición de los títulos respectivos. 
 
El Poder Ejecutivo reglamentará la presente ley en un plazo de noventa días. 




MARIO CANTON, Presidente. 
HORACIO D. CATALURDA, Secretario. 
MINISTERIO DE EDUCACION Y CULTURA. 
MINISTERIO DE ECONOMIA Y FINANZAS. 
MINISTERIO DE TRABAJO Y SEGURIDAD SOCIAL.  
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Montevideo, 25 de julio de 1994. 
Cúmplase, acúsese recibo, comuníquese, publíquese e insértese en el 
Registro Nacional de Leyes y Decretos. 
SANTORO. 
ANTONIO MERCADER. 
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7.CEPRE Regulations 
Ministry of Economy and Finance 
 
Presidencia de la República Oriental del Uruguay 
Oficina de Planeamiento y Presupuesto 
Comité Ejecutivo para la Reforma del Estado 
 






El plazo para completar esta información es 29 de noviembre de 2002 
• Consultas 
Las consultas relativas a la Evaluación de las Metas e Indicadores de 
Desempeño: 
Email: sev@cepre.opp.gub.uy 
Teléfonos: 150 Interno 1415 o 1417 Edificio Libertad Piso 4 OPP-CEPRE. 
ll. Objetivo 
La finalidad de este instructivo es proporcionar pautas para evaluar las metas 
e indicadores de  gestión presentados en los Planes Anuales de Gestión 
(PAG) contenidos en ―Propuesta de  modificaciones de las Metas e 
Indicadores de Gestión 2002-2004‖ (SIP), presentado anexo a  la Rendici￳n 
de Cuentas 2001.  
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Específicamente se considerará el grado en que las Metas e Indicadores 
permiten evaluar el  desempeño y aportan elementos relevantes para la toma 
de decisiones de las Unidades  Ejecutoras.  Este análisis servirá de base 
para modificar los PAG en próximas Rendiciones de  Cuentas y será 
considerado para participar en un futuro sistema de incentivos dirigido a 




lll. Material de apoyo 
Para realizar la evaluación de los indicadores de desempeño se utilizarán los 
siguientes  documentos: Formulario de Evaluación, en formato Excel, donde 
se registrarán los resultados de la  evaluación (disponible en la página web: 
www.cepre.opp.gub.uy). 
El tomo ―Resultados de la Gesti￳n Pública‖ (SEV) de la Rendici￳n de 
Cuentas 2001 1 ,  que contiene las Metas definidas para el Presupuesto 
2002-2004 y los valores de los  Indicadores de Gestión correspondientes al 
año 2001. 
1 Se puede consultar en : www.cepre.opp.gub.uy/ Rendición de Cuentas 
2001 
El tomo ―Propuesta de modificaciones de las Metas e Indicadores de Gesti￳n 
2002-2004‖ 
(SIP), presentado anexo a la Rendición de Cuentas 2001, donde figuran las 
metas 
propuestas para el año 2002 al 2004  
Ö El documento donde están disponibles las fuentes de información que 
fueron ingresados  por cada Unidad Ejecutora en el momento de la  
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Formulación del Presupuesto por  Resultados, es ConsultasFuentes.xls 
(disponible en la página web: www.cepre.opp.gub.uy). 
Ö El libro "La Reforma Administrativa del Estado‖ que contiene las 
reestructuras 
organizativas realizadas antes de 1999. 
lV. Año de análisis 
Se evaluarán las metas e indicadores de gestión del año 2002 ya que son 
pasibles de ser  modificadas en la próxima Rendición de Cuentas, a 
mediados de 2003. En el caso de aquellas  metas que se repiten cada año 
será necesario tomar en cuenta, además, la presentación de  metas e 
indicadores del año 2001(SEV), a efectos de examinar su evolución, la forma 
en que  se ingresaron los datos y la calidad de los mismos. 
V. Definición de algunos conceptos  
Meta es un fin que las Unidades Ejecutoras se proponen alcanzar en un 
período de tiempo  especifico, cuantificándose los resultados que se desean 
lograr e incluso el costo estimado  para llegar a los mismos. Una meta de 
gestión es, por definición, el propósito de una Unidad  Ejecutora de pasar de 
un estado actual, considerado perfectible o insatisfactorio, a un estado futuro 
deseado. 
En el Presupuesto 2000-2004 las metas se establecieron en el ámbito de los 
Centros de  Actividad y en general expresan los fines a lograr en términos de 
los productos de los Centros  de Actividad. En los Planes Anuales de Gestión 
(PAG) la meta es la expresión concreta, para  cada año, de los objetivos 
estratégicos que la Unidad Ejecutora se propone alcanzar en el mediano 
plazo, en general en el período de gobierno. 
Indicador de gestión es una variable cuantitativa cuya finalidad es dar 
información acerca del grado de cumplimiento de una meta. Los indicadores  
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no son más que la expresión cuantitativa de un compromiso de la institución 
por alcanzar ciertas metas o estándares de desempeño y, por lo tanto, al 
tener este carácter de "compromiso interno" deben basarse sobre variables 
que la Unidad Ejecutora pueda controlar. 
Es sólo un instrumento que permite la medición y por lo tanto, su calidad y 
utilidad como tal estará determinada principalmente por la claridad y la 
relevancia de la meta que tiene asociada. 
Las Metas deben reflejar tres dimensiones principales a través de los 
indicadores de gestión: eficacia, eficiencia y calidad (Artículo Nº 41 de la Ley 
16.736 de 5 de enero de 1996). Para analizar el desempeño global de la 
Unidad Ejecutora debe tomarse en cuenta todos los indicadores en forma 
integral. 
Los indicadores de eficacia y de eficiencia deben expresarse como una 
relación entre dos variables. 
Indicador de Eficacia: se refiere al grado de cumplimiento de las metas 
establecidas y relaciona en general la cantidad de producto realmente 
obtenida en la gestión con la cantidad prevista en la meta (por ejemplo: 
número de análisis realizados sobre número de análisis previstos). 
2 Idem. 3 Se incorporará un glosario completo con los conceptos relativos a 
Evaluación de la Gestión Pública   
Indicador de Eficiencia: describe la relación entre dos magnitudes, la 
producción física de un bien o servicio y los insumos que se utilizaron para 
alcanzar ese nivel de producto. Por ejemplo, cantidad de recursos 
empleados para obtener un bien o servicio (expresada en general en valores 
monetarios) dividida la cantidad de bienes o servicios producidos. 
Generalmente se expresa en costos unitarios, por ejemplo: costo por Km.  
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pavimentado, pero también puede expresarse como unidades producidas 
dividido cantidad de horas trabajadas o cantidad de personas (productividad). 
Indicador de Calidad: se refiere a la capacidad de la institución para 
responder en forma rápida y directa a las necesidades de sus usuarios. 
También se puede referir a la calidad técnica del producto entregado por el 
CA o la UE. Por ejemplo: tiempo de espera promedio para atención en 
consulta, demora promedio en la entrega del servicio, porcentaje de defectos 
o quejas. La calidad se valora en función del cumplimiento de expectativas 
de los administrados. 
En general, un servicio público es de calidad si el servicio prestado 
coincide con lo que espera de él quien lo recibe. 
Algunos factores de calidad a tener en cuenta son: a) la información que 
recibe el usuario; b) la accesibilidad del servicio; c) la competencia del 
personal en contacto; d) tiempos de respuesta; e) simplicidad del trámite; f) 
calidad técnica; g) percepción del usuario  
VI. Procedimiento 
1.  Abrir la planilla Excel, FormularioEvaluación .xls 
2. Identificar Inciso, UE, Número de Centro de Actividad, Número de Meta en 
el tomo (―Propuesta de modificaciones de las Metas e Indicadores de Gesti￳n 
2002-2004‖ (SIP). Por ejemplo: Inciso 10, UE 005, CA 10 – Estudios y 
Proyectos y Meta 01. 
2.  Analizar las Metas e Indicadores presentados en el tomo ―Propuesta 
de modificaciones de las Metas e Indicadores de Gestión 2002-2004‖ 
(SIP), en el marco de los Productos y Objetivos Estratégicos 5 , de la 
Misión 6 y de los cometidos sustantivos de cada Unidad Ejecutora  
3.  Complementar el análisis del punto anterior con la información del 
SEV, observando en particular los datos presentados en el 2001 (lo  
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que es posible si la meta se repite en el 2002) y examinar la relación 
de la meta con los principales productos de la Unidad Ejecutora.  
4.  Evaluar la Meta a través de los atributos que se listan a continuación y 
que deberán ser calificados según el grado que se entienda 
pertinente. Se contemplan los siguientes valores para cada uno de los 
atributos: 
0- No se cumple 
1- No se cumple pero es solucionable (con alguna modificación se puede 
llevar a que el 
atributo se cumpla) 
2- Se cumple 
4 ―Guía para la Construcci￳n de Indicadores de Gesti￳n‖ SEV – Feb/99 5 
―Programa Estratégico de Gesti￳n y Planes Anuales de Gesti￳n por Inciso y 
por Unidad Ejecutora‖ Tomo VI-1 del 
Anexo al Presupuesto Nacional 2000-2004. 6 ―Resultados de la Gesti￳n 
Pública‖ (SEV) Rendici￳n de Cuentas 2001 y de los Decretos de 
Reformulación de las 
Estructuras Organizativas presentadas en ―La Reforma Administrativa del 
Estado‖ CEPRE 7 Decretos de Reformulación de las Estructuras 
Organizativas presentadas en ―La Reforma Administrativa del Estado‖ 
Atributos de metas Concepto 
Tipo A – Cuantitativa; B – Cualitativa 
Relevancia CA Contribuye claramente con los productos y cometidos 
sustantivos del CA 
Relevancia estratégica Contribuye claramente a los productos y objetivos 
estratégicos de la 
Unidad Ejecutora.  
  423 
Claridad Expresa concretamente el objetivo que se quiere lograr 
Independencia Responde a acciones que dependen solamente de la Unidad 
Ejecutora 
Indicador de eficacia 1: tiene indicador; 0: no tiene indicador 
Indicador de eficiencia 1: tiene indicador; 0: no tiene indicador 
Indicador de calidad 1: tiene indicador; 0: no tiene indicador 
6. Evaluar los Indicadores a través de los atributos que se listarán a 
continuación y que deberán ser calificados según el grado en que se 
entienda pertinente. Como en el caso anterior, se contemplan los siguientes 
valores para cada uno de los atributos: 
0- No se cumple 
1- No se cumple pero es solucionable (con alguna modificación se puede 
llevar a que el 
atributo se cumpla) 
2- Se cumple 
 
Atributos de Indicador de eficacia 
Concepto 
Pertinencia Refleja claramente el logro o no de la meta propuesta 
No manipulable Que sea resistente a comportamientos indeseables (por 
ejemplo es posible que resulte una expedición exagerada de multas si un 
departamento es evaluado solamente por esta actividad) 
Fuentes de información Se indican claramente las fuentes utilizadas para 
su cálculo 
Sistemas de información 
Existen sistemas internos verificables o auditables, que 
proporcionan los datos en forma rutinaria.  
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Datos 0- si no existe dato, 1- si existe dato para un año, 2- si existe dato 
para los dos años 
Atributo de indicadorde eficiencia 
Concepto 
Pertinencia Expresa la cantidad de recursos usados para la producción del 
bien 
o servicio referido en la meta. 
No manipulable Que sea resistente a comportamientos indeseables (por 
ejemplo es posible que resulte una expedición exagerada de multas si un 
departamento es evaluado solamente por esta actividad) 
Fuentes de información   
Se indican claramente las fuentes utilizadas para su cálculo 
Sistemas de información 
Existen sistemas internos verificables o auditables, que proporcionan los 
datos en forma rutinaria. 
 
Datos 0- si no existe dato, 1-  si existe dato para un año,  
2- si existe dato para los dos años 
Atributo de indicador de calidad 
 Concepto 
Pertinencia Que esté referido con precisión a la satisfacción del cliente o a 
la 
calidad técnica del producto o servicio que se entrega. 
No manipulable Que sea resistente a comportamientos indeseables (por 
ejemplo es posible que resulte una expedición exagerada de multas si un 
departamento es evaluado solamente por esta actividad)  
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Fuentes de información Se indican claramente las fuentes utilizadas para 
su cálculo.  
Sistemas de Existen sistemas internos verificables o auditables, que 
proporcionan los datos en forma rutinaria. 
Datos 0- si no existe dato, 1- si existe dato para un año, 2- si existe dato 
para los dos años.En caso de que haya más de un indicador, se evaluarán 
todos ellos colocando el mismo número de identificación que figura en el 
SEV. 
Una vez ingresados los valores asignados a cada atributo en la planilla 
Formulario de Evaluación, se puede sumar a nivel de cada fila obteniendo 
así un puntaje global de las metas e indicadores que permite realizar 
comparaciones entre distintas metas y entre los Centros de Actividad. 
El control del desempeño es posible si los indicadores son en conjunto: 
• oportunos, recogidos y distribuidos en tiempo como para ser considerados 
por los directivos y responsables en la toma de decisiones. 
• obtenidos a un costo razonable, ya que el costo de recolecci￳n y 
procesamiento de la información no puede exceder el valor de la misma. 
• tales que responden a una meta que refleja los Objetivos y Productos  
estratégicos de la Unidad Ejecutora. 
VII. Pasos a dar para mejorar el sistema de evaluación 
Para realizar efectivamente el control de la gestión y la evaluación, se 
deberán tener en cuenta aspectos organizativos como los que se señalan a 
continuación: 
• Fijar la frecuencia con que se informará sobre cada indicador. 
• Designar un responsable de la recolecci￳n de datos y de la preparaci￳n de 
informes en cada Centros de Actividad.  
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• Designar un responsable para la recepci￳n de datos, la supervisión y 
retroalimentación a nivel de la Unidad Ejecutora. También será responsable 
de coordinar con el Inciso. 
• Auditar peri￳dicamente los datos. 
• Asegurar que los datos contenidos en los indicadores tengan informaci￳n 
de años anteriores o estándares que sirvan de base de comparación. 
El éxito de un sistema de evaluación del desempeño depende, en gran 
medida, de que los directores de las organizaciones se comprometan con el 
mismo y que sus resultados sean incorporados en los procesos de toma de 
decisiones y de definición de políticas. Ello es particularmente relevante a la 
hora de formular los presupuestos y discutir las asignaciones  presupuestales 
en el ámbito parlamentario. 
 
VIII. Bibliografía consultada  
―Guía para la construcci￳n de indicadores de Gesti￳n‖ – CEPRE – SEV; 
Febrero 1999 (está en pagina web del CEPRE). 
―Evaluaci￳n de la gesti￳n en Chile‖, A￱o 2001, Ministerio de Hacienda – 
Dirección de Presupuesto. 
―Metodología SINE (Sistema Nacional de Evaluaci￳n), Documento 
Explicativo, Costa Rica. (en CEPRE) 
―Selecting performance indicators‖ Performance Monitoring and Evaluation. 
TIPS. 
―Medidas de desempe￱o en los gobiernos estatales y locales‖ David 
Ammons. 
    


















    













DOCUMENTS FROM THE POLITICAL  PARTIES 









IV CONGRESO "Hector Rodríguez"  
FRENTE AMPLIO  
PROPUESTA DE GRANDES LINEAMIENTOS PROGRAMATICOS PARA EL 
GOBIERNO 2005 - 2010 
PORQUE ENTRE TODOS OTRO URUGUAY ES POSIBLE 
 
Educación para el desarrollo y la cultura ciudadana 
 
La democratización del acceso – a través de la superación de las condiciones que hoy 
la limitan - y la mejora sustancial de la calidad de la enseñanza resulta fundamental 
para la construcción de un país productivo y justo que apunte al desarrollo humano, la 
construcción de ciudadanía, la formación permanente, la cultura y la innovación. 
 
La educación debe atender las tremendas desigualdades sociales existentes, 
rescatando su carácter integrador y su apertura a la comunidad. La educación técnica y 
profesional debe jerarquizarse para todas las edades y a todo nivel, así como la 
investigación y la extensión en función del interés nacional. Debe apostarse a la 
formación y profesionalización docente. 
 
Es imperioso construir un sistema nacional de educación acorde a estos objetivos 
promoviendo la participación, la descentralización y la autonomía, recobrando la   
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esencialidad del carácter público de la educación. La enseñanza no formal y 
comunitaria, al igual que los medios de comunicación, deben aprovecharse al máximo 
en esta dirección. 
 
Todo ello requiere un aumento presupuestal significativo contemplando el planteo 
plebiscitado en 1994 en relación al PBI tendiendo a ajustarse a las recomendaciones 
de organismos como la UNESCO. 
 
Rechazamos los proyectos de mercantilización de la educación, impulsados por 
organismos internacionales como la OMC, en la medida que reivindicamos su carácter 
de derecho esencial y patrimonio nacional.  
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PROGRAMA PARA UN GOBIERNO DE COMPROMISO NACIONAL 




EL CENTRO EDUCATIVO PASARÁ A SER EL EJE DE LA INNOVACIÓN, EL 
ELEMENTO ESTRATÉGICO DE LA MEJORA EDUCATIVA 
 




La política educativa estará orientada al cumplimiento de los siguientes fines 
fundamentales. 
 
• El desarrollo de una educaci￳n en valores, que contribuya a la construcci￳n 
autónoma de personas con sólidas disposiciones éticas y una ciudadanía 
democrática sustentada en los valores universales que consagra nuestra 
Constitución y las Declaraciones de Derechos Humanos. 
 
Se jerarquizará la función ética de la enseñanza y la dimensión formativa del acto 
educador. La educación no puede limitarse sólo a la instrucción  
  432 
en unas materias, sino a la formación integral de las personas, acompañando y 
apoyando la función de las familias. 
 
Las fisuras que se advierten en el entramado social y el debilitamiento de las 
agencias de socialización tradicionales, demandan del sistema educativo un papel 
activo en la afirmación de valores compartidos para la convivencia. El 
fortalecimiento de una cultura democrática debe proveer competencias y virtudes 
ciudadanas (en su doble dimensión cognitiva y moral) para una convivencia sin 
exclusiones, para ser agentes participantes en la vida de la comunidad, para la 
adopción de decisiones fundadas y responsables, para el desarrollo de un sentido 
crítico, la adquisición de habilidades dialógicas, el intercambio respetuoso de ideas 
y la formación de una razón pública informada. 
 
• La educaci￳n debe contribuir a recrear las bases de la integraci￳n social y 
cultural de la comunidad nacional. 
Se fortalecerán con ese objetivo las políticas de igualdad de oportunidades y 
acciones compensatorias de las asimetrías de origen socio-cultural; 
los programas de atención a alumnos con dificultades de aprendizaje y propuestas 
socializadoras. 
La educación debe ser un derecho efectivo que resulte accesible para toda la 
población. Esto incluye el desafío de atender las necesidades educativas 
especiales a través, por ejemplo, de soluciones desde lo pedagógico que hagan 
posible acceder a una educación para todos en entornos lo menos restrictivos 
posibles. 
Se generarán importantes incentivos para atraer maestros y profesores bien 
calificados a las escuelas y liceos emplazados en las zonas y 
barrios más desprotegidos. Destinar ―mejores‖ recursos a los lugares donde 
existan las mayores necesidades. Hoy el domicilio del alumno termina en los 
hechos convalidando oportunidades educativas diferentes.  
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La administración pública acordará un proyecto pedagógico específico con cada 
centro educativo y brindará apoyos que capaciten a cada institución para ser 
agente de su transformación. En contrapartida, las evaluaciones de su 
funcionamiento y los resultados de aprendizaje, permitirán identificar debilidades y 
proveer medios para el fortalecimiento institucional y la mejora pedagógica. 
Se incentivará el concepto de comunidad educativa, buscando que cada 
institución con la participación y el compromiso de todos sus actores, 
diseñe y desarrolle un proyecto educativo que provea de identidad y clarifique el 
sentido del ―para qué‖ educar. 
Una educación de calidad sólo puede darse en buenas instituciones, que a partir 
de un proyecto pedagógico y una cultura institucional, propician 
un contexto apto para el aprendizaje y el desarrollo de las capacidades de los 
alumnos. El concepto central es que la buena educación la hace la buena 
institución. 
La construcción de un proyecto de centro educativo permite trascender los 
contenidos curriculares y lo que ocurre estrictamente en el aula. 
Todo el centro educa con la experiencia cotidiana de los alumnos en la institución, 
a partir de un proyecto vertebrador que otorga significado y sirve de marco de 
referencia a todas las actividades de aprendizaje. 
El éxito de esta modalidad de gestión institucional requiere directores con 
liderazgo pedagógico y conformar equipos de trabajo estables, evitando la rotación 
de docentes y directores. 
Los docentes son actores claves en la dinámica de cualquier política educativa. Es 
necesario avanzar hacia un sistema integral de implementación de mejores 
prácticas de enseñanza que vincule la capacitación docente con necesarios 
cambios a nivel de la escuela, el liceo y el salón de clase. El desarrollo de políticas 
efectivas requiere además entender mejor los incentivos –o desincentivos- que 
subyacen a la organización y funcionamiento de nuestras instituciones y que 
influyen sobre el comportamiento y desempeño de los actores involucrados.  
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Se buscará que las instituciones de enseñanza de todo el país incentiven la 
participación de los estudiantes en diversas actividades, que retroalimenten 
positivamente las sinergias de la sociabilidad juvenil. Esto contribuirá a dar mayor 
sentido a los estudios, identificando a los alumnos con el centro. 
Los estudiantes se enfrentan a un sistema educativo rígido que no contempla la 
heterogeneidad de contextos, determinantes de diferencias 
en sus necesidades. Aquí vuelve a ser valiosa la autonomía del centro educativo 
que le otorga flexibilidad y le permite adaptarse a los requerimientos particulares 
de cada comunidad. En este sentido se reconoce la importancia de mantener una 
amplia red de escuelas rurales. Cada escuela rural operará como centro de 
irradiación cultural de su zona, como ámbito de socialización y de vinculación de 
niños y jóvenes con su propio entorno y como centro de animación de actividades 
de capacitación y promoción social. 
 
 Acceso y permanencia en el sistema educativo 
En el período 1985-2003 la educación pública no universitaria incorporó casi 200 
mil nuevos alumnos a niveles de enseñanza, a los que estos sectores de la 
población no tenían antes acceso. Ello marca una fuerte progresividad de la 
escolarización del país. El problema no es el acceso sino la permanencia en el 
sistema educativo, así como los aprendizajes y rendimientos de los alumnos. 
 
En el nivel primario la repetición centrada en 1ero. y 2do. grado, (21%) es un 
problema endémico y ha sido impermeable a estrategias específicas orientadas a 
su abatimiento. La extensión prácticamente universal de la educación inicial a las 
edades 4 y 5 años no ha tenido el impacto esperado sobre el aprendizaje de estos 
primeros grados. Problemas de regularidad en la asistencia y permanencia de los 
matriculados, podrían explicar la debilidad de las adquisiciones. 
La repetición en los primeros grados de primaria tiene impactos negativos 
determinantes del abandono escolar temprano. En el Ciclo Básico de Educación 
Media sólo el 45% del alumnado egresa del mismo en los tres años previstos, un  
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33% abandona y un 22% queda rezagado. La deserción durante el Ciclo 
Secundario alcanza a uno de cada dos alumnos.  
Los promedios no dan cuenta de las diferencias significativas por estrato socio-
económico, indicadores de la transmisión intergeneracional de la desigualdad. 
Estos adolescentes y jóvenes que interrumpen tempranamente sus estudios, se 
verán afectados en el modo de integración a la propia sociedad, debido 
fundamentalmente a las desventajas con las que hacen frente a la estructura de 
oportunidades de que disponen. 
 
Acciones para abatir el fracaso y el abandono temprano 
 
En el Ciclo Primario 
• Captar el adicional de ni￱os de 4 y 5 a￱os que aún no se ha incorporado a la 
educación inicial. Fortalecer la regularidad de la asistencia y permanencia de los 
alumnos matriculados, evitando el desgranamiento progresivo de la matrícula a lo 
largo del año. 
• Ampliar el proceso de extensi￳n del modelo de escuelas de tiempo completo. 
• Fortalecer los vínculos escuela-familia-comunidad, trabajando en redes con 
instituciones de cada zona como forma de sumar recursos y coordinar acciones de 
protección social. 
• Formular un plan de acci￳n para la mejora de los aprendizajes y de los niveles de 
desempeño escolar en los primeros grados de enseñanza 
primaria. 
Dicho plan comprenderá: 
• La adjudicaci￳n preceptiva a los grupos de primer ciclo escolar de Maestros 
efectivos, bien calificados y con experiencia en el grado. 
• La jerarquizaci￳n de los objetivos y contenidos de grado fijando la centralidad de 
unos aprendizajes básicos, que todos los escolares deben adquirir 
satisfactoriamente.  
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• La clasificaci￳n de las dificultades de los alumnos y formas de intervenci￳n 
pedagógica para la mejora de los aprendizajes, mediante apoyos específicos y 
ayudas diferenciales según la índole de los problemas detectados. 
• Una estructura curricular por ciclos extendidos de aprendizaje, que promuevan el 
progreso individual del escolar y potencien futuras 36experiencias de aprendizaje. 
• La ampliaci￳n del programa ―verano solidario‖ como instancia de 
complementación alimentaria, de recreación, de deporte y de apoyo pedagógico 
para los alumnos cuya situación socioeconómica les impide el acceso a mejores 
alternativas. 
 
En el Ciclo Básico de la Educación Media 
 
• Restablecer espacios curriculares que permitan la atenci￳n personalizada y la 
compensación pedagógica de los alumnos con desempeños disminuídos. 
• Impulsar una política de protecci￳n social básica de los adolescentes, mediante 
programas que combinen apoyo alimentario, acceso a textos, facilidades de 
transporte, promoción de la recreación y el deporte. 
• Fortalecer la capacidad de los liceos para constituirse en referente para el 
estudiante, a través de: un clima educativo propicio para la sociabilidad 
con sus pares, el fortalecimiento de los vínculos con las familias y el desarrollo de 
un sentido de pertenencia. 
 
Reinserción educativa de los jóvenes que no estudian ni trabajan 
 
El número de jóvenes entre 15 y 18 años que desertó del sistema educativo sin 
completar el Ciclo Básico obligatorio se estima en casi 44 mil. De estos, 28 mil ni 
estudian ni trabajan. Estos jóvenes se encuentran en una condición de 
marginalidad respecto de cualquier ámbito público, con interrupción del proceso de 
formación de capital humano, lo que implica el riesgo de volverse un patrón 
estable de marginalización.  
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Lograr la reinserción educativa de los mismos es un objetivo a priorizar, 
requiriéndose de una propuesta educativa flexible, adaptada a sus intereses y 
aptitudes y capaz de integrar en un núcleo de formación básica una orientación 
profesional que favorezca su inserción laboral y social. Esta nueva propuesta 
educativa debe motivar al joven desertor para retomar los estudios y potenciar al 
máximo sus capacidades, brindando 
protagonismo y orientación a sus expectativas, para así fortalecer su autoestima. 
A tales efectos y entre otros mecanismos, se utilizarán en verano las aulas vacías 
para la realización de cursos de reinserción. 
Debe crear espacios de recreación y de información en temas de su interés y 
favorecer institucionalmente la socialización con sus pares. 
Lograr su inserción y que cursen con éxito este ciclo formativo requerirá una 
política de protección social que incluya alimentación y transporte colectivo, así 
como apoyos pedagógicos permanentes para sustentar su proceso de 
aprendizaje. 
El diseño curricular atenderá las formaciones requeridas para la acreditación del 
Ciclo Básico y estará basado en competencias a desarrollar en los jóvenes, desde 
un enfoque de enseñanza aprendizaje activos, basado en la elaboración y 
desarrollo de proyectos educativos. 
 
 Formación de recursos humanos para el emprendimiento productivo 
 
En la época actual el mundo del trabajo está sometido a cambios permanentes y 
transformaciones radicales que inciden en la cualificación y competencias 
requeridas a los trabajadores, demandando una formación polivalente que habilite 
procesos de reconversión y adaptación a los cambios. 
La oferta de cursos y su diseño curricular deberán concebirse a partir de una 
investigación prospectiva, que plantee diversidad de escenarios productivos y de 
evolución tecnológica en una proyección a mediano y largo plazo. Aquellos no 
pueden surgir unilateralmente del sistema educativo, sino de una fuerte  
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articulación con las cámaras empresariales y el ámbito sindical, los que deben 
implicarse firmemente en la formación de los futuros recursos humanos para la 
producción y el trabajo. 
Los procesos de aprendizaje en el área técnico-profesional no pueden resolverse 
satisfactoriamente en el ámbito exclusivo de las aulas y talleres. 
Allí no pueden aprenderse las destrezas y aptitudes necesarias para el mundo real 
del trabajo, capacitarse en el uso de equipos de última generación y comprender 
la complejidad de roles, de procesos productivos y de organización empresarial 
implicados. La educación técnicoprofesional requerirá una visión más global del 
proceso de aprendizaje donde participen la escuela técnica, el mundo empresarial, 
el ámbito sindical y sean incluidos los intereses de los jóvenes aprendices. Estos 
deberán adquirir capacidades no sólo técnicas sino para gestionar cambios 
organizativos, para tomar o compartir decisiones, para el trabajo colaborativo, 
adquirir hábitos y cultura de trabajo, desarrollar espíritu de iniciativa y de 
emprendimiento personal y productivo. 
 
 Profesionalización docente y calidad educativa 
 
En el horizonte temporal de una década la sociedad uruguaya debe apostar al 
logro de un cuerpo docente de la enseñanza media totalmente profesionalizado, 
con formación específica de excelencia. Esta es una prioridad para el logro de la 
calidad educativa y la mejora pedagógica. 
La formación inicial de maestros y profesores en todas sus modalidades, tendrá 
una duración de cuatro años y su titulación nivel universitario. 
A partir de un marco común institucionalizado y jerarquizado como sistema de 
formación docente que garantice un perfil de formación de alta calidad, se deben 
habilitar diversidad de caminos y formatos de formación inicial, de posgrados y 
especializaciones y de capacitación permanente 
de los educadores. Se fortalecerán como centros de excelencia los institutos de 
formación docente existentes.  
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Programa de recursos para ampliar la inversión educativa 
 
La relativa baja asignación de recursos económicos a la educación de nuestro 
país, en comparación con la inversión que realizan sociedades de desarrollo 
comparativo, ha determinado una base salarial poco acorde con los requisitos de 
profesionalidad docente. La significativa expansión de la matrícula desde la 
recuperación democrática en los niveles educación inicial y educación media, 
acotaron aún más las posibilidades 
de mejorar las condiciones de trabajo. 
 
Formación de recursos humanos para el emprendimiento productivo 
 
En la época actual el mundo del trabajo está sometido a cambios permanentes y 
transformaciones radicales que inciden en la cualificación y competencias 
requeridas a los trabajadores, demandando una formación polivalente que habilite 
procesos de reconversión y adaptación a los cambios. 
La oferta de cursos y su diseño curricular deberán concebirse a partir de una 
investigación prospectiva, que plantee diversidad de escenarios productivos y de 
evolución tecnológica en una proyección a mediano y largo plazo. Aquellos no 
pueden surgir unilateralmente del sistema educativo, 
sino de una fuerte articulación con las cámaras empresariales y el ámbito sindical, 
los que deben implicarse firmemente en la formación de los futuros recursos 
humanos para la producción y el trabajo. 
Los procesos de aprendizaje en el área técnico-profesional no pueden resolverse 
satisfactoriamente en el ámbito exclusivo de las aulas y talleres. 
Allí no pueden aprenderse las destrezas y aptitudes necesarias para el mundo real 
del trabajo, capacitarse en el uso de equipos de última generación y comprender 
la complejidad de roles, de procesos productivos y de organización empresarial 
implicados. La educación técnicoprofesional requerirá una visión más global del  
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proceso de aprendizaje donde participen la escuela técnica, el mundo empresarial, 
el ámbito sindical y sean incluidos los intereses de los jóvenes aprendices. Estos 
deberán adquirir capacidades no sólo técnicas sino para gestionar cambios 
organizativos, para tomar o compartir decisiones, para el trabajo colaborativo, 
adquirir hábitos y cultura de trabajo, desarrollar espíritu de iniciativa y de 
emprendimiento personal y productivo. 
 
PROFESIONALIZACIÓN DOCENTE Y CALIDAD EDUCATIVA 
 
En el horizonte temporal de una década la sociedad uruguaya debe apostar al 
logro de un cuerpo docente de la enseñanza media totalmente profesionalizado, 
con formación específica de excelencia. Esta es una prioridad para el logro de la 
calidad educativa y la mejora pedagógica. 
La formación inicial de maestros y profesores en todas sus modalidades, tendrá 
una duración de cuatro años y su titulación nivel universitario. 
A partir de un marco común institucionalizado y jerarquizado como sistema de 
formación docente que garantice un perfil de formación de alta calidad, se deben 
habilitar diversidad de caminos y formatos de formación inicial, de posgrados y 
especializaciones y de capacitación permanente de los educadores. Se 




Programa de recursos para ampliar la inversión educativa 
 
La relativa baja asignación de recursos económicos a la educación de nuestro 
país, en comparación con la inversión que realizan sociedades de desarrollo 
comparativo, ha determinado una base salarial poco acorde con los requisitos de 
profesionalidad docente. La significativa expansión de la matrícula desde la  
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recuperación democrática en los niveles educación inicial y educación media, 
acotaron aún más las posibilidades 
de mejorar las condiciones de trabajo. 
Consolidar los logros de escolarización y una enseñanza de calidad supone una 
inversión sostenida en locales y equipamiento didáctico y una mejora en las 
remuneraciones y condiciones de trabajo de los docentes. Su viabilidad requiere 
de un acuerdo en torno a un programa de recuperación salarial en el tiempo que 
concilie la mejora de los ingresos con la disponibilidad de los recursos financieros. 
Esto podría asegurarse vinculando la asignación de recursos a la enseñanza con 
el mantenimiento de un porcentual del producto en los años en que éste registre 
crecimiento. 
La asignación y uso de los recursos presupuestarios puede traducirse no sólo en 
impactos de eficiencia sino también en impactos de equidad buscando reducir la 
desigualdad con políticas redistributivas. En este sentido proponemos, en el marco 
de políticas de distribución progresiva del gasto público una organización del 
sistema de remuneraciones de los docentes y una redistribución de los recursos 
de la educación 
pública mediante los cuales las escuelas y liceos emplazados en las zonas más 




Se establecerá un Sistema de Educación Superior que coordine la gestión pública 
y la privada sobre la base de niveles académicos de calidad. 
El sistema garantizará la libertad de enseñanza, la autonomía y el rigor 
académico, la formación y la capacitación continua. La educación superior deberá 
insertarse en el país real y ser co-protagonista en proyectos de desarrollo de la 
comunidad nacional. 
• Se ampliará y fortalecerá el proceso de descentralizaci￳n y las actividades 
universitarias en el interior del país, mediante:  
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• La elaboraci￳n de un plan para el afincamiento de las Facultades de Agronomía 
y Veterinaria en el interior del país, así como el traslado a 
diversos departamentos de otros centros universitarios, especialmente de 
investigación y extensión. 
• La ampliaci￳n del proceso descentralizador de la Regional Norte, dotándola de 
nuevos servicios y carreras, una adecuada atención presupuestal 
y de un sistema de bienestar universitario. La Regional Norte deberá elaborar un 
plan de desarrollo estratégico propio, como base para estudiar la posibilidad de su 
conversión progresiva en una segunda Universidad pública. 
• Se dará cumplimiento y efectivizará con los recursos que la ley del ―Fondo de 
Solidaridad‖ dispone al efecto, la construcci￳n de la ciudad universitaria con 
destino a los estudiantes provenientes del interior del país. 
 
 La organización de aulas a distancia 
 
• Se desarrollarán mecanismos de cooperaci￳n e integraci￳n internacional y 
regional con instituciones de educación superior los que, a través de programas 
conjuntos, redes académicas, planificación común de sistemas de becas y 
subvenciones, y la ejecución de programas de educación a distancia, contribuirán 
a la actualización permanente de contenidos docentes y de investigación. Se 
promoverá asimismo la 
realización de estudios avanzados en el exterior y el retorno de científicos al país. 
• Generar un s￳lido y renovado programa de becas que garantice apoyo financiero 
a los estudiantes académicamente calificados que no puedan absorber los gastos 
directos e indirectos (ingresos no percibidos) de la enseñanza superior. 
• Con el prop￳sito de proteger la equidad en el acceso a la educación superior, 
proponemos generar fondos especiales para dar apoyo a estudiantes del interior 
del país (estudiantes académicamente calificados y de bajo ingreso) en el 
financiamiento de los gastos de subsistencia mientras estudian.  
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• Avanzar con mayor determinaci￳n en una propuesta importante de posgrado, 
complementada con una oferta dinámica de educación continua (permanente) a lo 
largo de la vida profesional de los egresados. 
• El marco normativo de la Universidad de la República resulta inapropiado para 
responder a los desafíos vigentes. Su revisión se hará en consulta con todos los 
actores involucrados. Se atenderá especialmente al modo y alcance que debe 
darse al cogobierno para garantizar la eficacia de los órganos colegiados y la 
adopción de decisiones de política en tiempo real. Se deberá corregir el déficit 
democrático en la 
elección de Rector, Decanos y Directores, mediante formas electivas directas por 
la comunidad universitaria. 
La nueva Ley Orgánica debería incorporar una Auditoría Académica Permanente, 
de conformación mixta, con miembros de la Universidad y pares externos a ella, 
para la evaluación permanente de sus programas de enseñanza, de investigación 
y de extensión y la difusión pública de sus resultados. Un sistema de evaluación 
permanente universitario deberá comprender igualmente a las instituciones de 
gestión privada. 
• Se deberá crear un nuevo sistema universitario para dar respuesta a los 
procesos crecientes de superpoblación en las carreras de grado, los fracasos 
masivos en los primeros años, así como la saturación de las titulaciones 
tradicionales. 
La reestructura de los cursos universitarios, a partir de un núcleo generalista al 
inicio, debería abrir a los estudiantes diversidad de opciones formativas, con la 
creación de carreras cortas y títulos intermedios que habiliten la inserción laboral y 
permitan regular y reorientar la matrícula según vocaciones y los créditos 
académicos logrados por los estudiantes. 
• La realidad de una Universidad de la República crecientemente elitizada 
compromete sus fines, al tener un fuerte efecto regresivo en lo social. La política 
universitaria deberá facilitar el acceso a la misma de los jóvenes del interior y  
  444 
satisfacer las aspiraciones por educación superior de jóvenes provenientes de los 
sectores de la población con menores recursos. 
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La Revolución del Centro 
 
Bases programáticas del Partido Colorado 
para un cambio hacia la modernidad 
 
 
Mas calidad y más tiempo 
 
Ha mejorado persistentemente la calidad del producto educativo en todos sus 
niveles, con mejores comportamientos en lenguaje y matemática. Mientras que en 
lenguaje la proporción de alumnos suficientes pasó de 57.1% en 1996 a 66.3% en 
el año 2002, en la prueba de Matemática dicha proporción fue de 34.6% en 1996 
para luego ascender al 48.3% en 2002. 
Hay 800 centros de enseñanza vinculados a la red de conectividad educativa, lo 
que abre enormes posibilidades de instrumentar programas de educación a 
distancia. 
Las inversiones en infraestructura permitirán superar uno de los problemas serios 
de nuestros liceos: la acumulación de tres turnos, con atosigamiento de alumnos y 
docentes. 
Desde 2006 se logrará que los centros del ciclo básico, es decir, todos los liceos y 
las escuelas técnicas, funcionen con un máximo de dos turnos. 
Hacia el largo plazo del país, pensando en la próxima década, la enseñanza 
pública tendrá que apuntar a la hazaña de dar a todos sus alumnos un sistema de 
doble horario, como ofrece la enseñanza privada. Ahí está planteada la gran 
brecha entre unos alumnos y otros, desafío que solamente ha superado hasta 
ahora la escuela de Tiempo Completo. La masificación impide por ahora que el  
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sector público encare ese tema, que puede ir resolviéndose con programas de 
educación física o artística o de recreación que permitan una mayor vinculación 
horaria del alumno con la escuela o el liceo. Pero el camino del futuro es el horario 
completo o doble para toda la enseñanza pública. Suena utópico, pero las utopías 
educativas son relativas y más realizables en el país de José Pedro Varela. Junto 
a estos esfuerzos, la mayor y más completa profesionalidad de los docentes del 
ciclo medio permitirá redondear la apuesta a la calidad. La creación de los CERP, 
la nueva legislación para el reconocimiento de los títulos y una redimensión del 
IPA van a permitir que en los próximos 5 años todos los docentes de Educación 
Media tengan formación específica en profesorado. 
 
Una Gestion más eficaz 
 
La tendencia preponderante en el primer mundo es la de darle mayor autonomía 
de gestión a los centros de Enseñanza, para que cada unidad educativa tenga sus 
propias facultades de administración y de orientación, dentro de los parámetros 
pedagógicos que establezcan las autoridades competentes. 
Sin llegar a los extremos autonómicos que muestran algunas experiencias sajonas 
y norteamericanas, podría aceptarse que en Uruguay es oportuno ensayar 
algunas formas de descentralización, que paulatinamente vayan complementando 
el centralismo administrativo que suele mostrar nuestra organización educativa. 
Eso no debe significar un debilitamiento del sentido representativo y democrático 
que la ley da a la organización de la Administración de Educación Pública y, por lo 
tanto, deben evitarse los excesos corporativistas según los cuales se propone que 
la Enseñanza sea dirigida exclusivamente por los profesores. La ANEP representa 
por sus tradiciones y estructuras una sabia armonización de la participación 
técnica y política en la dirección de la Enseñanza y debe mantenerse la 
centralidad de las decisiones. 
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Pero seguramente se podrá aligerar la gestión si se comienza un proceso 
paulatino  pero firme de delegación en los centros de enseñanza de algunas 
cuestiones de la administración. Varias evaluaciones internacionales demuestran 
que son más exitosos los centros educativos con mayor autonomía de gestión y 
que cuenten con una intensa integración de padres, alumnos y profesores, con 
una comunidad responsable que se comprometa positivamente. 
 
Ello va de la mano de una nueva mentalidad, en la que la ―rendici￳n de cuentas‖ o 
accountability pase a ser un ejercicio habitual de información y transparencia, de 
manera que los rendimientos del centro educativo puedan evaluarse y mejorarse 
permanentemente. 
 
La Democracia necesita Demócratas 
 
Así como la República necesita republicanos, la democracia requiere demócratas, 
personas educadas en los valores cívicos y la tolerancia y preparados para ejercer 
responsablemente sus derechos y obligaciones. 
Esto significa que la Enseñanza tiene que formar ciudadanos competentes, 
sujetos de pleno derecho, jóvenes con autoestima, uruguayos con sentido de 
nacionalidad, personas predispuestas a la racionalidad y a la mentalidad científica, 
capaces de discernir y criticar. 
Hombres y mujeres que libremente puedan desarrollar sus vidas a través de la 
aplicación de sus talentos y virtudes. 
Para ello es imprescindible que el principio de laicidad sea respetado 
cotidianamente, en todos los ámbitos de formación y socialización. La Enseñanza 
debe mantener y cuidar la laicidad todos los días, para que sea absolutamente 
inadmisible todo intento directo o subliminal que vaya en su contra. 
    












    


















INTERVIEWS    
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Mi nombre es Panambi Abadie y soy estudiante del  doctorado en Administración 
de  la  Educación  Superior  en  el  Centro    de    Administración  de  la  Educación 
Superior de la Universidad de Southampton, Gran Bretaña. 
 
En el marco de ese programa estoy realizando una tesis acerca del financiamiento 
de  la  Educación  Superior  en  el  Uruguay.  La  tesis    tiene  como  finalidad 
proporcionar  información  de  tipo  integral  acerca  de  los    criterios,  formas    y  
métodos  utilizados para asignar fondos al sector  que  permitan categorizar un 
modelo de financiamiento a  nivel nacional. En este caso, y a diferencia, de otros 
estudios      no  hay  una    focalización    en  los  montos  asignados  a  este  nivel 
educativo,  sino    que,  de  manera  principal,    se  analizarán  las  formas  y    las 
metodologías utilizadas para la asignación de fondos.  
 
El  estudio  abarca  instituciones  de  Educación  Superior  públicas  y  privadas.  Se 
prevé que sus resultados sean de utilidad   tanto para los ámbitos académicos 
como para aquéllos en los que se toman decisiones acerca  de esta temática. 
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En este contexto  le solicito una entrevista de una hora de duración en la que, si 
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Interviewee A :    Rector of a public university. 
 
Interviewee B :   Director of Planning of a public university. 
 
Interviewee C :    Vice rector  of a private  university. 
 
Interviewee D:     Director of Planning of a public university. 
 
Interviewee E:     Director of Human Resources  of a public institution of Higher 
Education. 
 
Interviewee F :    Director   at the Ministry of Education 
 
Interviewee  G:   Senior officer Ministry of Economy and Finance 
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3.  Questionnaire for university officials 
(public institutions) 
 





1.  Which is the amount of funds that your institution receives as budget? 
a)  Amount  of the main funding source that supports the system? 
b)  Amount of  the other sources of revenue  such as: tuition,  teaching and 
research contracts, grants from research funding bodies, consultancies,  
fees paid by hospitals and clinics or other services. 
2.  Which are  the funding methodologies in use by the funding authorities? 
For example:  
  block grant,  
  with a  separation between research and teaching funds,  
  using  some formula to "follow" v. gr.  students or teachers? 
3. Which is  the funding criteria used by the  authorities when providing  the 
allocations?. For example:  
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  The basis is the former budget , for instance: historical allocations.   
  The basis is the result of a negotiation between the funding authority and 
the institution. 
  The allocations are a consequence of the application of formulae. 
  There  are  orientations  or  guidelines  and  allocations  are  linked  to  this  
specific orientations or to specific policies or commitments. 
3.  Which is the degree of  decentralisation that exists between  your  institution 
and the funding authority? For instance,  is the institution  in the position of 
using  the funds  at its  own  wish?  
4.   Are there  controls in use by  the funding authorities in relation  to the use of 
funds allocated? 
5.   Which are the   requirements of accountability  to the funding body or other 
bodies ( e. g.  The  Parliament,  to the  Ministries, etc).  
6.    Which  are  the procedures,     or methods,   that are used  to report how funds 
have  been  used,  for  instance:  the  use  of  performance  indicators,  auditing 
procedures,  etc. 
7.  Do you know other model  that is used in  our country to fund all the system? 
8.  Do you think that this model (if known)  may change? 
9.  Which could be an alternative model? 
10. Do you think that the sector should receive more funds?  
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4.  Questionnaire for university officials 











1.  Which is the amount of funds that your institution receives as budget? 
a)  Amount  of the main funding source that supports the system? 
b)  Amount of  the other sources of revenue   such as:   teaching 
and research contracts, grants from research funding bodies, 
consultancies,  etc. 
2.   Which are  the funding methodologies in use by the funding authorities? 
For example:  
  block grant,  
  with a  separation between research and teaching funds,  
  using  some formula to "follow" v. gr.  students or teachers? 
3.  Which is  the funding criteria used by the  authorities when providing  the 
allocations?. For example: 
  The basis is the former budget , for instance: historical allocations.    
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  The basis is the result of a negotiation between the funding authority and 
the institution. 
  The allocations are a consequence of the application of formulae. 
  There  are  orientations  or  guidelines  and  allocations  are  linked  to  this  
specific orientations or to specific policies or commitments. 
4.   Which is the degree of  decentralisation that exists between  your  institution 
and the funding authority? For instance,  is the institution  in the position of using  
the funds  at its  own  wish?  
5.   Are there  controls in use by  the funding authorities in relation  to the use of 
funds allocated? 
6.   Which are the   requirements of accountability  to the funding body or other 
bodies ( e. g.  The  Parliament,  to the  Ministries, etc).  
7.    Which  are  the procedures,     or methods,   that are used  to report how funds 
have  been  used,  for  instance:  the  use  of  performance  indicators,  auditing 
procedures,  etc. 
8.     Do you know other model  that is used in  our country to fund all the system? 
9.      Do you think that this model (if known)  may change? 
10.    Which could be an alternative model? 




  459 









1.  Do you know which are  the funding methodologies that are used in Uruguay    
to fund Higher Education institutions? 
For example:  
  block grant,  
  with a  separation between research and teaching funds,  
  using  some formula to "follow" v. gr.  students or teachers? 
 
2.  Do you know which is  the funding criteria used in Uruguay  when providing  the 
allocations to Higher Education institutions ?. For example: 
  The basis is the former budget , for instance: historical allocations.   
  The basis is the result of a negotiation between the funding authority and 
the institution. 
  The allocations are a consequence of the application of formulae. 
  There  are  orientations  or  guidelines  and  allocations  are  linked  to  this  
specific orientations or to specific policies or commitments. 
c)  Do you know which is the degree of  decentralisation that exists between the  
authorities that provide funds to Higher Education institutions   and the  Higher  
  460 
Education institutions? For instance,  are  the institutions  in the position of 
using  the funds  at  their   own  wishes?  
 
d)   Do you know which are there  controls in use by  the authorities that  provide 
funding  to    Higher  Education    institutions    in  relation    to  the  use  of  funds 
allocated? 
 
5.   Do you know if there  are   requirements of accountability  that apply to Higher 
Education institutions  in relation      to the funding body or other bodies ? 
 
6.  Do you know if  there   are  procedures,     or methods,   that Higher Education 
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6. Questionnaire for  members of parliament 
 
 




1.  Do you know which are  the funding methodologies that are used in 
Uruguay    to fund Higher Education institutions? 
For example:  
  block grant,  
  with a  separation between research and teaching funds,  
  using  some formula to "follow" v. gr.  students or teachers? 
 
2.     Do you know which is  the funding criteria used in Uruguay  when providing  
the allocations to Higher Education institutions ?. For example: 
  The basis is the former budget , for instance: historical allocations.   
  The basis is the result of a negotiation between the funding authority and 
the institution. 
  The allocations are a consequence of the application of formulae. 
  There  are  orientations  or  guidelines  and  allocations  are  linked  to  this  
specific orientations or to specific policies or commitments. 
3.  Do you know which is the degree of  decentralisation that exists between 
the  authorities that provide funds to Higher Education institutions   and the  
Higher  Education  institutions?  For  instance,    are    the  institutions    in  the 
position of using  the funds  at  their   own  wishes?   
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4. Do you know  if  the authorities that  provide funding to  Higher Education  
institutions   apply controls  about  the use of funds allocated? 
 
5.   Do you know if there  are   requirements of accountability  that apply to Higher 
Education institutions     in relation to the funding body or other bodies ? 
 
6.  Do you know other models   of  funding Higher Education systems  that  are 
used  in other countries that are different from the one that is used  in  Uruguay? 
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7. Questionnaires in Spanish 
 
 
CUESTIONARIO DE ENTREVISTA 
 







1.  Cuál es el  monto que su institución recibe como presupuesto?  Por favor  
distinguir: 
 
Fondos  presupuestales 
 
Fondos  extrapresupuestales ( obtenidos por ejemplo por: convenios,  servicios de 
investigación o enseñanza,  servicios técnicos, matrículas,  servicios  clínicos,  etc) 
  
2.  Cuáles son las metodologías que  utilizan las autoridades que financian  a su 
institución para asignar  fondos? Por ejemplo:  
 
    si  no 
Los fondos se asignan en bloque     
Existe separación de  fondos para enseñanza  e 
investigación 
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Se usan  f￳rmulas que ―siguen‖ a  unidades, ej:  a 
estudiantes o a docentes. 
   
 
3.  Cuáles son los criterios  que  utilizan las autoridades   para  asignar el 
financiamiento a su institución?  Por ejemplo: 
 
   si    no 
La base es  la asignación anterior ( asignaciones  
históricas) 
   
La base es el resultado de una negociación entre  
las autoridades financiadoras  y la  institución 
   
Las asignaciones resultan de la aplicación de una 
fórmula 
   
Existen lineamientos y políticas y las asignaciones 
están ligadas  a esos lineamientos o políticas. 
   
 
 
4.  Su  institución  está en condiciones de usar los fondos que se le asignan  de 
acuerdo a su propia voluntad? 
 
5.  Su institución está sometida a controles de las autoridades que la  financian 
acerca del uso de los fondos asignados? 
 
6.  Qué tipo de  rendiciones  de cuentas  tiene que realizar  su institución  a las  
autoridades    que    la  financian    o  a  otras  autoridades  (  por  ejemplo:  al 
Parlamento,   Ministerios ) 
 
7.  Cuáles son los métodos que   utiliza  su   institución para reportar el uso de los 
fondos  asignados?  Por  ejemplo:    se  utilizan  indicadores  de  rendimiento  o  
auditorías ? 
  
  465 
8. Ud conoce  el  modelo de financiamiento del sistema de  Educación Superior 
que se utiliza en Uruguay.?  Puede describirlo? 
 
9.  Ud cree que  el modelo de financiamiento de la Educación Superior que se 
utiliza en Uruguay  ( si lo conoce) puede cambiar? 
 
10.  Cuál podría ser un modelo alternativo? 
 
11.  Ud  considera  que  el  sistema  de  Educación  Superior    de  Uruguay  debería 
recibir más fondos?  
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CUESTIONARIO DE ENTREVISTA 
 







12. Cuál es el  monto que su institución recibe como presupuesto?  Por favor  
distinguir: 
 
Fondos  presupuestales 
 
Fondos  extrapresupuestales ( obtenidos por ejemplo por: convenios,  servicios de 
investigación o enseñanza,  servicios técnicos, matrículas,  servicios  clínicos,  etc) 
  
13. Cuáles son las metodologías que  utilizan las autoridades que financian  a su 
institución para asignar  fondos? Por ejemplo:  
 
    si  no 
Los fondos se asignan en bloque     
Existe separación de  fondos para enseñanza  e 
investigación 
   
Se usan  f￳rmulas que ―siguen‖ a  unidades, ej:  a 
estudiantes o a docentes. 
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14. Cuáles son los criterios  que  utilizan las autoridades   para  asignar el 
financiamiento a su institución?  Por ejemplo: 
 
   si    no 
La base es  la asignación anterior ( asignaciones  
históricas) 
   
La base es el resultado de una negociación entre  
las autoridades financiadoras  y la  institución 
   
Las asignaciones resultan de la aplicación de una 
fórmula 
   
Existen lineamientos y políticas y las asignaciones 
están ligadas  a esos lineamientos o políticas. 
   
 
 
15. Su  institución  está en condiciones de usar los fondos que se le asignan  de 
acuerdo a su propia voluntad? 
 
16. Su institución está sometida a controles de las autoridades que la  financian 
acerca del uso de los fondos asignados? 
 
17. Qué tipo de  rendiciones  de cuentas  tiene que realizar  su institución  a las  
autoridades    que    la  financian    o  a  otras  autoridades  (  por  ejemplo:  al 
Parlamento,   Ministerios ) 
 
18. Cuáles son los métodos que   utiliza  su   institución para reportar el uso de los 
fondos  asignados?  Por  ejemplo:    se  utilizan  indicadores  de  rendimiento  o  
auditorías ? 
 
19. Ud conoce  el  modelo de financiamiento del sistema de  Educación Superior 
que se utiliza en Uruguay.?  Puede describirlo? 
 
20. Ud cree que  el modelo de financiamiento de la Educación Superior que se 
utiliza en Uruguay  ( si lo conoce) puede cambiar? 
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21.  Cuál podría ser un modelo alternativo? 
 
22.  Ud  considera  que  el  sistema  de  Educación  Superior    de  Uruguay  debería 
recibir más fondos?  




CUESTIONARIO DE ENTREVISTA 
 







1. Ud   sabe  cuáles son las metodologías  de financiamiento que se utilizan en el 
Uruguay para financiar a la Educación Superior ? Por ejemplo:  
 
    si  no 
Los fondos se asignan en bloque     
Existe separación de  fondos para enseñanza  e 
investigación 
   
Se usan  f￳rmulas que ―siguen‖ a  unidades, ej:  a 
estudiantes o a docentes. 
   
 
2.  Ud conoce cuáles son los criterios que se utilizan en Uruguay para  asignar  
fondos a la Educación Superior? Por ejemplo: 
 
   si    no 
La base es  la asignación anterior ( asignaciones  
históricas) 
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La base es el resultado de una negociación entre  
las autoridades financiadoras  y la  institución 
   
Las asignaciones resultan de la aplicación de una 
fórmula 
   
Existen lineamientos y políticas y las asignaciones 
están ligadas  a esos lineamientos o políticas. 
   
 
3.  Ud  sabe  si las instituciones están en condiciones de usar los fondos en base 
a su propia voluntad? 
 
4.  Ud  sabe  si  las  autoridades  que  financian  la  Educación  Superior  aplican 
controles sobre el uso de los fondos asignados? 
 
5.  Ud  conoce cuáles son los requerimientos de rendición de cuentas que tienen 
las instituciones de Educación Superior con respectos a las autoridades  que  
las financian  o a otras autoridades? 
 
6.  Ud conoce cuáles son los procedimientos que deben seguir las  instituciones 
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CUESTIONARIO DE ENTREVISTA 
 






7. Ud   sabe  cuáles son las metodologías  de financiamiento que se utilizan en el 
Uruguay para financiar a la Educación Superior ? Por ejemplo: 
  
    si  no 
Los fondos se asignan en bloque     
Existe separación de  fondos para enseñanza  e 
investigación 
   
Se usan  f￳rmulas que ―siguen‖ a  unidades, ej:  a 
estudiantes o a docentes. 
   
 
8.  Ud conoce cuáles son los criterios que se utilizan en Uruguay para  asignar  
fondos a la Educación Superior? Por ejemplo: 
 
   si    no 
La base es  la asignación anterior ( asignaciones  
históricas) 
   
La base es el resultado de una negociación entre  
las autoridades financiadoras  y la  institución 
   
Las asignaciones resultan de la aplicación de una 
fórmula 
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Existen lineamientos y políticas y las asignaciones 
están ligadas  a esos lineamientos o políticas. 
   
 
9.  Ud  sabe  si las instituciones de Educación Superior  están en condiciones de 
usar los fondos en base a sus propios   deseos? 
 
10. Ud  sabe  si  las  autoridades  que  financian  a    la  Educación  Superior  aplican 
controles sobre el uso de los fondos asignados ? 
 
11. Ud  conoce cuáles son los requerimientos de rendición de cuentas que tienen 
las instituciones de Educación Superior con respectos a las autoridades  que  
las financian  o a otras autoridades? 
 
12. Ud conoce cuáles son los procedimientos que deben seguir las  instituciones 
de  Educación Superior   para reportar el uso de los fondos asignados? 
 
13. Ud conoce  otros modelos de financiamiento de la Educación Superior que se 
utilicen en  otros países y que sean diferentes al que se utiliza en Uruguay? 
Puede describirlos? 
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CUESTIONARIO DE ENTREVISTA 
 






23. Cuál es el  monto presupuestal que su organización recibe ( o asigna)  para los 
programas de Educación Superior ?  Por favor  distinguir: 
 
 
24. Cuál es el  monto extrapresupuestal  que  obtienen  los programas de 
Educación Superior  de su organización ?   Por ejemplo por: convenios,  
servicios de investigación o enseñanza,  servicios técnicos, matrículas,  
servicios  clínicos,  etc) 
  
 
25. Ud      sabe    cuáles  son  las metodologías    de financiamiento  que  se  utilizan 
dentro  de  su  institución    para  financiar  al/  a  los  programas  de    Educación 
Superior?  Por ejemplo:  
 
    Si  no 
Los fondos se asignan en bloque     
Existe separación de  fondos para enseñanza  e 
investigación 
   
Se usan  f￳rmulas que ―siguen‖ a  unidades, ej:  a 
estudiantes o a docentes. 
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26. Ud conoce cuáles son los criterios que se utilizan dentro de su institución  para  
asignar  fondos al/ a los programas de Educación Superior? Por ejemplo: 
 
   si    no 
La base es  la asignación anterior ( asignaciones  
históricas) 
   
La base es el resultado de una negociación entre  
las autoridades financiadoras  y la  institución 
   
Las asignaciones resultan de la aplicación de una 
fórmula 
   
Existen lineamientos y políticas y las asignaciones 
están ligadas  a esos lineamientos o políticas. 
   
 
27. Ud    sabe    si  la  institución  que      brinda  el  o  los  programas  de  Educación 
Superior dentro de su organización  está en condiciones de usar los fondos en 
base a su propia voluntad? 
 
28. Ud sabe si las autoridades que financian los programas de Educación Superior 
de su organización  aplican controles sobre el uso de los fondos asignados? 
 
29. Ud  conoce cuáles son los requerimientos de rendición de cuentas que tienen 
la  institución  que  brinda  programas  de  Educación  Superior  dentro  de  su 
organización  con respectos a las autoridades  que  las financian  o a otras 
autoridades? 
 
30. Ud conoce cuáles son los procedimientos que debe seguir la  institución que 
brinda programas de Educación Superior dentro de su organización     para 
reportar el uso de los fondos asignados? 
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Tal  como  se  le  mencionado  personalmente  estoy  realizando  una  tesis 
acerca del financiamiento de la Educación Superior en el Uruguay. La tesis  
tiene como finalidad proporcionar información de tipo integral acerca de los  
criterios, formas  y  métodos  utilizados para asignar fondos al sector  que  
permitan categorizar un modelo de financiamiento a  nivel nacional. En este 
caso, y a diferencia, de otros estudios   no hay una única focalización  en 
los  montos  asignados  a  este  nivel  educativo,  sino    que  -de  manera 
principal-   se analizarán los criterios y  las metodologías utilizadas para la 
asignación de fondos.  
 
En este contexto  le solicito su apoyo  participando en un focus group en el que se 
desarrollará un diálogo acerca del modelo de financiamiento actual de la ES en el 
país  y las perspectivas de cambio en el modelo.  
 
El  focus group se desarrollará el día ...  a la hora.... ( duración  60 minutos aprox)  
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Tel 902 1505 ext 220 
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Interviewee  L,  Deputy Director of  the Graduate School in a public institution,  an 
Assistant to the Dean and a  senior officer at one of the private university institutes  
 
Interviewee  M,  Director at the Ministry of Education and an  academic  at  a 
private university . 
 
 Interviewee  N  Director of  the Graduate School  at private university of Uruguay 
and an academic at the same university. 
 
Interviewee  O,  Senior Officer  at the Office of Planning in a public institution also  
in charge of a major project of e-government that involves informations systems at 
her institution. 
 
Interviewee  P,  Director of Planning in a public institution. 
 
Interviewee  Q,  Senior Officer at the Office of Planning in a public institution, also 
an academic at  private university.  
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BASES PARA LA DISCUSION EN UN FOCUS GROUP 












1.  El  Estado es la  caja pagadora de la Educación Superior  pública  
 
2.  Las instituciones  públicas  cuentan con un financiamiento asegurado por el 
Estado (automático)  con independencia de su desempeño. 
 
3.  Las asignaciones se fijan en base a criterios históricos.  La metodología de 
asignar  los  recursos      no  está  vinculada      a  criterios,    costos,    eficiencia, 
rendimiento, calidad, etc. 
 
4.  Los  únicos  controles  aplicados  al  uso  de  los  fondos    asignados  a    las 
instituciones de Educación Superior  son burocráticos. 
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5.  La  Educación  Superior    privada  no  recibe  subsidios    del  Estado    y    se  
autofinancia por vía  de las  matrículas.  Está  sometida a baja regulación. 
 
 
I. EDUCACIÓN SUPERIOR  PUBLICA 
 
I. i. Formas de determinar las asignaciones a la EDUCACIÓN SUPERIOR 
 
 
1.  En  base  a    asignaciones  presupuestarias    automáticas,  de  ser  posible 
incrementales. 
 
2.  El  monto  asignado  se  determina  en  base  al  presupuesto  del  año  anterior, 
(criterio histórico de  asignación)  incrementado  si hay disponibilidad  fiscal   y 
en base a negociaciones del Parlamento con las corporaciones  del sistema, 
tales como los  gremios, las  Facultades, etc, 
 
 
I. ii. Mecanismos de financiamiento 
 
1.  Las instituciones reciben  las asignaciones  a través del pago de las cuentas 
mediante transferencias ligadas a la disponibilidad del erario  público. 
 
2.  Los  gobiernos  buscan    congelar  el  gasto  directamente  transferido  a  las 
instituciones de Educación Superior  
 
I. iii. Criterios de financiamiento 
 
1.  Los subsidios otorgados a cada institución se definen conforme a un criterio 
histórico de distribución que ha ido desarrollándose y cristalizando a lo largo 
del tiempo, producto de negociaciones ad-hoc.  
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2.  Las asignaciones responden más a la evolución del gasto en el pasado que a 
previsiones futuras.  
 
I. iv. Seguimiento del uso de los fondos. Control.  Accountability 
 
  Controles  burocráticos    (Tribunal  de  cuentas)  con  el  fin  de  garantizar  la 




II.  EDUCACIÓN SUPERIOR  PRIVADA 
 
 
El Estado autoriza  la creación  de nuevas instituciones en base  a un   proceso 
político- administrativo de reconocimiento oficial.  
 
II.i.  Financiamiento 
 
1.  La Educación Superior  privada no recibe subsidios  del Estado aunque está 
exonerada de determinados tributos. Las instituciones se  autofinancian por vía  
de las  matrículas.  
 
2.  Funcionamiento y control: la Educación Superior  privada tiene baja regulación.  
Las instituciones deben   proporcionar informes  anuales -meramente formales 
















    











    














MATRIX OF QUESTIONS 
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MATRIX OF QUESTIONS 
 
 
Current model  
 
1.  How funds are provided ? 
1)  Block  
2)  formula : input  driven or output driven? 
2.         According to which criteria? 
3)  Historical 
4)  negotiations 
5)  formula : input or output/predictability 
6)  strategies 
3.        Degrees of decentralisation   
7)  control over the use of funds,   
8)  control is loose or tight,  etc.   
4.        Requirements of accountability 
9)  performance indicators,  
10)  auditing procedures,  etc. 
 
Future model 
1.  How funds might be  provided ? 
11)  Block  
12)  formula : input  driven or output driven? 
2.  According to which criteria?  
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13)  Historical 
14)  negotiations 
15)  formula : input or output/predictability 
16)  strategies 
17)  quality 
3.   Degrees of decentralisation   
18)  control over the use of funds,   
19)  control is loose or tight,  etc.   
4.  Requirements of accountability 
20)  performance indicators,  

















ANNEX 7  
SAMPLE OF PARLIAMENTARY SESSIONS    
  488 
 
Nº 230 - TOMO 415 - 26 DE DICIEMBRE DE 2002 
REPUBLICA ORIENTAL DEL URUGUAY 
DIARIO DE SESIONES 
DE LA 
CAMARA DE SENADORES 
TERCER PERIODO ORDINARIO DE LA XLV LEGISLATURA 
77ª SESION EXTRAORDINARIA 
PRESIDEN EL SEÑOR LUIS HIERRO LOPEZ Presidente 
EL SEÑOR SENADOR DOCTOR GUILLERMO GARCIA COSTA Primer Vicepresidente 
Y EL SEÑOR SENADOR DOCTOR RUBEN CORREA FREITAS Segundo Vicepresidente 
ACTUAN EN SECRETARIA LOS TITULARES SEÑOR MARIO FARACHIO Y ARQUITECTO HUGO 
RODRIGUEZ FILIPPINI 
S U M A R I O 
1) Texto de la citación 
2) Asistencia 
3) Levantamiento del receso 
- El Senado resuelve levantar el receso para considerar el asunto motivo de la convocatoria. 
4) Situación de la salud en los ámbitos público y privado y políticas implementadas por el Poder 
Ejecutivo en el área de la salud 
- Moción de censura al señor Ministro de Salud Pública formulada por varios señores Senadores.  
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- En consideración. 
- Se vota negativamente. 
5) Se levanta la sesión 
1) TEXTO DE LA CITACION 
"Montevideo, 23 de diciembre de 2002. 
La CAMARA DE SENADORES se reunirá en sesión extraordinaria, el próximo jueves 26, a la hora 16, a fin 
de hacer cesar el receso, a efectos de considerar la moción de censura al señor Ministro de Salud Pública y 
resolver sobre su curso. (Artículo 147 de la Constitución de la República). 
Carp. Nº 975/02 
Hugo Rodríguez Filippini Secretario - Mario Farachio Secretario." 
"Montevideo, 23 de diciembre de 2002. 
De conformidad con el artículo 147 inciso 2º de la Constitución, presentamos una moción de censura 
respecto del señor Ministro de Salud Pública, por lo cual deberá convocarse a una sesión especial del 
Senado, que proponemos sea para el día 3 de enero de 2003 a la hora 16. 
José Korzeniak, Manuel Núñez, Mónica Xavier, Eleuterio Fernández Huidobro, Reinaldo Gargano, 
Alberto Couriel, José Mujica, Enrique Rubio, Danilo Astori, Rodolfo Nin Novoa, Alberto Cid, Marina 
Arismendi, Senadores." 
2) ASISTENCIA 
ASISTEN: los señores Senadores Arismendi, Astori, Barrios Tassano, Brause, Cid, Correa Freitas, 
Couriel, de Boismenu, Fernández Huidobro, Gallinal, Garat, García Costa, Gargano, Heber, Herrera, 
Korzeniak, Michelini, Millor, Mujica, Nin Novoa, Núñez, Pereyra, Pou, Riesgo, Rubio, Sanabria, 
Scarpa, Singer y Xavier. 
FALTAN: con licencia, el señor Senador Virgili; y, con aviso, el señor Senador Larrañaga. 
3) LEVANTAMIENTO DEL RECESO  
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SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Habiendo número, está abierta la sesión. 
(Es la hora 16 y 15 minutos.) 
- El Senado ha sido convocado para hacer cesar el receso y considerar la moción de censura al señor 
Ministro de Salud Pública. 
Se va a votar si el Senado desea levantar el receso para considerar el asunto motivo de la convocatoria. 
(Se vota:) 
- 26 en 26. Afirmativa. UNANIMIDAD. 
4) SITUACION DE LA SALUD EN LOS AMBITOS PUBLICO Y PRIVADO Y POLITICAS 
IMPLEMENTADAS POR EL PODER EJECUTIVO EN EL AREA DE LA SALUD 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- El Senado pasa a considerar el único asunto que figura en el Orden del Día: 
"Moción de censura al señor Ministro de Salud Pública y resolver sobre su curso. (Artículo 147 de la 
Constitución de la República) (Carp. Nº 975/02)". 
Tiene la palabra el señor Senador García Costa. 
SEÑOR GARCIA COSTA.- Señor Presidente: en nombre del Partido Nacional quisiera expresar las razones 
por las cuales no vamos a votar afirmativamente la moción a la que se ha hecho referencia y que debe 
dilucidarse en esta sesión. 
A nuestro juicio, el episodio de la interpelación no ha resultado en los términos establecidos en la 
Constitución. No cumplió el objetivo esencial que debe tener, necesariamente, el llamado a Sala de un 
Ministro. En definitiva, redundó en aspectos negativos para el Senado, por lo menos, en cuanto a la labor 
que este cumple y al alcance que la opinión pública le da a su tarea. 
No vacilamos ni tenemos dificultad en señalar que tales circunstancias negativas se deben a ambas partes. 
En lo que tiene que ver con la parte interpelante: en primer lugar, por proponer un tema tan vasto que 
terminó siendo inasible y se prestó a muchos alcances como los que tuvimos que ver y soportar. En 
segundo término, porque se propuso la moción de censura antes de saber la respuesta a lo planteado. 
Aunque en términos políticos a veces se sabe, se conoce, se supone, cuál va a ser la actitud que se 
adoptará por quienes interpelan, parece lógico que primero se complete el trámite antes de dar por sentado 
que este será negativo. En tercer lugar, por el retiro de Sala, del que supongo que la Bancada del Frente  
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Amplio brindará las explicaciones correspondientes. Tal actitud nos resultó totalmente sorprendente. Se 
había solicitado un cuarto intermedio, como tantas veces ocurre en este ámbito. Eso no justificaba -es obvio 
decirlo- el retiro de la Bancada del Frente Amplio, convocante del Ministro, y mucho menos el de la señora 
Senadora interpelante, dejando sin efecto el diálogo, al faltar una de las partes. 
La parte interpelada, el señor Ministro de Salud Pública, a nuestro juicio, cumplió en su inicio 
adecuadamente el objetivo e informes para los que fue convocado a Sala. Realizó una exposición sobre el 
tema en su propio estilo. Pero, en un medio político como éste, de grande repercusión en la opinión pública, 
es evidente que se espera, y se descuenta con lógica, otra agilidad conceptual; otra agilidad en el manejo 
de los informes y en las respuestas. No fue así, y los nacionalistas comenzamos a sentir que se podía 
augurar una muerte por inanición al pedido de informes. Por tanto, consideramos que el señor Ministro pudo 
haber recurrido a medios más eficaces que el que ensayó para defender su posición. 
Hubo, pues, responsabilidad de la parte interpelante y de la interpelada. Durante todo este episodio -
aunque no se haya querido, lo que damos por descontado- quedó ajeno el interés público. La opinión 
pública, en un tema de particular gravitación como es la salud pública y privada del país, estaba esperando 
un amplio intercambio de ideas para luego conocer algunos acuerdos que permitieran solucionar, al menos 
en parte, esta problemática tan acuciante. La opinión pública esperaba que desde el Senado se brindaran 
algunos avances que fueran valiosos. Incluso, el Partido Nacional, en una reunión previa, analizó el tema de 
acuerdo a los elementos de juicio de que disponía hasta ese momento. Íbamos a proponer -obsérvese cuán 
deslucido fue nuestro criterio- la concreción de dos, tres o cuatro temas que, según supusimos, iban a ser 
planteados por la señora Senadora Xavier y de los que estimamos el Ministro iba a brindar respuestas. De 
esa forma, se podría haber logrado que el Senado avanzara en materias trascendentes. Por supuesto que 
nuestro deseo estaba subordinado a lo que ocurriera durante la interpelación. Por lo sucedido en el día de 
hoy no vamos a presentar moción de clase alguna al respecto. ¿Qué podríamos mocionar? Daríamos 
nuestra opinión, pero lo que estamos haciendo es juzgar sobre el pedido de informes realizado por el 
Senado y que, a raíz de lo acontecido, no pudo ser evacuado. A nuestro juicio, este Cuerpo dejó transcurrir 
una excelente oportunidad y ello hoy no se puede remediar. 
Hemos recibido -supongo que también los demás integrantes del Senado- las respuestas escritas del señor 
Ministro -aunque ni siquiera tuve tiempo de hojearlas- a las preguntas de la señora Senadora Xavier. Esto 
no es adecuado. No es la manera de responder a un pedido de informes. Aclaro que no lo he leído y no 
dudo de que debe ser una singular demostración de eficacia. Habrá que analizar si la verdad contenida en 
esos escritos es absoluta. Pero no dudo de su honestidad. Más, reitero que ese no es el procedimiento 
adecuado. Tampoco lo es que continuemos con la interpelación. Incluso, comentaba con un periodista 
amigo que esto no es como un partido de fútbol, que si termina por empate Juan y Pedro, vuelven a la  
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cancha a tirar los penales correspondientes. Esta interpelación es un hecho mucho más serio, formal y 
profundo. 
En síntesis, dejamos esta constancia de que nuestra colectividad considera que se ha perdido una 
excelente oportunidad de avanzar en los temas de la salud, no de discutir porque, en definitiva, lo segundo 
tiene un valor muy relativo y lo primero es lo que la gente está esperando, en estos momentos que está 
viviendo una situación tan crítica en este tema, tan brutal, que tanto afecta a nuestra sociedad. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra la señora Senadora Xavier. 
SEÑORA XAVIER.- Señor Presidente: la verdad es que no salgo de mi asombro con relación al curso de 
esta interpelación y de la convocatoria del día de hoy para discutir la censura del señor Ministro de Salud 
Pública. 
Lógicamente, hubiésemos deseado que el curso de la interpelación fuera otro, puesto que si nuestra 
intención hubiese sido censurar, habríamos comenzado por una convocatoria como la que se está 
realizando hoy. Ocurre que considerábamos más importante llevar adelante una interpelación y un debate 
en torno a temas que no pueden ser considerados -ninguno de ellos- novedosos. Con relación a todos 
estos temas está planteada, desde hace mucho tiempo, la búsqueda de solución y todos están encima de la 
mesa del señor Ministro de Salud Pública, de éste y también de los anteriores, que no han encontrado 
ningún paliativo. 
Quiero dejar bien en claro que lo que acaba de anunciar el señor Senador preopinante refuerza, aún más, 
mi asombro. En el mediodía de hoy escuchamos decir al señor Ministro que las respuestas vendrían por 
escrito al Senado. No obstante ello, le hicimos saber al señor Presidente de que era deseo de nuestra 
Bancada -más allá de que el señor Ministro no está obligado a estar presente en esta sesión en la que se 
va a decidir si se lo censura o no- que concurriera, puesto que si las 48 horas habían alcanzado para 
completar las respuestas, resultaba importante que este Parlamento y la ciudadanía las conocieran. Pero 
resulta que ahora escucho que esas respuestas le llegaron a alguien; y nosotros, en cuanto arribamos al 
Senado, nos comunicamos con quien corresponde, es decir con la Secretaría, para saber si, efectivamente, 
lo que el señor Ministro había anunciado en medios de prensa estaba disponible, puesto que allí no había 
señalado cuándo iban a llegar las respuestas, sino simplemente que las haría llegar por escrito a este 
Cuerpo. 
Por lo tanto, son absolutamente llamativos los procedimientos que este Ministro utiliza para relacionarse 
con el Poder Legislativo. En consecuencia, no podemos hacer otra cosa que asombrarnos y quedar atónitos 
ante un mecanismo por el cual si hay diez para elegir, eligió el número once: el que no corresponde de 
ninguna manera.  
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Se han hechos planteamientos en torno a la vastedad del cuestionario hecho al señor Ministro de Salud 
Pública; pero les puedo asegurar que va haber mucha gente que me va a decir que tales y cuales temas no 
formaron parte de él, puesto que, como señalamos durante la interpelación, sólo elegimos algunos. Ahora 
bien, ¿cuál puede ser la ubicación de un Ministro de Salud Pública que piensa que no le íbamos a preguntar 
sobre el mutualismo, el destino del préstamo del BID, el cierre de las instituciones mutuales y la pérdida de 
fuentes de trabajo? ¿Cuál puede ser la ubicación de un Ministro de Salud Pública que no imagina que le 
vamos a preguntar sobre el desabastecimiento permanente que ha estado planteado, durante todo el año, 
como una necesidad general del país? ¿Cuál puede ser la ubicación de un Ministro de Salud Pública que 
asume la Cartera a raíz del relevamiento del Ministro anterior producto de la crisis que se produjo por la 
vacuna contra la meningitis, y que no encuentra una solución y se sorprende ante nuestras preguntas, 
hechas de todas las formas posibles, es decir, por teléfono y hasta en forma escrita? ¿Acaso esto era 
sorpresivo para el Ministro? 
El señor Ministro de Salud Pública tuvo tiempo de operar todos los temas planteados desde tiempo antes; 
tuvo la oportunidad de haber asignado el préstamo otorgado por el BID de manera que no hubieran cerrado 
las mutualistas que cerraron durante estos trece meses en que ese dinero estaba depositado en un banco; 
tuvo la oportunidad de vacunar e inmunizar adecuadamente a nuestros niños y adolescentes, y no lo hizo; y 
tuvo la oportunidad, además, de venir a decir que todos los intentos que hizo para solucionar el tema de 
desabastecimiento le fracasaron por cuestiones externas. Seguramente, no utilizó los mecanismos más 
idóneos para encontrar una solución. 
Asimismo, tuvo la oportunidad de venir aquí a decir que implantaba una política de medicamentos, para que 
se legisle sobre eso. Este Parlamento le ha dado mil señales para que, justamente, manifestara su voluntad 
política de que se legislara sobre medicamentos, sobre todo, si se trataba de genéricos y de todos aquellos 
que terminaran con el desabastecimiento de la medicación más elemental que necesita nuestra población. 
No vio las señales y no dio respuestas sobre eso. Entonces, ¿podía el señor Ministro llamarse a sorpresa 
en cuanto a que esas iban a ser algunas de las preguntas? 
En cuanto a la vastedad del cuestionario -que parece ser algo que no tiene antecedentes en otro tipo de 
interpelaciones- debo decir que todos tienen las preguntas de estos ocho capítulos, que son preguntas que 
guían las respuestas, justamente, para que hubiera una coincidencia en la manera de encarar estas últimas 
y, en función de ello, tener un debate en el que pudiéramos intercambiar alternativas y soluciones a todos 
estos problemas. Algunas de ellas se contestan con un sí o con un no; algunas, inclusive, posibilitan seguir 
desarrollando cada uno de los temas. Por lo tanto, ¡vamos a dejarnos de embromar con las 94 ó 100 
preguntas! Se trata, en definitiva, de ocho preguntas esenciales sobre las que se debe responder. Sistema 
de salud: ¿a dónde va, en este país, la salud? Atención primaria de sa-lud: ¿terminaremos, de una vez por 
todas, con las décadas, con los asesores, con todos los libros que se escriben sobre las bondades de la  
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atención primaria de salud y pasaremos a hacer efectivo algo más que no sean las costosas experiencias 
que, con ayudas extranjeras, se hacen en el país? ¿Terminaremos o no esas experiencias? Al parecer, el 
Ministerio las quería implantar en todo el país y, por lo tanto, resultaba elemental que supiéramos cómo se 
iba a financiar esto. ¡Bienvenido sea un cambio en el modelo de atención! ¿Pero acabó el modelo de 
atención que se sustenta sin un modelo de atención adecuada? ¿Se sustenta sin un modelo de gestión 
adecuado y un modelo de financiación que se debía discutir? Aquí parecería que todos fuéramos escolares 
y no supiéramos que hay determinadas cosas que no son sustentables si no se encadenan con otras 
alternativas. 
Le preguntábamos al señor Ministro sobre el Hospital de Clínicas y le aclaramos que no lo hacíamos porque 
estuviéramos confundidos en materia de financiación, sino porque ese es un punto fundamental de la 
cadena asistencial, puesto que sigue con cierres técnicos un día tras otro y, cuando logra obtener recursos, 
los tiene que diferir en la cadena asistencial porque las compras llevan su tiempo. 
También preguntábamos sobre el tema de los contratos. En diciembre se hicieron anuncios con relación a 
la revisación que se iba a hacer de los contratos. Las máximas autoridades dijeron que había contratos que 
no eran asistenciales y que fueron celebrados en épocas de bonanza. Pero recordemos que hace muchos 
años que este país no tiene tiempos de bonanza y, también, que los que estamos en la cuestión pública, así 
se trate de momentos de bonanza, no podemos dilapidar los esfuerzos y la plata de la gente. 
También el cuestionario abarcaba la materia tecnológica. Pero eran ocho capítulos y no el mundo y sus 
alrededores. Por lo tanto, desmitifiquemos aquello de las cien preguntas porque, repito, éstas eran una guía 
para facilitarle las respuestas al señor Ministro. 
El señor Ministro vuelve a perder la oportunidad de responder y actúa de un modo que me asombra 
sobremanera. Por lo visto, aquí hay algunas Bancadas que no tenemos el derecho a recibir, de parte del 
Poder Ejecutivo, las respuestas que solicitamos. Hoy el señor Ministro dijo: "cumplí con el 25% de lo que 
tenía para leer". Puesto que llevaba dos horas, íbamos a tener que "bancarnos" ocho horas de lectura de 
las memorias del Ministerio de Salud Pública. ¿Le parece que eso es respeto a la institución parlamentaria? 
No; no lo es. Es más, hoy vuelve a ratificar esto con una modalidad, sumamente extraña, de responder a 
este Parlamento y a esta fuerza política. 
En consecuencia, la moción de censura que planteamos el otro día está más que justificada y le pedimos, 
señor Presidente, que se proceda a su votación luego que se culmine con la lista de oradores porque la 
verdad es que esto queda para la peor historia del Parlamento, y lo lamentamos muchísimo, puesto que no 
sólo nuestra Bancada ha quedado sin respuesta, sino también la ciudadanía.  
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SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Corresponde informar que la Mesa no dio trámite a una sugerencia de la señora 
Senadora Xavier y del señor Senador Korzeniak en el sentido de que estuviera presente el Ministro en esta 
circunstancia, porque entiende que no es procedente. El Ministro debe estar en el momento del llamado a 
Sala, pero esta sesión es convocada expresamente para que el Senado instrumente los mecanismos de los 
artículos 147 y 148. 
SEÑOR FERNANDEZ HUIDOBRO.- Pido la palabra para una aclaración. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador. 
SEÑOR FERNANDEZ HUIDOBRO.- Señor Presidente: he escuchado con atención al señor Senador 
García Costa decir que tiene en su poder las respuestas que por la prensa el señor Ministro anunció que 
había enviado al Parlamento. Sin embargo, como acaba de decir la señora Senadora Xavier, nosotros no 
las tenemos. Creo que a otros no les ha constado la claridad de lo que la señora Senadora Xavier dijo. 
Entonces, señor Presidente, quería saber si esas respuestas vinieron, porque a nuestra Bancada no 
llegaron. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- No tengo información oficial. A mí me enviaron las respuestas y se me dice que así 
se hizo porque me quedé a escuchar al señor Ministro cuando vino a darlas en Sala. 
SEÑOR KORZENIAK.- Pido la palabra. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador. 
SEÑOR KORZENIAK.- Señor Presidente: antes de referirme al tema -lo que haré con la mayor brevedad- 
quiero decir que lo que comunicamos al señor Presidente es que originalmente en la moción de censura 
habíamos incluido una frase, que después eliminamos, que decía que si el día en que la moción se 
discutiera y se votara, afirmativa o negativamente, se invitaba al Ministro nosotros estaríamos de acuerdo 
con ello, pero no más que eso. Quiere decir que se trataba de una invitación cordial. Sin embargo, la Mesa 
acaba de aclarar que entendió que no era procedente. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- No sólo me pareció improcedente, sino también curioso que los Senadores del 
Frente Amplio se retiraran y luego sugirieran invitar al señor Ministro. 
Puede continuar el señor Senador. 
SEÑOR KORZENIAK.- Improcedente no es. El Parlamento no está obligado a invitarlo, pero no es 
improcedente, ya que el Senado puede invitar al Ministro o permitir su ingreso.  
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Por otra parte, el objetivo de esta reunión es votar si se censura o no al señor Ministro de Salud Pública. 
Quiero empezar por decir que considero que la actuación del Ministro de Salud Pública el otro día aquí -y 
por estas cosas que voy a decir, me gustaría que estuviera presente- fue una insolencia. Un Ministro que 
viene a leer cuatro tomos durante 6 u 8 horas, sinceramente, es un insolente. 
En segundo lugar, contando con la información que nos habían proporcionado nuestros compañeros 
integrantes de la Comisión de Salud Pública, en lo personal -no comprometo a nadie- ya estaba 
absolutamente convencido de que este Ministro es una calamidad como Ministro de Salud Pública. Un 
desastre. Ha mentido, ya que veinte veces dijo en la radio, la televisión y en las Comisiones del Parlamento 
cosas que se probó que no eran ciertas. Estoy pensando, por ejemplo, en el tema de las vacunas, historia 
que no sé quién fabuló. El hecho es que o es un ignorante en materia de medicina o es un mentiroso. Si 
sabía y le mintieron a él y después lo dijo públicamente, es un mentiroso. Si no lo sabía, al no ser médico, 
puede administrar un Ministerio pero se supone que hay que conocer el tema cuando se trata de asuntos 
técnicos. En otros aspectos puede ser un excelente Ministro, aún no conociendo la técnica de la Medicina. 
De todas maneras, quiero aclarar que no tengo ninguna duda de que este Ministro tenía que ser censurado. 
Resulta que hay toda una tradición de hacer una larga exposición y después se entrega una hoja de 
preguntas. Una vez estuve en una interpelación que duró veinte minutos, oportunidad en la que lo que se 
hizo fue pedir la censura y el Ministro se fue porque había mentido, como una vez pasó con el Ministerio de 
Defensa Nacional. Se siguen tradiciones que en el Parlamento juegan, lo cual no está mal. 
Quiero decir que esta introducción vale porque podíamos haber hecho una moción de censura sin pedir una 
interpelación, que fue lo primero que trató la Bancada. 
Aquí termino la explicación que justifica esa conversación informal respecto a que si se quería invitar al 
Ministro nosotros no íbamos a estar en contra. La moción de censura del artículo 147 no requiere -como 
tradicionalmente se hace en el Parlamento- que primero haya una interpelación. En absoluto. Se puede 
venir acá y proponer la censura. ¿Por qué se procede tradicionalmente así y no está mal que se haga un 
llamado a Sala antes de una moción de censura? Porque el Ministro no está el día en que se vota la 
censura y entonces, para darle la oportunidad de que explique, se realiza una interpelación. Reitero: no 
porque la Constitución imponga que primero haya una interpelación. En el concepto vulgar siempre se 
entiende que antes debe haber una interpelación pero con relación al concepto técnico-jurídico, no es así. 
No es malo que se haga. ¿Para qué? Para oír al Ministro, para que no pueda decir que lo censuraron sin 
escucharlo. Por esa razón, como nosotros propusimos una censura, no queríamos que se pudiera decir que 
se propone la censura y el Ministro no está para defenderse. En ese sentido dijimos que si se lo quería 
invitar, nosotros no nos íbamos a oponer.  
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En tercer término, se realizó un cuarto intermedio y oí voces vivas del Partido Nacional y del Partido 
Colorado -con esto quiero decir de viva voz- acerca de que era un desastre lo que estaba haciendo el 
Ministro al leer las memorias del Ministerio de Salud Pública, completadas con menciones a hortalizas o 
tubérculos, aunque no en la sesión. Es decir que no fuimos sólo nosotros que nos sentimos primero 
perplejos y después realmente molestos. 
Entonces, cuando después del cuarto intermedio la Bancada del Partido Nacional -que salía de una 
reunión- nos comunicó que iban a plantearle al Partido Colorado que le dijera al Ministro que contestara las 
preguntas y no siguiera leyendo -esto me lo dijeron aquí dentro algunos miembros del Partido Nacional y 
también del Partido Colorado- resolvimos esperar qué decía el Ministro. Personalmente nunca pude saber 
qué dijo. Sé que le dijo a un grupo de técnicos que tenía, que fueran preparando las respuestas pero que se 
aprestaba a seguir leyendo las memorias del Ministerio. No sé cuál fue la respuesta del Ministro en las 
Bancadas, pero acá se acaba de preguntar cómo es posible que se haga una moción de censura sin haber 
escuchado las respuestas del Ministro, moción que vamos a votar sin ninguna duda en forma afirmativa. ¿Y 
qué lógica tiene que los partidos tradicionales -por lo que han anunciado- voten en contra la moción de 
censura si tampoco escucharon al Ministro de Salud Pública? ¿No lo escucharon por culpa nuestra? No, 
señor Presidente; no lo escucharon por que no se quedaron en Sala o por que el Ministro se fue. Los 
miembros del Partido Colorado y del Partido Nacional más el señor Presidente del Senado suman 18 y 
resulta que levantaron la sesión. Debido a que ya no soportaban más al Ministro, me fui a mi despacho y 
encendí el parlante -que esta vez funcionaba- para continuar escuchándolo desde allí. Sin embargo, a los 
cinco minutos la sesión se había terminado. Tratándose de 18 Senadores, podrían haberlo escuchado y hoy 
habrían concurrido con todos los elementos. Nuestra compañera planteó una cantidad de puntos 
incontestables. ¿Qué va a contestar el Ministro? Podrá contestar sobre el tema de la política, es verdad, si 
es que tiene una política de crear por ejemplo seguros privados. En ese caso, sí. Pero respecto al tema de 
las vacunas, ¿qué es lo que va a contestar? ¿Nos iba a mentir de nuevo? Lo mismo sucede con otros 
temas. Menciono el de las vacunas porque no me quiero meter en honduras y estoy pensando en las 
contrataciones. No me refiero a las contrataciones de los médicos que tuvieron un conflicto, porque eran 
contratados, sino en las contrataciones privilegiadas que el Ministro ha hecho -ya sea porque lo mandan o 
porque le piden- con sueldos muy grandes. Aclaro que estas últimas nada tienen que ver con el conflicto al 
que hice mención. ¿Qué iba a decir a este respecto? ¡Si hasta le podemos dar los nombres! 
Entonces, en lo que me es personal tenía y tengo elementos para solicitar que se declare la censura. Por 
cierto, los señores Senadores del Partido Colorado y del Partido Nacional escucharon la interpelación; si 
hubieran querido, se hubieran quedado y escuchado al señor Ministro. No sé si fue conminado pero, en 
todo caso, creo que le trasmitieron la idea de que querían escucharlo. Sin embargo, ¿por qué no lo 
escucharon? ¿Por qué se terminó la sesión?  
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SEÑOR GARCIA COSTA.- ¿Me permite una interrupción, señor Senador? 
SEÑOR KORZENIAK.- Con mucho gusto. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede interrumpir el señor Senador. 
SEÑOR GARCIA COSTA.- Señor Presidente: no me gusta interrumpir y menos al señor Senador 
Korzeniak, pero ¿debe suponerse que la Bancada del Partido Nacional tenía que quedarse en Sala cuando 
a la señora Senadora interpelante, que había pedido los informes, ya no le interesaba más escucharlos? 
Disculpe, señor Senador Korzeniak, pero el Partido Nacional elige cuándo le parece oportuno llamar, 
dirigirse o visitar al señor Ministro. No vamos a esperar a que un integrante de la Bancada del Frente 
Amplio, con los votos de la misma, proponga que venga el señor Ministro a informarnos, pero cuando éste -
como ya lo explicité en una forma que no nos parece lógica- trata de hacerlo, esa Bancada se retira de 
Sala. Pero, sobre todo, se va de Sala la señora Senadora interpelante, quien podría haber entrado, señalar 
que estaba presente y proponer el diálogo. Sin embargo, ella también renuncia. Entonces, el señor Senador 
Korzeniak no nos puede pedir que nos transformemos en personeros del Frente Amplio y de la señora 
Senadora interpelante; hacemos lo que debemos, pero no más que eso. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede continuar el señor Senador Korzeniak. 
SEÑOR KORZENIAK.- El señor Senador García Costa, con su gracia e ironía características, hizo lo que 
hace siempre: me atribuye cosas que no digo y planteos que no hago. Precisamente, el otro día, cuando 
tratamos el tema de la Corte Electoral, hizo lo mismo y me divertí mucho. 
Por supuesto, no pretendo indicarle al Partido Nacional lo que tiene que hacer. Expreso que si los señores 
Senadores del Partido Nacional, para poder votar hoy con conocimiento de causa, querían escuchar a la 
señora Senadora interpelante y al interpelado, lo podían haber hecho; si no lo quisieron hacer, allá ellos. De 
todos modos, tengo derecho a decir que van a votar en contra la declaración de censura sin haber oído al 
señor Ministro; lo digo, porque es así. Lo mismo ocurre con el Partido Colorado. 
Si el señor Senador García Costa me pidiera otra interrupción y volviera a inventar cosas que no digo, pues, 
que lo haga, porque es una dialéctica con la que me divierto mucho. Siempre hemos tenido un trato 
correcto y lo vamos a seguir teniendo, pero no comparto esa técnica de atribuirle al otro cosas que no dijo, 
para poder criticarlo fácilmente. Esa técnica también se utiliza para abordar ideologías y criticar a algún 
autor que no nos gusta -personalmente, no lo hago pues tengo cierta probidad y, por razones académicas, 
me sentiría mal si lo hiciera- presentándolo mal para poderlo criticar o, por el contrario, si alguien es muy 
hincha de determinado autor, se le borran aquellos aspectos que no gustan a los efectos de poder alabarlo. 
Por cierto, esto es bastante común.  
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Es verdad que se le puede cuestionar a los señores Senadores del Frente Amplio cómo es que piden la 
censura sin escuchar al señor Ministro. En lo que me es personal, la hubiera planteado, incluso, antes de 
abocarnos a la interpelación pues -lo vuelvo a decir- este Ministro me parece una calamidad y ha tenido una 
actuación muy mala. Pero, si por una cuestión de formas y de tradiciones parlamentarias hay derecho a que 
se nos diga: "Se hubieran quedado a escuchar y, entonces sí, después podrían votar fundadamente la 
censura", tengo el mismo derecho de contestarles que para votar en contra de la censura también tendrían 
que haber escuchado al señor Ministro. Si no lo escucharon, tenían todo el derecho del mundo a hacerlo, a 
irse de Sala y a dar por terminada la sesión. Honestamente no sé qué pasó y por qué el señor Ministro no 
habló. Quizás el señor Ministro pensó que debía irse porque no estaban los que querían oírle o tal vez es lo 
que pensaron las dos Bancadas. Yo creo que no es así y que en esos temas todo el mundo está interesado 
en escuchar los detalles, ya sean los interpelantes, los interpelados, o se trate de los señores Senadores 
del Partido Colorado, del Nuevo Espacio o del Partido Nacional. Reitero que, en mi opinión, todo el mundo 
está interesado en saber qué pasa con este tema. 
Es habitual que se diga que la izquierda vota siempre en contra o que tiene una predisposición en contra. 
Sin embargo, cuando se enciende la computadora se comprueba que en más del 80% de los casos no ha 
sido así, sino que ha colaborado sanamente para que todo siga adelante. Precisamente, conozco el tema 
muy de cerca y sé que en determinado momento se iba a hacer una publicación, pero la persona a quien se 
le encomendó esta tarea señaló que no era oportuno hacerlo porque se iban a encontrar con que el Frente 
Amplio había presentado más proyectos que los otros Partidos. Entonces, acá ocurre el mismo fenómeno y 
lo voy a decir con mucha simplicidad. Cada vez que se plantea la censura a un señor Ministro advierto 
muchos votos en contra a pesar de que hay gente que quiere que ese Ministro se vaya. Esto lo vi muchas 
veces, inclusive, hace poco vivimos el episodio, muy concreto, del ex-Ministro Bensión. Recuerdo que 
planteamos ¿por qué el Partido Nacional no votaba, si estaba reclamando que se fuera? Por supuesto, al 
final eso se logró y en esa instancia el Partido Nacional jugó un rol muy importante. Pero la censura no la 
votaban ni puestos contra la pared, porque señalaron que yo quería interpelar al Partido Nacional. Eso no 
era así y hoy tampoco estoy interpelando al Partido Nacional ni al Partido Colorado. 
Insisto en lo siguiente: si se nos imputa falta de lógica por haber planteado la censura antes de escuchar las 
respuestas, a mi juicio, existe la misma falta de lógica en votarla en contra sin haber escuchado las 
respuestas. Las preguntas fueron escuchadas y pienso que fueron contundentes y muy duras sobre el tema 
de la salud pública; otras no fueron formuladas, porque todavía no tenemos las pruebas suficientes de las 
malas actuaciones que se han llevado adelante en ese Ministerio. 
SEÑOR GARGANO.- Pido la palabra. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador.  
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SEÑOR GARGANO.- Señor Presidente: teniendo en cuenta la seriedad del tema, voy a tratar de manejar 
con austeridad los conceptos. En lo que me es personal, voy a votar la censura. Y voy a hacerlo porque la 
interpelación ha tenido un trámite muy peculiar; diría que ninguna ha sido manejada en una forma tan mala. 
En principio, se demoró 25 días en convocar al señor Ministro. Siempre había un problema: primero estaba 
el sistema financiero y había que resolverlo, y luego nos ocuparíamos del tema de la salud. No se podían 
tratar los dos al mismo tiempo. Nosotros aceptamos y vinimos a discutir un proyecto de ley sobre el sistema 
financiero. Fue así que, a un mal proyecto que venía del Poder Ejecutivo, le introdujimos modificaciones 
sustantivas a los efectos de poder votar algo que sirviera para sacar del escollo en que estaba al sistema 
financiero. No pido que el Gobierno aplauda esta posición. Y cuando digo "Gobierno" me refiero al Partido 
Colorado y al Partido Nacional, porque este último, aunque no tenga Ministros, sigue estando en el 
Gobierno. 
Es así que pasa un mes y se fija la interpelación para el 23 de diciembre, la antevísperas de Navidad. 
Se dice que la actitud del Encuentro Progresista-Frente Amplio es inasible. Me pregunto cómo califican los 
señores Senadores de todos los Partidos lo que hizo el señor Ministro de Salud Pública, que vino y exhibió, 
delante de todo el mundo, seis tomos. Todos los señores Senadores del Gobierno nos dijeron que su 
exposición insumiría seis u ocho horas y reiteraban ese planteo, inclusive, cuando la interpelación estaba 
comenzando. Fue así que el señor Ministro hizo una larga exposición sobre la historia de la poliomielitis en 
el Uruguay para señalarnos que estaba erradicada hace veinte años; en mi opinión, hasta los escolares de 
este país tienen esa información que, por otra parte, ya empiezan a abordarla en segundo año de escuela. 
Lo mismo hizo con el tema de la difteria, para indicarnos que estaba erradicada y con un minucioso análisis, 
de diez páginas, de cada una de las enfermedades prevalentes, si es que precisamos bien el término 
porque, en verdad, no logramos saber exactamente de qué se trataba. Supongo que los médicos lo sabrán, 
pero los demás no tenemos la fortuna o la información sanitaria suficiente como para identificar, por 
ejemplo, el virus de Egipto. En verdad, todo esto nos resulta inasible. 
La señora Senadora Xavier, en una exposición demoledora de dos horas -no era preciso ser muy sagaz 
para decir que el tema central estaba en lo que sucede en el sistema público y privado- ejemplificó diciendo 
que se cierran las mutualistas y que el sistema público no tiene hilo para suturar, no hace operaciones y 
que la emergencia del Hospital de Clínicas está cerrada porque de los $ 20:000.000 que le deben, 
prometieron darle $ 1:000.000 por mes para atender las necesidades. Obviamente, todo esto es 
responsabilidad del Ministro de Salud Pública, porque es la persona del Gobierno que se ocupa de eso. 
Tampoco se puede operar en el Hospital Maciel y los hospitales psiquiátricos no tienen medicamentos. Eso 
se le preguntó al señor Ministro y no se necesitaba consultar libros para responderlo. Además, observé que 
el Ministro no tomó ni un solo apunte de lo que se le estaba preguntando. Vino con la idea de hablar 
durante seis horas, dormir al Senado matándolo de cansancio y después ver si se aguantaba o no. Los  
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integrantes del gremio de la prensa y de comunicación han calificado esta situación como atípica y eso es 
exacto. Que al Ministro de Economía y Finanzas le pregunten qué pasó con el préstamo del BID, de U$S 
70:000.000 o U$S 80:000.000 -quien habla escuchó con atención que había llegado en noviembre del año 
pasado- y haya señalado hace dos meses, ante la opinión pública, que por él pasó la aspiradora del Banco 
Central, es inédito en el Uruguay. Vamos a detenernos un poco, con austeridad, señor Presidente y 
manejando los vocablos en su justo término. Es insólito que el señor Ministro de Economía y Finanzas diga 
que a los préstamos que vienen para atender la salud de la gente, el Banco Central le pase la aspiradora y 
los destine a otra cosa. Seguramente los utilizó para asistir financieramente al Banco de Montevideo, al 
Banco Comercial o al Banco la Caja Obrera. Sin embargo, ante esa pregunta, no dio ninguna respuesta 
durante dos horas. Se le dice que el sistema público está en una crisis total, que no está funcionando la 
emergencia del Hospital de Clínicas, que hay una absoluta parálisis, que cierran las mutualistas y no dice 
nada al respecto. Recientemente se ha terminado un conflicto con los médicos que trabajan contratados por 
Salud Pública en régimen de Comisiones de Apoyo que fue provocado por el Ministro, porque no discute. 
Ahora hay un nuevo método: para bajar los salarios o para disminuir el ingreso de la gente, no se discute 
con el gremio interesado, sino que se hace directamente. A los diez o quince días, como se paralizó el 
sistema de salud que atienden estos médicos, en 24 horas se solucionó un problema que no debería haber 
existido. Acá no hay sólo falta de responsabilidad, sino que también hay incompetencia total. Se le preguntó 
sobre eso concretamente, pero no dijo una sola palabra. 
El señor Senador García Costa dijo que era inasible, pero lo que es inasible es esto. Los mismos miembros 
de su Bancada estaban horrorizados de lo que estaba haciendo el señor Ministro. Además, las 
exclamaciones no partían solamente de la Bancada del Frente Amplio - Encuentro Progresista, sino 
también del Partido Nacional. Hubo Senadores de este Partido que se retiraron de Sala diciendo "Feliz 
Navidad". 
SEÑOR GARCIA COSTA. No es así. 
SEÑOR GARGANO. No diga que no, señor Senador García Costa, porque lo principal es la verdad, es una 
sola y no se la puede dar vuelta. 
También se le preguntó al señor Ministro sobre el tema de las vacunas. Voy a repetir esto porque es 
asombroso lo que ha ocurrido. En el país hay una larga polémica acerca de si hay que utilizar una vacuna 
que procede de Cuba o no. Recuerdo que esto fue planteado en la interpelación que le hicimos al Ministro 
de Relaciones Exteriores hace varios meses -no sé si fue en marzo, abril o mayo- y se nos dijo que no se 
sabía qué iba a pasar con la vacuna, porque se rompían las relaciones. Sin embargo, la vacuna vino como 
donación. Después se dijo que se iba a pagar, aunque nunca se llevó a cabo el pago, por supuesto. 
(Ocupa la Presidencia el señor Senador doctor Correa Freitas)  
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Es más, se pidieron más vacunas para completar la dosis. Varias veces he preguntado a la señora 
Senadora Xavier y al señor Senador Cid si los jóvenes que recibieron una sola dosis estaban inmunizados y 
me dijeron que no. Es decir que pueden haber nuevos casos -esto es de tremenda gravedad para el país- 
porque hay varias decenas de miles de muchachos que recibieron una sola dosis y pueden contraer la 
enfermedad, ya que no están inmunizados. Y resulta que el Ministro nos dice que no se fabrica más, no se 
compra más; no se entiende nada. Parece que también se fabrica en Estados Unidos que compró la 
patente, pero el señor Ministro de Salud Pública no entiende nada de eso y necesita tener a 70 asesores en 
una sala proveyéndolo de notas para poder responder. Esto es insólito y si esto es inasible, no entiendo 
absolutamente nada. 
Esto es muy bien atable; el Ministro vino a desarrollar una táctica de distracción y, diría, de desprecio al 
Cuerpo. Pertenezco a este Senado desde hace 18 años y nunca he visto algo así. He visto discusiones 
duras, violentas, de intercambio de epítetos, pero nunca algo de este tipo. No se puede tratar a un Cuerpo 
legislativo de esta manera, ni se puede utilizar una táctica de cansar a la gente y no responder 
absolutamente nada. Entonces, después de aceptar un cuarto intermedio planteado por la Bancada de 
Gobierno, dijimos que a esa altura, luego de los hechos ocurridos, dábamos por terminada la interpelación. 
Dijimos eso porque se había visto confirmado por el silencio del Ministro y su elusión de los temas 
principales, leyendo la cuarta parte de los seis tomos que tenía para leer. Eso sí que es inasible, señor 
Senador García Costa. Ate eso, señor Senador, átelo a la conducta. Usted sabe muy bien lo que pasa en el 
Ministerio de Salud Pública, porque estuvo a cargo de esa Cartera. Puede quedarse tranquilo, señor 
Senador, porque no voy a examinar su gestión; no es la oportunidad. A lo mejor algún día podemos 
conversar de eso. Su Partido sabe muy bien lo que sucede en el Ministerio de Salud Pública, porque 
muchos mandos medios de ese Ministerio pertenecen al Partido Nacional. Ustedes no necesitaban la 
interpelación, porque ya tenían información de lo que estaba ocurriendo allí. 
¿Qué respuesta se nos dio al desabastecimiento, a la crisis del sector privado, a los varios miles de 
trabajadores que han perdido sus puestos de trabajo en ese sistema, a la incapacidad absoluta para 
resolver esos temas? El Sindicato Médico del Uruguay, la Federación Médica del Interior y las Instituciones 
de Asistencia Médica Colectiva piden colectivamente la renuncia del Ministro por el descalabro y el caos 
que hay en materia de salud pública y privada. Entonces, frente a la actitud despectiva, desconsiderada e 
insólita del Ministro de Salud Pública, decidimos que el tiempo de la interpelación había acabado y venía el 
de la censura. Por eso, vamos a votar la censura. Sin embargo, comprendo muy bien que el Partido 
Nacional no la vote, no ha votado nada en contra del Gobierno y forma parte de él. Tenemos una lista de 
todo lo que ha votado en estos tres años y medio. Además, ha tenido participación en el Ministerio de Salud 
Pública y muchos de los problemas de los que hay ahora, vienen de antes. Ha habido muchos Ministros 
blancos en el Ministerio de Salud Pública y no sólo el señor Senador García Costa. Además, han tenido 
cargos en los otros Ministerios y han colaborado para mantener a este Ministro, no desde hace dos meses - 
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cuando sacaron a los Ministros del Gobierno- sino durante toda la gestión. Esto que está ocurriendo hoy en 
el Uruguay en materia de salud no es de ahora. Entonces, está perfectamente justificada la actitud del 
Frente Amplio de actuar como lo hizo, con responsabilidad y diciendo que no vamos a tolerar esto que 
aparece como una falta de respeto al Senado de la República. 
Por lo tanto, vamos a proceder a hacer lo que corresponde en estos casos, que es votar la censura del 
Ministro. 
No quiero dar recomendaciones a nadie, pero no auguro que el señor Ministro de Salud Pública 
permanezca mucho tiempo en su cargo, no porque el Encuentro Progresista - Frente Amplio vaya a sacarlo 
del mismo, sino porque los hechos lo van a hacer, ya que no tiene competencia ni sensibilidad para afrontar 
la situación que se vive en esa Cartera e intentar resolver por lo menos uno de los cincuenta problemas que 
se han generado durante su gestión y la de los que lo antecedieron en el cargo. 
SEÑOR GARCIA COSTA.- Pido la palabra para contestar varias alusiones. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE (Dr. Correa Freitas).- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador. 
SEÑOR GARCIA COSTA.- Como sorpresivamente en algún momento parecía que el señor Senador 
Gargano dirigía el tema a la actitud del Partido Nacional -creí que era una interpelación del Frente Amplio y 
el Ministro pertenecía al Gobierno y al Partido Colorado- da la impresión de que nosotros tenemos que 
absolver posiciones. 
He planteado nuestro enfoque del tema con todo cuidado, precisando los términos, evitando entrar en 
cuestiones polémicas y en un enfrentamiento que todos descontábamos era entre el Gobierno y el Frente 
Amplio, pero resulta que ahora es con el Partido Nacional. Dije, señor Presidente -pero no hay peor sordo 
que el que no quiere oír- que consideraba que los sucesos del otro día no le hacen ningún bien al Senado ni 
al país ni dan solución a ninguno de los problemas de la salud pública. Este hecho nadie me lo puede 
discutir. Échense la culpa recíprocamente, pero lo claro es que nadie dio solución a nada. Además, di las 
razones de ello. Traté de no limitarme a un concepto subjetivo: "a nosotros nos parece inasible" por varias 
razones. ¡Cómo no va a ser inasible cuando se quieren plantear tantos temas! Ahora el señor Senador 
Gargano se refiere de pasada a varios temas concretos y muy importantes de la salud pública y privada del 
país, pero el pedido de informes dice: "Estado actual de la Salud Pública y Privada del país y elementos de 
política que procure el Ministerio para corregirlo". 
(Murmullos en Sala) 
(Campana de orden)  
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SEÑOR PRESIDENTE (Dr. Correa Freitas).- Puede continuar en el uso de la palabra el señor Senador 
García Cos-ta. 
SEÑOR GARCIA COSTA.- Dije que es inasible. ¡Cómo no lo va a ser! Es necesariamente inasible. De otra 
manera no funciona. 
En cuanto a que el Ministro estuvo mal e hizo esto o aquello, señalé que según el criterio de la Bancada del 
Partido Nacional, el Ministro no cumplió adecuadamente el objetivo de un pedido de informes y de una 
interpelación. ¿Quieren que además proclamemos nuestro odio eterno? Ni contra uno ni contra otro. No 
compartimos lo que se hizo; indicamos las razones. ¿No son suficientes? No lo serán, pero son las 
nuestras, señor Presidente. Si el Ministro estuvo mal, lo estamos diciendo. Sin embargo, también 
expresamos que no volver cuando la interpelación estaba en pleno, nos parecía un absurdo. Al final, la 
teoría del "Miren que pedimos la interpelación porque hay costumbre, pero en realidad es el 147 que 
deberíamos haberlo puesto sin ponerlo", no la entiendo. 
SEÑOR KORZENIAK.- No dije eso. 
SEÑOR GARCIA COSTA.- Pero no dije que lo haya dicho el señor Senador Korzeniak. ¿Por qué se siente 
aludido si no dije que fue él? Señor Senador Korzeniak: usted no es el único que habla. 
(Campana de orden) 
- No tengo por costumbre el revelar charlas que se tienen acá y ponerlas como un elemento de juicio para 
los compañeros del Senado. Es algo que aprendí en veinte y tantos años en esta Casa. Pero si se quiere se 
usa: "Juan me dijo, Pedro me avisó, el otro me dijo en el Ambulatorio, el de más allá me lo conversó y vino 
un periodista...". En general, en eso hay un estilo de discreción. Parece que eso es lo normal. Hubo otras 
personas que también me hablaron del 147, ¿por qué sólo lo haría el señor Senador Korzeniak? 
Repito que el tema no es el Partido Nacional, sino que el otro día el Senado se negara en los hechos -
obviamente, no en la intención- a cumplir con la necesidad nacional, que es atender los graves problemas 
de la salud en este país y se dedicó, de un lado y otros, tirios y troyanos, a no entrar nunca al tema. Se 
entró por el reproche, pero la respuesta no la pudimos oír. Ahora se nos dice: "Quédense ustedes para 
oírla", pero yo no hice el pedido de informes ni pedí que viniera el Ministro. Si el Partido Nacional lo hubiera 
solicitado, alguno de sus representantes hubiera formulado las preguntas concretas del caso. Resulta que 
no lo hicimos nosotros, pero tenemos que quedarnos para escuchar lo que contesta el Ministro al 
requerimiento del Frente Amplio. Eso no es racional ni lógico. 
SEÑOR GARGANO.- Pido la palabra para contestar una alusión política.  
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SEÑOR PRESIDENTE (Dr. Ruben Correa Freitas).- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador. 
SEÑOR GARGANO.- Quiero decir, señor Presidente, que la polémica no es con el Partido Nacional. Lo que 
ocurre es que éste, por intermedio de su portavoz, ha enjuiciado la conducta del Encuentro Progresista - 
Frente Amplio y le explicamos cuál era nuestra opinión. Nosotros sabíamos que el Partido Nacional iba a 
votar en contra de la censura. Personalmente, me atrevería a decir que estaba seguro de que, aunque 
hubiéramos llegado en absoluta paz al final de la sesión, iba a votar en contra de la censura, como lo va a 
hacer con todas las censuras, ahora y hasta que termine el período de Gobierno, porque son el Gobierno y 
lo han sido desde la salida democrática, junto con el Partido Colorado. Me parece bien que actúen así, en 
bloque y férreamente unidos, porque tienen una misma concepción y desarrollan una misma práctica. Esto 
tampoco es un reproche. Si están convencidos de ello, me parece perfecto. Creo que es elogiable una 
conducta transparente ante la opinión pública para que ésta esté totalmente enterada de la unidad de 
criterios del Partido Colorado y del Partido Nacional. 
Si alguna sorpresa me llevo ahora, es que el Partido Nacional ha recibido las respuestas del señor Ministro 
de Salud Pública, mientras que el Encuentro Progresista - Frente Amplio, no las recibió. Quiere decir que el 
Ministro, de alguna manera, está agradeciendo la actitud del Partido Nacional al entregarle las respuestas y 
ni siquiera hacerle llegar al Encuentro Progresista - Frente Amplio la notificación de que dichas respuestas 
están elaboradas. Es otra demostración de desprecio a las instituciones. Creo que se está insistiendo 
mucho en esto del desprecio a las instituciones y, aquí sí, convendría rectificar el camino. Este no es el 
único episodio que ha ocurrido; ha habido varios en los últimos meses que muestran la actitud que se toma. 
Por ejemplo, se aprecia cuando al estallar el sistema financiero, por encima de la Constitución y de la ley se 
adoptan determinadas decisiones o cuando ocurre un episodio como el de la integración de los organismos 
de contralor y se sigue para adelante. Ahora tenemos esta actitud: acercar una respuesta al Partido 
Nacional mediante un documento voluminoso, casi tanto como uno de aquellos seis tomos que tenía el 
señor Ministro en Sala, que espero no sea nuevamente una síntesis de la Rendición de Cuentas anual del 
Ministerio de Salud Pública, sino la contestación a las preguntas formuladas en la interpelación, porque por 
lo menos el Partido Nacional se va a enterar. 
SEÑOR CID.- Pido la palabra. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE (Dr. Ruben Correa Freitas).- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador. 
SEÑOR CID.- Creo que para analizar esta circunstancia que se está atravesando hoy con respecto al 
Ministro de Salud Pública, habría que ver cuál fue la conducta de la Bancada del Encuentro Progresista - 
Frente Amplio con las autoridades del Ministerio de Salud Pública. 
Estamos hablando del tercer Ministro de Salud Pública de esta Legislatura.  
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Quiero señalar algunos elementos fundamentales con respecto a este hecho, y voy a marcar, entonces, 
cuál fue nuestra actitud con el primer Ministro de Salud Pública, el contador Fernández Ameglio, que hizo 
un diagnóstico de situación y una propuesta de trabajo y creó un ámbito de trabajo multiinstitucional, con la 
elaboración de planes que permitían una expectativa cierta para poner proa a los problemas que 
atravesaba, en primer lugar, el sistema privado y, en segundo término, el sistema público. Esta Bancada los 
apoyó y aprobó, e incluso en conflictos que dieron lugar a situaciones críticas como las que ocurrieron con 
el cierre de instituciones mutuales, compañeros nuestros actuaron mediando, tratando de minimizar un 
hecho de extrema gravedad, pues se dejaba a cientos de trabajadores sin cobertura asistencial, así como a 
miles de afiliados al sistema mutual en una total incertidumbre, porque luego de los cierres del año 1989 -es 
decir, doce años después- se procesaban los primeros cierres de instituciones de asistencia médica 
colectiva, lo cual es absolutamente negativo para la calidad de la asistencia médica. 
Luego de la renuncia del contador Fernández Ameglio -que, bueno es reiterarlo, elaboró una estrategia para 
poner proa a la solución de los problemas de la asistencia médica colectiva-, asume el doctor Luis 
Fraschini, a quien en su momento dimos nuestro apoyo público y notorio en condiciones muy adversas para 
pronunciarse favorablemente y darle el apoyo cuando se le acusaba de ser responsable de muertes por 
meningitis. Recordemos ese hecho con respecto al cual, reitero, dimos públicamente nuestro apoyo, porque 
de ninguna manera podíamos aceptar que se encarara como responsable al doctor Luis Fraschini de 
muertes de niños por meningitis. Otros eran los responsables, y no precisamente el Ministro; lo eran otros 
que tergiversaron la información. 
Dimos nuestro apoyo, entonces, al doctor Luis Fraschini, con quien tuvimos almuerzos de trabajo para 
tratar, entre todos, de dar solución a los problemas de la salud; de poner un norte e ir colaborando en un 
tema que merece una política de Estado, como es -así lo entendemos personalmente- el que tiene que ver 
con la salud. Creemos que debe ser un elemento esencial y no de politización, como se puede interpretar. 
Nuestro compañero, el señor Representante Luis Gallo, cuando reconoció que se había tergiversado 
información sobre la tipificación de cepas de meningococo que demostraban que la vacuna cubana era 
efectiva para prevenir la meningitis en nuestro país, se encargó públicamente de decir a todos los medios 
de difusión que el interés no era proponer una interpelación al doctor Fraschini, sino promover la destitución 
del doctor Touyá, quien, en conocimiento de ese error de tipificación, había ocultado los datos al señor 
Ministro. 
Hasta ese grado ha llegado nuestra lealtad como Legisladores del Encuentro Progresista - Frente Amplio, 
tratando de defender a los Ministros que se han designado, al tema de la salud como un asunto prioritario y 
rumbear en las soluciones más consensuadas o factibles para la salud pública y la mutual. 
Desgraciadamente, por razones políticas, el doctor Fraschini fue destituido. Digo "desgraciadamente", 
porque considero que fue un buen Ministro, y así lo demostró, no sólo ocupando esa Cartera, sino también  
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como Subsecretario de ese Ministerio y como Director de ASSE. Desgraciadamente, vuelvo a decir, fue 
destituido el doctor Fraschini. Lo digo con los alcances que tiene el término. 
Se puede atribuir que no hubo tiempo de analizar 94 preguntas, pero si un Ministro de Salud Pública no 
tiene motivos suficientes para contestar la interrogante número 1 que hizo la señora Senadora Mónica 
Xavier después de un análisis absolutamente exacto, preciso y completo, es un Ministro incompetente. La 
pregunta número 1 dice: "¿Cuál es el enfoque o modelo de sistema de salud que se persigue como vía para 
la toma de decisiones de su Cartera?". Si el doctor Varela no tiene dos horas y media para hablar de este 
tema, es un Ministro incompetente. 
Entonces, comparto algunas de las afirmaciones que se han hecho en este ámbito por parte de algún 
compañero en el sentido de que no era necesaria la interpelación para promover la destitución o censura de 
este Ministro. Han sido muchos los episodios que, incluso, hemos compartido por los medios de difusión, 
que nos hacen llegar al descrédito del señor Ministro. En primer lugar, hay uno esencial. Luego de hechos 
gravísimos que se estaban dando en todos los niveles de salud, el Ministro demoró más de un mes en 
asistir a la Comisión de Salud Pública del Senado. El señor Senador Correa Freitas, que ocupa la 
Presidencia del Senado en este momento, integra esa Comisión y, si bien no le pido que avale lo que estoy 
señalando, conoce que ese hecho fue real. Reitero que ese es un primer elemento esencial. No había 
consideración al Parlamento Nacional, y el señor Ministro tampoco sentía necesidad de darle explicaciones, 
incluso olvidando lo que había sido nuestra posición histórica de colaboración, de apoyo, de tratar de dar 
una mano en temas tan esenciales. 
Luego se desencadenan una serie de situaciones, que las sintetizo en que estamos asistiendo al cierre, 
durante este Gobierno, de la sexta institución de asistencia médica colectiva. Es más; estamos asistiendo al 
cierre de instituciones históricas creadas por Maestros de la medicina nacional. Se cierra el Sanatorio 
Larghero, en donde nuestro Profesor de Cirugía desarrolló la actividad quirúrgica al más alto nivel, 
colaborando con la asistencia pública. Debemos recordar que cuando los pacientes no podían ser asistidos 
en el Hospital Pasteur, el Profesor Larghero, con generosidad y desprendimiento, llevaba a los pacientes a 
su Sanatorio y los asistía bajo su costo. Precisamente ese es el último de los sanatorios que se está 
cerrando. Digo esto con gran dolor y con profundo sentimiento, porque fui alumno del Profesor Larghero, 
quien me enseñó muchas cosas además de Medicina. 
En ese entorno se desarrolla un conflicto con los médicos contratados. Ahí realmente se actuó -lo digo con 
franqueza y si molesta lo siento mucho- con irresponsabilidad. Se rescindieron los contratos de los médicos 
contratados. Desde 1991, el Ministerio de Salud Pública no tenía un avance significativo en la calidad de 
asistencia como cuando se resolvió incentivar a grupos de médicos para implementar coberturas 
asistenciales que en ese momento debía contratar Salud Pública en los servicios privados. Bajo el Gobierno 
del doctor Lacalle se implementa este sistema que permite transformar la asistencia en los CTI desde el  
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sector privado al público. Ese fue un elemento fundamental que permitió al Ministerio de Salud Pública 
abaratar la cobertura asistencial de una manera muy significativa. Luego eso se fue ampliando en círculos 
concén-tricos; se contrataron cirujanos, anestesistas y médicos psiquiatras que permitieron implementar el 
Plan de Salud Mental. Todo esto se hizo mejorando radicalmente -debemos decirlo enfáticamente- la 
calidad de la asistencia y de la cobertura de Salud Pública. 
Y este señor Ministro, a quien el señor Presidente Jorge Batlle ha señalado como un ejemplo de ahorro en 
el área de la Salud Pública -diciendo que había que tomar como ejemplo esa Cartera como organismo que 
había hecho los máximos ahorros-, pretende desprenderse de los médicos contratados. Rescinde el 
contrato, y el señor Subsecretario, supuestamente con el aval del señor Ministro, sale a la conquista de la 
opinión pública. ¿Qué se le ocurre decir al señor Subsecretario? Se le ocurre decir que los médicos 
contratados cobran un 300% más que los presupuestados. Por supuesto que se omitió decir que los 
médicos presupuestados ganan $ 3.500; es una verdadera vergüenza lo que Salud Pública abona a sus 
médicos y, en fin, a los profesionales que trabajan en esa área. Esa conquista por la opinión pública resultó 
indignante, porque se refirió a un hecho absolutamente tramposo en cuanto a su argumentación, pues 
señalaba claramente un ánimo de desprestigiar a los médicos que estaban en conflicto. 
Pero, además, cuando uno dice "irresponsable", está señalando que el núcleo central del conflicto era el 
Hospital Pereira Rossell. En ese Hospital se asisten 9.000 partos al año, es decir que estábamos poniendo 
en riesgo al binomio materno-fetal, desencadenando un conflicto que podía desembocar en lo que 
finalmente desembocó: el traslado de prematuros a sanatorios privados y la declaración de la Facultad de 
Medicina de que no podía dar cobertura a los partos, el día 4 de diciembre, por la pérdida de calidad de 
asistencia. Esto significa que se sometió a miles de uruguayas a un riesgo, situación desencadenada por 
las propias autoridades del Ministerio de Salud Pública quienes, además, se negaron a dialogar y a buscar 
un ámbito de acuerdo. 
En ese entorno -de las características que estamos señalando- de lo que significó esta contratación de 
médicos -que fue hecha durante el Gobierno del Partido Nacional y que reconozco como algo trascendente-
, el señor Ministro de Salud Pública dice públicamente, ante los medios de difusión, que está dispuesto a 
estudiar alternativas de privatización de los CTI, cuando nosotros, como médicos intensivistas, vimos cómo 
se expoliaba al propio Ministerio por su incapacidad de control, debido a su tamaño o a su dimensión. Lo 
cierto es que se retenían enfermos o se pasaba a los CTI a pacientes cuando ello no era realmente 
necesario, con lo cual se incrementaba el costo de la asistencia en terapia intensiva, en una forma 
exorbitante. 
Entonces, esos anuncios hechos por el señor Ministro a la ligera demuestran que, en realidad, no maneja 
muy bien la situación. Cabe agregar que poco después de las manifestaciones públicas a las que 
aludíamos antes, señaló -también públicamente- que los CTI privados son mucho más baratos que los CTI  
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públicos, porque la cotización es de U$S 200 los primeros, contra U$S 700 los segundos. Todos sabemos 
que esa cifra no es real y que no tiene consistencia. En definitiva, vemos que hay un manejo tan superficial 
de todas estas situaciones que no podemos salir de nuestro asombro para catalogar la actitud del señor 
Ministro. 
¿Cómo se destraba este conflicto de los médicos contratados? En base a una denuncia que ellos mismos 
hacen sobre las contrataciones de las Comisiones de Apoyo. Estas últimas contratan servicios que son 
absolutamente desconcertantes -por utilizar un término benevolente- como, por ejemplo, los de pintores, 
caseros, choferes que no están asignados -justamente- al manejo de ambulancias, o treinta arquitectos; y 
en muchos casos ni siquiera existe asignación presupuestal o un área dónde desarrollar sus actividades. 
Cuando los médicos que estudian esa planilla denuncian esa situación, se destraba el conflicto y se otorga 
una parte de los beneficios que los médicos estaban dispuestos a recibir. 
Entonces, todo esto resulta muy sorprendente, porque habla de un manejo muy a la ligera de esta situación. 
Por mi parte, me gustaría poder decir en mi discurso que este Ministro de Salud Pública es excepcional y 
que le puso proa a los problemas. Pero no puedo hacerlo, señor Presidente, porque lo que él ha hecho ha 
sido crear un ámbito de incertidumbre tanto en el sistema público como en el privado. En lo que refiere a 
este último, no fue implementada ninguna de las medidas consensuadas en el ámbito de la Comisión 
Multisectorial -en la que participó prácticamente el 100% de los actores vinculados al tema de la salud- que 
fueron apoyadas, en forma casi unánime, en el mes de abril de 2002. Y lo cierto es que algunas de ellas 
son instrumentales, es decir, no precisan recursos económicos para poder ser puestas en práctica, sino que 
ello depende de la voluntad política. Sin embargo, reitero que ninguna de esas medidas se ha 
implementado. 
A continuación, me gustaría hacer referencia a una de las medidas inmediatas, que era absolutamente 
imprescindible. Se trata, concretamente, del préstamo del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, que 
inicialmente era de U$S 70 por afiliado. Sin embargo, hace muy poco tiempo se transformó en U$S 35 por 
afiliado, argumentándose también que las deudas que tiene el sistema mutual no son en dólares. Decir esto 
es desconocer la realidad. Personalmente, conozco decenas de instituciones mutuales que tienen deudas 
en dólares. De cualquier modo, supongamos por un momento que esa afirmación que he mencionado, que 
no es exacta, se corresponde con la realidad; en ese caso, tampoco esa cifra de U$S 35 comprometida por 
el señor Ministro de Economía y Finanzas y ratificada por el de Salud Pública, se repartió. Personalmente, 
sé que las instituciones mutuales hicieron un gasto; por mi parte, conozco el caso concreto -porque fue 
publicado en la prensa- de la Sociedad Médica Universal, que gastó U$S 70.000 en auditoría con sus 
recursos, apostando a que el préstamo del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo le daría después un poco 
de oxígeno, tanto a ella como a los proveedores, recomponiéndose en parte la cadena de pagos. Sin 
embargo, no han recibido un solo peso y hace meses que el plan de fortalecimiento mutual de estas  
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instituciones ha sido aceptado por el Ministerio de Salud Pública, a través de la Comisión que evaluó esos 
programas. 
A todo esto, agregamos que en el mes de mayo el señor Ministro afirmó que el préstamo del Banco 
Interamericano de Desarrollo estaba disponible. Sin embargo, en diciembre expresa que, probablemente, 
en el mes de enero se otorgará parte de dicho préstamo. Ya no se habla de todo el préstamo, sino de la 
cifra de U$S 20 por afiliado, y el resto, luego se verá. 
Entonces, un Ministro que se maneja con afirmaciones tan radicales, que luego no se condicen con la 
realidad, no puede resultar creíble. No se puede creer en un Ministro que tiene distintos discursos para 
diferentes situaciones. 
Podemos agregar, también, que el día 7 de noviembre de este año, un periodista del diario "Ultimas 
Noticias", frente a la declaración hecha por el Sindicato Médico del Uruguay, le pregunta al señor Ministro si 
hay emergencia en la salud. El señor Ministro responde que no la hay e, incluso, alude a las inversiones 
que han hecho algunas instituciones mutuales, las que han construido -dice- salas asistenciales, salas de 
Gerentes, etcétera, a todo lujo, lo que indica -a su juicio- que ha habido un rendimiento económico. 
Evidentemente, el Ministro no sabe nada sobre cómo se financian las inversiones en el área mutual. No 
sabe que hay una sobrecuota para equipamiento médico y edificaciones, y también desconoce que esa 
sobrecuota financia ese tipo de desarrollos, lo que no significa que eso tenga un carácter lucrativo. Quiere 
decir que estamos hablando de un Ministro que no conoce nada del sistema mutual y, además, dice cosas 
que son realmente inaceptables para los que estamos involucrados en este tema desde hace muchos años. 
Quisiera referirme a otro tema vinculado también con esta materia. Se trata del préstamo del Banco 
Interamericano de Desarrollo con relación a la Federación Médica del Interior. En cierta oportunidad, en la 
Comisión de Salud Pública -el señor Senador Correa Freitas, en ejercicio de la Presidencia en este 
momento, y la señora Senadora Xavier lo recordarán muy bien-, recibimos la afirmación categórica del 
señor Ministro de que una parte del préstamo del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo sería destinada a la 
Federación Médica del Interior. Muy poco tiempo después, afirma que a dicha Federación no destinará 
nada, cuando el Estado le debe U$S 15:000.000 a todas las Instituciones de Asistencia Médica Colectiva 
del Interior, colocándolas así en una situación de inviabilidad. Estamos, pues, ante otra afirmación ligera, 
liviana, que no se condice con la realidad. 
En este mismo orden de afirmaciones, el señor Ministro dijo hace muy pocos días en el seno de la Comisión 
de Salud Pública -y la señora Senadora Mónica Xavier lo señaló en su excelente informe- que, si había 
alguna carencia, en más o menos 24 horas sería resuelta. Palabras más, palabras menos, eso fue lo que 
afirmó. Sin embargo, todos sabemos que el aprovisionamiento de las áreas públicas del Ministerio de Salud 
Pública es, realmente, un caos. Tanto es así, que en oportunidad de asistir a la Comisión de Salud Pública  
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una delegación de usuarios y médicos del departamento de Florida -pocos días después de haberse hecho 
presente el señor Ministro-, se manifestó que el Hospital de Florida se encontraba en una situación de 
omisión de asistencia. 
Si algo faltaba para enriquecer ese concepto de omisión de asistencia, tenemos los informes que remitieran 
a la señora Senadora Xavier los colegas del Hospital Pasteur y del Hospital Pereira Rossell, con un listado 
de enfermos con cánceres que no son operados por falta de insumos en el área pública. A todo esto, el 
señor Ministro nos dice que en 24 horas se resuelven los temas. 
Por otro lado, los acuerdos que hizo el Ministerio de Salud Pública con la Cámara de Especialidades 
Farmacéuticas y Afines, CEFA, no fueron respetados ya que de las 24 cuotas pactadas sólo se pagaron 8, 
la última de las cuales se hizo efectiva en el mes de abril. Si con ese nivel de cumplimiento se aspira a que 
el aprovisionamiento de Salud Pública sea normal, realmente se constata que hay una gran irrealidad en el 
análisis que hace el señor Ministro de Salud Pública. 
A su vez, cuando la señora Senadora Xavier realizó el informe sobre la Meningitis -que fue mucho más 
preciso que el que diera Salud Pública en la Comisión respectiva del Senado- señaló el porcentaje de niños 
y adolescentes no vacunados con la segunda dosis, a quienes se colocó en riesgo de contraer dicha 
enfermedad. El Ministro no reiteró lo que explicó en la Comisión en el sentido de que habían faltado 
vacunas porque algunos pediatras habían recomendado vacunar por debajo de los cuatro años. Se trata de 
una explicación asombrosa porque según tengo entendido el Ministerio de Salud Pública, históricamente, 
ha tenido criterios que deben ser aplicados en la vacunación de aquellos casos estrictamente necesarios. 
No puedo entender que los médicos por su cuenta hayan decidido vacunar a niños por debajo de esa edad 
y ese haya sido el factor de carencia de vacunas. Me parece que hubo un gran desorden con la vacunación 
antimeningocóccica, tal como está sucediendo en el Ministerio. No existieron criterios ni factores que 
permitieran anticiparse a las necesidades que la propia vacunación exigía. 
Quiero hacer mención al tema de Biofarma con la famosa intoxicación con litio de pacientes sometidos a 
hemodiálisis mediante la provisión de un medicamento elaborado en forma errónea. Pregunto al Cuerpo si 
es aceptable que el laboratorio Biofarma -que es de propiedad de la familia del doctor Lasalvia, integrante 
del Partido Colorado- haya estado cuatro años sin ser fiscalizado por el Ministerio de Salud Pública. El 
propio Ministro reconoció que no se lo inspeccionaba desde 1999 y que cuando se realizó la inspección, 
una vez detectado el problema, se encontraron errores metodológicos de las buenas prácticas de 
producción, todo lo cual obligó a la suspensión de la elaboración de medicamentos, pero no a la clausura 
que demoró tres semanas. Tengamos en cuenta que se trata de un laboratorio que engañó a las 
autoridades del Ministerio ocultando que había detectado un error en la producción y no lo había 
denunciado. Sin embargo, con esos antecedentes, el Ministerio de Salud Pública demoró tres semanas en 
clausurarlo. La Comisión de Control de Calidad de los medicamentos nos informó que en un año se  
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fiscalizan 2000 especialidades terapéuticas. Qué llamativo es que el laboratorio Biofarma no haya sido 
examinado y que no se hayan detectado esos errores. Una explicación que dio la doctora Carolina Seade 
por los medios de difusión fue desmentida por el señor Ministro. Esta doctora, que está al frente de la 
Comisión de Control de Medicamentos, manifestó que faltaba personal para realizar las fiscalizaciones, 
pero el Ministro dijo que eso no era así. Entonces, si no faltaba personal, ¿por qué no se fiscalizó el 
laboratorio Biofarma? ¿Cuáles fueron las razones que llevaron a que no se lo fiscalizara? Personalmente no 
lo puedo contestar, pero todo esto me resulta sumamente sospechoso. 
En lo que tiene que ver con las propuestas del Ministerio, quisiera saber qué es lo que ha planteado como 
hecho concreto y tangible, cuando lo que ha sucedido es que ha generado más conflicto en la sociedad. Por 
ejemplo, tenemos el caso del cambio de estatus del Instituto Nacional de Oncología que provocó una 
suspensión de algunas de sus funciones, cuando en este Plenario los Legisladores del Partido Colorado 
nos habían asegurado que ese cambio de denominación no iba a tener ningún efecto sobre la calidad 
asistencial. Sin embargo, se suspendió el block operatorio hasta el día de la interpelación y tampoco 
funcionaba la policlínica de atención primaria. A su vez, se traspasó la responsabilidad del Registro 
Nacional de Cáncer a una esfera que no corresponde al Instituto Nacional de Oncología. Lo digo con todo 
respeto, señor Presidente, pero es una realidad incontrastable: aquí se nos mintió, y con un agravante que 
es que en la Comisión de Salud Pública nosotros dijimos a las pacientes con cáncer que el cambio de 
denominación no iba a tener ninguna consecuencia en la calidad de asistencia. Se nos mintió rotundamente 
y eso provocó que nosotros, aunque sin querer, también mintiéramos, cuando una vez más tratamos de 
mitigar, amortiguar y tratar de ser agentes de trasmisión de confiabilidad. A su vez, en la Rendición de 
Cuentas el señor Ministro propuso traspasar la Escuela de Enfermería Scosería a la Universidad del 
Trabajo del Uruguay, sabiendo que esta no tiene capacidad, ni instrumental, ni historia para formar 
enfermeras. Cuando la señora Senadora Pou propuso que fuera llevada al ámbito de la Universidad de la 
República, las decisiones no se tomaron con tanta celeridad. En este mismo sentido, a través de un decreto 
existe una propuesta para desregularizar la ubicación de las farmacias en el país, propiciando la instalación 
en los barrios más poblados y de mayor capacidad económica de empresas internacionales que van a 
destruir la farmacia uruguaya, que ha sido histórica en la capacidad de cobertura, asistencia y consejo a la 
población del Uruguay. Quiere decir que en unas áreas ha sido muy rápido, pero en otras no. Esto también 
estaba vinculado a las preguntas que formulara la señora Senadora Xavier en este largo cuestionario que 
alguien competente podría haber contestado con mucha agilidad. 
En consecuencia, señor Presidente, soy mucho más estricto que la Senadora Xavier, quien abrió una 
expectativa de respuesta al Ministro. Personalmente venía con la composición intelectual de que el Ministro 
no podía seguir al frente de la Cartera por todos estos hechos que hemos relatado y por todas estas 
situaciones que muestran una falta de Norte, de conducción, contradicciones y la ruptura de líneas de 
trabajo aceptadas universalmente por todos los actores. Entonces, a pesar de que exista alguna crítica por  
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no haber escuchado al Ministro, lo que este ha contestado públicamente al país ha sido suficiente como 
para concluir que no puede seguir al frente de la Cartera. 
Muchas gracias. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- La Mesa debe informar que hay varios oradores anotados para hacer uso de la 
palabra. El Reglamento no establece ningún criterio con respecto a esta sesión especial y si nos 
atuviéramos a la letra del artículo 147 de la Constitución, concluiríamos que esta reunión ha sido convocada 
para resolver y no para analizar otra vez el tema. De todas formas, la Mesa va a amparar el derecho de los 
señores Senadores a expresarse y solamente los exhorta a que sean lo más breves posible. 
SEÑOR BRAUSE.- Señor Presidente: no salgo de mi asombro, porque no alcanzo a comprender los dichos 
ni la conducta de los integrantes del Frente Amplio, quienes convocan a una interpelación al señor Ministro 
de Salud Pública para considerar un tema de la vastedad que se señaló, relativo a la salud pública, a la 
salud privada, al estado actual de la misma y a las políticas instrumentadas al efecto, y cuando el señor 
Ministro concurre a la sesión del lunes pasado y contesta el interrogatorio que se le hace, el Frente Amplio 
presenta una moción de censura y se retira de Sala. Dicha moción de censura alude expresamente al 
artículo 147 de la Constitución de la República y como consecuencia de ella hoy el Senado, como 
corresponde, es convocado a efectos de considerar la moción de censura al señor Ministro de Salud 
Pública y resolver sobre su curso, según consta en la citación. Voy a ahorrar al Senado la lectura del inciso 
segundo del artículo 147 de la Constitución, haciendo honor a la exhortación hecha por el señor Presidente 
del Cuerpo en el sentido de que tratemos de ser breves. Lo cierto es que en lugar de estar en este 
momento considerando el motivo concreto de la convocatoria, que es resolver sobre el curso de la censura, 
el Senado está reiterando -en realidad lo están haciendo los señores Senadores integrantes del Frente 
Amplio- la interpelación de la sesión pasada, pero reformulándola, como es obvio, sin la presencia del señor 
Ministro, que no tiene por qué estar presente en esta oportunidad. Quiere decir que el Frente Amplio no 
aprovechó la presencia del señor Ministro para escuchar las respuestas y ahora replantea la interpelación 
en su ausencia. Sinceramente, me parece que esta situación es totalmente insólita, que carece de 
precedentes y que motiva, precisamente, el asombro a que hice referencia al principio de mi exposición. 
Razones de hecho y de derecho fundamentan las afirmaciones que estoy realizando. Antes de reseñar y 
fundamentar las causas que me motivan, deseo expresar de la manera más enfática y afirmativa posible, de 
la manera más enfática y radical, mi rechazo a las adjetivaciones que se han vertido con relación al señor 
Ministro de Salud Pública. Las rechazo, por cuanto se le ha tratado de insolente y de que es una calamidad. 
Rechazo radical y enfáticamente adjetivaciones de esa naturaleza. También se aludió a que el señor 
Ministro de Salud Pública mintió a la opinión pública, que es incompetente e insensible a la situación de la 
salud. Reitero que rechazo enfática y radicalmente afirmaciones de esa naturaleza que, a mi modo de ver,  
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en ausencia del señor Ministro, no sólo demuestran que no se está actuando a la altura de las 
circunstancias, sino que además es una gran falta de respeto hacia quien está ausente en este momento. 
SEÑOR SINGER.- ¿Me permite una interrupción, señor Senador? 
SEÑOR BRAUSE.- Con mucho gusto. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede interrumpir el señor Senador. 
SEÑOR SINGER.- Señor Presidente: deseo hacer algunas precisiones que me parecen importantes en 
cuanto a los procedimientos seguidos desde el punto de vista político, dado que el señor Senador Brause 
se está internando en una cuestión más de fondo. 
En primer lugar, esta interpelación fue formulada por la totalidad de los integrantes de la Bancada del 
Frente Amplio. Luego de solicitar dicha interpelación anunciaron a la Mesa que quien iba a realizarla, al solo 
efecto del tiempo que el Reglamento del Senado otorga, era la señora Senadora Xavier. 
En segundo término, me parece importante recordar en esta sesión el tema por el cual el Frente Amplio 
convocó al señor Ministro de Salud Pública: la situación de la salud, tanto en el ámbito público como 
privado, y las políticas implementadas por el Poder Ejecutivo en el área de la salud. Me pregunto si esta no 
era una exhortación para que el señor Ministro no hablara seis horas, sino veinte. ¿De qué estamos 
hablando, señor Presidente? En el día de hoy varios señores Senadores del Frente Amplio señalaron una 
serie de puntos concretos. Me pregunto por qué no los pusieron como tema de la interpelación y dijeron 
concretamente que querían interpelar al señor Ministro por tal y cual asunto. Esta es la metodología habitual 
e histórica de las interpelaciones. Debo aclarar que en mi larga vida parlamentaria nunca he asistido en el 
Senado ni en la Cámara de Representantes a una interpelación de esta naturaleza, y me refiero a la forma 
cómo se planteó. Además, después que se plantea el tema de esta manera, se hace un escándalo porque 
el señor Ministro vino con dos, tres, veinte o cien tomos para contestar el interrogatorio. Si el señor Ministro 
hubiera contestado rápidamente sobre este tema tan vasto, también se le podría haber reprochado que no 
es atento con el Senado, que no es respetuoso con las instituciones porque contestaba rápidamente sobre 
un tema tan importante y trascendente, que abarca nada menos que la totalidad de la salud pública y 
privada, además de las políticas que instrumenta el Poder Ejecutivo en la materia. Realmente, no me 
parece desconcertante porque todos sabemos cuál ha sido la motivación de todo esto, está relacionada con 
el tema de la fecha. Cuando pregunté al señor Presidente por qué se había acordado la interpelación para 
el día 23, se me informó que de conformidad con lo estatuido en el Reglamento, el señor Presidente la 
concertó con el señor Ministro y la señora Senadora interpelante. No era una buena fecha... 
VARIOS SEÑORES SENADORES.- Fue mal informado, señor Senador.  
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SEÑOR SINGER.- Quiere decir que la fecha no se fijó luego de un acuerdo. 
(Campana de orden) 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Efectivamente, la fecha fue concertada entre el señor Ministro, el Presidente del 
Cuerpo y la señora Senadora interpelante. 
Puede continuar el señor Senador Singer. 
(Dialogados) 
SEÑOR SINGER.- Vamos a no interrumpirnos y a escucharnos como corresponde. Simplemente estoy 
trasmitiendo información que me dio el señor Presidente. Si los señores Senadores del Frente Amplio 
hubieran estado totalmente en desacuerdo con la fecha -en la hipótesis de que no hubiera sido así, tal 
como acaba de afirmar el señor Presidente del Cuerpo-, bien podrían haber planteado no realizar la 
interpelación en esa fecha porque preferían otra. Todo parece indicar que luego de una exposición de dos 
horas de la señora Senadora interpelante, habiendo comenzado la interpelación a las cuatro de la tarde y 
siendo vísperas de Nochebuena, había ánimo de irse. Cabe recordar aquí que en la historia de este Senado 
y de la Cámara de Representantes hubo interpelaciones en las que los Ministros no hablaron seis horas 
sino que hablaron doce. 
SEÑOR RUBIO.- Pero hablaron sobre el tema de la interpelación. 
SEÑOR SINGER.- No importa el tema. 
(Dialogados) 
(Campana de orden) 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- La Mesa exhorta a los señores Senadores a evitar los dialogados. Está en uso de 
la palabra el señor Senador Singer, que le pidió una interrupción al señor Senador Brause. 
SEÑOR SINGER.- El señor Ministro tiene legítimo derecho de manejar su tiempo en una interpelación. Eso 
es indiscutible; se podrá decir -como en su momento señaló el señor Senador García Costa- que era 
preferible que fuera más ágil. Muy bien; ese es su criterio. Pero el derecho del señor Ministro a contestar "in 
extenso" es incuestionable, y mucho más lo es cuando se plantea una interpelación en los términos en que 
fue redactada ésta. Reitero el tema por el cual fue convocada: la situación de la salud, tanto en el ámbito 
público como privado, y las políticas implementadas por el Poder Ejecutivo en el área de la salud.  
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(Suena el timbre indicador del tiempo) 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Ha finalizado el tiempo de la interrupción, señor Senador. 
SEÑOR SINGER.- ¿Me permite otra interrupción, señor Senador Brause? 
SEÑOR BRAUSE.- Con mucho gusto. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede interrumpir el señor Senador. 
SEÑOR SINGER.- Quiere decir que en la convocatoria de la interpelación no se planteó ninguno de los 
temas que hoy señalaron los señores Senadores del Frente Amplio. 
(Interrupciones) 
- Se podrían haber planteado concretamente en la interpelación. La tradición parlamentaria indica que una 
interpelación se hace por motivos concretos y no por una cuestión genérica que abarca una totalidad. Aquí 
se hizo de esta manera y luego se reprochó al señor Ministro que estaba hablando en detalle sobre muchas 
cuestiones. 
Señor Presidente: la metodología que se siguió, políticamente, ya desde el comienzo, no le hace bien a la 
institucionalidad, porque esta no es una forma de decir "Señores, estamos interesados en que venga aquí 
el señor Ministro de Salud Pública para que informe al Senado sobre tales y cuales aspectos". 
Desde el punto de vista institucional, se ha dicho "Nosotros ya veníamos preparados para censurar al señor 
Ministro". Pero si estaban preparados para censurarlo, no hubieran hecho el pedido de informe que 
establece el artículo 119 de la Constitución de la República. El mecanismo del artículo 119 se emplea para 
pedir y recibir los informes del señor Ministro; pero la interpelación no se hizo en base al artículo 147 de la 
Constitución, sino directamente por el artículo 119. De modo tal que el señor Ministro concurrió al Senado 
para responder a este pedido de informes que le hace la Bancada del Frente Amplio - Encuentro 
Progresista. Me parece que no es serio -para decirlo en el tono más respetuoso y considerado posible- que 
después se le reproche al señor Ministro que haya venido con 2, 3, 4 ó 5 tomos para hacer un informe 
absolutamente completo y total sobre todo lo que está involucrado con el manejo de su Cartera. Aquí se dijo 
"No vi que el señor Ministro sacara apuntes de las preguntas", pero tenía su equipo de asesores y estaba 
preparándose para responder. Como Ministro, puedo sacar apuntes si quiero, pero si no se me antoja, no lo 
hago; para ello tengo un equipo de asesores. El señor Ministro vino a esta interpelación con la mejor 
disposición de contestar, y no cualquier tema en concreto, sino el genérico que abarcaba la totalidad de los 
asuntos involucrados en el Ministerio. Reitero que estaba dispuesto a contestar puntualmente todas y cada  
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una de las preguntas que le iba a hacer la señora Senadora interpelante. Me parece que es importante que 
eso quede claro. 
Muchas gracias. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede continuar el señor Senador Brause. 
SEÑOR BRAUSE.- Señor Presidente: la argumentación del señor Senador Singer no hace más que avalar 
la expresión de asombro que yo señalaba al inicio de mi exposición sobre la conducta y los dichos de los 
integrantes del Frente Amplio a propósito de esta interpelación. 
SEÑORA XAVIER.- ¿Me permite una interrupción, señor Senador? 
SEÑOR BRAUSE.- Disculpe, señora Senadora, pero quisiera terminar con mi exposición y hacer honor a la 
exhortación que hizo el señor Presidente a todos los miembros del Cuerpo. 
En este momento, quiero afirmar lo que ya comencé diciendo en mi exposición. Es realmente insólito que 
se convoque a un Ministro, se le someta a dos horas y media de una tediosa lectura, que encierra 98 
preguntas formuladas por la señora Senadora interpelante, y no se le dé la oportunidad de responder. 
Todavía se agrega que ya tenían preparada la moción de censura, como bien señalaba el señor Senador 
Singer. Además, se dice que el señor Ministro ni siquiera tomó apuntes, siendo que para eso tiene a sus 
asesores quienes, justamente, estaban preparando las respuestas a las 98 preguntas, para lo cual hubo 
que solicitar el cuarto intermedio del caso en momentos en que el señor Ministro todavía llevaba un tiempo 
de respuesta mucho menor que el que le insumió a la señora Senadora interpelante para hacer la lectura 
que acabo de señalar del texto que incluía las 98 preguntas que ya mencioné. 
De manera tal que decir que el señor Ministro no actuó con seriedad no refleja de ninguna manera la 
realidad política y consideramos que ello tiene que ser rechazado desde todo punto de vista. El señor 
Ministro vino acompañado por un equipo de asesores para responder en forma conjunta a la vastedad del 
temario al cual fue sometido. Reitero que es absolutamente insólito que se diga que el señor Ministro 
tendría que haber imaginado cuáles eran las preguntas, para poder estar en condiciones de responder de 
forma inmediata. Como no lo hizo, entonces, se le califica negativamente, aun cuando aquí bien se ha dicho 
que la experiencia del Parlamento es que los señores Ministros dispongan del tiempo necesario para poder 
hacer su afirmación inicial respecto del motivo de la convocatoria de la interpelación y, además, para poder 
responder a cada una de las preguntas contando con el asesoramiento de sus técnicos. Aquí, la señora 
Senadora interpelante y los integrantes del Frente Amplio no le dieron esa oportunidad al señor Ministro de 
Salud Pública. Es insólito, pero no se le dio la oportunidad de contestar. Increíblemente, se presentó la 
moción de censura cuando el señor Ministro tenía las respuestas prontas.  
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Señor Presidente: imaginarse preguntas y, por tanto, las condignas respuestas en un tema tan vasto como 
es el de la salud pública y privada y las políticas al efecto, me parece que es ingresar en un curso de 
intenciones que no es el que la experiencia y los precedentes en esta materia aconsejan. Lo que ocurre es 
que la impresión que uno saca es que no se actuó correctamente por parte de los integrantes del Frente 
Amplio en la sesión en que se convocó al señor Ministro de Salud Pública y, ahora, se procura hacer una 
explicación de lo que se debió haber hecho. Además, se pretende que en esta ocasión esté presente el 
señor Ministro, cuando la interpelación ya terminó, aun cuando el Frente Amplio la quiera reiterar. Aquí lo 
que corresponde es que el Senado de la República diga sí o no a la moción de censura. 
La seriedad y la importancia de la salud pública para el Senado de la República, pero también para la 
opinión pública, no mereció ni merece el tratamiento que le da el Frente Amplio. Entiendo que este tema tan 
importante debió ser considerado con la seriedad correspondiente, contando con la presencia del señor 
Ministro de Salud Pública, dándole la oportunidad de responder y, además, a la hora de contestar debió 
estar presente no sólo la Bancada del Frente Amplio, sino también la señora Senadora interpelante. La 
actitud de retirarse de Sala sin escuchar las respuestas, a nuestro modo de ver, dio por terminada la 
interpelación y frustró claramente a la opinión pública -que había sido convocada en este Senado que, sin 
duda, es un ámbito de repercusión pública- que se quedó sin poder escuchar las respuestas en el ámbito 
correspondiente. La responsabilidad por esa ausencia le corresponde, sin duda, a la Bancada del Frente 
Amplio y a la señora Senadora interpelante que se retiró en ese momento. Las respuestas del caso las hará 
conocer el señor Ministro, como corresponde y por los medios pertinentes, a fin de que la opinión pública no 
se vea defraudada ante actitudes y conductas como las puestas de manifiesto por el Frente Amplio. 
En tal sentido, señor Presidente, mediante estas breves palabras, quería dejar señalado mi asombro frente 
a la conducta y los dichos que hoy en día uno tiene que escuchar por parte del Frente Amplio. Al mismo 
tiempo, deseo señalar que lo que hoy convoca al Senado es responder, en definitiva, sobre si corresponde 
o no la censura al señor Ministro de Salud Pública de acuerdo con el artículo 147 de la Constitución. En ese 
momento, cuando realmente ingresemos a la consideración de la convocatoria -sin continuar con el tema de 
la interpelación al señor Ministro, que ya se acabó en la sesión pasada- el Partido Colorado habrá de votar 
negativamente la censura que aquí se está proponiendo. 
SEÑORA XAVIER.- Pido la palabra para contestar una alusión. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra la señora Senadora. 
SEÑORA XAVIER.- Señor Presidente: realmente creo que se están trayendo cuestiones irrelevantes de 
procedimiento y nuevamente entramos en el tema de hacer tiempo, tirando para adelante la votación de la 
censura. No sé por qué se hace esto, puesto que si no estuvieran los votos para censurar no habría ningún 
tipo de inconveniente.  
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Por otra parte, quiero indicar al señor Senador Singer -que si mal no recuerdo no estaba presente durante 
la interpelación y había un suplente en su lugar- que cuando la nota fue remitida iba con la temática que el 
señor Senador ha señalado y con la designación de miembro interpelante con que mi Bancada me había 
honrado. 
Si el señor Ministro -como lo he dicho y lo reitero y no usted, señor Senador, que sabe de muchísimos 
temas pero no tiene por qué saber de todo, porque "todólogo" no hay necesidad de que sea- no sabía por 
qué motivos se lo llamaba a Sala, lo lamento porque tendrá un problema de memoria, porque ha tomado 
nota sistemáticamente cuando ha concurrido a la Comisión de Salud Pública y no ha respondido nada; 
incluso, ha recibido pedidos de informes y tampoco los ha contestado. Entonces, lo que ocurre es que el 
señor Ministro tiene un problema de memoria y habrá que ver dónde se va a atender. Pero lo que aquí 
queda claro es que no hay una sola respuesta, quizás las tengan algunos, será una cuestión secreta o 
puede ser que sea tranquilizador lo que acaba de decir el señor Senador, en cuanto a que le va a llegar a la 
opinión pública. Aquí habemos doce floreros y quiero recordarle que detrás de ellos hay algunos que otros 
miles de votos y me parece que el tratamiento es bastante despectivo, por ser suave en la caracterización. 
Por otro lado, quiero decirle al señor Senador Singer que aunque él no sepa de cuestiones médicas -insisto 
en que no tiene por qué conocerlas-, aquí hubo un problema grave el año pasado, que fue el de la 
meningitis. No estuvo planteado el virus del Nilo porque por suerte no tenemos ese problema, aunque está 
bien que alguno lo estudie por si surgiera. 
El señor Ministro durante más de dos horas habló de determinados puntos -y prometía tres libros más- pero 
ninguno de ellos tenía que ver con los temas acuciantes. Esos son los que usted escucha por la prensa 
todos los días y los que se nos plantean a quienes trabajamos en la salud. Por otro lado, esas insólitas 
preguntas que formulamos están a su disposición, son las mismas preguntas sobre los mismos capítulos de 
los que se habló; no son un invento ni una cosa salida de atrás de un camión, sino que se trata de los 
temas que hoy están planteados en la salud pública y están presentados de forma tal que el señor Ministro 
no tuviera ninguna duda de para dónde arrancar en un tema tan vasto. Inclusive, algunas de esas 
interrogantes se responden con un sí o con un no. 
Creo que lo que aquí importa es que no ha habido ni una sola respuesta por parte del Ministro para la 
Bancada del Encuentro Progresista - Frente Amplio y de parte de la Bancada de Gobierno hay referencias a 
cuestiones de metodología. 
(Dialogados) 
-Señor Presidente: en varias oportunidades le dijimos que no estábamos de acuerdo con que la 
interpelación se hiciera en vísperas de Navidad y que entendíamos que no se podía anteponer el tema de  
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los Bancos al de la salud pública, pero si usted y el señor Ministro estuvieron de acuerdo en una fecha, 
nosotros no podíamos revertirlo. Aclaro que nunca le dimos el consentimiento en ese sentido, sino que 
simplemente lo aceptamos por la vía de los hechos. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Por una cuestión de procedimiento corresponde aclarar que el criterio con respecto 
a la fecha de interpelación fue asumido en la reunión de los coordinadores del Senado, a la que fue invitado 
el coordinador del Frente Amplio, pero no pudo concurrir. En esa reunión se estableció el criterio de que la 
interpelación se iba a hacer después de votada la ley de Bancos, lo cual se le comunicó al señor 
coordinador del Frente Amplio de inmediato y luego discutimos la hora con la señora Senadora interpelante, 
en cuanto a si era a las 10 de la mañana o a las 16. Si la señora interpelante creía que no era conveniente 
el día 23 alcanzaba con decirlo. 
SEÑORA XAVIER.- Ya era 22 y estábamos discutiendo el tema de los Bancos. 
SEÑORA ARISMENDI.- Podría haber sido antes. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- En una reunión de coordinación habíamos resuelto que se haría después. 
SEÑOR COURIEL.- ¿Quién lo había resuelto? 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Los coordinadores de Bancada, señor Senador, como se hace habitualmente. El 
Presidente actuó de acuerdo con lo que indica el Reglamento, que establece que antes de los quince días 
debe fijarse la fecha de la interpelación. Es decir que la fecha se determina en la coordinación, a la que no 
concurrió el señor Senador Núñez, por lo que el Presidente le informó de inmediato el criterio, porque otra 
cosa no se podía hacer. Además, se había resuelto que la interpelación se haría luego de aprobada la ley 
de Bancos. 
SEÑOR SINGER.- Pido la palabra para contestar una alusión. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador. 
SEÑOR SINGER.- No hice un cuestionamiento de las noventa y ocho, doscientas, trescientas o quinientas 
preguntas que hizo la señora Senadora interpelante, porque me parece muy bien que las haga, ya que está 
en todo su derecho. Lo que dije fue que el tema por el cual se convocó al señor Ministro está escrito aquí y 
no contiene ninguna cuestión concreta, sino que abarca la totalidad de todo. Este procedimiento no tiene 
antecedentes en la historia de las interpelaciones en este Senado ni en la Cámara de Representantes, 
porque siempre que se interpela se hace por una, dos o tres cuestiones concretas. Esto no se hizo a pesar 
de que siempre se procedió de esa forma. Es decir que nunca hubo una interpelación que abarcara un tema  
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genérico y si se hace de ese modo después no se le puede reprochar a un Ministro que venga a informar en 
detalle sobre la totalidad de lo que se le ha preguntado, sin perjuicio de que al final respondiera las 
preguntas puntuales formuladas por la señora Senadora. Otra cosa no dije. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- La Mesa aclara que se le va a dar precedencia a quienes se han anotado para 
hacer uso de la palabra, por lo cual tiene la palabra la señora Senadora Pou. 
SEÑORA POU.- Quiero hacer algunas reflexiones que habrían sido apropiadas para el día de la 
interpelación y otras que son más adecuadas para el día después. 
SEÑOR KORZENIAK.- ¿Me permite una interrupción, señora Senadora? 
SEÑORA POU.- Con mucho gusto. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede interrumpir el señor Senador Korzeniak. 
SEÑOR KORZENIAK.- Pido disculpas a la señora Senadora Pou, pero me he quedado con una 
preocupación académica muy grande por la exposición del señor Senador Singer y desearía incorporarla a 
mis fichas de la historia parlamentaria. Me gustaría saber cuál fue el Ministro que habló doce horas en una 
interpelación. En mis registros tengo que la única persona que habló doce horas fue el señor Renán 
Rodríguez cuando se discutía la reforma constitucional, pero no era Ministro, sino parlamentario. Reitero 
que no conozco ningún caso de un Ministro que haya hablado doce horas. 
Por una preocupación, me permito dejar planteado esto para que me lo aclaren para mi cosecha personal. 
Muchas gracias. 
(Dialogados) 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede continuar la señora Senadora Pou. 
SEÑORA POU.- El señor Presidente puede tener la certeza de que no voy a hablar doce horas, sino que 
más bien voy a ceñirme a lo solicitado por el señor Presidente. 
El motivo y el objetivo del llamado a Sala fue analizar las dificultades y las políticas de salud que se están 
desarrollando en el país. Honestamente, creo que la sesión del 23 fue una reunión de autistas en la que no 
fuimos capaces de comunicarnos y, por lo tanto, quizá no estuvimos a la altura de nuestras obligaciones 
con y para la gente. No quiero volver atrás, a la sesión del 23, sino mirar hacia adelante. Creo que si no  
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logramos comunicarnos, comprendernos y compartir nuestras ideas y actitudes, de nada van a servir esas 
instancias. 
Con esto no pierde el Ministro interpelado del Partido Colorado -ya que nosotros no formamos parte del 
Gobierno- ni pierde el Frente Amplio, que es el interpelante, sino que aquí claramente pierde el país y 
pierde su gente. Asimismo el Senado, como Cuerpo, pierde la oportunidad de hablar francamente con 
espíritu constructivo, aun en el disenso, de la salud del país, de los problemas y de las soluciones. Creo que 
a la altura de la vida en que está el país no tenemos ningún derecho de defraudar a la gente. Si nos 
preguntáramos cómo deberíamos actuar, diríamos que priorizando el diálogo, enriqueciendo nuestro caudal 
informativo para ver con más claridad y transparencia, siendo este último término muy utilizado en todos los 
ámbitos. 
El señor Senador Astori hace unos días en un seminario sobre el Estado -allí dijo algo que anoté y no es la 
primera vez que lo utilizo- habló de la comunicación para intercambiar información y conocimiento, estando 
los interlocutores dispuestos desde el inicio a modificar los puntos de vista con los cuales se inicia el 
diálogo. Creo que esta es la esencia del espíritu parlamentario que deberíamos tener, ya que estamos 
perdiendo la capacidad de tenerlo. 
Venir a defender a ultranza cada uno su verdad como si de esta dependiera la estabilidad o el futuro de un 
gobierno o de la sociedad, me parece un agravio a la inteligencia y al derecho de la gente. La salud es un 
tema fundamental de la Nación y, como tal, deberíamos tender a encararla como política de Estado, para lo 
que la instancia del otro día y las futuras son de un valor y una trascendencia que no deberíamos 
desperdiciar. 
Las condiciones para que así sea, por supuesto, son dejar de lado la intransigencia, el autoritarismo y la 
soberbia, y actuar con franqueza, comunicando, informando y haciendo participar, a través de cada uno de 
nosotros, a la sociedad. 
Los señores Senadores Cid y Xavier mencionaban -y otros señores Senadores que están en Sala saben 
que fue así- el espíritu de la Comisión de Salud Pública en estos casi dos años y medio de trabajo: ha sido, 
justamente, el de ser una caja de resonancia de los problemas de los distintos actores de la salud, 
incluyendo -naturalmente, y sin olvidarlos- a los usuarios que, muchas veces, representando comisiones de 
barrio o de vecinos de apoyo a los hospitales, han visitado nuestra Comisión para plantearnos los 
problemas que han citado los señores Senadores -y también los que se pueden imaginar- que conocen por 
sus recorridas en contacto con la sociedad.  
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Hay consenso, pues, en que la salud atraviesa por serias dificultades; por suerte, ello se complementa 
diciendo que está en crisis. Digo "por suerte" porque, en definitiva, el ideograma chino que dice que crisis 
quiere decir cambio y oportunidad, implicaría que tenemos alguna chance de poder aprovecharla. 
Los problemas son multifactoriales. No queremos entrar ahora en su análisis, pero sí convenir en que se 
plantean temas de intereses empresariales, gremiales, políticos y otros que son contrapuestos o, por lo 
menos, no coincidentes con el interés general. Hay corporativismos, hay grupos de poder, hay falta de 
rumbos e inercias que agravan los problemas. El panorama es, decididamente, complejo. 
Según quienes los miren, los problemas serán prioritariamente económicos, financieros, de gestión, de 
administración, de modelo de atención, de medicamentos, de tecnología, de calidad, de acceso, de 
equidad, y podríamos seguir enumerando. Todos y cada uno seguramente tengan algo que ver, pero lo que 
nos debe importar no es dedicarnos a rever los fragmentos de una colcha de retazos, sino rehacer el 
conjunto en forma coordinada y armónica. 
Al enumerar esta serie de abordajes al tema, vemos que en el análisis que de ellos se hace raramente se 
jerarquiza al usuario o a la comunidad. Diría que el gran ausente en estos planteos ha sido el usuario y la 
comunidad. O hablamos del interés de la comunidad, o seguimos en la misma, atendiendo los problemas 
en función de intereses particulares, corporativos y sectoriales. 
La salud fue tradicionalmente analizada por enfoques que priorizaron el saber médico, y en las últimas 
décadas han incursionado los economistas y los administradores. Resultado: sigue siendo un problema que 
manejan los médicos, en detrimento de la opinión de los otros profesionales del quehacer sanitario, en 
colaboración con administradores y economistas que defienden a las empresas. Estamos en una etapa en 
donde los problemas de la salud se analizan desde el punto de vista de la oferta y la demanda. La oferta es 
por parte profesional, sobre todo médica, y debemos decir, una vez más, con carencias del personal de 
enfermería en esta ecuación en la que es tan importante, porque es algo que sostiene la salud, al punto que 
más adelante vamos a ver. Por lo tanto, la demanda corresponde al ámbito empresarial, público y del sector 
mutual y privado. Esa es la realidad de la salud en nuestro país, hoy. 
Se comete el error de pensar que la demanda de servicios de las instituciones públicas o privadas, muchas 
veces condicionada y presionada por la oferta, representa a las necesidades de la gente. Yo considero que 
estamos equivocados, señor Presidente: la correcta atención de las necesidades en salud de los uruguayos 
no necesariamente se corresponde con la realidad dada por el juego de la demanda y la oferta del mercado 
actual. Vayan dos ejemplos de leyes económicas que avalan lo anterior: la primera, la Ley de Say, que dice 
que "toda oferta crea su propia demanda". En la salud de nuestro país esto es evidente: hay exceso de 
médicos y esto termina en demanda inducida. La segunda ley es la llamada de "rendimientos decrecientes" 
y expresa que "si un factor o grupo de factores aumenta y el otro factor o grupo de factores se conserva fijo,  
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la producción total tenderá a aumentar al principio, pero llegará un momento en que alcance un punto 
donde la tasa de crecimiento comience a disminuir; este es el punto de los rendimientos decrecientes". A 
esta situación se ha llegado en algunos aspectos de la salud en nuestro país, sobre todo, en Montevideo. 
Tenemos rendimientos decrecientes al aumentar, año a año, el número de médicos y de especialistas. 
Señor Presidente: considero que estamos embretados y seguimos por inercia políticas destinadas al 
fracaso. Vaya como ejemplo un fragmento de un reportaje que la periodista Gamio, del diario "El 
Observador", le formulara a la señora Decana de la Facultad de Medicina, doctora Ana Ferrari, en julio de 
este año. Ante la pregunta de si creía que había que aplicar algún mecanismo para reducir la cantidad de 
alumnos y egresados de Medicina que se vuelcan a un mercado deprimido, la Decana responde: "Este es 
un tema real, pero creo que la Facultad de Medicina no puede ser la que regule este tema, ni tampoco la 
Universidad. Creo en la necesidad de que la Universidad tenga sus puertas abiertas, que sea accesible al 
mayor número de personas posible. Sin embargo, admito que la cantidad de alumnos que está entrando a 
la Facultad de Medicina es muy elevada." 
Para rematar el tema, el Boletín del Sindicato Médico del Uruguay de marzo de 2001, hablando sobre el 
número de médicos y su distribución en el país, nos dice: "Esta es una de las materias pendientes que tiene 
la sociedad uruguaya y que el gremio médico ya laudó, tanto a nivel del Sindicato Médico del Uruguay como 
de la FEMI, a través de sendos plebiscitos en 1995, en donde se aprobó por amplia mayoría, apoyar 
medidas que regularan el ingreso." Este es un típico tema en torno al cual el Ministerio de Salud Pública 
debería asumir responsabilidad y, eventualmente, fijar posición. Ni una cosa ni la otra se han hecho hasta 
ahora. 
(Ocupa la Presidencia el doctor Guillermo García Costa) 
- En octubre del año 2000 hicimos una extensa exposición planteando interrogantes al Ministerio de Salud 
Pública, y al día de hoy no hemos recibido respuesta, quizá, porque ésta no se haya encontrado. 
Señor Presidente: al Partido Nacional no le interesa defender, ni sugerir, ni pedir la renuncia del Ministro del 
Partido Colorado; para nada. Al Partido Nacional le interesa que el país tenga la mejor gestión posible de la 
política definida para alcanzar los objetivos superiores de políticas de salud que atiendan las necesidades 
de su población, con este o con otro Ministro y su equipo de colaboradores. El país lo sabe: nuestra 
convicción es que lo que es bueno para el país, es bueno para nosotros, por encima de intereses 
electorales, sectoriales o personales. Que nadie tenga dudas acerca de que si entendemos que lo mejor 
para alcanzar los objetivos superiores de la salud de los ciudadanos es un cambio de persona o de 
políticas, vamos a actuar en consecuencia. Pedir renuncias o censurar no es nuestra vocación, pero puede 
llegar a ser nuestra obligación. Que no quepa la menor duda de que, en caso de ser necesario, lo haremos, 
primero sugiriendo, luego solicitando y, finalmente, poniendo toda nuestra energía en lograr ese objetivo  
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que sabemos, de antemano, que no será más que el inicio de una nueva gestión de la cual mucho debemos 
esperar. 
Hecha esta introducción, señor Presidente, quería referirme a algunos aspectos de la interpelación. 
Las preguntas estaban formuladas; la mayoría de ellas habían estado consignadas en las distintas 
comparecencias y en las versiones taquigráficas de las sesiones de las Comisiones de Salud Pública del 
Parlamento. Las preguntas podían responderse con justificaciones, con excusas, con fundamentaciones, 
con evasivas o con distracciones. No estamos hablando, en particular, de las respuestas del señor Ministro, 
pero sí queremos decir que, más importantes que las respuestas, son las soluciones, o sea, las acciones 
correctivas cuando éstas puedan corresponder. 
Hace instantes, minutos antes de la hora fijada para reunirnos, recibimos por escrito las respuestas del 
señor Ministro. Por cierto que su volumen no nos permitió leerlas y pensamos, entonces, dedicar los 
primeros días de nuestras vacaciones a hacerlo. De todas maneras, insisto en definir esta instancia como 
un diálogo de sordos, en donde se nos niega la oportunidad de intercambiar información y conocimientos. 
Realmente, creo que errar es humano, pero persistir en el error es diabólico. 
Hoy queremos agregar algo más a lo ya expresado por la señora Senadora Xavier; son tres breves titulares: 
en primer lugar, con respecto al marco conceptual; en segundo término, unos pocos ejemplos puntuales de 
la gestión del actual Ministerio y, finalmente, algunas condiciones que creemos que las gestiones 
Ministeriales siempre deberían tener. 
En el ámbito conceptual entendemos que los problemas de la salud del país requieren un enfoque que 
contemple los siguientes puntos. Por un lado, el análisis y la formulación de propuestas para iniciar un 
proceso coordinado de reformas que nos lleven definitivamente a un Sistema Nacional de Salud, integrado 
o no, con diferentes sectores o no, pero sistema al fin. Sobre estos temas nos comprometemos a seguir 
trabajando en 2003, teniendo como meta lograr políticas de Estado centradas en la calidad de vida de todos 
los ciudadanos del país. 
Y aquí una acotación: ¡cuidado con tomar indicadores numéricos para evaluar la salud en el país! Decir que 
tenemos una expectativa de vida promedio de 75 años no nos dice nada sobre qué calidad de vida estamos 
alcanzando, y eso es lo que importa. Decir que el Ministerio de Salud Pública ha distribuido unos cuantos 
preservativos más e implantado varios dispositivos intrauterinos más, no nos aclara qué clase de salud 
demográfica reproductiva se está llevando a cabo, qué objetivos tiene y cuáles son sus fundamentos. En un 
país con una tasa de crecimiento demográfico que comienza a ser negativa y con tasas de nacimiento y 
fecundidad muy bajas, estos temas interesan y nos deben preocupar, y mucho.  
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El segundo planteo se refiere a algunos ejemplos. En el ámbito de las resoluciones del Ministerio del último 
año, quisiera analizar tres -coincidentemente, el señor Senador Cid se ha referido a alguna de ellas, pero 
quiero dejarlas aunque sea para la versión taquigráfica-: las relativas a la Escuela de Auxiliares de 
Enfermería Doctor Scosería, el Registro Nacional de Cáncer y el Instituto Nacional de Oncología, no por la 
importancia cuantitativa de los temas, sino por la forma de encararlos y de dictar resoluciones. Me parece 
que son ejemplos paradigmáticos de errores que se repiten en la actual administración del Ministerio de 
Salud Pública. Estos temas tienen un común denominador: las resoluciones no se tomaron con la debida y 
necesaria fundamentación, análisis y coordinación. Sobra discrecionalidad y falta responsabilidad. Los 
temas de salud no deben ser manejados con improvisaciones, falta de estudio y reflexión, ni atendiendo 
intereses subalternos o sectoriales. 
Sobre la decisión de pasar la Escuela Scosería a la UTU -votada en la Rendición de Cuentas- ya en otra 
oportunidad fundamentamos en esta Sala los argumentos por los cuales consideramos que se cometió un 
error importante al no haberla derivado al Instituto Nacional de Enfermería. En su redacción no se tomó en 
cuenta el sentido común, la racionalidad, la integración profesional, la proporción, la coherencia y, sobre 
todo, la finalidad de su propuesta. Baste como aval de esto la respuesta del señor Ministro en la Comisión 
de Salud Pública. Ante este planteo, nos decía lo siguiente: "En lo que respecta a la Escuela de Enfermería, 
lo que tenemos claro es que no tiene que estar en el ámbito de Salud Pública. Nos pareció, teniendo en 
cuenta las circunstancias actuales del país, de la Universidad del Trabajo, de la Universidad de la República 
y del mercado, que era mejor que estuviera en el ámbito de la UTU. Pero si tiene que estar en la órbita de la 
Universidad de la República y ella está en condiciones de manejarla y de darle el nivel que el país necesita, 
para nosotros no hay mayor problema." 
Señor Presidente: consideramos que se actuó con discrecionalidad y ligereza, modificando no sólo la 
estructura y la gestión de una Escuela sino, sobre todo, la formación académica de las futuras 
generaciones. 
Me quiero referir ahora, señor Presidente, al Registro Nacional del Cáncer, que mencionaba como uno de 
los episodios erráticos recientemente efectuados por el Ministerio de Salud Pública. 
Por el Decreto Nº 194/2002, el Ministerio de Salud Pública dispuso eliminar el Registro Nacional del Cáncer 
y encargar sus funciones a la Comisión Honoraria de la Lucha Contra el Cáncer. Llama la atención que la 
redacción del referido Decreto no haga mención a la actuación del Registro Nacional del Cáncer en el 
ámbito del Instituto Nacional de Oncología, Unidad Ejecutora de ASSE dentro del Ministerio. Las mismas 
consideraciones del Decreto podrían ser dichas para el Registro Nacional del Cáncer y no para la Comisión 
Honoraria de la Lucha Contra el Cáncer. La conclusión sería que el Registro Nacional del Cáncer puede y 
debe quedar en el Instituto Nacional de Oncología, vinculado a ASSE o a la Dirección General de la Salud. 
Como consecuencia del referido Decreto y teniendo observaciones al mismo por parte de gente que trabaja  
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en el Instituto Nacional de Oncología, se realizaron desde mi despacho tres consultas al Ministerio de Salud 
Pública, a aquellas jerarquías que razonablemente podían y debían estar al tanto de las razones y 
fundamentos de la resolución. Ellas fueron: el Director de ASSE, el Subdirector de la Dirección General de 
la Salud y un destacado asesor médico del señor Ministro. ¡Cuál sería nuestra sorpresa, y también 
desconcierto, señor Presidente, cuando los tres informaron que desconocían el Decreto y, por supuesto, las 
razones y fundamentos del mismo! 
Razón le asiste al señor Senador Cid cuando dice que ante una consulta nuestra, como sólo iba a ser un 
tema semántico, sólo iba a cambiar la denominación, nosotros nos comprometimos con usuarios y 
comisiones interesadas en este tema de la salud a que, efectivamente, sería así. Sin embargo, no lo fue. 
En este punto se entiende ineludible, necesario y conveniente hacer un planteo formal al señor Ministro de 
Salud Pública para recabar las razones que determinaron el referido Decreto. Como no tuvimos oportunidad 
de hacerlo el otro día, aunque sea por vía del escrito y a efectos clarificar el tema, queríamos formular las 
siguientes interrogantes. ¿Cómo funcionó el Registro Nacional del Cáncer en el ámbito del INO -es decir, 
del Instituto Nacional de Oncología-, de ASSE y del Ministerio de Salud Pública? ¿Qué informes hay sobre 
el desempeño del mismo en los últimos 5 años? Quisiéramos saber si algo funcionaba mal, si había 
observaciones, quejas y reclamos, y en tal caso, qué medidas se tomaron. En segundo lugar, ¿por qué 
razones se entendió que podía funcionar mejor en la Comisión Honoraria de la Lucha Contra el Cáncer? En 
tal caso, ¿en qué se basaron, qué consultas se hicieron con el Ministerio de Salud Pública, con la 
Secretaría General u otras reparticiones? Si se hicieron consultas con el Registro Nacional del Cáncer, 
¿con quiénes se hicieron y qué se informó? Además, ¿cuáles fueron las consultas con la Comisión 
Honoraria de Lucha Contra el Cáncer, con quiénes, y qué se informó? Y las consultas en el Instituto 
Nacional de Oncología, en ASSE, en la Dirección General de la Salud, ¿con quiénes se efectuaron y qué se 
informó? ¿En qué otros lugares y con qué otras personas que puedan ser pertinentes se plantean las 
mismas interrogantes? También quisiéramos tener información acerca de si hubo otras razones o intereses, 
aparte de los anteriores. Finalmente, consultamos cómo se constituye la Mesa Ejecutiva de la Comisión 
Honoraria de la Lucha Contra el Cáncer. Son siete los cargos que representan al Poder Ejecutivo, a la 
Federación Médica del Interior, al Sindicato Médico, a la ANEP, al Instituto Nacional de Oncología y al 
Registro Nacional de Cáncer; sin embargo, ¿los Directores del Instituto Nacional de Oncología y del 
Registro Nacional del Cáncer han concurrido regularmente en los últimos meses? Si no estaban 
concurriendo, ¿esto constituye una casualidad o puede haber una cierta causalidad? 
Nos gustaría conocer estas respuestas, porque en este tipo de resoluciones que suspenden y transfieren la 
actividad en áreas tan sensibles del Ministerio, creo que se debe exigir que se fundamenten y se expliciten 
las razones que las determinaron. Aceptar el Decreto tal como está redactado es aceptar una 
argumentación que impresiona, por lo menos, como sesgada e insuficientemente fundada. No se debe  
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repetir el mismo tipo de error cometido recientemente al transferir la Escuela de Auxiliares de Enfermería a 
la UTU, descartando al Instituto Nacional de Enfermería de la Universidad de la República. Estos errores, si 
no hay intereses subalternos no explicitados, son producto del apresuramiento y la falta de consulta con la 
gente que sabe y tiene conocimiento de causa. Creemos que en el caso del Registro Nacional del Cáncer, 
lamentablemente, podemos estar ante una de estas situaciones y, hasta tanto no se den los pasos 
necesarios para arribar a una resolución bien fundamentada, pudiendo entonces responder a estas 
interrogantes, se entiende necesario, además de conveniente, dejar en suspenso la aplicación del referido 
Decreto. 
(Ocupa la Presidencia don Luis Hierro López) 
- Finalmente, señor Presidente, quisiéramos hablar de lo que algunas gestiones Ministeriales deberían 
tener, siempre, como condiciones. Parecería de Perogrullo, pero hoy siento la necesidad de ser redundante. 
Entendemos que en política de salud se debe actuar dialogando, sin soberbia, sin autoritarismos, 
escuchando, analizando y consultando, comunicando a los interesados y a la población el porqué de las 
resoluciones tomadas, no teniendo temor al disenso, reconociendo los errores cuando ellos puedan existir, 
con apertura del espíritu y del intelecto, mejorando permanentemente, y siempre, siempre, teniendo claro 
que se debe actuar en función de los superiores objetivos de priorizar las necesidades de la gente, de ésta 
y de las generaciones que vendrán. Los Ministros no deben actuar dejándose llevar por grupos de presión, 
a veces interesados en lograr sus objetivos particulares o sectoriales. 
En función de estos principios básicos, me consta que en la actual gestión del Ministerio de Salud Pública 
hay cosas que se han hecho bien, otras regular, otras mal y otras que, directamente, no se han hecho. Hay 
muchísimas cosas por mejorar y me refiero a lograr determinados objetivos, pero, sobre todo, a la forma de 
encarar y de resolver los problemas. Quizás haya en el Ministerio de Salud Pública un problema de actitud. 
El diálogo a tiempo, interactivo y amplio, constituye el inicio de las soluciones para muchas de las 
dificultades a enfrentar. 
Me permito recordar que en una de las situaciones difíciles que tuvo el Ministerio de Salud Pública cuando 
estaba a su frente al doctor Fraschini, todos los miembros de la Comisión de Salud Pública del Senado que 
estuvimos allí presentes apoyamos al señor Ministro y al señor Subsecretario -incluida la señora Senadora 
Arismendi, que no pertenecía a nuestra Comisión- en la instancia del cierre de unas mutualistas. 
Por todo lo expuesto, creo que es un buen momento para decir que actuar con menos discrecionalidad, 
más responsabilidad y más capacidad de diálogo puede, realmente, mejorar mucho las cosas, algunas de 
las cuales no implican un desembolso económico y financiero, elemento que, como todos sabemos, en esta 
etapa de la vida del país es tan importante tener en cuenta.  
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Para finalizar, señor Presidente, diría que esta interpelación termina sin censura. Afirmo que este llamado a 
Sala culmina con el señor Ministro y la gestión de su Ministerio cuestionados. Por cierto, todo ha sido 
respondido por escrito y no hemos tenido la posibilidad de construir en el disenso, pero ha sido cuestionado 
al fin. Entonces, que no se repita el error de un Ministro que, al terminar su interpelación, a mediados de 
año, en declaraciones a la prensa concluyó que, como no había una censura ni una moción mayoritaria, 
tenía el apoyo político. Todos sabemos cómo se terminó de saldar esa errática interpretación. 
Frente a la falta de respuestas, de aclaraciones y de posibilidades -que hemos tenido- de hablar de temas 
muy sensibles -por lo menos, para quienes sentimos estos problemas y, por suerte, seguimos teniendo la 
piel fina ante las respuestas que nos exige la gente, que muchas veces no podemos dar-, hoy venía 
pensando que no puedo discernir si estamos en algunas de esas situaciones que tan brillantemente 
describieron Cervantes y Shakespeare. Me pregunto si no estaremos cabalgando en el campo donde hay 
molinos de viento y, como Quijote, pensamos que son gigantes a los que hay que combatir. ¿Será que nos 
equivocamos al pensar que hay cosas que no se están haciendo bien, a las cuales debiéramos enfrentar y, 
en realidad, está todo bien y estamos errados? ¿O no estaremos como en aquella escena de Hamlet en la 
que resuena la frase de que "algo huele mal en Dinamarca"? No creo que sea bueno ni conducente para la 
gestión del Ministerio de Salud Pública y del Partido de Gobierno que nos quedemos sin respuestas y sin 
diálogo sobre tantas interrogantes que se formularon y donde, seguramente, muchos señores Senadores y 
señoras Senadoras podíamos tener buenas ideas y buen espíritu para tratar de incorporarlas a éste, que 
debe ser el problema más difícil que tiene el país. 
Señor Presidente: se supone que los que estamos en esta Sala trabajamos representando a la gente y 
tratamos de buscar la equidad, ya que no la igualdad, y si esta es difícil cuando uno tiene salud, es 
prácticamente imposible en situación de enfermedad. Y de eso se trata. 
Entonces, nos parece que la posibilidad de sugerir respuestas y no dejar cuestiones pendientes sería de 
muy buena política. Desgraciadamente, los tiempos que se manejan actualmente no son los que el país y 
su gente requieren y merecen. Si tuviéramos un metrónomo para medir los tiempos políticos en lugar de los 
musicales, diríamos que los tiempos actuales del Gobierno serían "lentissimo" o quizá una pausa silenciosa. 
En mi opinión, la situación del país reclama un tiempo "prestissimo" o "vivace". 
Muchas gracias. 
SEÑOR RUBIO.- Pido la palabra. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE (Dr. García Costa).- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador.  
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SEÑOR RUBIO.- Señor Presidente: a esta altura, lo que debemos hacer es votar pero, simplemente, en 
unas breves palabras voy a decir cuál es nuestra actitud política. 
Después de las expresiones de la señora Senadora Pou concluyo en que, en primer lugar, el señor Ministro 
en el fondo no tiene apoyo, pero tampoco lo tiene en la forma. Está claro, entonces, que este Ministro no 
tiene respaldo político. Lo que sucede es que, no sé por qué razones y consideraciones, los Partidos de la 
coalición de Gobierno no están dispuestos a sacarlo, pero lo cierto es que no tiene apoyo político. 
Por otro lado, deberíamos agradecer a la señora Senadora Xavier las preguntas que formuló porque en 
ellas están contemplados todo el sistema y los problemas relevantes de la salud. En verdad, me parece una 
picardía de parte de algunos señores Senadores, cuando dicen que nunca se ha discutido la política de un 
Ministerio. ¿Qué hemos hecho cuando discutimos la política económica y agropecuaria? Debatimos sobre 
la política general y su implementación. De esto, el Parlamento tiene abundante historia y basta consultar a 
quien tenga experiencia parlamentaria. 
Por su parte, el señor Ministro podría haber dicho qué piensa sobre el modelo de salud, si va a haber 
privatizaciones o no, si va a existir o no un impulso a los seguros privados, cuál es la calidad de la 
información, qué sucede con las prestaciones, etcétera. Podría haber repasado y tomado las situaciones 
más importantes y haber contestado las preguntas correspondientes, tal como lo haría cualquier Ministro en 
una interpelación. En mi opinión, no tenía capacidad para hacerlo. Es un Ministro abiertamente 
incompetente, pues estaba esperando que sus asesores le prepararan por escrito las respuestas para, 
después, darles lectura. Nos introdujo en una lectura de ocho horas para hacer tiempo con la idea de dar, 
luego, lectura a las respuestas que prepararían los asesores. En verdad, puedo entender que discrepemos, 
pero no puedo hacer la afrenta a la inteligencia de mis colegas, de suponer que ellos piensan que el señor 
Ministro es competente para el lugar que ocupa, porque es abiertamente incompetente. Hay un refrán 
clásico que dice: "Lo que Natura non da, Salamanca non presta". Aparentemente, para el Ministerio de 
Salud Pública no hay Natura ni Salamanca, porque no puede confundirse el artículo 118 de la Constitución 
de la República con el 119. Este último nos habilita a pedir todos los informes que queramos sobre las 
políticas de los Ministerios, mientras que el artículo 118 posibilita los pedidos de informes. No se puede 
responder en el marco de una convocatoria a interpelación habilitada por el artículo 119 como si se tratara 
de la aplicación del artículo 118 y, de esa manera, tomarse no sé cuántas horas para que los asesores 
preparen las respuestas a las preguntas formuladas por un señor Senador de la República. En verdad, no 
se puede. Por ello, pienso que es absolutamente defendible que nos hayamos molestado -quizás con la 
excepción de algún señor Senador que no estaba presente-, porque se molestó el Senado entero. No 
resiste el menor análisis que un Ministro venga y haga, durante horas, una lectura como la que hizo el titular 
de Salud Pública, que no tenía nada que ver con aquello que se le estaba preguntando.  
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Entonces, quedan pendientes diez o trece preguntas -que tienen la virtud de estar bien articuladas- 
relacionadas con el sistema de salud, sobre el préstamo del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, la política 
de medicamentos, el tema de la vacuna contra la meningitis, etcétera, etcétera. La problemática quedó 
planteada pero el Ministro fue incompetente para ensayar, siquiera, un comentario de respuesta. Después 
podría haber agregado, con los asesores, información cuantitativa y detalles, pero, antes, tendría que haber 
mostrado en el Senado que tenía capacidad y solvencia para encarar todo lo relacionado con su Ministerio. 
Si no las tiene, no puedo creer que algún miembro de este Senado, con la experiencia que tiene la mayor 
parte de sus integrantes, piense y diga que este Ministro tiene capacidad para el ejercicio de la función y 
que lo demostró en la interpelación en la cual habló dos horas y media de temas que no tenían el menor 
relieve e importancia con relación al tema de fondo. 
Por consiguiente, reitero que debemos agradecer su esfuerzo a la señora Senadora Xavier, destacar que 
los señores Senadores que se han referido al tema de fondo han pronunciado su discrepancia y señalar 
que este Ministro, más allá del resultado de esta votación, no tiene respaldo político. Aun si la coalición de 
Gobierno hoy evita la censura, está claro que, si se sigue por el camino en que vamos, dentro de unos 
meses vamos a estar interpelando nuevamente al señor Ministro de Salud Pública para saber si es verdad o 
no que se mantienen las diferencias que se han planteado y expuesto ante la opinión pública, pues los 
problemas son absolutamente graves. 
Entonces, si se habla de seriedad, creo que la seriedad de la crisis que hay en la salud del Uruguay no se 
merece este Ministro de Salud Pública. Por consiguiente, entiendo que a esta altura debemos pasar a votar 
y dar por concluida esta cuestión, después que terminen de hablar los señores Senadores que están 
anotados. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra la señora Senadora Arismendi. 
SEÑOR ARISMENDI.- Voy a ser muy breve. En primer lugar, quiero destacar algo que le he dicho a mis 
compañeros y en estas horas he comentado, aunado a una preocupación. Considero que la interpelación 
que llevó adelante la señora Senadora Xavier no era típica y lo digo en el sentido positivo. No era típica 
porque, en lugar de hacer una argumentación o descripción política, tal como ha ocurrido a lo largo de la 
historia -en el fondo todo es político, incluso, lo fue la selección de los temas y la investigación que llevó 
adelante- en lugar de un discurso -para decirlo aun más claramente- hizo una demoledora descripción 
sustentada en datos sobre la emergencia sanitaria que vive el país y en los elementos fundamentales, tanto 
del sector de la salud pública como de la privada. Nos explicó a todos -incluso, al Ministro- cuál era la 
realidad que existía, departamento por departamento y localidad por localidad, con datos serios. Y así como 
decía que todo eso era político, de cada una de las afirmaciones que fueron quedando claramente 
expuestas ante la opinión pública, de manera rotunda, había una sola conclusión o se podría haber hecho 
una sola pregunta: ¿qué piensa hacer con todo esto el Ministro de Salud Pública? ¿Qué medidas va a  
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tomar cuando se señala que no hay recursos en determinado lugar, que no se vacunó en otro, que tampoco 
hay insumos en tal lado ni se pagan los salarios? Cuando se habla de la situación sanitaria en general, 
¿tenía argumentos o no tenía ninguno? ¿Iba a contestar? De hecho, lo que hizo fue contestarle a la 
Senadora interpelante lo mismo que a los medios de comunicación. Cuando los periodistas le dicen que los 
hospitales no tienen medios con qué atender y que esa noche, si llegan heridos de arma blanca o de bala, 
no hay insumos para asistirlos, responde que se está enterando por ellos. Por lo visto, también se estaba 
enterando por la señora Senadora Xavier de un conjunto de elementos que aquí se estaban planteando. 
Entiendo fundamentalmente a la Bancada Quincista porque, después del papelón que hizo el Ministro, hoy 
tenía que venir a sacar un poco de pecho y tratar de tirar la pelota para otro lado. Políticamente, es lo que le 
quedaba hacer cuando nadie le había soplado antes al oído -y, si alguien se lo sopló, por favor, sáquenlo 
ustedes- que no se le puede tomar el pelo al Parlamento. Veinticuatro horas antes, cuando en los 
corredores se decía que iba a leer 700 páginas, nadie le sopló al oído que eso no se podía hacer y que, por 
lo menos, tal como ha ocurrido en otros casos, le echara la culpa a la aftosa, a la Argentina, al Brasil, al 
Efecto Tequila, a la devaluación, en fin, todas estas causas que nos explican que fueron las culpables. Lo 
único de lo cual yo tomé nota fue que los diez casos del dengue son importados. Si bien mencionó cosas 
graves, cuando habló de los diez departamentos del país que tienen el vector presente sin enfermedad, lo 
leyó al pasar. Tampoco supimos qué iban a hacer con eso. Estoy hablando del dengue -además del Virus 
del Nilo- que fue uno de los temas que planteó la señora Senadora Xavier. Más allá de lo que se dijo aquí, 
en Sala, que no voy a repetir -como, por ejemplo, las veces que se lo convocó a la Comisión y no concurrió 
o, incluso, aquellas que sí vino y no supo qué contestar- y de las discusiones reglamentarias -el Presidente 
tiene razón cuando habla del Reglamento pues, si bien se caminó sobre el filo del Reglamento, al fin se 
estaba dentro de él, con sus quince días- el hecho concreto es que en el país hay una emergencia sanitaria 
y los quince días que se tomaron y que dicen que marca el Reglamento no admitían espera, no se podía 
esperar para responder. El señor Ministro no viene en cualquier momento, no aterrizó en un trineo sino que 
viene en el momento en que se cierran las mutualistas, en que los hospitales no tienen con qué atender, en 
medio de un conflicto médico, en problemas con las IAMC, con todas las gremiales habidas y por haber, 
con el Sindicato Médico, con la FUS, con la Federación de Funcionarios de Salud Pública, con el Plenario 
de Instituciones, con la FEMI, etcétera. Es decir que no debe haber un sector que involucre salud pública 
con el que el señor Ministro no haya tenido problemas. Es peor aún. A la media noche, en los informativos 
que por lo menos nosotros vimos cuando nos fuimos del Palacio Legislativo, el Ministro dice que la FUS lo 
apoya. Me hubiera gustado que dijera acá cuándo va a cumplir los compromisos que ha asumido con ella 
porque desde el 4 de abril -desde que se firmó el acuerdo de la Multisectorial- ya pasaron tres Ministros, y 
en lo que me es personal no me pongo el sayo de lo que dicen acá en cuanto a que estábamos prontos 
para votar la censura a priori. Eso no es verdad, en mi caso, aspiraba a que viniera y, sobre eso que estuvo 
piando a media noche en los medios de comunicación, en cuanto a que la FUS lo apoyaba, dijera en 
concreto cuándo y cómo. Pretendía que entre tantas propuestas y diagnósticos que seriamente se le ha 
proporcionado, nos dijera cuándo iba a empezar a actuar o a instrumentar las medidas.  
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Tampoco es cierto lo que se dice en cuanto a que no hay propuestas porque se señalaron las de la 
Multisectorial. Aquí hay propuestas concretas con las que se puede no estar de acuerdo -pero, de ser así, 
por lo menos que se diga que no se comparten- con distintos escenarios, estudios serios y datos que nadie 
ha desmentido, con sugerencias claras para resolver algunos temas. La señora Senadora Xavier mencionó 
dos o tres para quien quiso escuchar, cuando se refirió a qué pasa con la compra de medicamentos, con el 
control de precios. Hablar de esto es meterse con los laboratorios y, por cierto, no con los nacionales. Qué 
pasa cuando la Directora del Hospital de Clínicas viene y nos dice cuánto le cuesta un medicamento 
fundamental si lo compra bajo determinadas condiciones que imponen los laboratorios internacionales y 
cuánto cuando se compra con precios que se pueden controlar. ¿Cuál es la respuesta? 
A mí, que me creo muy maledicente, muy mal pensada, me mató, me superó con creces. Pensé que el día 
antes iba a tirar algunos pesos al Hospital de Clínicas; está haciendo tiempo para venir y decir que tiene 
media respuesta para la situación de la salud pública o un cuarto de respuesta para el ámbito de la salud 
privada y mutual. Sin embargo, sacó un papelito y leyó: "no voy a conceder interrupciones para no perder el 
hilo" y, después, empezó a leer los tomos. Creo que es la actitud de quien no escucha. A mí no me interesa 
que venga un Ministro y se vaya otro, y que la política siga siendo la misma. Lo que queremos es que 
cambie la política de ese Ministerio. En lo que va de esta Administración han pasado tres Ministros y no voy 
a contar los líos que tuvimos en la anterior Legislatura. 
Acá todo está mal pero al Ministro no le importa. Hay una realidad gravísima que comentaba todo el mundo. 
No voy a decir -como el señor Senador García Costa- qué y quiénes comentaban en los corredores, pero 
todos tenemos conciencia de que hay gente que se va a atender en Salud Pública y no puede, y que otros 
tienen mutualista pero no pueden concurrir, porque no pueden pagar los tiques y las órdenes, como decía la 
señora Senadora Xavier. 
Hay preguntas que venimos formulando desde la Rendición de Cuentas, cuando se habilitó el 
desmantelamiento de los servicios asistenciales de ANCAP, del Banco Hipotecario, etcétera. Queremos 
saber qué va a pasar con ellos, porque se supone que cuando establecieron el artículo, ya sabían lo que 
iban a hacer. Se reglamenta la disposición para todos los funcionarios públicos, pero esto ¿sirve o no sirve? 
¿Se ha discutido? Podría servir para algún sector de la salud privada pero, ¿es esa la solución para la 
Administración Central? Hay un conjunto de problemas que no admiten ni quince días de espera para 
recibir una respuesta del señor Ministro, ni que se entreguen esas cosas que parece se hicieron llegar a 
Senadores que no pertenecen al Encuentro Progresista-Frente Amplio, lo que también me parece una 
barbaridad. 
Entonces, vemos que no se escucha a la Multisectorial ni se pide su concurso en este tema, porque hay 
contradicciones, y esto lo decía muy bien la señora Senadora Pou. ¡Cómo no va a haber contradicciones 
entre los dueños de las mutualistas, entre determinados sectores de médicos o entre determinados  
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funcionarios de la salud pública y de la privada! Hay contradicciones, pero también hay una enorme 
disposición a estudiar, a aportar, a elaborar y a proponer dos, tres, cuatro o cinco cosas que responden a 
emergencias asistenciales de carácter nacional. 
Algo conocemos de la realidad del país porque, aunque más no sea, medimos estadísticamente cómo ha 
venido votando la coalición. El tema concreto es que tenemos frente al Ministerio de Salud Pública a una 
persona que es una especie de versión dos de aquél que siempre decía: "No tengo conocimiento". Hay 
distintas maneras de decir "no tengo conocimiento", y una es expresar a los periodistas que se entera por 
ellos de sucesos que competen a su Cartera. Confieso que no sería Ministra de Salud Pública porque no 
tengo las condiciones y porque no es mi especialidad -como decía la señora Senadora Xavier, no hay por 
qué ser todólogo- pero, si por alguna razón inexplicable llegara a ese cargo y me comunicaran determinada 
situación, lo que debería hacer es ir al lugar de los hechos a ver lo que está pasando. Como señalaba la 
señora Senadora Xavier, el señor Ministro Varela pasea por las farmacias de los hospitales públicos y dice 
que están repletos de medicamentos y que está todo bien. 
Creo que, en nuestro caso, se fuerza un pronunciamiento porque, insisto, se va este Ministro, viene otro, y 
el hecho concreto es que aquellas cosas que están pautadas -y, en muchos casos, acordadas- siguen sin 
respuesta y sin resolverse. Y se dijo, con toda claridad, que los dineros van a parar todos "al agujero 
negro". A propósito de otro tema, en el día de hoy comentábamos que lo que, supuestamente, se iba a 
destinar para la asistencia médica de los maestros durante seis meses fue a parar a ese agujero negro, así 
como también terminan en ese destino los préstamos del BID. Para el que quiso oír -y para el que estaba 
en Sala-, se relataron todos los pasos que dimos y que llegaron hasta el cambio de estatuto para las 
instituciones a efectos de adecuarlas a la posibilidad de recibir el préstamo, así como otra serie de medidas 
que se tomaron, pero seguimos en la misma. Sin embargo, el Ministro no sabe o no contesta, o ambas. 
Por lo tanto, además de ser un Ministro que no tiene respaldo parlamentario -lo que es muy grave-, es un 
Ministro que no fue, ni es capaz, en estos momentos tan graves que estamos viviendo -por más que ahora 
reparta esas respuestas a la población-, de dar una respuesta por lo menos, a la situación que atraviesa el 
país. De comisiones, diagnósticos, consultoras y trabajos escritos está lleno, pero también de propuestas. 
Hay propuestas de todo tipo, pero de los sucesivos Ministros que han desfilado por esta Cartera, algunos 
dejaron las cosas a medio hacer, otros contrariaron lo que hicieron los anteriores y otros, mal aconsejados, 
se plantaron en una tesitura que llegó a irritar al Parlamento Nacional. 
Por último, quiero decir que hay una pradera seca, muy seca, de gente que trabajaba en la salud, que se 
quedó sin trabajo y que no tiene para comer. Sobre los hombros de estas personas se sostenía la 
asistencia sanitaria pública, y cualquiera sabe que cuando se acude a una dependencia de salud pública, 
de una cosa no se puede quejar, y es del esfuerzo denodado que estos funcionarios hacen para atenderlo. 
No tendrán los elementos suficientes, pero estos seres humanos que trabajan en la salud pública y privada  
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de nuestro país realmente sostienen -como todas las cosas en este paisito- el funcionamiento de esa 
asistencia. Hay gente que todavía está haciendo duelo por las mutualistas que cerraron y a las que 
dedicaron sus esfuerzos y su vida, porque estaban vinculados a ellas vocacionalmente. Estoy hablando 
tanto de los técnicos como de los no técnicos que volcaron sus horas, su entusiasmo y su amor a 
determinada institución y que hoy están en la calle. 
En consecuencia, ante tantas dificultades, ante tanto dolor y ante tanta incapacidad para resolver el 
problema de fondo -que es el problema de la salud de la población-, la frivolidad con la que actúa el señor 
Ministro amerita que sea sustituido por otro. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador Pereyra. 
SEÑOR PEREYRA.- Deseo dejar una constancia en homenaje a la brevedad con que se ha exhortado a 
tratar es-te tema, que ya está prácticamente muerto, pero es absolutamente necesario por el futuro que 
digamos algo sobre esta insólita interpelación a la que nos tocó asistir esta semana. 
Haciendo memoria a través de los muchos años que llevo en el Parlamento, no recuerdo que haya ocurrido 
nada parecido. El instituto de la interpelación está establecido en una disposición que tiene mucho valor en 
la Constitución de la República: es la que le garantiza a los Legisladores el derecho de interiorizarse y de 
informarse sobre la gestión de la Administración. Tanto el artículo 119 -que refiere al simple pedido de 
informes- como el 147 y el 148, que implementan la acusación del Ministro y su posible sustitución, son 
garantía del carácter esencial del cumplimiento de la labor parlamentaria. Por ese motivo, si algo no se 
puede tomar con falta de seriedad es una interpelación. En este caso, lamentablemente, faltó seriedad; 
fundamentalmente, faltó seriedad en la respuesta del señor Ministro. Puedo compartir o no toda la 
exposición que realizó la señora Senadora Xavier, pero, por otra parte, la mayoría de los hechos son de 
pública notoriedad: las carencias, los errores, las ineficacias, los abusos y también la corrupción, que 
existen en la salud pública. 
Además de la importancia del instituto de la interpelación, que tenemos la obligación de vigilar, custodiar y 
prestigiar, debemos tener presente que esta vez funcionaba en torno al más esencial de los derechos, que 
es el derecho a la vida. La Constitución garantiza una serie de derechos a los ciudadanos, y el primero de 
todos es el derecho a la vida, que es el único que no tiene limitaciones; todos los demás están sujetos a 
razones de interés general, como lo establece la expresión constitucional, pero no el derecho a la vida. 
Naturalmente, en un tiempo se creyó que esa disposición estaba establecida a los efectos de garantizar que 
no existiría en el país la pena de muerte, que por otra parte figura en otra norma constitucional. El derecho 
a la vida en su amplitud no consiste solamente en que no puede quitarse la vida a nadie, sino también en 
dar los medios necesarios para conservar la vida. El Estado tiene la obligación de aplicar integralmente el  
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derecho a la vida, es decir, asistir a los ciudadanos, a los habitantes del país, en la conservación de la salud 
que, en definitiva, es la forma de conservar la vida. Entonces, por la importancia del instituto de la 
interpelación y del tema que se trató, creo que la interpelación merecía otra suerte. 
Quiero decir que comparto lo que señalaba nuestro compañero, el señor Senador García Costa, en cuanto 
a que este Ministro no merece mantenerse en el cargo y, por lo tanto, es absolutamente necesario que 
abandone la titularidad de la Cartera. Hay que tener en cuenta que estamos hablando de un Ministerio de 
una enorme importancia; no soy de los que creen que para ser Ministro de Salud Pública haya que ser 
médico, porque hemos tenido excelentes Ministros que no lo eran, como el señor Senador García Costa. 
Pero por lo menos debe tener una trayectoria política, un conocimiento de la función del Estado y una 
práctica política del país que le permitan resolver con alguna eficiencia temas tan delicados como estos. 
Entonces, señor Presidente, no voy a votar que se siga el procedimiento ante la Asamblea General. No lo 
hago para defender al Ministro, que creo que debe irse; simplemente, pienso que no vale la pena 
desencadenar una crisis política a esta altura de las circunstancias que pueda llevar, incluso, a la disolución 
de las Cámaras y embarcar al país en una campaña electoral. El señor Ministro, reitero, ha demostrado 
muy poco o nulo conocimiento de la Cartera que tiene a su cargo y, además -no quiero molestar a nadie, 
pero como lo siento, lo digo- creo que no actuó con la necesaria seriedad con que debe actuar un Ministro 
en el Parlamento Nacional. A mi juicio, la estrategia que trazó fue una verdadera burla al Poder Legislativo 
y, por lo tanto, la defensa del prestigio de esta Institución, que es el alma de la democracia nacional, nos 
lleva a decir que es absolutamente necesario que abandone el cargo. El país necesita ese gesto del señor 
Ministro, pero no vamos a recorrer el camino de una crisis política para destituir a un funcionario que ha 
mostrado ineptitud para el cumplimiento de sus funciones. 
Quería dejar estas constancias a manera de fundamento de voto, para quedar tranquilo con mi conciencia y 
para tener la autoridad en el futuro de, en cada circunstancia en que un Ministro no se aleje, exigirle las 
correspondientes responsabilidades. 
SEÑOR GALLINAL.- ¿Me permite una interrupción, señor Senador? 
SEÑOR PEREYRA.- Con mucho gusto. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede interrumpir el señor Senador. 
SEÑOR GALLINAL.- Señor Presidente: además de señalar que comparto lo expresado por el señor 
Senador Pereyra, quiero dejar de manifiesto -porque no se ha hecho en la tarde de hoy- que fue a iniciativa 
del Partido Nacional que, en la jornada de la interpelación, se logró evitar que las cosas siguieran el curso 
en que venían, que seguramente nos iba a deparar muchas horas más, no solamente de interpelación sino,  
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en particular, de lectura cansina del tomo que en aquel momento el señor Ministro venía utilizando y de los 
otros que, en forma amenazante, estaban colocados a la derecha de su Banca. 
También estoy de acuerdo con el señor Senador García Costa en cuanto a que el Partido Nacional tuvo una 
actuación absolutamente inobjetable en la jornada de la interpelación, como la va a tener en el día de hoy. 
Ese día logramos, tras una conversación que tuvimos con los señores Senadores Riesgo y Brause -ya que 
el señor Ministro no concedía interrupciones-, que se accediera a pedir un cuarto intermedio a efectos de 
que se interrumpiera la lectura de esos documentos y se aceptara que los mismos fueran incorporados 
directamente a la versión taquigráfica, de modo tal de poder pasar de forma inmediata a la contestación de 
las preguntas. Esto también fue aceptado y, de no haber mediado la actitud de los interpelantes de retirarse 
de Sala, hubiera dado la oportunidad de ir directamente a las respuestas de las preguntas que se habían 
formulado por parte de la señora Senador Xavier. 
De manera que hubo una actitud por demás positiva de parte de la Bancada del Partido Nacional, que logró 
poner las cosas en su curso y centrar la atención del Senado a efectos de evitar una actitud que hubiera 
sido, en caso de haberse prolongado, francamente irrespetuosa. Incluso en algún momento señalamos a 
los señores Senadores del Partido Colorado que si el señor Ministro terminaba de leer todos los 
documentos que tenía arriba de la Mesa, inevitablemente habríamos tenido que votar que las respuestas 
del señor Ministro no eran satisfactorias, porque no es esa la actitud que corresponde tomar al Poder 
Ejecutivo o a un Ministro para con el Poder Legislativo. Es más, creo que le hace mal hasta al propio 
Gobierno, y mi deseo es que no se repita una circunstancia de estas características. 
Además, en respaldo de las expresiones que venía pronunciando el señor Senador Pereyra sobre el futuro, 
que es lo más importante, quiero agregar que el artículo 174 de la Constitución de la República -que nunca 
ha tenido la reglamentación correspondiente- establece que el Presidente de la República designará a los 
Ministros entre aquellas personas que, contando con respaldo parlamentario, aseguren su permanencia en 
el cargo. La referencia al respaldo parlamentario quizás haya que interpretarla como una expresión tácita 
que se da a partir del momento en que el Presidente designa a los Ministros y luego no hay una objeción 
por parte del Parlamento con respecto a las personas elegidas. Pero es absolutamente claro que en estas 
circunstancias, teniendo en cuenta los problemas que tiene a su frente y su forma de relacionamiento con el 
Poder Legislativo, el señor Ministro no asegura su permanencia en el cargo. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede continuar el señor Senador Pereyra. 
SEÑOR PEREYRA.- Señor Presidente: prometí ser muy breve y dejar simplemente una constancia, como 
lo he hecho. Pero el señor Senador Gallinal, en su interrupción, ha reiterado algo que está en nuestro 
espíritu: que esto no puede volver a suceder. Si volviera a darse, el compromiso que asumimos al terminar  
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nuestras palabras es el de incidir, en la medida de nuestras posibilidades, para que el Parlamento no tenga 
una noche tan desprestigiante como la de la interpelación mencionada. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- No hay más oradores inscriptos. 
Dése lectura de la moción de censura. 
(Se lee:) 
"De conformidad con el artículo 147, inciso segundo, de la Constitución, presentamos una moción de 
censura respecto del señor Ministro de Salud Pública." 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Si no se hace uso de la palabra, se va a votar. 
(Se vota:) 
- 13 en 29. Negativa. UNANIMIDAD. 
SEÑOR NIN NOVOA.- Pido la palabra para fundamentar el voto. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador. 
SEÑOR NIN NOVOA.- Señor Presidente: hemos votado afirmativamente la moción de censura al señor 
Ministro de Salud Pública en el entendido o con la intención de censurar a la política de salud. Somos de los 
que creen -como aquí se ha dicho- que de nada vale cambiar a los Ministros cuando las políticas continúan; 
esto es una suerte de "gatopardismo", que implica cambiar algo para que todo siga como está. 
A su vez, siguiendo un poco aquel consejo evangélico que dice "Por sus frutos los conocereis" -esto era lo 
que decía Jesús a sus apóstoles-, basta ver cuál es la situación de la salud tanto pública como privada, 
para advertir rápidamente que todo va de mal en peor. 
Actualmente, en materia de salud privada, no hay una sola mutualista que no tenga graves problemas -
gravísimos, algunas de ellas- y tal como decía el señor Senador Rubio, dentro de pocos meses, con toda 
seguridad, serán otra vez objeto de discusión en el Parlamento. En materia de salud pública, a lo largo de 
esta tarde y en oportunidad de realizarse la sesión de interpelación, se han dado innumerables ejemplos 
que ilustran la difícil situación.  
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Por otra parte, como en su oportunidad, el señor Ministro de Salud Pública hizo referencia a la política del 
uso de preservativos o anticonceptivos, quiero decir que en el interior del país estos elementos no están 
siendo utilizados. En un avance por tratar de sensibilizar a mujeres de bajos recursos sobre embarazos 
indeseados, éstas decían que no accedían a los preservativos porque el Ministerio no se los daba y porque 
el costo de uno de ellos es igual al de un litro de leche, es decir, $7; por lo tanto, era mucho más importante 
para ellas acceder a ese vital alimento que a un método anticonceptivo. 
Tampoco quiero molestar a nadie, pero me parece que aquí hay una fuerte contradicción. Digo esto porque 
lo que hoy la mayoría del Senado ha hecho ha sido avalar la política del salud que hay en el Uruguay, más 
allá de los dichos y de las declamaciones. Este es un aval para que esto continúe de la misma manera en 
que está. Aquí había dos posiciones: por un lado, la censura, que implicaba un cambio, una luz amarilla, 
una alerta al Poder Ejecutivo, como modo de señalarle que por este camino vamos mal y exhortarlo a 
cambiar de política, empezando por cambiar al Ministro; y, por otro, la no censura, que significa, de alguna 
manera, aceptar resignadamente que todo esto siga tal como está. 
Esta es la conclusión a la que he arribado y quería manifestarla por esta vía. 
SEÑOR MUJICA.- Pido la palabra para fundamentar el voto. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador Mujica. 
SEÑOR MUJICA.- Señor Presidente: este es un tema muy vasto, que apenas se ha insinuado y que, 
inevitable e inexorablemente, estará presente en los meses venideros. 
Aquí, formalmente, se ha respaldado una política que todos sabemos está cuestionada. Quienes sean 
observadores políticos perspicaces, se tienen que dar cuenta de lo que ha pasado. No están los votos para 
censurar, más no hay un franco apoyo, sino un apoyo en la negativa, como rezongando. Y es bueno que en 
política las cosas se viabilicen y se anote que tal vez lo importante no es el Ministro, sino que tengamos la 
capacidad -en medio de las dificultades que hoy tiene el país- de empezar a encauzar otra política de salud. 
SEÑOR MILLOR.- Pido la palabra para fundamentar el voto. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador. 
SEÑOR MILLOR.- Señor Presidente: ante todo, aclaro que lo que voy a decir será a título estrictamente 
personal.  
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Por mi parte, no he avalado absolutamente nada. Una vez más -y no será la última-, a nadie tanto como a 
mí mismo, he dado una lección de disciplina partidaria. Soy colorado y estoy orgulloso de serlo. Según mi 
decálago de comportamiento, si se integra un Gobierno, se "banca", lo cual no quiere decir que se avale. 
Pero, además, digo -sin pretender incurrir en ningún tipo de alusión- que, como pensábamos intervenir en la 
noche de la interpelación, también teníamos los tomos en cuestión aunque, claro está, no para leerlos. 
Por otro lado, quisiera referirme a un tema que ha sido mencionado dentro del montón de asuntos que 
involucran una situación tan genérica, teniendo presente a todo el tema de la salud. Una cuestión que 
verdaderamente me preocupa en profundidad es la de cómo se mezcla lo confesional con algo tan delicado 
como es la salud. Evidentemente, aquí se ha mezclado el tema del preservativo, y yo les tengo terror a las 
corrientes confesionales cuando incursionan en asuntos que son políticos pero que tienen que ver, 
fundamentalmente, con toda la población del país. Esa misma corriente profesional que hace treinta años 
estaba en contra de la pastilla anticonceptiva porque era para evitar la vida, hoy está en contra del 
preservativo porque es para evitar la muerte. Así, se está haciendo un daño terrible -por motivos 
confesionales, que no deberían mezclarse con las cuestiones terrenales- a la salud del Uruguay, ante una 
de las peores plagas de los últimos tiempos, como es el SIDA. Quería dejar esta constancia porque se 
mencionó el tema del preservativo. 
Antes de finalizar, reitero enfáticamente lo primero que mencioné: yo no avalé nada. Simplemente, como 
colorado que soy, "banco", aún lo que no comparto plenamente. 
SEÑOR GALLINAL.- Pido la palabra para fundamentar el voto. 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador. 
SEÑOR GALLINAL.- Simplemente, quisiera dejar constancia de que no he recibido las respuestas a las 
preguntas que le fueran formuladas al señor Ministro, a pesar de que permanecí en Sala hasta el término 
de la sesión. 
5) SE LEVANTA LA SESION 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Agotado el Orden del Día, se levanta la sesión. 
(Así se hace a la hora 19 y 22 minutos, presidiendo el señor Hierro López y estando presentes los señores 
Senadores Arismendi, Astori, Barrios Tassano, Brause, Cid, Correa Freitas, Couriel, de Boismenu, 
Fernández Huidobro, Gallinal, Garat, García Costa, Gargano, Heber, Herrera, Korzeniak, Michelini, 
Millor, Mujica, Nin Novoa, Nuñez, Pereyra, Pou, Riesgo, Rubio, Sanabria, Scarpa, Singer y Xavier.)  
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SEÑOR LUIS HIERRO LOPEZ Presidente 
Sr. Mario Farachio - Arq. Hugo Rodríguez Filippini Secretarios 
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Nº 70 – TOMO 372 - 6 DE 





  Nº 70 – TOMO 372 - 6 DE 





  Nº 131 - TOMO 409 - 3 
DE OCTUBRE DE 2001  
 






model,   
 
     
  4 DE DICIEMBRE DE 
1994 
 
Gargano  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
  Nº 71 - TOMO 372 - 7 DE 
DICIEMBRE DE 1995  
 
Sarthou   
  Nº 70 – TOMO 372 - 6 DE 
DICIEMBRE DE 1995 
Heber.  BLANCO  
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    Couriel  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
    Sanabria  COLORADO 
    Fernandez 
Faingold 
COLORADO 
  Nº 69 - TOMO 371 - 5 DE 
DICIEMBRE DE 1995 
 
Arismendi  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
  Nº 131 - TOMO 409 - 3 
DE OCTUBRE DE 2001  
 






Nº 71 - TOMO 372 - 7 DE 
DICIEMBRE DE 1995  
 
Sarthou  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
    Iturralde  BLANCO 
  Nº 70 – TOMO 372 - 6 DE 
DICIEMBRE DE 1995 
 
Heber  BLANCO 
  Nº 69 - TOMO 371 - 5 DE 
DICIEMBRE DE 1995 
 
Arismendi  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
  15 de setiembre de 
2000, de la 
Comisión de 
Presupuesto integrada 
con la de Hacienda, 
Penades    
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de la Cámara de 
Representantes, 
del Poder Legislativo 
 
    Diaz  COLORADO 
    Gonzales Alvarez  COLORADO 
    Gonzalez  BLANCO  
    Gonzalez Alvarez  COLORADO 
    Posada  COLORADO 
    Pais  COLORADO 
    Arrate  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
    Diaz  COLORADO 
       
  Nro  87, 3 de setiembre 
de 2000  
Comisión de 
Presupuesto integrada 
con la de Hacienda, 
de la Cámara de 
Senadores 
del Poder Legislativo 
 
Baraibar  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
    Abdala  COLORADO 
    Diaz  COLORADO 
    Abdala  COLORADO 
    Amorim Batlle  COLORADO 
    Berois  BLANCO  
  546 
    Vener  BLANCO 
    Pais  COLORADO 
    Ibarra  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
    Topolanski  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
   
Cámara Senadoes 






    Garcia Costa  BLANCO 
       
Tuition-fees 
at UdelaR 
Nº 71 - TOMO 372 - 7 DE 
DICIEMBRE DE 1995  
 
Heber  BLANCO 
    Korzeniak   
  Nº 70 – TOMO 372 - 6 DE 
DICIEMBRE DE 1995 
 
Heber   BLANCO 
    Gandini   
    Sarthou  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
  Nº 118 - TOMO 377 - 12 
DE SETIEMBRE DE 1996  
 
Hierro Lopez  COLORADO 
  269 - TOMO 391 - 13 DE 
OCTUBRE DE 1998  
Sarthou  FRENTE 
AMPLIO  
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  268 - TOMO 391 - 7 DE 
OCTUBRE DE 1998  
 
Arismendi  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
  N° 2998 - 5 DE 
DICIEMBRE DE 2001 
 





Nº 318 - TOMO 360 - 17 
DE MAYO DE 1994 
 
Gargano  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
    Korzeniuak  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
   
Nº 70 – TOMO 372 - 6 DE 
DICIEMBRE DE 1995 
 
Heber  BLANCO 
    Sarthou  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
    Sanabria  COLORADO 
    Fernandez 
Faingold 
COLORADO 
  Nº 69 - TOMO 371 - 5 DE 
DICIEMBRE DE 1995 
 
Gargano  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
  Nº 194 - TOMO 385 - 25 
DE SETIEMBRE DE 1997  
Couriel  FRENTE 
AMPLIO  
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  Nº 248 - TOMO 389 - 22 
DE JULIO DE 1998  
 
Korzeniak  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
  Nº 52 - TOMO 404 - 4 DE 
OCTUBRE DE 2000  
 
Pou  BLANCO 
  N° 2998 - 5 DE 
DICIEMBRE DE 2001 
 
Diaz Maynard  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
    Abdala  COLORADO 
    Scavarelli  COLORADO 
    Bergstein  COLORADO 
   
N° 3066 - 17 DE 
SETIEMBRE DE 2002 
 
Da silva  BLANCO 
  N° 3039 - 3 DE JULIO DE 
2002 
 
Silveira  COLORADO 
  N° 3037 - 26 DE JUNIO 
DE 2002  
 
Tourne  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
  Nº 201 - TOMO 413 - 12 
DE SETIEMBRE DE 2002 
 
Gargano  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
  N° 3200 - 5 DE MAYO DE  Penades  COLORADO  






Nº 318 - TOMO 360 - 17 
DE MAYO DE 1994 
 
Korzeniak  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
    Arana  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
  Nº 70 – TOMO 372 - 6 DE 
DICIEMBRE DE 1995 
 
Heber  BLANCO 
    Couriel  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
    Sanabria  COLORADO 
  Nº 118 - TOMO 377 - 12 
DE SETIEMBRE DE 1996  
 
Couriel  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
   
Nº 249 - TOMO 389 - 23 
DE JULIO DE 1998  
 
Ponce de Leon  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
   
Nº 131 - TOMO 409 - 3 
DE OCTUBRE DE 2001  
 
Ponce de Leon  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
  Nº 273 - TOMO 417 - 16 
DE JULIO DE 2003 
 
Pou  BLANCO  
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other  Nº 318 - TOMO 360 - 17 
DE MAYO DE 1994 
 
Korzeniak  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
    Gargano  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
    Arana  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
  Nº 71 - TOMO 372 – 7 DE 
DICIEMBRE DE 1995  
 
Sarthou  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
    Iturralde  BLANCO 




    Sarthou  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
  Nº 70 – TOMO 372 – 6 DE 
DICIEMBRE DE 1995 
 
Heber  BLANCO 
    Gandini  BLANCO 
    Sarthou  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
    Korzeniak  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
    Couriel  FRENTE 
AMPLIO 
    Sanabria  COLORADO 
    Fernandez  COLORADO  
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tuition  or 
increasing it at 
a  rapid  rate 
might exclude 
potential 
students  from 
poor  or  rural 






While tuition is 
charged  the 
educational 
activities  may 
be  supported  
by  offering 
financial 
assistance  to 
individuals 
during  their 
studies 
through  loans 
(i.e., loans that 




ss—and  thus 
the  financial 
   ―We have to question if the tuition free 
system  is  a  falacy.  It  has  been 
instituted  to  serve  as  an  instrument 
towards equity and democracy in our 
society. However we see that ( in the 
university)  enrollment    there  is  no 
representation of all the sectors of our 
society‖ 
09/21/1997 










―A  tuition-fee 
system  affects 
severely  the 
possibilities  of 
low  income 
students.    A 
low  income 
student  within  
a  loan system 
is  severely 
affected,  his 
real 
possibilities 
are  very 
affected. 
Modest 
famlies are not 
  
  554 
dampened  for 
those  whose 
access  is 
already 
compromised 




worth—of  the 











―I must say that I don´t agree with a 
tuition-fee  system  and  my  political 
Party has no position about it, either. 
Furthermore my Party has historically 
been  placed  against  a  tuition  fee 
system. 
But… if the available resources are so 
scarce,  why  is  the  university  so 
resistant to charge a tuition-fee? It (the 
tuition-fee)    will  not  entail    a  major  
effort for a great majority of university 
students,  those  from  higher  and 
medium income levels?‖ 
09/15/2000 





able  to  send 
their  children 
to  the 
university. 
These 





Brecha,  ed 
1052 
 01/21/ 2006 
 
 
“As  I  see 




I think that 
if  we 
introduce 
a  tuition 
fee  in the 
public 
university  














we will  be 
placed 
against 
equity.  I 
think  that 
those who 





If  we 
introduce 
a  tuition 





will  not 
provide 
funds  for 
the  low 
income 
students... 
the  only  
result  of  
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such  a 
system 
will  be 
that  low 
income 
students 
will  feel 
discourag
ed  to 














―We  will  not 
charge  tuititon 
fees  at  the 
undergraduate  
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student  is  a 
non – assisted 
student,  he  is 
not  supported 
at  all...  our 
society  is  not 
providing  him 
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―I think that the 
university (...)  
has to say ―no‖ 
to a tuition fee, 
(...)  it has to 
show that it 
can fight for 
matters that 











I disagree with 
a  tuition  fee 
system,(...)  it 
deepens 
inequity  and  

































Education  has 
come  to  be 








“I  think  that  the 
discussion  ....  has  to  be 
internal....  has  to  be 
developed  by  the  own 
university  within  its  own 
bodies.  This  matter  does 
not belong to  the political 
system” 
 
―I wonder why the university is not 
considering the possibility of charging a 
tuition fee considering that it has an 
authorisation to do so. According to our 
experience and to what we have heard, 
almost 80% or 90% of university 
students come from families that can 
afford a tuition-fee  because  the 
greatest majority or at least half of 
“In 
relation  to  
a  tuition 
fee 
system  
as  we 
perceive  
Education 
as  a 
human  
  





that  justify 






Those  who 
benefit  should 
at  least  share 
in  the  costs. 
Johnstone 
 
Tuition  free  
Higher 
Education  is 
actually  paid 
for  by  all 
citizens, 
whether or not 
they know that 
they  have 
been taxed. 
 
Besides,  most 






A  very 
09/21/1997. 





“The  university  is  an 
autonomous  institution  
and  the  only  linkage  with 
the Parliament is related to 
the  budget allocation.  The 
only discussion (about the 
university)  is    around  the 
budget laws steps”. 






“We all pay full respect to 
the  autonomy,  to  the  co-
government system and to 
all  what  entails  the 
Organic  Law.  I  do  not 
agree  with  (charging)  a 
tuition fee” 
them had previously attended private 
(Primary ans Secondary) schools. 
Those families had payed more than 
300 or 400 hundred  (USA) dollars per 
month in private schools. But when 
they arrive to the university, the sistem 
is completely free.  During twelve years 
the family is paying more than  4000 
(USA) dollars at the private system but 
in the higher level … these is totally 
tuition-free‖ 15/09/ 2000, Mr Gonzalez 
Alvarez, Blanco Party 
 
―Indeed    a  university  education 
provides  a    personal  and  a    social 
benefit. Therefore … I think that it is fair 
for the society to receive some portion 
of the personal benefit to support the 
university education‖. 
12/26(2001 




right  ...  it 
is  not  a 
good  in 
the 
market. 
That  is 
why  the 




access  to 
knowledg
e, must be 
guarantee
d    to  all 
and 








covers  all 
the  
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disproportiona
te  number  of 
the 
beneficiaries 
of  Higher 
Education  are 
from middle, 
upper  middle, 
and  upper 
income 
families  who 
could  and 
would  pay  at 
least a portion 
of 
the  costs  of 
instruction  if 










―(Like) the Rector (I think)  that this 
country has chosen a good formula 
which entails that those  who have 
received  a  free  education  have  to 
return some fraction to the society 
because  when    one  receives  a 
university education the society as a 
whole benefits of such education as 
well.  That is why we support the 
Solidarity Fund‖.  
12/26(2001 
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“I  cannot 
accept  a 
tuititon  fee 
system  or  to 
limit  the 
entrance  to  
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the 
university. 
This  is  an 
idea  that has 
been 
introduced by 
IDB,  together 
with  the  idea 
of  creating 
other  public 
universities, 
or  other 
public HEIs.  
A  tuition-fee 
will  be  a 
barrier  to 
access,  our 
institution 
has  already 
expressed 
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University 
Hospital 








Society  is  the 
major 


















Tuition  free 
 
There  are  
demonstrably 
high  private 
benefits 
received  by 
the  graduates 






There  are  
private 
benefits  that 
college 
students 
receive  in  the 
form of higher 
incomes  by 
virtue  of  their 
  
―I must say that I don´t agree with a 
tuition-fee  system  and  my  political 
Party  has  no  position  about  it, 
either.  Furthermore  my  Party  has 
historically  been  placed  against  a 
tuition fee system.‖ 
09/21/1997 




―I  am  not  a  friend  of  a  tuition  fee 
system,  either.  But  we  have  to 
consider some planning‖.  
09/21/1997 
Mr Washington Abdala 
(Colorado Party) 




supports  a 
complete 
tuition fee 










chances  to 
rich  and  poor 

















may  accrue  to 
individuals  in 







attachment  to 
the  labour 
market,  better 
health  and  a 
range  of  other 
non-monetary  
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benefits. 




ng  the 
expansion  of 
enrolments  in 
tertiary 
education  in 
recent 
decades, 
students  in 
Higher 
Education  still 
tend  to  come 
from  relatively 
favoured 
background. 







in  post- 
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compulsory 
education tend 
to  be 
regressive. 




education  -- 
typically 
people  from 
disadvantaged 
backgrounds 
and  with 
modest 
income 
prospects  -- 
do  not  benefit 
at  all  from 
public  funding 





expansion  of 
students’  
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access  to 
loans  to 
finance  their 
education 
could  offset 
such  effects, 
and  the 
experience  of 
countries  that 
have 
combined  an 
increase  in 
tuition  fees 
and  an 
increase  in 
student  loan 
facilities 
suggest  that 
there  are  no 
significant 
adverse 





Practica             





Increases  in 
tuition  may 
not  lead    to 
more 
resources  for 
the  university 
and  will  not  
determine  a 
shift  in  public 
resources  to 
other  socially 
worthwhile 
programs.  It 
will  determine  
a  shift  of 
taxpayer 
resources 
from  Higher 
Education  to 
some  other 
claims  that 










to  Higher 
Education.  
Therefore,  the 
continuing 
austerity  will 
become  
damaging  to 












Public  funds 
are limited. As 
―We must  begin to think about other 
mechanisms  in  order  to  obtain  a 
democratic  system  inside  the 
university  without  abandoning  the 
tuition free system‖ 
09/21/1997 
















“We know that the government cannot 
supply further funding, as said by the 
Minister of Finance. We cannot raise 
more taxes, actually we must reduce 
the tax burden in this country. Of 
course, the University of the Republic 
requests more funds because, 
according to its view, it has to grow… 
and it come here to our legilature and 
requests more funds …but if there are 
not more resources we cannot ―create‖ 







“Certainly we  recognise that 
the  university  has  made  a 
huge  effort  during  the  last 
years  towards 
modernisation.  But  like  the 
MP  Gonzalez  Alvarez  I 
wonder  about  the  tuition-
fees.  We  are  placed  in  a 
complicated  economic 
“I 
disagree 
with  a 
tuition  fee 
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must  compete 






services,  such 
as health care, 
infrastructure, 







context, in particular we have 
a high public burden”  15/09/ 
2000,  Mr  Gabriel  Pais, 














Tuition  -  as  a 
price-  brings 
to  Higher 
Education 
some  of  the 
   
“As  I  see  it,  the  student 
constribution could be a very 
positive aspect, because the 
student  will  apreciate    more 
for what he pays… if there is 
    












financing  of 
provision  has 
been  the 
traditional 
means in most 






virtues  of  the 
market : 
(i)  greater 
efficiency:  the 
payment  of 
some  tuition 
will  make 
students  more 
discerning 
consumers 











responsive  to 





some  kind  of  individual  or 
family  financial  effort  the 
student  will  be  more  careful 
with  his  studies  and  his 
courses…  he  will  attend 
classes because it will not be 
a societal burden.”  
09/15/ 2000, Mr Gabriel Pais, 
Colorado  Party 
 
 
“I  think  that  these 
(charging  a  fee) 
would  entail  a  signal 
for  the  society,  as  it 
would mean a student 
contribution  to  the 
university cost and an 
individual  and 
personal  effort  of 
those  involved  in  the 
university  matters.   
As  I  see  it,  the  
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Tuition    tends 
to  reinforce 
the  inequities 
already 




student  constribution 
could  be  a  very 
positive  aspect, 
because  the  student 
will  apreciate    more 
for what  he  pays…  if 
there is some kind of 
individual  or  family 
financial  effort  the 
student  will  be  more 
careful  with  his 
studies  and  his 
courses…  he  will 
attend  classes 
because it will not be 
a societal burden. 
 09/15/2000,  Mr  Gabriel  Pais, 
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LEY DE PRESUPUESTO AÑO 2005 
Nr 17.930 
 
INCISO 26  
UNIVERSIDAD DE LA REPÚBLICA  
Artículo 436.- Asígnanse al Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República" para los años y financiaciones que 
se indican, las siguientes partidas presupuestales anuales, en pesos uruguayos a valores del 1º de enero 
de 2005: 
 
2006  2007  2008  2009 
FINANCIACIÓN 
       
RENTAS 
GENERALES 
                $                     $               $                   $  
Retribuciones 
personales 
1.800.636.000  1.836.648.720  1.895.081.694  1.955.949.328 
Gastos de 
funcionamiento 
   352.608.000      380.817.000     411.282.000 
452.411.000 
Inversiones       24.016.029        26.417.632       26.306.640      26.912.250 
SUBTOTAL:  2.177.260.029  2.243.883.352  2.332.670.334  2.435.272.578 
FONDOS PROPIOS 
 
     
Retribuciones 
personales 
     49.398.000       50.386.000       51.393.000      52.421.000 
Gastos de 
   177.398.000     191.590.000      206.917.000    227.609.000  
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funcionamiento 
Inversiones       66.075.619       72.683.181        71.125.360      72.762.750 
SUBTOTAL:     292.871.619     314.659.181    329.435.360    352.792.750 
TOTAL:  2.470.131.648  2.558.542.533  2.662.105.694  2.788.065.328 
La distribución de los créditos presupuestales de inversión se encuentra incluida en el planillado adjunto 
a la presente ley. 
En la distribución de los créditos presupuestales correspondientes a retribuciones personales, no se 
encuentran  incluidos  los  aumentos  otorgados  durante  el  año  2005,  debiéndose  adicionar  según  lo 
establecido por el artículo 3º de la presente ley. 
Artículo 437.- Distribución de las Partidas Presupuestales.- La Universidad de la República distribuirá 
los montos otorgados entre sus programas presupuestales, por grupo de gasto, todo lo cual comunicará al 
Tribunal  de  Cuentas,  al  Ministerio  de  Economía  y  Finanzas  y  a  la  Asamblea  General  dentro  de  los 
noventa días del inicio de cada Ejercicio. 
Artículo 438.- Todos los créditos de la Universidad de la República se distribuirán entre los siguientes 
Programas Presupuestales: 
 
Programa 101 - Programa Académico. 
 
Programa 102 - Programa de Desarrollo Institucional. 
 
Programa 103 - Programa de Bienestar Universitario. 
  Programa 104 - Programa de Atención a la Salud de la Universidad de la República. 
Artículo 439.- Establécese  que  la  Universidad  de  la  República  podrá  celebrar  convenios  para  la 
realización de pasantías laborales de sus estudiantes en el marco del sistema de pasantías laborales, 
creado como mecanismo regular de formación curricular por la Ley Nº 17.230, de 7 de enero de 2000, la 
que será aplicable en lo pertinente. 
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Publicada D.O. 7 set/007 - Nº 27317 
Ley Nº 18.172 
RENDICIÓN DE CUENTAS Y BALANCE DE EJECUCIÓN 
PRESUPUESTAL EJERCICIO 2006 
 
INCISO 26  
UNIVERSIDAD DE LA REPÚBLICA  
Artículo 281.- Asígnase  al  Inciso 26  "Universidad  de  la  República",  a  partir  del  ejercicio  2007,  una 
partida anual de $ 36:325.306 (treinta y seis millones trescientos veinticinco mil trescientos seis pesos 
uruguayos) adicional al anticipo otorgado por lo dispuesto en el artículo 150 de la Ley Nº 18.046, de 24 de 
octubre  de  2006,  a  efectos  de  completar  el  incremento  de  créditos  presupuestales  dispuesto  por  el 
literal A) del artículo 476 de la Ley Nº 17.930, de 19 de diciembre de 2005, referido a la variación de 
ingresos del ejercicio 2006. 
Artículo 282.- Asígnase  al  Inciso 26  "Universidad  de  la  República",  a  partir  del  ejercicio  2008,  una 
partida anual como adelanto a cuenta del incremento dispuesto en el literal A) del artículo 476 de la Ley 
Nº 17.930, de 19 de diciembre de 2005, de $ 50:000.000 (cincuenta millones de pesos uruguayos). 
El Inciso deberá comunicar a la Contaduría General de la Nación la distribución de la referida partida, 
dentro de los treinta días de entrada en vigencia de la presente ley. 
Artículo 283.- Asígnase al Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República" para el ejercicio 2008 un monto de 
$ 97:920.000  (noventa  y  siete  millones  novecientos  veinte  mil  pesos  uruguayos),  equivalente  al  20% 
(veinte por ciento) de la partida dispuesta por el literal B) del artículo 476 de la Ley Nº 17.930, de 19 de 
diciembre de 2005, con Financiación 1.1 "Rentas Generales", a valores de enero de 2007, con destino a 
la financiación de los siguientes proyectos de inversión: 
A)  Descentralización  -  Desarrollo  Universitario  en  el  interior  del  país:  $ 20:459.082  (veinte  millones 
cuatrocientos cincuenta y nueve mil ochenta y dos pesos uruguayos). 
B)  Proyectos conjuntos con la Administración Nacional de Educación Pública - Educación Tecnológica 
Terciaria: $ 13:166.736 (trece millones ciento sesenta y seis mil setecientos treinta y seis pesos 
uruguayos).  
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C)  Inversión  en  infraestructura  edilicia  y  no  edilicia:  $ 44:463.053  (cuarenta  y  cuatro  millones 
cuatrocientos sesenta y tres mil cincuenta y tres pesos uruguayos). 
D)  Capacitación - Postgrados y capacitación para funcionarios no docentes: $ 7:363.244 (siete millones 
trescientos sesenta y tres mil doscientos cuarenta y cuatro pesos uruguayos). 
E)  Fortalecimiento de las capacidades de apoyo a los sectores productivos claves para la economía 
nacional: $ 12:467.886 (doce millones cuatrocientos sesenta y siete mil ochocientos ochenta y seis 
pesos uruguayos). 
Artículo 284.- Facúltase al Poder Ejecutivo a exonerar al Inciso 26 Universidad de la República del pago 
de los aportes patronales a la seguridad social sobre las retribuciones financiadas con fondos de libre 
disponibilidad. 
INCISO 27  
  Rendición de Cuentas y Balance de Ejecución Presupuestal - Ejercicio 2007 - 
Publicada en el DiarioOficial el 15/10/008  
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RENDICIÓN DE CUENTAS Y BALANCE DE EJECUCIÓN 




Artículo 435  
 
 Asígnase en el Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República" una partida de $ 
55:483.252 (cincuenta y cinco millones cuatrocientos ochenta y tres mil 
doscientos cincuenta y dos pesos uruguayos) para el Ejercicio 2008, 
Financiación 1.1 "Rentas Generales", a los efectos de alcanzar el monto 
dispuesto en el inciso segundo del artículo 301 de la Ley Nº 18.172, de 31 
de agosto de 2007. 
 
Esta disposición entrará en vigencia a partir de la promulgación de la 
presente ley. 
 
Artículo 436  
 
 Asígnase al Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República", a partir del 
Ejercicio 2008, una partida anual de $ 47:000.000 (cuarenta y siete 
millones de pesos uruguayos) adicional a los anticipos otorgados por lo 
dispuesto en el artículo 272 de la Ley Nº 18.172, de 31 de agosto de 2007, 
a efectos de completar el incremento de créditos presupuestales dispuesto 
por el literal A) del artículo 476 de la Ley Nº 17.930, de 19 de diciembre 
de 2005, referido a la variación de ingresos del Ejercicio 2007. 
 
Esta disposición entrará en vigencia a partir de la promulgación de la 
presente ley. 
 
Artículo 437  
 
 Asígnase al Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República", para el Ejercicio 
2009, un monto de $ 97:920.000 (noventa y siete millones novecientos 
veinte mil pesos uruguayos), en el marco de la partida dispuesta por el 
literal B) del artículo 476 de la Ley Nº 17.930, de 19 de diciembre de 
2005, con cargo a la Financiación 1.1 "Rentas Generales", para los  
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siguientes proyectos de inversión: 
 
A)     Descentralización - Desarrollo Universitario en el interior del 
       país: $ 20:459.082 (veinte millones cuatrocientos cincuenta y nueve 
       mil ochenta y dos pesos uruguayos). 
 
B)     Proyectos conjuntos con la Administración Nacional de Educación 
       Pública - Educación Tecnológica Terciaria: $ 13:166.736 (trece 
       millones ciento sesenta y seis mil setecientos treinta y seis pesos 
       uruguayos). 
 
C)     Inversión en infraestructura edilicia y no edilicia: $ 44:463.053 
       (cuarenta y cuatro millones cuatrocientos sesenta y tres mil 
       cincuenta y tres pesos uruguayos). 
 
D)     Capacitación - Postgrados y capacitación para funcionarios no 
       docentes: $ 7:363.244 (siete millones trescientos sesenta y tres 
       mil doscientos cuarenta y cuatro pesos uruguayos). 
 
E)     Fortalecimiento de las capacidades de apoyo a los sectores 
       productivos claves para la economía nacional: $ 12:467.886 (doce 
       millones cuatrocientos sesenta y siete mil ochocientos ochenta y 
       seis pesos uruguayos). 
 
Los créditos que al 31 de diciembre de 2009 no se hubieran ejecutado por 
razones fundadas, podrán transferirse al ejercicio siguiente con igual 
destino al previsto, siempre que el monto transferido no supere el 20% 
(veinte por ciento) del crédito original. 
 
Artículo 438  
 
 Asígnase al Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República", a partir del 
Ejercicio 2009, una partida anual de $ 293:000.000 (doscientos noventa y 
tres millones de pesos uruguayos). 
 
La partida precedente incluye el monto que corresponda habilitar de 
acuerdo a lo dispuesto en el literal A) del artículo 476 de la Ley Nº 
17.930, de 19 de diciembre de 2005, por la variación de ingresos del 
Ejercicio 2008 y del Ejercicio 2009. 
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La Universidad de la República comunicará a la Contaduría General de la 
Nación la distribución de la partida. 
 
Artículo 439  
 
 Asígnase al Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República", a los efectos de 
completar la asignación en el año 2009 de un volumen de recursos 
equivalentes al 4,5% del producto bruto interno con destino a la educación 
pública, las partidas que se indican a continuación: 
 
A)     Una partida anual de carácter permanente de $ 56:000.000 (cincuenta 
       y seis millones de pesos uruguayos) con destino a la recuperación 
       salarial y la adecuación de las escalas de sueldos de sus 
       funcionarios docentes y no docentes, en el marco de los proyectos 
       institucionales de profesionalización de las carreras docente y no 
       docente. 
 
B)     Una partida anual de carácter permanente de $ 13:000.000 (trece 
       millones de pesos uruguayos) con destino al fortalecimiento del 
       programa académico de los servicios. 
 
C)     Una partida anual de carácter permanente de $ 31:000.000 (treinta y 
       un millones de pesos uruguayos) para la Reforma Universitaria y el 
       Desarrollo Institucional a Largo Plazo. 
 
 
 
 
 